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Chapter 1 Introduction 
§ 1.1 What is this study about?
Though the practice of asylum has existed for a very long time and the 
right to asylum has already been laid down in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention), which is referred to as the ‘Magna Carta for Refugees’ is the 
key legal document for defining a refugee, their rights, the legal obligations 
of states and the major legal foundation on which the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) work is based.1 The object and 
purpose of the Refugee Convention consists in the protection of those who 
meet the refugee definition contained in Article 1A which states that the 
person must have a: 
‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it’.
Besides explaining who can claim protection, the Convention also defines 
who it does not cover. The exclusion clauses under Article 1F are designed 
to exclude from protection, persons with respect to whom there are serious 
reasons for considering that they have committed: 
a)  a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity;
b)  a serious non-political crime prior to being recognised as a refugee;
c)  or has been guilty of an act contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
UN.
The overall aim of the exclusion clauses are to deny protection to those who 
allegedly have committed certain acts that are considered so serious that 
the perpetrators are undeserving of international protection as refugees. 
The pre-war international instruments that defined various categories of 
refugees contained no provisions for the exclusion of criminals. It was after 
the Second World War that for the first time special provisions were drawn 
1 The Convention is signed on 28 July 1951 and entered into force on 22 April 1954. 
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up to exclude certain persons who were considered unworthy of international 
protection. At the time when the Refugee Convention was drafted, the 
memory of the trials of major war criminals was still very much alive, and 
there was agreement on the part of states that war criminals should not be 
protected. There was also a desire on the part of states to deny admission to 
their territories criminals who would present a danger to security and public 
order.2 According to the UNHCR Background Note on the Application of 
the Exclusion Clauses (UNHCR Background Note), Article 1F must be 
viewed in the context of the overriding humanitarian objective of the Refugee 
Convention. Hence, exclusion has to be limited to offences which exceed a 
certain high threshold of egregiousness and should apply where the criminal 
aspect of a case including, in particular, the nature of the circumstances and 
the character of the offender are so dominant that awarding the privileged 
label of ‘refugee’ to the offender would risk distorting the humanitarian 
image and essential objectives of asylum.3 
Article 1F has a relatively wide group of addressees as it excludes not only 
those actually prosecuted for certain crimes and acts but also anyone who 
there are ‘serious reasons for considering’ the same. The standard of proof 
required under Article 1F is thus less than the standard required in criminal 
proceedings (‘beyond reasonable doubt’) but more than mere suspicion. Clear 
and credible evidence is required to meet the ‘serious reasons for considering’ 
threshold. The grounds in Article 1F are enumerated exhaustively and the 
competence to decide whether a person falls within Article 1F lies with the 
state in whose territory the asylum seeker seeks recognition as a refugee. 
These are subject to interpretation, but cannot be supplemented by additional 
criteria in the absence of an international convention to that effect. In view of 
the possible consequences of exclusion, which implicate that an excludable 
person may not be issued with a Convention Travel Document or any other 
kind of certificate describing him as a refugee in the sense of the Refugee 
Convention, the exclusion clauses must always be interpreted restrictively 
and should be used with great caution.4 
Though an excluded asylum seeker does qualify for protection under the Refugee 
Convention, exclusion from a refugee status does not entail disqualification 
from all forms of protection under national and international law. This means 
2 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
Geneva, HCR/1P/4/Eng/Rev.2,1979. A revised edition of the Handbook is published 
in 1992 and the latest reissue dates from 2011. See Part 1, paras. 147-148 - <http://
www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html> (last accessed on 25 September 2015). 
3 UNHCR Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Protection Policy and Legal 
Advice Section, Department of International Protection, Geneva 4 September 2003. 
4 Idem, p. 503.
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that the excluded asylum seeker may still be able to turn for protection to 
relevant national and international instruments. It is, therefore, important to 
maintain a clear differentiation between refugee protection and other types of 
human rights protection. Protection against refoulement is an example of the 
latter. Though exclusion of an asylum seeker basically leads to the expulsion 
of the person from the country, this may be impossible to execute due to legal 
obstacles such as the non-refoulement principle. Pursuant to this principle, no 
person should be returned to any country where there is a risk that their life 
would be in danger or of their being subjected to torture. Several human rights 
instruments5 contain such a rule, but it is undisputed that aliens residing in 
European countries very often refer to Article 3 ECHR which prohibits torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has repeatedly affirmed that the protection under 
Article 3 is absolute and must prevail, even under difficult circumstances such 
as the fight against terrorism and organised crimes or even in times of public 
emergency. The protection afforded by Article 3 is thus wider than that provided 
by Article 33 of the Refugee Convention as according to Article 33 (2), 
the refoulement principle may not be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in 
which he is or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
serious crime constitutes a danger to the community of that country.6 In these 
situations, the alien is still protected by Article 3 ECHR. While the prohibition 
of refoulement may provide the individual with a right to stay, it does not, like the 
Refugee Convention, entail the right to a regulated status. 
§ 1.2 Reasons for research and the research question
The European Council, at its special meeting in Tampere in 1999, agreed to 
work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
based on the full and inclusive application of the Refugee Convention. The basic 
layout of the CEAS, as defined in the Tampere Programme7 and confirmed by 
the Hague Programme8, consists in the establishment of a common asylum 
procedure and a uniform status valid through the EU. Several legislative 
5 Such as Article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture; Article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and also regional refugee instruments such as the Bangkok Principles and the 
1969 Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. 
6 Under the Convention, Articles 1F and 33 (2) serve different purposes, as the first 
one deals with the exclusion clauses, while the latter is concerned with the treatment 
of persons who are deemed refugees, but who nonetheless may be removed under the 
Convention. More details on Article 33 (2) can be found in Chapter 3. 
7 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm> (last accessed on 21 September 
2015). 
8 <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_
within_european_union/l16002_en.htm> (last accessed on 21 September 2015). 
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measures have been introduced to ‘achieve both a higher common standard 
of protection and greater equality in protection across the EU and to ensure 
a higher degree of solidarity between EU Member States’. A key document 
adopted by the Council of the EU is the Qualification Directive. In this 
Directive, the exclusion clauses under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention 
are included as a central feature in the eligibility test for protection under the 
CEAS. Though the EU is making efforts to create uniformity within Europe 
regarding asylum, a relevant question remaining unresolved relates to the status 
and treatment of 1F applicants. Already in 2001, the European Commission 
called for an urgent need of further examination and eventual resolution at 
European level regarding the issue of excludable but non-removable persons.9 
To this day, not much has changed in Europe with regard to the group of 1F 
applicants as Member States have their own policies and deal differently 
with several aspects related to the issue of Article 1F. I will try to clarify this 
situation on the basis of the following example case:  
Mr X fled in 2004 from Turkey and applied for asylum in the Netherlands. 
Based on the account of his reasons for his request for asylum, the Dutch 
authorities suspect the applicant to have committed crimes which might 
fall under the exclusion clauses of Article 1F of the Refugee Convention 
and start further investigations about him. Documents submitted by Mr 
X and official country reports from Foreign Affairs and the General 
Intelligence and Security Service show that Mr X became a member of 
the Kurdish Hezbollah in 1990. It turns out that he made rapid progress 
within the organisation, joined the militant wing of the organisation and 
took over responsibility for seven provinces in East-Turkey. In 1992, he 
ordered the liquidation of a teacher and participated in actions which 
lead to inflicting grievous bodily harm on another teacher. Mr X went 
into hiding during conflicts involving the Turkish government and the 
Hezbollah in 1998 after which he managed to flee to the Netherlands. On 
the basis of the available information, the Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service decides in 2006 to apply Article 1F to the applicant and thus reject 
his claim to asylum. In such a situation, it assessed whether Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) forms an obstacle for 
the applicant’s removal to his country of origin. Mr X, who succeeded in 
bringing forward sufficient evidence to prove his removal would put him 
at risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is not 
removed to Turkey. In accordance with Dutch policy, a non-removable 
excluded asylum seeker is not given a legal stay either. Mr X is left in limbo 
for many years with no perspective for any change in his situation.
9 Commission Working Document, The relationship between safeguarding internal 
security and complying with international protection obligations and instruments 
COM/2001/0743 final. 
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In the case of Mr X, the Dutch authorities found that there were serious 
reasons to consider that he had committed a 1F-crime, and decided to 
exclude him from protection. Once an exclusion decision has been taken, the 
person in question is no longer entitled to other forms of legal residence in 
the Netherlands, even when Article 3 ECHR forms an obstacle for removal. 
This means in concrete that the 1F applicant cannot work and is not entitled 
to social benefits which results in far-reaching social, psychological and legal 
consequences for the person concerned, his family and for the society as a 
whole.10 It is likely that if Mr X had fled to another European country instead 
of the Netherlands, he would have not been excluded from protection and he 
would have been issued with a residence permit. The results of a Strategic 
Committee on Frontiers, Immigration and Asylum (SCIFA) questionnaire 
on Article 1F, which was distributed among EU Member States, shows 
that the Netherlands carries out a more proactive 1F-policy within Europe 
because most of the EU countries rarely apply the exclusion clauses.11 The 
reason why other countries do not use the exclusion clauses often can be that 
they are less attentive to it during the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) 
procedure or they do not have enough expertise on the matter. It can also 
be because there is no consensus on the status to be granted to excludable 
but non-removable persons. As stated above, Article 3 ECHR prohibits 
removal, but does not entail a right to legal stay.12 This matter falls entirely 
within the prerogatives domain of states. This way, the Netherlands does 
not allow residence permits to be issued to those persons falling within this 
category. In case Mr X had fled to the United Kingdom (UK) instead of the 
Netherlands and indeed been excluded under Article 1F, he would still have 
been given a legal residence as the UK grants Restricted Leave to those who 
are excluded but cannot be removed. Those under this leave can claim certain 
rights which may be restricted by the authorities. 
The European aspect is of growing importance because of the increasing 
power of the European Courts and legislative institutions, combined with 
the process of European integration and harmonisation. In this research the 
European perspective is furthermore reflected in the jurisdictions that are 
studied in detail on a national level, namely the Netherlands and the UK. 
These countries are interesting to study because their post-exclusion phase is 
different as turns out from the example of Mr X, but there are more reasons 
which make their scrutiny worthwhile.13 As stated above, the Netherlands 
10 See Reijven & Van Wijk 2012, pp. 26-30 and 2014, pp. 259-263.
11 Several states filled in the questionnaire with the reservation of confidentiality 
therefore only rough data are published. House of Representatives (Kamerstukken II) 
2006/07, 30 800 VI, No. 123.
12 Larsaeus 2004, pp. 69-97.
13 Post-exclusion means: the period after an alien is indeed excluded from refugee 
protection under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention.
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are within Europe at the forefront of applying Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention. A great deal of the 1F-policy in the Netherlands has actually 
been developed with respect to the group of former KhAD/WAD members 
who are collectively assumed to fall under Article 1F.14 The exclusion of 
these Afghan men is based on a Dutch official report from 2000 which is 
still being criticized for its correctness. To this day, the authorities stand firm 
and is a change not in sight. 
The UK is a special case within the EU as it has included a Special Immigration 
Status (SIS) in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, which relates 
to foreign criminals and their dependants (including those who are excluded 
under Article 1F) whom it cannot remove from the country because to do so 
would breach their human rights. Though the 2008 Act is named Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act, part 10 of the Act which deals with the SIS is 
the only part concerning immigration which to date is not in force and most 
likely will not be. 
 The central question of this research is as follows:
Which solutions can be formulated on a national and European level to deal with 
the dilemmas surrounding 1F applicants who cannot be removed?
§ 1.3 Structure of the study 
A lot has already been written about the exclusion clauses in the literature. 
Nevertheless, publications on the topic deal to a large extent with the definition 
of the three clauses of Article 1F. A study on the provision, including an 
in-depth focus on the post-exclusion phase from a European perspective 
is, as yet, sorely lacking. The description of the applicable law as it stands, 
its theoretical framework and comparative elements of this research fill up 
this gap and contribute to the debate regarding the possibilities and limits 
of developing a Common European Asylum System and make this research 
valuable to legal practice.
On the basis of the following sub-questions I will attempt to provide an 
answer to the central research question as stated above. 
What is the rationale behind Article 1F of the Refugee Convention and how 
should it be applied? 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to Article 1F of the Refugee Convention 
and discusses the exclusion clauses within the framework of UNHCR’s 
14 The abbreviations KhAD/WAD stand for Khadimat-e Atalát-e Dowlati and 
Wazarat-e Amaniat-e Dowlati, which were Afghanistan’s intelligence services during 
the communist government (1978-1992). 
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documents on the matter. This chapter comprises three parts: a historical 
and substantive analysis of the exclusion clauses and a focus on procedural 
aspects related to exclusion.
After an overview on the history of development of the Refugee Convention, 
attention is paid to the question why the drafters of the Convention found 
it necessary to exclude protection to persons who have been involved in 
criminal activities. Further, this chapter will discuss the negotiation and 
drafting process of Article 1F and examine the three clauses under this 
provision. It will also look into which crimes fall under these limbs. It falls 
outside the scope of this study to provide a thorough study of the latter, but it 
is indeed relevant to have a good understanding of how the exclusion clauses 
should be interpreted. The last part of the chapter concerns the exclusion 
process within the Refugee Status Determination procedure. 
What does the EU asylum acquis state about the exclusion clauses?
The EU’s aim of creating a Common European Asylum System has led 
to the adoption of secondary legislation within the area of immigration 
and asylum law. Chapter 3 deals with EU asylum law with a focus on the 
four main asylum Directives which have been adopted during the first 
phase of the CEAS and implemented in the EU Member States. These 
are the Temporary Protection Directive, Reception Conditions Directive, 
Qualification Directive and the Directive on Asylum Procedures. These 
Directives and also the already adopted recasts of the last three mentioned 
Directives will be studied to explore what they state with regard to the 
exclusion clauses and aspects relating to exclusion, such as refoulement and 
detention. The original text of the Directives and the recasts are discussed. 
However, the revised version of the relevant provisions serve as a starting 
point for this study. In addition to the mentioned Directive’s which include 
specific provisions relating to exclusion, also other instruments such as the 
Returns Directive and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will be examined. 
Up to now, several cases have been handled by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) regarding the exclusion clauses of the EU asylum Directives. These 
will also be examined.
What is the role of the ECHR for asylum seekers who have been denied on the 
basis of Article 1F?
Exclusion under Article 1F makes an alien ineligible for a refugee status 
under the Refugee Convention and Qualification Directive, but it does not 
prohibit states from providing ‘another kind of protection’. The latter is often 
based on the rights and freedoms as laid down in the ECHR. Though the 
Convention is relevant for all asylum seekers, Chapter 4 will particularly deal 
with the relevant provisions of the ECHR which are related to the application 
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of the exclusion clauses. Article 3 plays a central role in this study and will 
be discussed first. The other provisions which will be treated are: Article 8 
on the right to family life, Article 5 (1) (f) concerning the right to liberty 
and security and Article 13 regarding the right to have an effective remedy 
before a national authority. Finally, ECtHR case law concerning excluded 
asylum seekers will be examined. The Strasbourg Court plays a significant 
role in monitoring compliance with the Convention as its judgments are 
binding upon states.15 
How do the Netherlands and the UK deal with the application of Article 1F in 
their national legislation and case law? 
After outlining the exclusion clauses and refoulement as reflected in UNHCR 
and European documents and case law, Chapters 5 and 6  elaborate upon 
the question how the Netherlands and the UK deal with Article 1F, in 
particular with regard to non-removable 1F applicants in the post-exclusion 
phase. Article 1F has been and still is the subject of discussion and debate in 
these two jurisdictions and both countries have their own backgrounds and 
point of view on the matter. Furthermore, the study will discuss the current 
legislation, practice and development and the influence of particular cases on 
the policy towards excluded asylum seekers who are unremovable. 
In Chapter 7, a comparison is made based on the findings of the two 
countries on relevant aspects relating to exclusion to see the similarities and 
differences and the way they deal with the issue. The aspects to be discussed 
are the assessment of exclusion, the post-exclusion phase and the role of 
Article 8 ECHR. 
The main findings are summarised in the conclusions of very chapter. These 
will be used in the synthesis of Chapter 8 which will provide an answer to the 
central research question.  
For the sake of clarity, the term ‘exclusion clauses’  used throughout the 
study only refers to the clauses as laid down under Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention. This way, ‘exclusion clauses’ and ‘Article 1F’ can be seen as 
synonyms. 
§ 1.4 Methodology
The overall objective of this study is to cover historical and comparative 
aspects and also discuss the European view based on the traditional methods 
used in legal research including relevant legislation, literature and case law. 
A variety of sources have been consulted such as legislation and legislative 
history, policy and other government/parliamentary legal documents, 
15 Article 46 (1) ECHR. 
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reports from international organisations and NGOs and case law from 
national and international bodies.16 
Literature search
To present the topic in a framework, it was necessary to study existing 
academic and theoretical literature on the issue of Article 1F. For this 
purpose, several handbooks, commentaries and articles in the field of 
international refugee law were consulted including related sources in the UK 
and the Netherlands. My objective has been to provide a complete overview 
on the available material regarding the exclusion clauses and their contextual 
aspects according to prevailing ideas, but also any deviations from the rule. I 
have also described, analysed and commented on my findings. 
Legislative analysis
The travaux preparatoires to the Convention proved valuable for the discussion 
in Chapter 2 dealing, inter alia, with the historical development of the Refugee 
Convention. Additionally, commentaries to the Refugee Convention and its 
Protocol have been consulted. With regard to Chapter 3 on EU asylum law, 
the commentaries from Hailbronner, Peers and others in which the relevant 
Directives receive ample treatment have been consulted. As regards the 
jurisdictions of the two countries involved, I undertook an in-depth analysis of 
the national legislation, including the Explanatory Memoranda to the national 
Acts resulting in good insights into the relevant legislation.
Legal documents
Besides literature and legislation, diverse documents at international/
European and national level on the exclusion clauses and, in particular, 
relating to the issue of the unremovable excluded asylum seekers are 
examined. Among these are UNHCR documents, EU Green Paper on 
the CEAS, reports by Amnesty International and European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles. Regarding the Netherlands and the UK, attention is 
also paid to national policy documents from the Ministries concerned. 
Case law 
Exploring the available jurisprudence on Article 1F is an important aspect 
of the study as judgments may clarify certain matters and some principles 
related to the exclusion clauses developed by courts. Where possible, 
reference is made to relevant judgments concerning the exclusion clauses, 
at the European level to the ECtHR and ECJ, but also from courts outside 
Europe. At the national level consideration is given to the extensive case law 
on Article 1F in the Netherlands and in the UK. 
16 The academic literature, legislation and jurisprudence are current as of September 
2015. 
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Interviews
In addition to the ‘traditional methods’ used in legal research as expressed 
in the foregoing, interviews were held. These were beneficial to the study as 
they make clear whether the gathered data is reliable. In addition, face-to-
face research interviews give one the chance to gather valid data concerning 
the practice in certain issues which are otherwise difficult to find in the 
literature. For the chapter on the UK, I interviewed and maintained several 
follow-up contacts with an expert from the Home Office’s Special Cases 
Unit. This unit is, amongst others, responsible for handling 1F cases. In the 
Netherlands discussions were held with excluded asylum seekers, lawyers 
assisting 1F applicants and staff members from the Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service which falls under the Ministry of Justice.17  
17 Details of these interviews as well as names of the interviewees are on file with the 
author. 
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Chapter 2  A focus on Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention from UN perspective
§ 2.1 Introduction
To understand what this study is about and to be able to put the following 
chapters in a right context, requires a good grasp of the matter. That is 
why this chapter will provide an introduction to Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention. The discussion of the provision takes place within the 
framework of authoritative documents of the UNHCR, which are based on 
the organisation’s supervisory task concerning the Refugee Convention, 
and provide guidance to Member States with respect to the interpretation 
and application of the Convention. The chapter starts with the history of 
the Refugee Convention and the term ‘refugee’ in particular after which a 
distinction between a substantive and procedural analysis can be made. The 
substantive part deals with the rationale behind the exclusion clauses, the 
drafting proceedings of the clauses which took place at the meetings of the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries followed by attention to the interpretation 
of the clauses, particularly to the question which crimes are covered by 
Article 1F. The procedural analysis concerns the exclusion process within the 
Refugee Status Determination procedure. According to the UNHCR, first a 
person is assessed whether they meet with the definition of a refugee and, if 
so, a three-step test is followed when there are indications that the person 
concerned has been involved in excludable acts under Article 1F. Within 
this discussion, topics such as individual responsibility, family unity and 
proportionality considerations will be presented followed by a conclusion.  
§ 2.2 Adoption of the Refugee Convention
The conflict and political instability during the Second World War led to the 
enforced migration of huge numbers of people. With the end of this War, 
the largest population movements in European history took place. The 
Soviet Union took over the eastern countries of Europe which came under 
Communist regimes and led to the escape and expulsion of many refugees. 
The International Refugee Organisation (IRO) which was set up by the 
United Nations (UN) in 1946, resettled more than one million displaced 
Europeans around the world and helped 73,000 civilians to return to their 
former homes. In December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which Article 14 (1) prescribes 
that ‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution’. Two years later, in 1950, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established which succeeded 
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the IRO. Though UNHCR was initially established for a period of three 
years, it still exists and is the only authorised institution dealing with refugee 
issues.18 UNHCR’s primary responsibility is set out under paragraph 1 of the 
UNHCR Statute which states that it is to provide ‘international protection’ 
to refugees and, by assisting governments, to seek ‘permanent solutions for 
the problem of refugees’. 
It was in 1949 that the UN Economic and Social Council appointed an 
Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems consisting 
of ‘representatives of thirteen governments, who shall possess special 
competence in this field’ to ‘consider the desirability of preparing a revised 
and consolidated convention relating to the international status of refugees 
and stateless persons and, if they consider such a course desirable, draft the 
text of such a convention’.19 There were already legal instruments available 
regarding refugees which were still valid at the end of the Second World 
War.20 However, they concerned only specific categories of refugees, defined 
by origin or nationality and were not relevant for refugees during or after 
the Second World War. The Ad Hoc Committee focused on the refugee 
and came with a draft of the Refugee Convention. The work and draft 
Convention of the Ad Hoc Committee was sent to member governments as 
well as other governments who were invited to give their comments on the 
report so that this could be submitted to the Economic and Social Council. 
In its eleventh session, in August 1950, the Council considered the report 
of the Ad Hoc Committee and comments submitted by various States. It 
decided to reconvene the Ad Hoc Committee with the purpose of redrafting 
the Convention in the light of these comments. The report of the second 
session of the Ad Hoc Committee was transmitted by the Secretary General 
to the General Assembly.21 The General Assembly considered the report 
and decided to convene a Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons in order to redraft the Convention. In July 
18 In December 2003 the General Assembly decided to remove the temporal limitation 
on the continuation of the UNHCR and to continue the Office ‘until the refugee 
problems is solved’. 
19 Einarsen 2011, p. 54. 
20 E.g. the Agreement of 1928-1929 between Belgium and France; the Convention 
Relating to the International Status of Refugees of 1933 and the Convention of 1938 
concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany- the related Protocol and 
the Evian Resolution of 14 July 1938. The substantive rights stated by the Refugee 
Convention originate from two main sources, namely the mentioned 1933 Refugee 
Convention and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
21 The second Ad Hoc Committee is known as the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees 
and Stateless Persons. During the early stages of the discussions including the session 
of the first Ad Hoc Committee, the problems of refugees and stateless persons were 
treated together.
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1951, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries met and completed the drafting 
of the Convention. Besides the representatives of the member governments, 
different NGOs were also present during the treaty process which took 
approximately five and a-half years.22 
The Refugee Convention is still the key legal document in refugee law: it defines 
a refugee, his rights, legal obligations of states and is the major legal foundation 
of UNHCR’s work. The importance of the UNHCR’s role is recognised in the 
Preamble to the Convention, while Article 35 of the Refugee Convention deals 
with the cooperation of States with UNHCR. The UNHCR Statute which was 
adopted in December 1950 serves as the institution’s constitution and lays down 
the functions and responsibilities of the High Commissioner.23 Also the Statute 
provides a definition of the term ‘refugee’.24 The substance of the definitions 
in the UNHCR Statute and Refugee Convention are quite similar, but not 
identical. For a more detailed elaboration of the similarities and differences 
between the definitions see Grahl-Madsen.25 According to him, the terms are 
drawn up for different purposes: paragraph 6 of the Statute sets forth that ‘the 
competence of the High Commissioner shall extend to’ the persons satisfying 
the conditions laid down in this (and the following) paragraphs. Article 1 of the 
Convention provides that ‘for the purposes of the present Convention’ the term 
‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who meets the criteria set forth in the said 
Article, which means that these criteria are decisive for the extent of the duties 
which the Contracting States have undertaken by acceding to the Convention. 
Given its various limitations, the Refugee Convention does not cover every 
refugee, but the competence of the High Commissioner may extend to further 
categories of persons and apply the provisions of the Convention to other 
persons than those who fall under the terms of Article 1. Over the years, the 
General Assembly has given the UNHCR a broader mandate, which includes 
‘persons of concern to the UNHCR’, inter alia, stateless and internally displaced 
persons. The difference in definition makes it possible to recognise a person as 
both a mandate and a Convention refugee or as a mandate refugee but not as a 
Convention refugee.26 According to the travaux preparatoires of the Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries, drafting Article 1 of the Refugee Convention occupied the 
Conference more than the drafting of any other article, as every aspect of the 
definition was debated extensively.27 
22 Goodwin-Gill 2008.  
23 See <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home> (last accessed on 21 September 
2015).  
24 The term refugee is stated in paragraph 6A of the UNHCR Statute and the exclusion 
clauses are laid down in paragraph 7 of the Statute. 
25 Grahl-Madsen 1966, p.105 et seq.
26 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 52.
27 The travaux preparatoires are the official records concerning the negotiations on the 
Refugee Convention. 
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§ 2.3 Definition of a refugee in the Refugee Convention
Article 1A of the Refugee Convention prescribes that the term ‘refugee’ 
shall apply to any person who has a:
‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it’.
The original text of the definition contained the complementary phrase, ‘as a 
result of events occurring before 1 January 1951’ and the option for Contracting 
States to understand the mentioned phrase as meaning events occurring 
in Europe or in Europe and elsewhere.28 These temporal and geographical 
limitations were initially incorporated because the drafters felt: 
‘it would be difficult for governments to sign a blank cheque and to undertake 
obligations towards future refugees, the origin and number of which would 
be unknown’.29  
The broadly framed definition with limitations was the adopted middle 
course in the discussion between states whether to formulate a universal 
refugee definition or a more casuistic definition based on nationality or origin 
of refugee groups. According to Einarsen, ‘the definition was, contrary to 
common belief, not influenced much by the Cold War. The new refugees 
from the East after the Second World War fitted the already well-known 
category of persecution for reasons of political opinion and it was made 
sure that this contemporary refugee group would not be left out of treaty 
protection by the limitations. Some of the deepest divisions were between 
Western states; it was not a case of the West against the rest’.30 
Though the original framers of the Refugee Convention did not expect 
refugee issues to be a major international problem for a long period, the 
contrary was the case. The refugee crisis spread from Europe to Africa in the 
28 Although governments had the option of adopting a geographical limitation when 
ratifying the Refugee Convention, only a few did so. Currently, Congo, Madagascar, 
Monaco and Turkey still apply the geographical limitation to refugees outside of 
Europe.
29 The UNHCR Statute is of universal application and does not contain a temporal nor 
geographical limitation. 
30 Einarsen 2011, pp. 55-67. 
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1960’s and then to Asia and back to Europe by the 1990s.31 The emergence 
of refugee situations outside Europe since 1951 made the international 
community recognise the universal value of the refugee regime. In 1964, the 
UNHCR started to consider the possibility of modifying or removing the 
time limit to secure the relevance of the Refugee Convention with respect to 
e.g. African refugees.32 This led to the adoption of the 1967 Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees33 which lifted the time and geographical limitations 
and extended the application of the Refugee Convention and the mandate of 
UNHCR to protect refugees other than those affected by events in Europe at 
the time of the Second World War.34
If we look at the Convention definition of a refugee as previously stated, 
we can see that the refugee who falls under the definition has to satisfy four 
elements: he is outside his country of origin; he is unable or unwilling to 
seek or take advantage of the protection of that country, or to return there; 
such inability or unwillingness is attributable to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted; and the persecution feared is based on reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.35  
With regard to the first point, Goodwin-Gill states that ‘the fact of having 
fled, or having crossed an international frontier, is an intrinsic part of the 
quality of refugee, understood in its ordinary sense’ and that ‘those who 
possess more than one nationality will only be considered as refugees 
within the Refugee Convention if such other nationality or nationalities are 
ineffective’.36 According to Grahl-Madsen the phrase ‘is outside’ includes 
persons who have fled from their home country as well as those who have 
become refugees sur place. The UNHCR Handbook prescribes that the 
term ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ contains a subjective and an 
objective element and that in determining whether it exists, both elements 
have to be taken into consideration. With respect to the subjective element 
‘the determination of refugee status primarily requires an evaluation of the 
applicant’s statements rather than a judgment on the situation prevailing in 
31 ’50th Anniversary, The wall behind which refugees can shelter. The 1951 Geneva 
Convention’, Refugees Volume 2, No. 123-2001, pp. 12-13.
32 Idem, p. 70.
33 The Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees entered into force on 4 October 1967.
34 Since its adoption, the Refugee Convention has been supplemented by refugee 
and subsidiary protection regimes in several regions, as well as via the progressive 
development of international human rights law. See for example, the Organisation of 
African Unity (now African Union) Convention governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa 1969 and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 
in Latin America.  
35 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 135.  
36 Goodwin-Gill 2008, p. 3.
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his country of origin’. As regards the objective element, ‘this implies that it 
is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned that determines his 
refugee status, but that his frame of mind must be supported by an objective 
situation’. The Handbook states further that ‘in general, the applicant’s fear 
should be considered well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, 
that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable if he 
returned there’.37 
The term ‘persecution’ is not defined in the Refugee Convention. According 
to Zimmermann & Mahler, ‘persecution’ contains two main elements, 
namely a sufficiently severe human rights violation and a determination 
regarding the perpetrator of the violation.38 With regard to the human rights 
violation, it may be inferred from Articles 31 and 33 that it includes the threat 
to life, or the threat of torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Persecution normally concerns action by the authorities of a 
country. However, where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are 
committed by the local populace, they can be considered as persecution if 
they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or of the authorities refuse, 
or prove unable, to offer effective protection.39 With respect to the reasons 
for persecution as stated above, the UNHCR Handbook mentions that it is 
unimportant whether the persecution arises from one of these reasons or 
from a combination of two or more; race has to be understood in its widest 
sense to include all kinds of ethnic groups that are referred to as race in 
common usage; the term reasons of religion covers various form such as 
membership of a religious community, personal faith or private worship, 
participation in or insistence on certain forms of public worship, religiously 
motivated acts or omissions40; nationality covers besides ‘citizenship’ also 
membership of an ethnic group; the reason ‘membership of a particular social 
group’ includes the previously stated reasons of race, religion or nationality, 
but is of broader application than the combined notions of racial, ethnic and 
religious groups. The typical ‘political refugee’ is set forth as one persecuted 
by the government of a state or other entity on account of his or her opinions, 
which are an actual or perceived threat to that government or its institutions, 
or to the political agenda and aspirations of the entity in question.41 
Under the Refugee Convention, refugees are not to be penalized for seeking 
protection, nor to be exposed to risking return to their country of origin.42 
37 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, paras. 37-50. 
38 Zimmermann & Mahler 2011, p. 345. 
39 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, paras. 51-65. 
40 Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 218. 
41 For a detailed elaboration of the reasons for persecution see Goodwin-Gill & 
McAdam 2007, pp. 74-90.
42 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits the expel or return of a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where their life or freedom would be 
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They are entitled to a number of basic survival and dignity rights, as well 
as to documentation of their status and access to national courts for the 
enforcement of their rights. Beyond these basic rights, refugees are also 
guaranteed a more expansive range of civil and socio-economic rights.43 
Besides prescribing the definition of who is a refugee and what their rights 
are, the Refugee Convention also explicitly spells out circumstances in 
which refugee status may be lost or denied. Goodwin-Gill & McAdam state 
four sets of circumstances in which this is the case: by reasons of voluntary 
acts of the individual; by reason of change of circumstances; by reason of 
protection accorded by other states or international agencies and in the case 
of criminals or other undeserving cases.44 The scope of this research focuses 
on the last category, in particular the exclusion clauses as laid down in Article 
1F of the Refugee Convention. Before discussing these clauses in detail, the 
following paragraph deals with several documents on Article 1F published 
by the UNHCR. 
§ 2.4 UNHCR guidance on exclusion 
According to the UNHCR’s Statute its main tasks are to provide international 
protection and seek durable solutions for the problems of refugees. What is 
meant by providing international protection is laid down in paragraph 8 of 
the Statute which gives a non-exhaustive list of forms of protection, such as 
assisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation 
or assimilation within new national communities and facilitating the co-
ordination of the efforts of private organisations concerned with the welfare 
of refugees.  
According to Article 35 of the Refugee Convention, Member States are 
obliged to cooperate with the UNHCR to enable it to carry out its tasks, 
particularly its supervisory role. A similar obligation to Article 35 is found 
in Article II of the 1967 Protocol and in various conclusions of the UNHCR 
ExCom which recall the obligation of state parties to the Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol to cooperate with UNHCR, by facilitating its 
supervisory task and providing detailed information on the implementation 
of the Convention and Protocol.45 
Zieck states that the drafters of the Refugee Convention did not have a clear 
understanding of what supervision on the part of UNHCR would mean. 
She explains that ‘proceeding from the understanding that ‘supervision’ 
threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. This so-called non-refoulement principle will be 
dealt with extensively later on in Chapter 4.
43 Hathaway 2005, pp. 93-95. 
44 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 135. 
45 Zieck 2011, p. 1482. 
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can be taken as the equivalent of monitoring rule compliance, identifying 
the meaning and purport of ‘supervision’ will take recourse to practice, 
which will proceed from two presumptions: supervision presupposes a 
clear understanding of the meaning of the various provisions of the Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, on the one hand, and knowledge about 
actual application on the part of state parties, on the other’.46 With regard to 
the first presumption, though UNHCR cannot provide authoritative rulings 
or opinions on the meaning of terms in the Convention, the organisation has 
issued various documents, which are regarded to have persuasive authority 
and provide guidance concerning the interpretation of the provisions of 
the Refugee Convention and Protocol. These documents are especially 
relevant as there is in practice no judiciary at the international level that 
can provide definitive interpretations on the Convention provisions. The 
Refugee Convention’s Article 38 states that disputes between parties to the 
Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which cannot be 
settled by other means, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice 
at the request of the parties to the dispute, but this provision is only available 
to states.47 As refugees cannot bring a case before the International Court of 
Justice, they are dependent on national courts and human rights instruments 
and their monitoring bodies concerning claims for the violation of their 
rights.  
One of the UNHCR documents already mentioned above is the Handbook 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 
Handbook) that was published in 1972. The Handbook was based on the 
knowledge accumulated by the High Commissioner’s Office over the 
years, since the Refugee Convention’s entry into force, taking into account 
practice of States and the literature devoted to the subject. It focuses on 
the term refugee and on various problems related to the determination of a 
refugee status. Chapter 4 of the Handbook deals with the exclusion clauses, 
including Article 1F. Besides the Handbook, the UNHCR has published 
several other documents on the application of Article 1F in particular, the: 
UNHCR Background Note and the Guidelines on International Protection: 
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees48 (Guidelines on Exclusion) which were published 
in 2003. These Guidelines replaced ‘The Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on 
46 Idem, pp. 1494-1495. 
47 For more on Article 38, see Oellers-Frahm 2011. 
48 ‘UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion 
Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees’, HCR/
GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003.
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their Application’49 and ‘Note on the Exclusion Clauses’ and give a summary 
of the key issues relating to the exclusion clauses.50 The UNHCR Background 
Note forms an integral part of the Guidelines on Exclusion and provides ‘a 
detailed analysis and review of the exclusion clauses, taking into account, 
UNHCR Handbook, case law, the travaux preparatoires of the relevant 
international instruments, opinions of academic and expert commentators’ 
and the Second Track of the Global Consultations on International 
Protection process which examined this subject at its expert meeting in 
Lisbon, in May 2001’. Besides the general Guidelines on Exclusion, two more 
Guidelines have been published on specific topics within the framework 
of Article 1F. These Guidelines concern the application of Article 1F in 
mass-influx situations51 and child asylum claims.52 While the Guidelines on 
Exclusion and the Background Note also fully apply to exclusion in mass-
influx situations, the Guidelines on Exclusion in Mass-Influx Situations pays 
particular attention to, inter alia, operational and legal issues on the arrival 
of large numbers of asylum seekers across an international border. The latter 
offers a substantive and procedural guidance on RSD in a child-sensitive 
manner and on the application of the exclusion clauses to children. With 
respect to children there is also an Advisory opinion of UNHCR available 
concerning the exclusion of child soldiers.53 
The UNHCR ExCom Conclusions on International Protection are also part 
of the documents that provide guidance on the interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention and thus on Article 1F. The Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner’s Programme (ExCom) was established in 1958 and 
functions as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. The functions of 
ExCom include, inter alia, advising the High Commissioner in the exercise of 
his/her functions and approving proposed biennial budget targets. ExCom 
has currently 85 members and the Conclusions constitute expressions of 
opinion which are broadly representative of the views of the international 
community. They are not formally binding, but as Goodwin-Gill expressed 
‘they may contribute to the formulation of opinion juris by setting out 
standards of treatment or approaches to interpretation which illustrate a 
state’s sense of legal obligation towards refugees and asylum seekers’.54    
49 UNHCR Geneva, 1 December 1996.
50 UNHCR Geneva, 30 May 1997. 
51 UNHCR Guidelines on the Application in Mass-Influx Situations of the Exclusion 
Clauses of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 
February 2006. 
52 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims under 
Articles 1(A) 2 and 1F of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/09/08, 22 December 2009. 
53 UNHCR Geneva, 12 September 2005. 
54 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 217. 
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The UNHCR documents mentioned above deal with several subjects 
related to the application of Article 1F in Refugee Status Determination 
procedures. These documents are the most relevant ones regarding the 
application of Article 1F, but are certainly not a complete list. UNHCR has 
published a variety of resources within the framework of this provision such 
as: the Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organised 
Crimes; Note on the Impact of Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) 
on the Application of Exclusion under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees; UNHCR Statement on Article 1F55 and 
the background paper and summary conclusions from the expert roundtable 
discussion on exclusion, organised as part of the Global Consultations on 
International Protection in 2001. 
§ 2.5 A substantive analysis of Article 1F 
§ 2.5.1 Rationale of the exclusion clauses 
The exclusion clauses in Article 1F have to be distinguished from Article 
1D and 1E of the Refugee Convention, as the latter two mentioned articles 
exclude from refugee protection persons whose need for international 
protection is already addressed under a system other than the refugee regime, 
or who are entitled to some form of national protection. Contrary to this, 
the basis for exclusion under Article 1F is the asylum seeker’s culpability for 
grave acts or offences and not the availability of alternative protection.56 
Article 1D prescribes that the Refugee Convention shall not apply to 
persons who are receiving protection or assistance from organs or agencies 
of the UN other than the UNHCR.57 They may, however, be entitled to the 
benefits of the Convention in the case that such protection or assistance has 
ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively 
settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly of the UN. In such circumstances, consideration of exclusion 
pursuant to Article 1F may arise.58 This Article involves Palestinians who 
are refugees as a result of the 1948 or 1967 Arab-Israeli conflicts and who 
are receiving protection or assistance from the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).59 Article 
1E of the Convention is not applicable to a person who is recognised by the 
55 The UNHCR Statement on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention is issued in the context 
of the ECJ’s Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B and D case of 9 November 2010 which 
will be discussed under § 3.4.2.
56 Nyinah 2000, p. 296.  
57 This Article is included in the UNHCR Statute under paragraph 7 (c). 
58 UNHCR Background Note, para. 8.  
59 For more see ‘Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees’, UNHCR October 2002. 
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competent authorities of the country in which he has taken up residence 
as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession 
of the nationality of that country (paragraph 7 (b) of the UNHCR Statute 
corresponds with this Article). The UNHCR Handbook60 defines Article 1E 
as concerning ‘persons who might otherwise qualify for refugee status and 
who have been received in a country where they have been granted most of 
the rights normally enjoyed by nationals, but not formal citizenship’. 
Article 1F states that the provisions of the Convention shall not apply to any 
person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
a) he [or she] has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to 
make provision in respect of such crimes;
b) he [or she] has committed a serious non-political crime outside the 
country of refuge prior to his or her admission to that country as a 
refugee; or
c) he [or she] has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the UN. 
The grounds for exclusion in these clauses are enumerated exhaustively 
and while they are subject to interpretation, they cannot be supplemented 
by additional criteria in the absence of an international convention to that 
effect. Paragraph 7 (d) of the UNHCR’s Statute contains exclusion clauses 
which are similar, though not identical, to those prescribed by Article 1F.61 
According to the ‘Guidelines on Exclusion’ UNHCR officials should be 
guided by the language of Article 1F as it represents the latter and more 
specific formulation.
The UNHCR has repeatedly expressed that the exclusion clauses must be 
applied scrupulously to protect the integrity of the institution of asylum. 
ExCom Conclusion No. 82 (XLVII), 1997 and other following Conclusions 
‘reiterated the need to ensure that the integrity of the asylum system is not 
abused by the extension of refugee protection to those who are not entitled 
to it and to apply scrupulously the exclusion clauses stipulated in Article 1F 
of the 1951 Convention and in other relevant international instruments’.62 
This point derives from the purpose of the clauses which is that perpetrators 
60 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, para. 144. See also ‘Note on the Interpretation 
of Article 1E of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’, UNHCR 
March 2009.
61 Besides paragraph 7 (d) of the UNHCR’s Statute, also Article I (5) of the 1969 
Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa contains exclusion clauses which are most identical to 
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. 
62 See also ExCom Conclusion No. 103 (LVI) – 2005. 
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of certain grave acts are undeserving of international protection as refugees. 
After the Second World War, thus at the time when the Refugee Convention 
was drafted, it was for the first time that special provisions were drawn up 
to exclude certain persons from a refugee status as they were considered 
unworthy of international protection. Another important principle of 
Article 1F lies in its connection with ideas of humanity, equity and refuge. 
Thus, the exclusion clause reflect the notion that a person may not claim a 
benefit or a privilege if she or he has violated some basic standard of lawful 
behaviour. If perpetrators of grave offences were not excluded from refugee 
status, the practice of international protection would be in conflict with 
human rights and humanitarian law standards and would, in some cases, 
contradict the humanitarian and peaceful nature of the concept of asylum. 
A further rationale of the Article is that the refugee framework should not 
stand in the way of serious criminals facing justice. 
Nyinah states that:
‘it would seem appropriate to consider Article 1F as a component of the 
network of norms which seek to sanction serious violations, inasmuch as 
denying the cover of refugee protection to a suspect potentially exposes 
him to prosecutorial investigation and action. However, this does not 
mean that the exclusion clauses are intended to perform a penal function 
in the sense of directly initiating instigating legal proceedings against 
the excluded individual. This function was not envisaged by the drafters 
and RSD procedures lack the capacity of performing the role of criminal 
process. Moreover, a penal function would ultimately threaten or destroy 
the confidence which asylum seekers should have in asylum protection if the 
system of international protection is to function effectively’.63 
According to the UNHCR, exclusion has to be limited to offences which 
exceed a certain high threshold of egregiousness and should apply where 
the criminal aspect of a case including, in particular, the nature of the 
circumstances and the character of the offender which are so dominant 
that awarding the privileged label of ‘refugee’ to the offender would risk 
distorting the humanitarian image and essential objectives of asylum. It was 
the notorious cases which the drafters of the Convention had in mind. 
From this perspective, the exclusion clauses must always be interpreted 
restrictively and should be used with great caution. In cases of ambiguity the 
narrower, stricter sense which favours non-exclusion has to be preferred.64 
A restrictive approach is particularly warranted in view of the serious 
possible consequences of exclusion for the individual, which implicates that 
an excludable person may not be issued with a Convention travel document 
63 Nyinah 2000, p. 298.  
64 UNHCR Background Note, para. 4.
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or any other kind of certificate describing him as a refugee in the sense of 
the Refugee Convention, and that he should not be referred as a Convention 
‘refugee’. Though beyond this, any state is free to grant any person any rights 
and benefits it wants to bestow on him, this being a matter entirely within 
its domestic domain. Though the Convention does not impose rules on 
further action on excluded persons, the main goal of states is the removal of 
the person. However, exclusion does not always lead to expulsion as the non-
refoulement principle is often at stake, which entitles the person to protection 
based on relevant international law.65 In view of the particular circumstances 
and vulnerabilities of children, the UNHCR documents state that the 
application of exclusion clauses to children always needs to be exercised with 
great caution. 
§ 2.5.2 The historical context of Article 1F
The draft 1951 Convention, as adopted by the first Ad Hoc Committee 
stated the current Article 1F of the Refugee Convention as follows:
‘No Contracting State shall apply the benefits of this Convention to any 
person who in its opinion has committed a crime specified in Article VI of 
the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal or any other act 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN’.66 
The London Charter of the International Military Tribunal was the decree 
issued on August 8, 1945, that laid down the laws and procedures by which 
the Nuremberg Trials were to be conducted. These were a series of military 
tribunals, held by the main victorious Allied forces of the Second World War, 
most notable for the prosecution of prominent members of the political, 
military, and economic leadership of the defeated Nazi Germany. Article 
6 of the London Charter defined three categories of crimes, namely: war 
crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. According to 
Hathaway & Harvey, the general incentive for the elaboration of Article 1F 
of the Refugee Convention was a determination to give legal force to Article 
14 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that the 
right to asylum ‘may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely 
65 Kapferer 2000, pp. 218-219.
66 The Economic and Social Council adopted Resolution E/1818 in which the exclusion 
provisions of the refugee definition were revised into: No Contracting State shall 
apply the benefits of this Convention to any person who in its opinion has committed 
a crime specified in article VI of the London Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal. No Contracting State shall be obliged, under the provisions of this 
Convention, to grant refugee status to any person whom it has serious reasons to 
consider as falling under the provisions of Article 14 (2) of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.  
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arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the UN’. Thus, an early formulation of Article 1F already 
prescribed that ‘no person to whom Article 14 (2) of the above-mentioned 
Declaration is applicable shall be recognised as a refugee’. Article 1F was 
phrased in mandatory terms and although a government may invoke its 
sovereignty to admit a person described in Article 1F to its territory, it is 
absolutely barred from granting refugee status to that person’.67
The basis for the discussions of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries was 
formed by the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless 
Persons which prescribed the following definition:
 
‘The provisions of the present Convention shall not apply to any person 
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that (a) he 
has committed a crime specified in Article VI of the London Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal; or (b) he falls under the provisions of Article 
14 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’.68 
At the 19th meeting of the Conference, the Federal Republic of Germany 
submitted an amendment with regard to clause (a), in which the representative 
suggested a reference to the appropriate provisions of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions instead of the London Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal:
‘By associating the Geneva Conventions with the work of the Conference 
the humanitarian aims which should govern the Convention would be 
stressed’…
‘The Federal Government of Germany fully agreed that all war criminals 
should be excluded from the benefits of the Convention, but it could not 
subscribe to an express reference to the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal’...69 
The representative of the Consultative Council of Jewish Organisations 
argued strongly against deletion of the reference to the London Charter on 
the ground that its principles had since been twice confirmed by the General 
Assembly and formulated by the International Law Commission. He stated 
67 Hathaway & Harvey 2001, p. 263.
68 A/Conf.2/1., Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, 12 March 1951.
69 A/Conf.2/SR.19, p.26 Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees 
and Stateless Persons, 26 November 1951. The German proposal can be found in UN 
doc. A.Conf.2/76.
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that neither the Geneva Conventions nor the UN Genocide Convention 
had the same ‘solid foundation’70 to which the Federal Republic of Germany 
replied that the objective would be as well met by a provision excluding 
anyone who had committed non-political crimes or acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the UN.71 The issue was referred to a working 
group, which replaced the phrase ‘he has committed a crime specified in 
Article 6 of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal’ with 
‘he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes’, and was eventually adopted by 20 votes 
to 1 against, with 2 abstentions.72 This exclusion clause is to be found under 
current Article 1F (a) of the Refugee Convention. 
With respect to clause (b) which has its roots in extraditable crimes and 
Article 14 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UK 
submitted alternative amendments.73 The representative argued, inter alia, 
that:
‘the Declaration only dealt with principles and ideals and was as such not an 
instrument to which reference could satisfactorily be made in a legal text’. 
The representative of the Netherlands stated its support to the UK and 
found the reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be 
inappropriate.74 The representative from Yugoslavia delivered the text for 
the second part of the exclusion clause which he thought to be generally 
acceptable as follows:
b)  he has committed a serious crime under common law outside the country 
of reception; or
c)  he has committed an act contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
UN. 
The amendment embraced two concepts: that of crimes committed outside 
the receiving country; and that of crimes committed by persons who had not 
at the time acquired the status of refugee. 
70 A/Conf.2/SR.21, p. 7-11, Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons, 26 November 1951.
71 A/Conf.2/SR.24, p. 6-18, Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons, 27 November 1951.
72 A. Conf.2/SR.29, p. 9-10, Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons, 28 November 1951.
73 A/Conf.2/74, Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons. 
74 A/Conf.2/SR.29, p. 11-12, Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons, 28 November 1951.
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The Belgian representative proposed the following version for clause (b) of 
the Yugoslavian amendment: 
‘that he has committed a serious crime under common law outside the 
receiving country before being admitted to it as a refugee’.
Clause (b) of the revised Yugoslav amendment as recast by the representative 
was eventually adopted by 22 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.75 In the final 
text of the Refugee Convention, clause (b) is placed under Article 1F (b) and 
reads as: ‘he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country 
of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee’. According to 
Hathaway & Harvey:76
‘the travaux suggest two distinct, but closely related rationales for Article 1F 
(b). For some countries, the primary concern was to avoid the admission as 
refugees of persons who could not be tried for their offences in the asylum 
state. For others, the goal was to honor extradition obligations despite 
intervening claims to refugee status. Proponents of both perspectives agreed 
that because of the gravity of peremptory exclusion, only crimes generally 
recognised as truly serious should be grounds for exclusion. The net result 
is a consensus on the substantive ambit of Article 1F (b) defined by three 
criteria: only crimes committed outside the adjudicating state are relevant, 
those crimes must be justiciable, and the crimes must meet a fairly exacting 
definition of gravity. In other words, the drafters’ differing perspectives on 
the primary purpose of Article 1F (b) did not prevent them for arriving at 
a clearly defined standard for the preemptory exclusion of certain common 
criminals’.  
The remaining clause (c) of the Yugoslav amendment which is the current 
Article 1F (c) was adopted by 22 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.77 
Grahl-Madsen explains that the records show that the representatives 
of the countries who made efforts for the inclusion of the clause had only 
vague ideas of the meaning of the phrase ‘acts contrary to the purpose and 
principles of the UN’ as the opinions varied on the interpretation. Thus, the 
French delegate said that the ‘provision was not aimed at the man-in-the-
street, but at persons occupying government posts, such as heads of states, 
ministers and high officials’. According to the delegate of the UK ‘it was 
difficult to define what acts were contrary to the purposes and principles of 
75 Idem, pp. 20-26
76 Hathaway & Harvey 2001, p. 278. 
77 A. Conf.2/SR.29, p. 27, Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees 
and Stateless Persons, 28 November 1951.
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the UN, though he presumed that what it meant was such acts as war crimes, 
genocide and the subversion or overthrow of democratic regimes’. He states 
that:
‘Considering the great divergence between these interpretations, it is easily 
understandable that the Social Committee of the Economic and Social 
Council expressed genuine concern, feeling that the provision was so 
vague as to be open to abuse. It seems that agreement was reached on the 
understanding that the phrase should be interpreted very strictly’.78  
§ 2.5.3 The interpretation of the exclusion clauses 
§ 2.5.3.1 Article 1F (a) 
By mentioning crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity, 
the Refugee Convention refers generally to international instruments drawn 
up to make provision in respect of such crimes. There are several instruments 
dating from the end of the Second World War up until the present that define 
the notion of ‘crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity’ 
and may be used for the interpretation of this exclusion clause.79 These are, 
inter alia, the London Charter, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions for 
the Protection of Victims of War and the Additional Protocols of 1977, 
the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1973 International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the 1984 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal 
of Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Contrary 
to other ad hoc international criminal tribunals, such as the International 
Military Tribunal, the ICC is a permanent court exercising jurisdiction over 
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed 
by individuals. Boot states that the idea of establishing a permanent 
international criminal court is not new, but that until the early 1990s, it 
appeared impossible to overcome the differences of opinion between states. 
According to her, the establishment of the ad hoc Criminal Tribunals of the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda significantly contributed to discussions about 
a permanent court and this way, the Statutes and case law of these Tribunals 
influenced the contents of the Rome Statute which was adopted in 1998.80 
In addition to the instruments mentioned, there are several other binding 
and non-binding instruments which can be referred to regarding the crimes 
78 Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 283. 
79 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, para. 150. 
80 Boot 2002, pp. 3-4.
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covered by Article 1F (a). The UNHCR Background Note states that clause 
(a) allows for a dynamic interpretation of the relevant crimes so as to take 
into account developments in international law. Though other instruments 
must also be given due consideration, the Statute and jurisprudence of the 
ICC can be seen as the main sources for the interpretation of these crimes.81 
As many asylum seekers will have been involved with acts of violence which 
do not meet this high standard of the crimes under clause (a), Article 1F 
(a) answers only a fairly small part of asylum-state concerns.82 Given the 
extensive writing and authoritative commentary on the international crimes 
under clause (a), only a brief overview will be provided.83
Crimes against peace
This term was first defined in Article 6 of the London Charter and it remains 
the only international instrument containing a definition. The Charter 
prescribes that crimes against peace arise from the ‘planning, preparation, 
initiation or the waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment for any of the foregoing’. 
The crime of aggression is listed as one of the core crimes under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction (Article 5 of the ICC Statute). However, the Court remained 
unable to exercise jurisdiction over this crime as the Statute did not define 
the crime. Article 5 (2) of the Rome Statute stated that:
‘The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 defining the 
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent 
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the UN’.  
On 11 June 2010, the Review Conference of the Rome Statute adopted by 
consensus amendments to the Rome Statute84 which includes a definition 
of the crime of aggression and a regime establishing how the Court will 
exercise its jurisdiction over this crime.85 The conditions for entry into force 
decided upon at the meeting in Kampala provide that the ICC will not be able 
to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime until after 1 January 2017 when 
a decision is to be made by State Parties to activate the jurisdiction. With 
81 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 25.
82 Hathaway & Harvey 2001, p. 266.
83 See Boot 2002 for a detailed overview concerning the crimes which ought to fall 
under clause (a) of Article 1F.
84 The Review Conference of Rome Statute was held in Kampala, Uganda between 31 
May and 11 June 2010 and the amendments were adopted in Resolution RC/Res.6.
85 The text of articles 15 bis and ter set out the conditions for the Court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 
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the amendments, Article 5 (2) is deleted and Article 8 bis inserted. The first 
paragraph of the latter Article defines the individual crime of aggression as: 
‘the planning, preparation, initiation of execution by a person in a leadership 
position of an act of aggression’. This paragraph also contains the threshold 
requirement that the act of aggression must constitute a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the UN. An act of aggression is defined as ‘the use of 
armed force by one state against another state without the justification of 
self-defence or authorisation by the Security Council’. The definition of the 
crime of aggression, as well as the actions qualifying as acts of aggression 
contained in the amendments (for example invasion by armed forces, 
bombardment and blockade), are influenced by the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.86 Crimes against peace can 
only be committed in the context of planning or waging of a war or armed 
conflict and as wars or armed conflicts are only waged by states or state-like 
entities, a crime against peace can only be committed by individuals in a high 
position of authority representing a state or state-like entity.87
War crimes88
Article 6 of the London Charter defined war crimes as violations of laws 
or customs of war, including ‘murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave 
labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied 
territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, 
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction 
of cities, town or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity’. 
As there have been many legal developments since the adoption of the 
Refugee Convention, several additional instruments have to be considered 
for the interpretation of the term ‘war crimes’ today.89 These crimes can be 
committed by or perpetrated against civilian as well as military persons. 
Although war crimes were originally considered to arise only in the context 
of an international armed conflict, it is now generally accepted that they 
may be committed in non-international armed conflicts as well.90 Article 8 
of the ICC Statute makes a differentiation between acts constituting war 
crimes in the context of an international armed conflict and those arising in 
non-international armed conflict. Internal disturbances and tensions, such 
as riots and other sporadic acts of violence are not considered to be a non-
international armed conflict (Article 8 (2) (d) of the ICC Statute).  
86 See, inter alia, Grzebyk 2014 and McDougall 2013 for more on the crime of aggression. 
<http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
87 UNHCR Background Note, para. 28.
88 For an outline on the notion of ‘war crimes’ see Pejic 2000.  
89 In addition to the London Charter these are the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
Additional Protocols, the jurisprudence of the international tribunals for former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda and by the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
90 UNHCR Background Note, para. 30.




In accordance with Article 7 (1) of the ICC Statute, a crime against humanity 
means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation or 
forcible transfer of population; (e) imprisonment or other severe deprivation 
of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; 
(f) torture; (g) rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity; (h) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined 
under paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognised as 
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to 
in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC; (i) enforced 
disappearance of persons; (j) the crime of apartheid; (k) other inhumane acts 
of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury 
to body or to mental or physical health.
Article 7 (2) of the ICC Statute prescribes that the attack by which a crime 
against humanity is perpetrated must be widespread or systematic. This 
characteristic distinguishes the difference between this category of crimes 
and ordinary crimes that do not meet the level of crimes under international 
law.91 According to the Statute, crimes against humanity can also take place 
in peacetime. It should also be noted that genocide is considered to be a sub-
category of crimes against humanity. Article 6 of the ICC Statute defines 
genocide in a similar way to that one in the 1948 Genocide Convention.92 
§ 2.5.3.2 Article 1 F (b)93
The IRO Constitution and the UNHCR Statute refer to extraditable cases 
in the context of exclusion. With reference to the IRO Constitution, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UNHCR Statute Grahl-
Madsen states the objective of exclusion is to ensure that international 
instruments are not abused by fugitives from justice, nor to interfere with 
the law of extradition. He continues with prescribing that the drafters of 
91 For an outline on the notion of ‘crimes against humanity’ see Pejic 2000.  
92 The following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group as such fall under the definition of genocide: (a) 
killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group.
93 This clause reads as: he [or she] has committed a serious non-political crime outside 
the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee.
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the Refugee Convention wanted to lay down more explicit criteria than 
those contained in either the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the 
UNHCR Statute.94 
Article 1F (b) contains a few elements which have to be assessed when 
deciding on exclusion under this clause. These are whether there are serious 
reasons for considering that the individual in question has committed the 
offence; secondly, whether the crime is serious, considered with due regard 
to context and individual circumstances; and at last, whether the crime is 
non-political. 
To start with, the term ‘serious crimes’ has different meanings in different 
legal systems, which makes it difficult to give a fixed definition. According 
to the UNHCR Background Note, the drafters did not intend to refer to 
individuals who committed minor crimes. Hence, crimes such as theft and 
traffic violations cannot be sufficient grounds for exclusion. The seriousness 
of the crimes has to be determined according to the following factors: the 
nature of the act; the actual harm inflicted; the form of procedure used to 
prosecute the crime; the nature of the penalty for such a crime and whether 
most jurisdictions would consider the act in question as a serious crime. The 
UNHCR Handbook which prescribes that a serious crime refers to a capital 
crime or a very grave punishable act, also has to be understood in the light of 
the factors mentioned above. 
According to the UNHCR Background Note a serious crime should be 
considered ‘non-political’ when other motives (such as personal reasons or 
gain) are the predominant feature of the specific crime committed. ‘Where 
no clear link exists between the crime and its alleged political objective or 
when the act in question is disproportionate to the alleged political objective, 
non-political motives are predominant. Thus, the motivation, context, 
methods and proportionality of a crime to its objectives are important 
factors in evaluating its political nature’.95  
Another relevant element of clause (b) is that the crime committed or 
presumed to have been committed must be done ‘outside the country of 
refuge prior to the applicant’s admission to that country as a refugee’. This 
can be the country of origin or another country, but not the country where 
the applicant seeks a refugee status.96 Grahl-Madsen explains that the term 
‘country of refuge’ should be read in the sense of any country where the 
person concerned would be safe from persecution, which means that a crime 
committed ‘outside the country of refuge’ connotes a crime committed 
94 Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 290.
95 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 41.
96 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, para. 153. 
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before the person concerned became a refugee; it does not apply to any 
crime committed after that time, irrespective of where in the world it has 
been committed.97 When a refugee commits a serious crime in the country 
of refuge, he would be subject to criminal prosecution according to the law 
in force of that country and risk possible expulsion under Articles 32 and 
33 (2) of the Refugee Convention. These provisions apply to those who are 
recognised as refugees and considered to be a threat to the country of refuge. 
The refugee, to whom Article 33 (2) applies, loses the non-refoulement 
protection he would otherwise receive and expulsion to his former country 
is permitted when: 
 ‘there are reasonable grounds for regarding him as a danger to the security of 
the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment 
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that 
country’.98
The UNHCR Handbook states that ‘it is also necessary to strike a balance 
between the nature of the offence presumed to have been committed by the 
applicant and the degree of persecution feared. Accordingly, if a person has 
well-founded fear of very severe persecution, a crime must be very grave 
in order to exclude him. If the persecution feared is less serious, it will be 
necessary to have regard to the nature of the crime or crimes presumed to 
have been committed to establish whether the applicant is not in reality a 
fugitive from justice or whether his criminal character does not outweigh 
his character as a bona fide refugee. In evaluating the nature of the crime 
presumed to have been committed, all the relevant factors must be taken 
into account. Also the fact that an applicant convicted of a serious non-
political crime has already served his sentence or has been granted a pardon 
or has benefited from an amnesty is relevant. In the latter case, there is a 
presumption that the exclusion clause is no longer applicable, unless it can be 
shown that, despite the pardon or amnesty, the applicant’s criminal character 
still predominates’.99 The proportionality test will be discussed under § 2.6.4 
in more detail where attention will also be paid to terrorism acts for which 
clause (b) is deemed important.100 
97 Grahl-Madsen 1966, pp. 302-304. According to the UNHCR ‘admission…as a 
refugee’ does not refer to the period in the country prior to recognition as a refugee; 
admission in this context includes mere physical presence in the country.  
98 See Chapter 3 for a discussion on Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention.
99 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, paras. 156-157. 
100 For more on Article 1F (b) in relation to terrorist acts see Kälin & Künzli 2000 and 
Rudy May 2004. 
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§ 2.5.3.3 Article 1 F (c) 
What under clause (c) with the ‘purposes and principles of the UN’ indicates 
is shown in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter.101 There is 
no internationally accepted understanding of all those ‘acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the UN’. The UNHCR Background Note states 
that there is ‘some indication that the intention was to cover violations of 
human rights which, although falling short of crimes against humanity, were 
nevertheless of fairly exceptional nature and that in view of its vagueness, the 
lack of coherent state practice and being open for abuse by states, clause (c) 
must be interpreted restrictively’.102 The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 
the Pushpanathan case103 that:
‘Article 1F (c) will be applicable where there is consensus in international law 
that particular acts constitute sufficiently serious and sustained violations of 
fundamental rights as to amount to persecution, or are explicitly recognised 
as contrary to the UN purposes and principles’. 
According to the UNHCR Handbook, Article 1F clause (c) overlaps 
with clauses (a) and (b) and does not introduce any specific new element. 
It is intended to cover in a general way such acts against the purposes and 
principles of the UN that might not be fully covered by the two preceding 
exclusion clauses.104 Kwakwa explains that clause (c) should not be used in 
situations which would otherwise fall within the scope of clauses (a) and/
or (b); it should only be used in situations which do not fall under clauses (a) 
and/or (b) and are an abundantly clear violation of fundamental rights that 
contravene the ‘purposes and principles of the UN’.105 Regarding terrorism 
acts which can fall under clause (b) and sometimes even under (a), the 
question whether clause (c) also plays a role rises. Goodwin-Gill summarises 
that:106
101 The purposes of the UN are: to maintain international peace and security; to develop 
friendly relations among nations; to achieve international cooperation in solving 
socioeconomic and cultural problems and in promoting respect for human rights; 
and to serve as a centre for harmonising the actions of nations. The principles of the 
UN are: sovereign equality; good faith fulfillment of obligations; peaceful settlement 
of disputes; refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of another State; and assistance in promoting the work of 
the UN. 
102 UNHCR Background Note, para. 46.
103 Pushpanathan v. Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 982, 4 June 1998.
104 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, para. 162. 
105 Kwakwa 2000, p. 91. 
106 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 197. 
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‘While ‘terrorism’ may indeed be contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the UN and therefore a basis for exclusion under Article 1F (c), conformity 
with international obligations requires that decisions to exclude or 
subsequently to annul a decision on refugee status be taken in accordance 
with appropriate procedural guarantees. Article 1F (c) ought only to be 
applied, therefore, where there are serious reasons to consider that the 
individual concerned has committed an offence specifically identified by the 
international community as one which must be addressed in the fight against 
terrorism, and only by way of a procedure conforming to due process and 
the state’s obligations generally in international law’.107
In relation to Article 1F (c), reference can be made to Resolution 1624 (2005) 
of the UN Security Council in which, among other things, it is recalled that 
‘the protection offered by the Refugee Convention and its Protocol shall 
not extend to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons 
for considering that he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the UN’. Furthermore, states are called upon to ‘cooperate 
fully in the fight against terrorism and adopt such measures as may be 
necessary and appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under 
international law to among other things deny safe haven to any persons with 
respect to whom there is credible and relevant information giving serious 
reasons for considering that they have been guilty of such conduct’.108 The 
UNHCR has issued a Note on the impact of this Resolution in which the 
Agency states that though Resolution 1624 seems to permit the exclusion 
of terrorist acts on the basis of Article 1F (c). It should also be observed that 
the Resolution ‘confirms that exclusion requires an individual assessment 
and a determination on the basis of reliable information that there are 
serious reasons for considering that the person concerned has individual 
responsibility for such acts’.109  
As only states are party to the Charter, another relevant question regarding 
clause (c) is whether it only applies to state entities or persons acting on 
behalf of states, or also to individuals acting as such. The UNHCR Handbook 
prescribes that it only applies to persons acting on behalf of the state, and ‘an 
individual, in order to have committed an act contrary to these principles, 
must have been in a position of power in a Member State and instrumental 
to his state’s infringing these principles’.110 Goodwin-Gill explains that 
107 For more on terrorism in relation to the exclusion clauses see, the UNHCR 
Background Note, paras. 79-86; Nyinah 2000 and Hathaway & Harvey 2001.
108 UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005), 14 September 2005.
109 UNHCR Note on the Impact of Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) on the 
Application of Exclusion Under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, Department of International Protection, 9 December 2005. 
110 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, para. 163.
Chapter 2 A focus on Article 1F of the Refugee Convention  
from UN perspective
39
many commentators share the same view and would limit this clause (c) to 
heads of state and high officials, while reserving its exceptional application 
to individuals not necessarily connected with government, such as tortures 
and other guilty of flagrant violations of human rights. He states that ‘the 
legislative history of Article 1F (c), considered together with the judicial and 
administrative decisions and practices of states and the UN, determines that 
the following general categories, in particular, may be excluded under clause 
(c): policy makers and those holding political responsibility, in situations 
where, for example, violations of human rights or other activities contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the UN have occurred, and where they 
may be considered to have covered such activities with their authority; the 
agents of implementation of such policies; individuals, whether members of 
organisations or not, who, for examples, have personally participated in the 
persecution or denial of the human rights of others; and those individuals, 
whether connected with the organisation of a state or not, who are considered 
to have committed terrorist or terrorist related acts’.111 
§ 2.6 Exclusion analysis in the RSD procedure 
According to the Guidelines on Exclusion, exclusion decisions should, in 
principle, be dealt within the context of the regular RSD procedure in order 
to make a full assessment of the factual and legal issues of the case. Though 
there is no rigid formula, UNHCR prefers the consideration of inclusion 
elements before exclusion. The summary conclusions from the expert 
roundtable state a number of reasons of a policy, legal and practical nature, 
for doing so. These are, inter alia, that exclusion before inclusion risks 
criminalising refugees; exclusion is an exception and it is not appropriate 
to consider an exception first and interviews which look at the whole 
refugee definition allow for information to be collected more broadly and 
accurately.112 Exceptionally, exclusion may be considered first when there is 
an indictment by an international criminal tribunal and in cases at the appeal 
stage where exclusion is the question at issue. This is also the case when 
there is clear and readily available evidence pointing strongly towards the 
applicant’s involvement in particularly serious crimes, notably in prominent 
Article 1F (c) cases.113 The primary responsibility for the RSD procedures, 
including exclusion, lies with the authorities of the host state. In a number 
of countries, UNHCR participates in various forms in RSD procedures.114 
111 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, pp. 189-190. 
112 Summary Conclusions: exclusion from refugee status, Expert roundtable organised 
by the UNHCR and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, hosted by the 
Luso-American Foundation for Development, Lisbon, Portugal 3-4 May 2001, p. 
482. 
113 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 100 and Guidelines on Exclusion, para. 31.
114 The Guidelines on the application of Article 1F in Mass-Influx Situation, para. 41 
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To deal with exclusion cases in a prompt way, UNHCR suggests specialised 
exclusion units within the institution responsible for RSD to be set up. The 
procedure of RSD is not specifically regulated and states are free to establish 
the procedure they believe is right. However, certain basic requirements 
for the procedure are laid down in the UNHCR Handbook among which 
include the following: the confidentiality of the asylum application should be 
respected at all times; applicants should receive the necessary guidance as to 
the procedure to be followed and be given the necessary facilities, including 
the services of a competent interpreter for submitting his case to the 
authorities concerned. They should also be given the opportunity, of which 
they should be duly informed, to contact a representative of UNHCR.115 
The Background Note prescribes procedural safeguards for exclusion in 
particular, which are also necessary to be considered in RSD in general such 
as, providing written reasons for exclusion, the right to appeal an exclusion 
decision to an independent body and no removal of the person concerned 
until all legal remedies against a decision to exclude have been exhausted.116 
According to the Guidelines on the application of Article 1F for child asylum 
claims, children should enjoy specific procedural and evidentiary safeguards 
to ensure that fair RSD decisions are reached with respect to their claims 
whether they are accompanied or not. In line with ‘ExCom Conclusion on 
Children at Risk’,117 these Guidelines also state, inter alia, that the claims of 
children should be processed on a priority basis; an independent, qualified 
guardian needs to be appointed immediately in the case of unaccompanied 
or separated children and appropriate communication methods need to be 
selected for the different stages of the procedure.118 
After it has been decided whether the person meets the refugee definition, 
a three-step analysis is to be followed when there are indications that the 
person concerned has been involved in excludable acts. This exclusion 
analysis requires that: 1) the acts in question be assessed against the exclusion 
grounds, taking into account the nature of the acts as well as the context and 
all individual circumstances in which they occurred, 2) it be established in 
prescribes that UNHCR must examine the applicability of exclusion based on the 
criteria of Article 1F in the following situations: where the Office determines eligibility 
for refugee status of former combatants; in the context of cancellation or revocation 
proceedings, if exclusion considerations arise from persons whom UNHCR has 
previously recognised as refugees under its international protection mandate, either 
on a prima facie basis or following an individualized assessment of the merits of their 
claims. 
115 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 2, para. 192. 
116 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 98. 
117 ExCom Conclusions, No. 107 (LVIII) – 5 October 2007, Children at Risk.  
118 UNHCR Guidelines on the application of Article 1F for child asylum claims, pp. 25-
28.
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each case that the person committed a crime which is covered by one of the 
sub-clauses of Article 1F, or that the person participated in the commission 
of such a crime in a manner which gives rise to criminal liability in accordance 
with internationally applicable standards and 3) it be determined, in cases 
where individual responsibility is established, whether the consequences 
of exclusion of refugee status are proportional to the seriousness of the act 
committed.119 
§ 2.6.1 First two steps of the exclusion analysis 
An answer to the question what kind of conduct is considered to be 
excludable under the exclusion clauses in Article 1F is discussed in the 
previous paragraph. It can be briefly stated that ‘for acts committed during 
armed conflict by soldiers, Article 1F (a) is the most relevant exclusion clause. 
Crimes against peace, which also fall under clause (a), and acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the UN, under clause (c), have generally been 
interpreted as requiring action by someone in a high position of authority 
representing a state or a state-like entity. Serious non-political crimes, under 
Article 1F (b) would also generally not apply unless it was determined that 
the crime was not linked to the armed conflict itself’.120  
Whereas clause (b) requires that the crime in question must have been 
committed ‘outside the country of refuge prior to admission to that country 
as a refugee’, the other exclusion clauses contain no temporal or territorial 
references and are, therefore, applicable at any time, irrespective of the 
country where the act took place. The standard of proof under Article 1F is 
‘serious reasons for considering’ which does not require a determination of 
guilt in the criminal justice sense, but is more than a simple suspicion.121 A 
criminal conviction in the host country for the crime which falls under the 
exclusion clauses is thus not necessary for the application of Article 1F. Clear 
evidence is required and non-cooperation in itself does not establish guilt 
in the absence of clear and credible evidence of individual responsibility. 
The Background Note states that ‘it is always important to assess the 
reasons for the individual’s non-cooperation as it may be due to problems of 
understanding, trauma, mental capacity, fear or other factors’. Consideration 
of exclusion in such cases may, however, be irrelevant if non-cooperation 
means that the basics of an asylum claim cannot be established.122 
With regard to the evidence, it is laid down that ‘anonymous evidence (where 
the source is concealed) may be relied upon in exceptional cases, only where 
this is absolutely necessary to protect the safety of witnesses and the asylum 
seeker’s ability to challenge the substance of the evidence is not substantially 
119 Idem para. 62 and UNHCR Advisory Opinion, 12 September 2005 p. 6. 
120 UNHCR Advisory Opinion, 12 September 2005, pp. 6-7. 
121 Bliss 2000. 
122 Guidelines on Exclusion, para. 35.
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prejudiced. Secret evidence or evidence considered in camera (where the 
substance is also concealed) should not be relied upon to exclude’. For cases 
in which certain evidence is being withheld within the scope of national 
security interests of a country, the UNHCR prescribes that such interests 
may be protected by introducing procedural safeguards which also respect 
the asylum seeker’s due process rights.123  
In all cases, the determination of a refugee claim, including application of the 
exclusion clauses requires an individualised assessment; each case must be 
evaluated on its own facts.
The Guidelines on the application of Article 1F for child asylum claims 
explain that the rules and principles that also address the special status, 
rights and protection afforded to children under international and national 
law at all stages of the asylum procedure have to be considered. Especially 
those related to ‘the best interest of the child, the mental capacity of children 
and their ability to understand and consent to acts that they are requested 
or ordered to undertake need to be considered’ in accordance with the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Though the Refugee Convention 
does not make a distinction between adults and minors, the exclusion clauses 
may not apply at all in the case of a young child and can only be applied 
to a child when they have reached the age of criminal responsibility as 
established by international and/or national law at the time of the committed 
act.124 There is no unambiguous answer to what this age is, as there is no 
universally recognised age limit which results in disparities between states’ 
practice.125 The ICC applies the age of eighteen and has no jurisdiction for 
those who were under eighteen when committing the offence. The individual 
assessment of a claim also counts in mass-influx situations and the fact that 
individual RSD is usually not practicable in mass-influx situations does not 
justify group exclusion.126 According to the Guidelines on the application of 
Article 1F in mass-influx situations ‘preparation and planning for exclusion 
procedures and related measures should begin early on, and a number of steps 
may be taken from the initial stages of mass-influx situation to facilitate the 
conduct of exclusion proceedings as soon as possible’.127 The Background 
Note prescribes that in large-scale movements, ‘suspected armed elements 
should be interned in a location away from the refugee camp and should not 
automatically benefit from a prima facie RSD. They should not be considered 
as asylum seekers until the authorities have established within a reasonable 
123 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 112.
124 UNHCR Guidelines on the application of Article 1F for child asylum claims, para. 
59-63. 
125 If the age of criminal responsibility is higher in the country of origin, this should also 
be taken into account in the child’s favour. 
126 Guidelines on Exclusion in Mass-Influx Situations, para. 18.
127 Idem, p. 3.
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time-frame that they have genuinely renounced military activities. Once 
this has been determined, their claims, including consideration of exclusion 
will be examined on an individual basis’.128 UNHCR believes taking part in 
armed conflict is not itself a ground for exclusion, although an assessment 
of the person’s conduct during armed conflict will be required. Detention 
of ‘normal’ persons (who not have been involved in armed conflict) whose 
exclusion is being examined is permitted only under certain limited 
conditions, when detention is not arbitrary and is imposed for as long as 
necessary.129 With individual assessment, the application of the exclusion 
clauses requires individual responsibility to be established in relation to the 
committed act under Article 1F. 
§ 2.6.2 Individual responsibility
To exclude a person from a refugee status, individual responsibility must 
be established regarding the crime which falls under Article 1F. In general, 
individual responsibility arises when the person has committed or made a 
substantial contribution to the criminal act, in the knowledge that their act 
or omission would facilitate the criminal conduct.130 The person does not 
need to have physically committed the criminal act in question; ‘instigating, 
aiding and abetting and participating in a joint criminal enterprise can 
suffice’.131 The degree of involvement of the person concerned has to be 
carefully analysed in each case. Persons with a senior position in a repressive 
government or members of an organisation involved in unlawful violence 
are not automatically excluded from a refugee status.132 A presumption 
of responsibility reversing the burden of proof may, however, arise where 
the individual has remained a member of a government clearly engaged 
in activities that fall within the scope of Article 1F. This is also the case 
128 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 96-97. 
129 Guidelines on Exclusion in Mass-Influx Situations, para. 58. 
130 Idem, para. 51.
131 ICC Kvočka and others case, App. No. IT-9830/1, 2 November 2001, para. 122 et 
seq. See also Article 25 of the ICC Statute which sets out the grounds for individual 
responsibility under its jurisdiction. 
132 Article 28 of the ICC Statute deals with commander/superior responsibility and states 
that a military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall 
be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed 
by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and 
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such forces, where:
 (i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at 
the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; and (ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission 
or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
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when a person volunteered to be a member of an organisation of which the 
purposes, activities and methods are of a particularly violent nature, such 
as indiscriminate killing, injury of the civilian population or acts of torture. 
According to the Background Note ‘caution must be exercised when such a 
presumption of responsibility arises, when considering the actual activities 
of the group, the organisation’s place and role in the society in which 
operates, its organisational structure, the individual’s position in it and their 
ability to influence significantly its activities and the possible fragmentation 
of the group’. Exclusion is also not automatically justified when an individual 
is associated with an organisation designated as a terrorist group on a list 
of the international community. However, a presumption of individual 
responsibility may arise when the list has a credible basis and the criteria 
on the list are such that all members or the listed persons can reasonably be 
considered to be individually involved in violent crimes.133  
To have individual criminal responsibility for the committed offence, the 
person concerned has to satisfy the mens rea requirement which means that 
he must have acted with knowledge and intent. Article 30 of the ICC Statute 
defines knowledge as an awareness that certain circumstances exist or that a 
consequence would occur in the ordinary course of events. A person has intent 
where the person meant to engage in the conduct at issue or to bring about a 
particular consequence. If the mens rea is missing, the person cannot be held 
responsible for the offence. There are situations, in which the person may not 
have the mental capacity to be responsible, such as children. As previously 
stated, young children cannot be excluded at all and for children who might 
be individually responsible for an excludable act, the issue whether they have 
the necessary mental state has to be a central factor in the exclusion analysis.134 
The assessment needs to consider elements such as the child’s emotional, 
mental and intellectual development. It is important to determine whether the 
child was sufficiently mature to understand the nature and consequences of its 
conduct and, thus, to commit, or participate in, the commission of the crime.135 
When it is concluded that the mental capacity is present, other reasons for 
rejecting individual responsibility have to be taken into account.  
§ 2.6.3 Defences to the exclusion 
Defences to criminal liability mentioned by the UNHCR are superior 
orders, duress/coercion and self-defence or defence of other persons 
or property. In the case of child soldiers, questions of immaturity and 
133 UNHCR Background Note 2003, paras. 50-62 and UNHCR Statement on Article 
1F, July 2009, see also § 3.4.2 for more on the exclusion of persons who are members 
of a terrorist organisation. 
134 Happold 2002, pp. 1131-1176.
135 Guidelines on the application of Article 1F for child asylum claims, para. 64.
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involuntary intoxication can be added. With regard to the first mentioned 
defence, Article 33 of the ICC Statute prescribes that it will only apply if 
the individual in question was under a legal obligation to obey the order in 
question, was unaware that the order was unlawful and the order itself was 
not manifestly unlawful. Duress only applies when the act in question results 
from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious 
bodily harm to him or another person, and that the person does not intend 
to cause greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.136 An additional 
element for consideration from international case law is that the situation 
leading to the duress must not have been voluntarily brought about by the 
person concerned. Additional factors to be taken into consideration for the 
determination whether duress applies in the claims of child soldiers are, inter 
alia, the age at which the child became involved in the armed forces or group; 
the length of time they were a member; the consequences of refusal to join the 
group; any forced use of drugs, alcohol or medication; the level of education 
and understanding of the events in question; and the trauma, abuse or ill-
treatment suffered by the child as a result of their involvement.137 Even if 
circumstances do not give rise to a defence, the circumstances which reduce 
the level of a person’s individual responsibility for a crime and in the case of 
children, the vulnerability of those who are subjected to ill-treatment should 
be taken into account when considering the proportionality of exclusion 
which will be discussed in the next subparagraph.138 
The Background Note explains that in the situation wherein the excluded 
person has already served a penal sentence, each case requires an individual 
consideration on the application of Article 1F, with relevant factors such 
as passage of time since the offence was committed, the seriousness of 
the offence and whether the person has expressed regret or renounced 
criminal activities. In the case of the worst crimes it may be considered 
that the person still does not deserve protection and should be excluded. 
According to the UNHCR Handbook, there is a presumption that Article 1F 
is no longer applicable in the case of pardons or amnesties, unless it can be 
shown that despite the pardon or amnesty, the applicant’s criminal character 
still dominates.139 This means that in some cases, a crime may be of such a 
heinous nature that the application of Article 1F is still considered justified 
despite the existence of a pardon or amnesty.140  
136 Article 31 (d) of the ICC Statute.
137 Advisory opinion, 12 September 2005, p. 9-11. 
138 The Advisory opinion prescribes that the forcible conscription of children under 
the age of 18 is a violation of human rights law and of children under the age of 15, 
whether forcible or not, and their active use in hostilities is considered a war crime, p. 
12.
139 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, para. 157.
140 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 72.




The last stage of the exclusion analysis concerns the proportionality test.141 
The UNHCR expresses that consideration of proportionality is an important 
safeguard in the application of Article 1F as the consequence of the exclusion 
is the denial of a set of rights attached to refugee status, including protection 
from removal to a country where the person could face persecution. The 
concept of proportionality is not expressly mentioned in the Refugee 
Convention or the travaux preparatoires, but ‘has evolved particularly 
in relation to Article 1F (b) and represents a fundamental principle of 
many fields of international law’. The test means that when a decision on 
exclusion is being reached and individual responsibility is established, the 
gravity of the offence in question must be weighed up against the degree of 
persecution feared upon return. If it is plausible that the person will face 
severe persecution, the criminal act in question needs to be very serious to 
exclude the person. However, when the offences are crimes against peace, 
crimes against humanity and acts falling under Article 1F (c), such a test is 
not required as the acts are so grave.142 In the case of children factors such 
as age, maturity and vulnerability must be taken into account, even if the 
circumstances do not give rise to a defence. For child soldiers, possible 
mitigating factors such as ill-treatment of the child by military personnel or 
circumstances of service can be added. The consequences and treatment that 
the child may face upon return also need to be considered.143 The UNHCR 
states that in addition, the proportionality test should include an examination 
whether other guarantees under human rights instruments will apply. 
Besides the three-step analysis discussed above, there are a few more 
points to be mentioned which are also relevant within the framework of 
the exclusion analysis. The next subparagraph will deal with the subjects of 
the burden of proof, reasons for cancellation/revocation and the position of 
family members.  
 
§ 2.6.5 Relevant aspects related to the exclusion analysis
For asylum claims in general, the legal principle is that the burden of proof 
lies with the person submitting a claim. However, it is often the case that 
persons fleeing from persecution arrive with almost nothing and are 
therefore unable to support their statements by documentary or other proof. 
The UNHCR Handbook states that ‘while the burden of proof in principle 
rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant 
facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. With respect to 
141 For a detailed discussion on the proportionality test see Rasulov 2002.
142 Guidelines on Exclusion, para. 24. 
143 Guidelines on the application of Article 1F for child claims, para. 64.
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exclusion cases, the burden of proof shifts to the state (or UNHCR) and the 
applicant should be given the benefit of the doubt. According to the UNHCR 
Handbook, ‘the benefit of the doubt should, however, only be given when all 
available evidence has been obtained and checked and when the examiner 
is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility; his/her statement’s must 
be coherent and plausible and must not run counter to generally known 
facts’.144 Shifting the burden of proof in exclusion cases is ‘consistent with 
the exceptional nature of the exclusion clauses and the general principle 
that the person wishing to establish an issue should bear the burden of 
proof’. In some cases, the burden of proof may be reversed which leads to 
a rebuttable presumption of excludability. It has been previously discussed 
that this may be the case when the applicant has remained a member of a 
government clearly engaged in activities that fall within the scope of Article 
1F. In addition, when the applicant has been indicted by an international 
criminal court, the burden of proof is reversed. To refute the presumption 
in such cases, the applicant needs to have a plausible explanation regarding 
non-involvement or dissociation from any excludable acts, coupled with an 
absence of serious evidence to the contrary.145 
In cases wherein facts are revealed after recognition of the person as a refugee 
which would have justified exclusion and thus that the person should not 
have been recognised as a refugee in the first place can lead to cancellation of 
the refugee status.146 The standards applicable to the cancellation of refugee 
status are set out in the UNHCR Note on the Cancellation of Refugee 
Status.147 The UNHCR Handbook states that ‘normally it will be during 
the process of determining a person’s refugee status that the facts leading 
to exclusion under these clauses will emerge. It may however, also happen 
that facts justifying exclusion will become known only after a person has 
been recognised as a refugee. In such cases, the exclusion clause will call 
for a cancellation of the decision previously taken’.148 It is important to note 
that the cancellation is not related to the person’s conduct after refugee 
determination. If a person commits a crime in the country of refuge, they are 
liable to criminal prosecution according to the laws of that country. They can 
risk an expulsion to the country of origin, but the action does not per se lead 
to revocation of refugee status. However, when the offence falls within the 
scope of Article 1F (a) or (c), revocation of the status would be appropriate, 
provided all the criteria for the application of these clauses are met.149 
144 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 2, para. 204. 
145 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 110.
146 Such reasons can be for instance that the person has given a false presentation of the 
facts or possesses another nationality than declared.   
147 UNHCR Note on the Cancellation of Refugee Status, 22 November 2004. 
148 In cancellation cases, the person concerned is not and has never been a refugee.  
149 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 17.
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In mass-influx situations where recognition as a refugee was made on a prima 
facie basis, exclusion is often examined in the context of cancellation.150 It is 
laid down in the Guidelines on the Application of Article 1F in Mass-Influx 
Situations that it is for the decision maker to establish the facts to support 
a decision to cancel refugee status on exclusion grounds. If the available 
evidence does not meet the threshold for exclusion, cancellation of refugee 
status may still be justified in those cases where non-cooperation and/or 
lack of credibility would have justified a rejection if it had arisen during the 
examination of the initial claim. Notification of intent to cancel or revoke 
should be given in time to enable the person concerned to prepare for the 
interview or hearing and regardless of the grounds for cancellation, the 
decision to cancel the refugee status should be reviewed on appeal.151  
UNHCR expresses with regard to extradition proceedings that in general 
refugee claims must be determined in a final decision before execution of 
any extradition order. This is not necessary when the person concerned 
does not risk indirect refoulement in case of extradition to a third state or 
is surrendered to an international criminal tribunal.152 If the host state has 
jurisdiction over the acts which caused exclusion, it may start criminal 
proceedings in its national justice system, though this will not always be the 
case and not easy concerning the gathering of evidence.  
According to the principle of family unity, dependants are normally granted 
a refugees status when the head of the family is eligible for a refugee status. 
In the case of exclusion of the main applicant, this does not mean that family 
members are also automatically excluded. Their asylum claims need to be 
determined on an individual basis. If there are serious reasons for considering 
that family members are individually responsible for excludable crimes, 
they will be denied a refugee status. When family members are recognised 
as refugees, the excluded person cannot rely on the right to family unity in 
order to receive a refugee status.153 The Guidelines on Exclusion in Mass-
Influx Situations add that ‘in those cases where the separation of potentially 
excludable persons from the group of refugees and their subsequent 
confinement is warranted, their family members should not be subjected to 
such measures unless this is necessary and justified because they themselves 
come within the scope of exclusion and that exceptions may be considered 
where it is the wish of family members to stay with their detained or interned 
relative’.154 
150 Guidelines on Exclusion in Mass-Influx Situations, para. 27.
151 Idem, p. 10.
152 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 102. 
153 Idem, para. 94.
154 Guidelines on Exclusion in Mass-Influx Situations, para. 59.




After the Second World War, the time when the Refugee Convention was 
drafted, the memory of the trials of major war criminals was still very much 
alive and there was agreement on the part of states, that war criminals did not 
deserve protection and should be denied admission to their territories. This 
view led to the adoption of Article 1F in the Convention which contains three 
exclusion clauses. These clauses prescribe when an asylum seeker is to be 
excluded from a refugee status, but answers to all kinds of questions relating to 
this exclusion are not provided. The fact that there is no international refugee 
tribunal providing conclusive interpretations on the Convention means that 
Member States’ practices concerning the application of the exclusion clauses 
differ. In order to give authorities, who have to determine refugee status and 
possibly exclusion, general guidelines to hold on to, the UNHCR compiled 
comprehensive documents which are considered to have persuasive authority 
but are not binding. The UNHCR Handbook, Background Note and several 
Guidelines on, inter alia, children and mass-influx, discuss how the clauses 
should be interpreted and various aspects relating to exclusion which staff 
members may encounter in practice. According to the UNHCR a three-
step exclusion analysis has to be followed when there are indications that a 
person has been involved in excludable acts. After an individual assessment 
of the case, individual responsibility regarding the crime concerned has to 
be established. Members of an organisation involved in unlawful violence 
or designated as a terrorist group are not automatically excluded. However, 
this situation can cause the reversal of the burden of proof. The last stage 
of the analysis concerns the proportionality test, which means that when an 
exclusion decision is taken and individual responsibility is established, the 
gravity of the offence must be weighted up against the degree of persecution 
feared upon return to their country of origin. 
The Handbook states that ‘the determination of refugee status is by no 
means a mechanical and routine process. On the contrary, it calls for 
specialised knowledge, training and experience, and what is more important, 
an understanding of the particular situation of the applicant and the human 
factors involved’.155 This also applies in the exclusion process within the 
RSD; The UNHCR can provide general guidance, but eventually each case 
must be considered on its own merit and it is up to the officials of the Member 
States to deal with it properly.
155 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 2, para. 222.
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Chapter 3  EU legislation and case law on the  
exclusion clauses
§ 3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I looked into the history of the drafting proceedings 
of Article 1F in the Refugee Convention. In addition, I studied the 
UNHCR’s point of view on the application of the exclusion clauses in the 
Refugee Status Determination procedure which are laid down in several 
non-binding authoritative papers. Besides these UN documents, Europe has 
also developed its own immigration and asylum law. As Boeles states, ‘there 
is no such thing as a coherent and complete set of binding rules within a 
single European legal order that can be said to embody European migration 
law.156 This chapter will deal with the sphere of the EU to be followed by the 
Council of Europe (CoE) which will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
The aim of creating a Common European Asylum System as set out in the 
Tampere European Council Conclusions of 1999, led to the adoption of 
secondary legislation within this field which falls under the Directorate-
General of Home Affairs. With the CEAS, the EU pursues to stop the diversity 
in national asylum legislations and practices among states which it sees as one 
of the main factors for asylum flows to Europe. As it is beyond the scope of this 
study to discuss all EU legislation within this area, the following paragraphs 
will deal with the four main asylum Directives: the Temporary Protection 
Directive, he Reception Conditions Directive, he Qualification Directive and 
the Directive on Asylum Procedures. The focus will particularly be on the 
inserted provisions on exclusion within the scope of these Directives. In this 
discussion, consideration will be given to comments made on the exclusion 
provisions and the recast Directives which replaced the originals and serve 
as starting point for this research. Also attention will be paid to the Returns 
Directive which is to be seen as the key instrument in the EU’s return policy157 
and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Further, I will elaborate on the 
available reports of cases before the ECJ regarding the exclusion provisions of 
the Directives finalising the chapter with a commentary.  
156 According to Boeles, Den Heijer, Lodder & Wouters 2009, p. 35, at least five legal 
spheres exist: national legislation of European States; EU legislation; treaties 
concluded within the framework of the Council of Europe; treaties concluded within 
the UN; bilateral and multilateral treaties concluded between Member States of the 
EU and third countries. 
157 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third country nationals.
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§ 3.2 Asylum policy at EU-level
The Maastricht Treaty which was adopted in 1992 formally recognised 
asylum law as a common interest of the EU.158 Though several instruments 
were adopted in the EU on asylum after 1992, the insertion of a new title 
IV (Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other policies related to free movement 
of persons - Articles 61-69) in the EC Treaty (TEC) provided the Union 
Institutions with new powers to develop binding legislation within this field. 
With this Treaty, the Union committed to establish an area of freedom, 
security and justice of which Article 61 TEC forms the legal basis. Article 
63 TEC deals with asylum, immigration and safeguarding the rights of third 
country nationals. According to Battjes, the powers on asylum matters given 
to the Community by Article 63 TEC are conditioned in four respects: ‘firstly, 
by the objective to create an area of freedom, security and justice; secondly, 
the degree of harmonisation that Community measures can produce; thirdly, 
imposing the obligation to adopt measures on most asylum issues within five 
years of the entry into force of the TEC and fourthly, the standards paragraph 
1 sets for its subsections as they must be in accordance with the Refugee 
Convention, 1967 Protocol and other relevant instruments of international 
law’.159 These measures as stated under paragraph 1 deal with the following 
areas: (a) criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is 
responsible for considering an application for asylum submitted by a national 
of a third country in one of the Member States; (b) minimum standards on 
the reception of asylum seekers in Member States; (c) minimum standards 
with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries as refugees 
and (d) minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting 
or withdrawing refugee status. Article 63 (2) TEC concerns measures on 
refugees and displaced persons in the areas of: (a) minimum standards for 
giving temporary protection to displaced persons from third countries who 
cannot return to their country of origin and for persons who otherwise need 
international protection; (b) promoting a balance of effort between Member 
States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and 
displaced persons.
In 1999, the TEC entered into force and a special meeting was held in 
Tampere where the European Council discussed its Justice and Home Affairs 
provisions. According to the Tampere milestones, ‘the aim is an open and 
secure EU, not only to its own citizens but also applicable to third country 
nationals’. One of the main topics at the summit was to work towards ‘a 
CEAS, based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention’, 
thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the 
158 Treaty on EU, 7 February 1992. 
159 Battjes 2006, p. 140.   
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principle of non-refoulement.160 At Tampere it was decided to construct the 
CEAS in two stages of which the first stage (five-year programme) aimed 
to harmonise Member States’ legal frameworks on the basis of common 
minimum standards ensuring fairness, efficiency and transparency.161 
Within this framework, several legislative measures are adopted between the 
years 1999-2006 in the field of asylum, of which the four main measures are: 
•	 Temporary Protection Directive;162
•	 Reception Conditions Directive;163
•	 The Qualification Directive;164 
•	 Directive on Asylum Procedures.165
Other measures adopted in this period that also apply to asylum cases are, 
inter alia, the Family Reunification Directive,166 Eurodac -and Dublin II 
Regulation.167 
A new five-year programme followed the Tampere Programme. The Hague 
Programme set out ten priorities for the Union with a view to strengthening 
the area of freedom, security and justice from 2005 to 2010.168 The 
Programme invited the EC to conclude the evaluation of the first-phase legal 
160 Tampere Summit Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999, point 13.
161 Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System, Brussels, 6.6.2007, 
COM(2007) 301 final, p. 2. 
162 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection in the event of a mass-influx of displaced persons and on 
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such 
persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12). 
163 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards 
for the reception of asylum seekers (OJ L 31, 6.2.2003, p. 18).  
164 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees 
or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted (OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 12).
165 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (OJ L 326, 
13.12.2005, p. 13).
166 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Right to Family 
Reunification. 
167 For an exhaustive overview of the legislative measures, financial programmes and 
other documents adopted within the scope of the CEAS between 1999-2006 see 
Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System Brussels, 6.6.2007, 
COM(2007) 301 final. 
168 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
of 10 May 2005- The Hague Programme: ten priorities for the next five years. The 
Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice 
[COM(2005) 184 final – Official Journal C 236 of 24.9.2005].
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instruments and submit the second-phase instruments and measures to the 
Council and European Parliament with a view to their adoption before the 
end of 2010. In June 2007, the Commission presented a Green Paper for an 
in-depth reflection and debate on the future developments of the CEAS.169 
The results of the evaluation formed the basis for a Policy Plan on Asylum 
in 2008 in which the Commission claims that despite the important asylum 
acquis which binds Member States, large discrepancies still exist between 
asylum decisions adopted by the different Member States and believes 
it is necessary to accompany legal harmonisation with effective practical 
cooperation in the form of creating a European Asylum Support Office.170 
In the light of the Policy Plan, the European Council presented the European 
Pact on Immigration and Asylum in the same year.171 In its Pact, the Council 
makes five commitments which need to be converted into concrete measures, 
in particular what will follow the Hague Programme in 2010. To construct 
a Europe of asylum, the Council agreed to establish an EASO as already 
proposed by the Commission, which was set up in November 2010. Among 
other things, the tasks of the EASO are to support Member States in their 
efforts to implement a more consistent and fairer asylum policy, for example 
by helping to identify good practices, organizing training at European level 
and improving access to accurate information on countries of origin and 
work closely with the authorities responsible for asylum in the Member 
States and with the Office of the UNHCR.172 In 2008, also the Returns 
Directive was adopted. 
Although, with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 
2009, the Commission planned the CEAS by the end of 2010, the deadline 
for the completion of the second phase of the CEAS was rescheduled. With 
the Lisbon Treaty, the European Community was replaced by the EU which 
succeeded it and took over all its rights and obligations. The Treaty on 
European Union kept the same name and the TEC became the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The legal framework in asylum 
policy, as was laid down in Article 63 TEC is modified into Article 78 TFEU. 
Article 78 (1) TFEU prescribes that ‘The Union shall develop a common 
policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a 
view to offering appropriate status to any third country national requiring 
international protection and ensuring compliance with the non-refoulement 
principle’. The policy must be in accordance with the Refugee Convention, 
169 Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System. 
170 Policy Plan on Asylum – An integrated approach to protection across the EU, 
COM(2008) 360 final, 17.6.2008, p. 6.
171 Brussels, 24 September 2008 (07.10) 13440/08.
172 <http://easo.europa.eu/> (last accessed on 21 September 2015). In Chapter 8, I will 
elaborate on the EASO with regard to the task of drawing up country reports.  
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1967 Protocol and other relevant treaties. Contrary to Article 63 TEC, this 
provision does not refer to ‘minimum standards’ anymore but to ‘common 
procedures/system’. Another new aspect is that Article 78 (2) of the TFEU 
states that measures shall be adopted for a CEAS comprising: a ‘uniform 
status’ of asylum/subsidiary protection. In addition to Article 63 TEC, the 
Lisbon Treaty has brought some other relevant changes which influence the 
EU asylum policy. These were:
•	 The Charter for Fundamental Rights which includes the right to asylum173 
and prohibition of the non-refoulement principle is given full legal status 
and is accepted as legally binding;174 
•	 The scope for activity of the ECJ is extended to full jurisdiction over 
Justice and Home Affairs and
•	 Decisions on Justice and Home Affairs are subject to the ordinary 
legislative procedure and qualified majority voting. The last mentioned 
is a voting system whereby 55% EU Council members (fifteen states), 
representing at least 65% of the EU’s population must vote in favour of a 
proposal from the Commission for it to pass. Votes are spread in relation 
to the size of a country.175 Article 78 (2) and (3) of the TFEU regarding 
measures concerning a CEAS176 is also transferred to the qualified 
majority vote.
In addition to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, 
the Stockholm Programme was also adopted by the European Council on 
which the current work of the DG Home Affairs is based. The Stockholm 
Programme sets out the EU’s priorities for the area of justice, freedom and 
security for the period 2010-2014 in which the Council outlines that it is 
‘time for a new agenda to enable the Union and its Member States to build on 
the achievements of the Tampere and Hague Programmes and to meet future 
challenges’. According to the Programme all actions taken in the future 
should be centered on the citizens of the Union and other persons for whom 
the Union has a responsibility. The Union should, in the years to come, work 
on 6 main priorities among which, ‘a Europe built on fundamental rights’ 
and ‘a Europe of responsibility, solidarity and partnership in migration and 
asylum matters’. The Council states that the area of freedom, security and 
justice must be a single area in which fundamental rights and freedoms are 
protected.177 The Council recalls that the establishment of a CEAS by 2012 
173 See Article 18 of the EU Charter. 
174 Along with Poland and the Czech Republic, the UK negotiated the right to opt-out 
from the Charter.
175 The new voting rule that emerged with the Lisbon Treaty came into force in November 
2014. 
176 Article 78 TFEU are ex Articles 63, points 1 and 2 and 64 (2) of the TEC.
177 European Council, The Stockholm Programme - an open and secure Europe serving 
and protecting citizens (2010/C 115/01). 
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which is based on a full and inclusive application of the Refugee Convention 
and other international treaties remain a key policy objective for the Union 
and states that it:178
‘remains committed to the objective of establishing a common area of 
protection and solidarity based on a common asylum procedure and a 
uniform status for those granted international protection. While CEAS 
should be based on high protection standards, due regard should also be 
given to fair and effective procedures capable of preventing abuse. It is crucial 
that individuals, regardless of the Member State in which their application 
for asylum is lodged, are offered an equivalent level of treatment as regards 
reception conditions, and the same level as regards procedural arrangements 
and status determination. The objective should be that similar cases should 
be treated alike and result in the same outcome’. 
As the Stockholm Programme ended in March 2014, the European 
Commission adopted a communication titled ‘An open and secure Europe: 
making it happen’,179 which identifies the central issues to be tackled over the 
next years regarding the Home Affairs area. 
§ 3.3 Current asylum acquis
As mentioned above, four main Directives on asylum law have been adopted 
during the first phase of the CEAS of which Article 63 TEC, by now changed 
into Article 78 TFEU forms the legal basis. The Directives only apply to 
third country nationals or stateless persons and are thus not applicable 
to EU citizens. This is in accordance with Protocol no. 29 on asylum for 
nationals of EU Member States which falls under the Amsterdam Treaty 
of 1997.180 Taking for granted that the Union shall respect the fundamental 
rights as guaranteed by the ECHR, Member States are considered as safe 
countries of origin in respect of each other in asylum issues. Accordingly, 
any application for asylum made by a national of a Member State may be 
taken into consideration or declared admissible for processing by another 
Member State only in the cases as laid down in the Protocol.181 
The European Council underlined in the Hague Programme the importance 
of reconsideration of the procedures used for implementing these 
instruments. To achieve a common level of procedures and uniform statuses. 
On the basis of evaluations done by the Commission and organisations, such 
178 Stockholm Programme, under heading 6.2.
179 <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/basic-documents/docs/
an_open_and_secure_europe_-_making_it_happen_en.pdf> (last accessed on 21 
September 2015). 
180 OJ C 321, E/306 (2006).
181 See Protocol <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
12006E/PRO/29:EN:HTML> (last accessed on 21 September 2015). 
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as Amnesty International and the European Council for Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE), which are interested in the asylum matter and comments delivered 
to the Directives by these organisations, shortcomings have been identified 
and where necessary a proposal for a recast of the Directive in question was 
adopted. UNHCR is one of the organisations which followed the development 
of EU asylum law and also made comments and recommendations on the 
Directives. The competence of this Office is recognised in EU law as it laid 
down in Article 78 (1) TFEU that a common policy on asylum, subsidiary 
protection and temporary protection must be in accordance with the 
Refugee Convention.182 The discussion of the Directives on asylum law in the 
following subparagraphs will particularly focus on the provisions relating to 
the exclusion clauses of Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, which are put 
in the table below. Article 72 of the TFEU should also be mentioned because 
it allows Member States to make public order exceptions concerning the 
entry and residence of third country nationals. This means that to maintain 
public order and internal security, states have the power to impose restrictive 
measures concerning the application of EU asylum law. 
Temporary Protection 
Directive
Exclusion from temporary protection: Article 28 
Right to challenge the exclusion: Article 29
Recast Reception 
Conditions Directive
Articles 8-11 on detention (see 8 (3) (e) when 




Exclusion and revocation from refugee status: 
Articles 12 & 14
Exclusion and revocation from subsidiary 
protection: Articles 17 & 19
Protection from refoulement: Article 21
Recast Directive on Asylum 
Procedures
Examination procedure: Article 31 (8) (j)
182 Also Declaration 17 to the TEC prescribed that ‘consultations shall be established 
with the UNHCR and other relevant international organisations on matters 
relating to asylum policy’. UNHCR’s supervisory role is further recognised in 
Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office. Recital 10 of 
the Regulations’ Preamble prescribes that the Support Office should act in close 
cooperation with UNHCR and in recital 17 is laid down that UNHCR should have 
a non-voting seat on the EASO’s Management Board. 
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Though the Returns Directive does not include specific provisions relating 
to exclusion, it is also of importance for those who fall under Article 1F. The 
application of Article 1F leads to the situation that the alien is not eligible 
for refugee or subsidiary protection and if the state concerned does not 
grant a stay on any other ground, the person becomes illegal. That is where 
this Directive is applicable because it applies to third country nationals 
staying illegally in a Member State. Article 1 of the Directive states that 
this Directive set outs out common standards and procedures to be applied 
in Member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals 
and makes a reference to respect fundamental rights and international law 
obligations as general principles of EU law, among which the ECHR and 
Refugee Convention are explicitly stated. This is also expressed in Article 5 
in four specific rights, including the principle of non-refoulement. According 
to Article 9 (1) (a), states have to postpone removal when it violates this 
principle and aliens should be provided with certain safeguards during this 
postponement.183 Within this perspective is recital 12 relevant which lays 
down that ‘the situation of third country nationals who are staying illegally 
but who cannot yet be removed should be addressed and their basic conditions 
of subsistence should be defined according to national legislation’. Several 
provisions of the Directive will be dealt with later on in this study when it 
concerns the discussion of subjects relating to those.184 
§ 3.3.1 Temporary Protection Directive
This Directive from 2001 is the first instrument adopted under the Tampere 
Programme which the Member States had to implement by 1 January 2003. 
It establishes minimum standards for temporary protection in the event of 
a mass-influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to 
return to their country of origin and, promotes a balance of effort between 
Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving such 
persons. The Commission states in its Explanatory Memorandum that:
‘the consequences of a mass-influx of displaced persons in the Union impose 
such pressures on the asylum system that special arrangements are necessary 
to give immediate protection to the persons who need it and avoid blocking 
up the asylum system, which would be against the interests not only of states 
but also of other persons seeking protection outside the mass-influx’.185 The 
183 Article 14 (1) of the Returns Directive prescribes that during the period for which 
removal has been postponed in accordance with Article 9, states have to take into 
account as far as possible that a) family unity with family members in their territory is 
maintained; b) emergency health care and essential treatment of illness are provided; 
c) minors are granted access to the basic education system subject to the length of 
their stay and d) special needs of vulnerable persons are taken into account. 
184 See § 3.3.2.1 and § 4.3. 
185 Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2000) 303 final, p. 3.
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Commission particularly referred here to the experience of EU countries 
concerning a large-scale movement of people fleeing the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia and later Kosovo. According to recital 9 of the Preamble, the 
standards and measures of the Member States for temporary protection are 
laid down in one single instrument for reasons of effectiveness, coherence 
and solidarity and, in particular, to avert the risk of secondary movements. 
Temporary protection is an exceptional measure which appears from 
the fact that the existence of a mass-influx of displaced persons has to be 
established by the Council adopted by qualified majority vote on a proposal 
from the Commission. The Council decision referring to a specific group 
of persons shall introduce temporary protection with respect to them in 
all Member States.186 Before the decision is taken, each Member State has 
to indicate its capacity of reception in figures or in general terms which is 
included in this decision.187 The duration of temporary protection is one 
year, with a possible automatic extension of two six-month periods for a 
maximum of one year. After this period, the temporary protection can be 
extended by another year and ends when the maximum duration of three 
years is reached or at any time by a Council decision adopted by qualified 
majority on a proposal of the Commission when the country of origin is 
considered to be safe.188 The Directive covers the voluntary return of former 
temporarily protected persons as well as the forced return which has to be 
conducted with due respect for human dignity. In the case of forced return, 
compelling humanitarian reasons which may make return impossible or 
unreasonable in specific cases have to be considered by Member States.189 
Kerber states that especially mentioned are persons whose state of health 
does not allow travelling. Other compelling reasons against forced return are 
the continuation of an armed conflict or serious human rights violations, or 
the fact that return is not realistic due to an ethnic or other affiliation of a 
person or group of persons or not possible due to an imminent danger of 
torture or cruel or inhuman treatment.190 Chapter 3 of the Directive deals 
with the obligations of Member States towards persons enjoying temporary 
protection and prescribes, inter alia, that residence permits during the 
protection period, medical assistance, suitable accommodation and access 
to the education system for persons under 18 years must be ensured.  
186 Article 5 of the Directive. 
187 This derives from the fact that the Temporary Directive is based on the assumption 
that Member States shall handle in a spirit of community solidarity as laid down in 
Article 25 (1).  
188 Article 6 of the Directive.
189 Articles 21-22 of the Directive. 
190 Kerber 2002, p. 209.
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§ 3.3.1.1 Exclusion from temporary protection
Pursuant to Article 28 (1) of the Directive, Member States may exclude a 
person from temporary protection based on the four grounds stated, of 
which the first three correspond to the grounds of Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention.191 The first ground conforms with Article 1F (a) of the Refugee 
Convention and excludes a person if there are serious reasons for considering 
that they committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in international instruments.192 The second ground, 
prescribed in paragraph 1 (a) (ii), excludes a person if they have committed 
a serious non-political crime outside the Member State of reception prior 
to the admission to that country which corresponds to Article 1F (b) of the 
Refugee Convention. The difference between this clause and Article 1F (b) 
is that formulations on the balance test and classifying particularly cruel 
actions as non-political crimes are added. This way, the clause on the whole 
reads as follows: a person may be excluded when there are serious reasons for 
considering that ‘they have committed a serious non-political crime outside 
the Member State of reception prior to his or her admission to that Member 
State as a person enjoying temporary protection’. The severity of the expected 
persecution is to be weighed against the nature of the criminal offence of 
which the person concerned is suspected. Particularly cruel actions, even if 
committed with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious 
non-political crimes. This applies both to the participants in the crime and 
to its instigators’. Thirdly, a person may be excluded if he or she has been 
guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN.193 The last 
exclusion ground is prescribed in Article 28 (1) (b) of the Directive: a person 
may be excluded from temporary protection if ‘there are reasonable grounds 
for regarding him or her as a danger to the security of the host Member State 
or having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
he or she is a danger to the community of the host Member State’. This 
ground is not derived from Article 1F, but from Article 33 (2) of the Refugee 
Convention. As it is also included in the same wordings or in a different 
form in provisions of the other Directives to be dealt with, a more detailed 
discussion on this ground can be found under § 3.3.3.  
Article 28 (2) lays down that the application of the exclusion grounds of the 
first paragraph shall be based only on the personal conduct of the person 
concerned and that the decision of exclusion is based on the principle of 
proportionality. According to Article 29 of the Directive, persons who 
191 Recital 22 of the Directive prescribes that it is necessary to determine criteria for the 
exclusion of certain persons from temporary protection in the event of a mass-influx 
of displaced persons. 
192 Article 28 (1) (a) (i). 
193 Article 28 (1) (a) (iii) of the Directive which corresponds to Article 1F (c) of the 
Refugee Convention. 
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have been excluded from the benefit of temporary protection or family 
reunification shall be entitled to mount a legal challenge in the Member State 
concerned which does not necessarily require a judicial body. This latter 
provision is formulated in general terms and does not express whether it 
only applies to persons excluded under Article 28. According to Kerber, ‘it 
might be better to interpret the provision in a wider sense, i.e. giving the right 
to mount legal challenge to any person excluded by a Member State from 
temporary protection for any reason which might for example be because 
somebody is regarded as not belonging to the protected group’.194 
§ 3.3.2 Reception Conditions Directive 
The Tampere Conclusions prescribed that the CEAS should include 
common minimum conditions on the reception of asylum seekers. This 
requirement resulted in the Reception Conditions Directive for those 
waiting for a decision on their asylum application in one of the Member 
States. According to its Preamble, the aim of the Directive is to ensure a 
dignified standard of living and comparable living conditions in all Member 
States for asylum seekers and help limit the secondary movements of asylum 
seekers because of differences in reception conditions in Member States.195 
Therefore, applicants, must amongst others, be informed about their rights 
and the benefits they may claim, as well as the obligations with which they 
must comply, receive a document certifying their status as an asylum seeker 
and move freely within the territory of the Member State. Though the last 
mentioned right is the rule as prescribed in Article 7 (1), there are exceptions 
to it. When it proves necessary, for example for legal reasons or reasons of 
public order, asylum seekers may be detained.196 When there are reasons 
for the authorities to consider the applicability of Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention on an applicant, the person is often kept detained during the 
investigation. In such cases, Member States may exceptionally set modalities 
for material reception conditions different from those provided in Article 14 
for a short as possible period.197 The ones set out in the latter provision deal 
with accommodation, food and clothing; health care; access to the education 
system for minors and take into account the specific situation of vulnerable 
persons.198 Article 16 of the Reception Conditions Directive deals with 
situations in which states can reduce or withdraw reception conditions. The 
rationale behind this provision is that Member States must be able to sanction 
194 Kerber 2002, p. 213. 
195 Recitals 7 and 8 of the Directive.  
196 Article 7 (3) of the Reception Conditions Directive.
197 See Article 14 (8) of the Directive which with the proposal for a recast of the Reception 
Conditions Directive is changed into Article 18 (8) (c).
198 Articles 13; 10 and 17-20 respectively of the Reception Conditions Directive. 
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those asylum seekers who abuse the reception system.199 This is the case 
when the applicant disappears without reasonable cause or does not comply 
with requests for information or fails to appear for personal interviews 
concerning the asylum procedure; has withdrawn his application; presents a 
threat to national security or is suspected of having committed a war crime 
or a crime against humanity.200 The latter situation, which is relevant within 
the scope of the exclusion clauses, was prescribed in the Commission’s 
legislative proposal for the Reception Conditions Directive as ‘if an applicant 
is regarded as a threat to national security or there are serious grounds for 
believing that the applicant has committed a war crime or a crime against 
humanity or if, during the examination of the asylum application, there are 
serious and manifest reasons for considering that grounds of Article 1F of 
the Geneva Convention may apply with respect to the applicant’.201 The 
European Parliament amended the ground into: ‘if an applicant is regarded 
as a threat to national security or there are serious grounds for believing that 
the applicant has committed a war crime or a crime against humanity or a 
terrorist offence, as referred to in Council Framework Decision of ... on combating 
terrorism (1), or if, during the examination of the asylum application, there 
are serious and manifest reasons for considering that grounds of Article 1 
(F) of the Geneva Convention may apply with respect to the applicant’.202 
This phrase including an explicit reference to Article 1F is eventually deleted 
and replaced by the words: ‘that Member States may determine sanctions 
applicable to seriously violent behaviour’.203 Article 16 (4) of the Reception 
Conditions Directive prescribes that decisions regarding reduction, 
withdrawal, refusal or sanctioning of reception conditions must be taken 
objectively and impartially, based on the individual behaviour of the person 
concerned and that emergency health care has to be provided in all cases. 
Asylum seekers who receive such a decision have the possibility to appeal 
their case before a judicial body.   
§ 3.3.2.1 Recast Reception Conditions Directive
The deadline for transposition of the Reception Conditions Directive 
in the Member States was 6 February 2005. On 26 November 2007, 
the Commission issued its Evaluation Report on this Directive. The 
deficiencies in the national reception conditions as addressed in this Report, 
199 See also recital 12 of the Directive.  
200 <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_
movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33150_en.htm> (last accessed on 21 
September 2015).  
201 Legislative proposal, COM(2001)0181.
202 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&refere
nce=P5-TA-2002-202> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
203 Article 16 (3) of the Reception Conditions Directive. 
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together with the contributions received in response to the Green Paper 
on the CEAS made the Commission come up with a proposal to recast the 
Reception Conditions Directive204 and a modified proposal for a recast in 
June 2011.205 The situation as it stands at the moment is that a new recast 
Reception Conditions Directive has been adopted and in accordance with 
the EU acquis, in particular with the Qualification Directive, the scope 
of this Directive is extended in order to include applicants for subsidiary 
protection.206 The new Directive aims to clarify and provide more flexibility 
to the reception standards and ensure adequate and comparable reception 
conditions throughout the EU. The Reception Conditions Directive was in 
force until 21 July 2015 after which the new Directive became applicable. 
A relevant change in the recast Directive within the context of exclusion is 
amongst others that new provisions are added regarding the detention of 
applicants. Hence, Article 7 (3) of the Directive concerning detention has 
been deleted and four new provisions have been introduced which deal 
particularly with detention. According to Article 8 (1) of the recast, states may 
not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he/she is an applicant 
for international protection. Paragraph 2 of the same provision prescribes 
that: ‘when it proves necessary and on the basis of an individual assessment 
of each case, Member States may detain an applicant to a particular place in 
accordance with national legislation, if other less coercive measures cannot 
be applied effectively. An applicant may only be detained to a particular place 
a) in order to determine, ascertain or verify his identity or nationality; b) in 
order to determine the elements on which his application for asylum is based 
which in other circumstances could be lost; c) in the context of a procedure, 
to decide on his right to enter the territory; d) when he is detained subject 
to a return procedure under the Returns Directive to prepare the return 
and/or carry out the removal process, and the Member State concerned 
can substantiate on the basis of objective criteria, including that he or she 
already had the opportunity to access the asylum procedure, that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is making the application for 
international protection merely to delay or frustrate the enforcement of the 
return decision; e) when protection of national security or public order so 
requires or f) in accordance with Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 
204 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down 
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, Recast COM(2008) 815 
final, 2008/0244 (COD).
205 Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
laying down standards for the reception of asylum seekers (recast), Brussels 1.6.2011, 
COM(2011) 320 final.  
206 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection 
(recast), L 180/96. 
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of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third country national or a stateless person. Contrary to 
Article 7 (3) of the Directive which used the general phrase ‘when it proves 
necessary for example for legal reasons or reasons of public order’, Article 8 
(2) of the recast allows detention only in exceptional cases and on one of the 
6 limited grounds. In Article 9 of the proposal for a recast, the guarantees 
for detained asylum seekers are laid down. The provision determines, inter 
alia, that detention shall be for the shortest period possible and detention 
shall be reviewed by a judicial authority at reasonable intervals. The last two 
provisions on detention; Articles 10 and 11 of the recast deal respectively 
with detention conditions and the detention of vulnerable groups and of 
applicants with special reception needs.
There is a varied practice among Member States on detention: it can be 
used at the beginning of the asylum procedure and also at the end in order to 
enforce removal. An important instrument with regard to the latter situation 
is the Returns Directive which is also mentioned above under ground (d).207 
This Directive which was adopted in 2008 allows Member States to detain a 
person who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return 
and/or carry out the removal process. The ECJ decided in the Kadzoev case 
that detention for the purpose of removal based on the Returns Directive and 
detention of an asylum seeker under the Asylum Procedures and Reception 
Conditions Directives and the applicable national provisions fall under 
different legal rules.208 Asylum applicants do not fall under the personal 
scope of the Returns Directive as long as they have a right to remain in the 
Member State because their stay cannot be considered as illegal in the sense 
of the Returns Directive.209 
The detention of asylum seekers who are waiting for a decision on their 
application remains an issue of concern for NGOs. Though the introduction 
of Article 8 of the recast Directive with limited grounds for detention is 
considered to be a positive development as it can prevent arbitrary acts by 
Member States, there is criticism on the grounds which are summed up 
under paragraph 3. One of these points is that detaining an asylum seeker in 
the context of a procedure to ‘decide on his right to enter the territory’ allows 
for systematic detention of asylum seekers in any entry procedure, regardless 
of whether they have proper documentation, which is not compatible with 
the exemption from penalties as laid down in Article 31 of the Refugee 
207 See Zwaan 2011.
208 ECJ 30 November 2009, Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov), App. No. C-357/09.
209 Spijkerboer & Arbaoui 2010, pp. 1280-1281. 
Chapter 3 EU legislation and case law on the exclusion clauses 
65
Convention.210 The ground: ‘when protection of national security or public 
order so requires’, which is relevant in relation to asylum seekers to whom 
Article 1F is possibly going to be applied, is considered to be open to a broad 
interpretation. Amnesty International and ECRE recommend a restrictive 
interpretation and believe detention on this ground should only be possible 
when the asylum seeker constitutes a genuine, present and sufficiently threat 
to the Member State. According to these organisations, the threat should 
be assessed on the basis of the individual conduct of the person and not on 
general assumptions based on nationality or country of origin.211 A reference 
has to be made here to the 2012 UNHCR Detention Guidelines for Asylum 
Seekers which represent UNHCR’s policy and are intended as advice for 
governments and other bodies making decisions on detaining people.212 The 
topic of alien’s detention will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 when 
dealing with Article 5 ECHR.  
Besides the changes concerning detention, the contents of Article 16 of the 
Reception Conditions Directive (dealing with reduction or withdrawal) 
under Article 20 of the recast Directive have also been modified. The new 
Directive changes the term ‘reception conditions’ into ‘material reception 
conditions’; limits the circumstances under which reception conditions 
can be fully withdrawn; deletes the paragraph on the refusal of conditions 
(paragraph 2) and states that Member States shall under all circumstances 
ensure access to health care and ensure a dignified standard of living for all 
210 Comments from the ECRE on the Amended Commission Proposal to recast 
the Reception Conditions Directive (COM(2011) 320 final), September 2011; 
Comments from ECRE on the European Commission Proposal to recast the 
Reception Conditions Directive, April 2009; UNHCR Comments on the European 
Commission’s Proposal for a recast of the Directive laying down minimum standards 
for the reception of asylum seekers (COM (2008)815 final of 3 December 2008); 
Amnesty International’s Comments on the Commission Proposal for a Directive laying 
down Minimum Standards for the reception of asylum seekers (recast) (COM(2008) 
815 final) and on the Commission Proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria 
and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third 
country national or a stateless person (recast) (COM(2008) 820 final). 
211 Amnesty International’s Comments on the Commission Proposals for a Directive 
laying down Minimum Standards for the reception of asylum seekers (recast) 
(COM(2008) 815 final) and on the Commission Proposal for a Regulation establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third country national or a stateless person (recast) (COM(2008) 820 
final) and Comments from ECRE on the Amended Commission Proposal to recast 
the Reception Conditions Directive (COM(2011) 320 final), September 2011.
212 <http://www.unhcr.org/505b10ee9.html> (last accessed on 21 September 2015). 
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applicants.213 Another amendment is that when decisions on withdrawal 
or reduction are appealed, Member States have to ensure access to legal 
assistance free of charge where the asylum seeker cannot afford the costs 
involved.214 The current Article 16 (3) of the Directive, the ground on which 
Member States can sanction applicants who conduct seriously violent 
behaviour, remains unmodified in the new Directive.215 Finally, the power of 
states to set different modalities for material reception conditions on asylum 
seekers who are detained or confined to border posts, including possible 1F 
applicants, has been deleted as the recast Directive no longer allows for this. 
§ 3.3.3 Qualification Directive
It is undisputed that this Directive is the most relevant instrument within 
the scope of creating a CEAS as it deals with the substantive asylum 
law of Europe. Though the deadline for the transposition of the original 
Qualification Directive by Member States was 10 October 2006, many 
states failed to meet this requirement. Subsequently, the Commission took 
measures against these states. After the expiry of the date, several studies 
were conducted on the implementation of the Directive and the way it was 
applied in practice based on the preliminary available data. The Commission 
concluded on the basis of the evaluation of the information gathered on 
the implementation that the adopted minimum standards were vague and 
ambiguous resulting in incompatibility with the evolving human rights and 
refugee law standards; not achieving a certain level of harmonisation and a 
negative impact on the quality and efficiency of decision-making. According 
to the Commission, the same applied to the Asylum Procedures Directive 
which will be dealt with in the next paragraph. To ensure a higher degree of 
harmonisation and better substantive and procedural standards of protection 
towards the establishment of a common asylum procedure and a uniform 
status, the Commission presented a proposal for the amendment of both of 
these Directives. The proposal for amending the Qualification Directive216 is 
by now already a recast and in force.217 Member States had the period until 
213 Under the current Reception Conditions Directive, the rule is that Member States 
shall under all circumstances ensure access to emergency health care.
214 See Article 26 (2) of the recast Directive.
215 In the recast Reception Conditions Directive, Article 16 (3) is changed into 20 (4). 
216 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum 
standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection and the content of the protection 
granted, Brussels 21.10.2009 COM(2009) 551 final. 
217 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for 
refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the 
protection granted (recast). 
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21 December 2013 to transpose the amendments into their national laws 
after which the recast Directive will be evaluated again in 2015.
The Commission prescribed in its explanatory memorandum to the proposal 
for a recast that the amendments to the Directive are expected to simplify 
decision-making procedures, improve the efficiency of the asylum process 
and to ensure coherence with the jurisprudence of the ECJ and ECtHR. 
Furthermore, it is stated that the changes ‘aim to remove the difference in the 
treatment of the two categories (refugee status and subsidiary protection) 
which cannot be considered as objectively justified, thus progressing towards 
uniformity of protection while maintaining the distinction between the 
two statuses’. The original Qualification Directive is the first supranational 
instrument which establishes a status for extra Convention refugees which 
should be understood as additional protection to the refugee protection as 
laid down in the Refugee Convention. According to Article 2 (f) of the recast 
Directive, a person who is eligible for subsidiary protection is a: 
‘third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee 
but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing 
that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the 
case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, 
would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15, and 
to whom Article 17 (1) and (2) do not apply, and is unable, or, owing to such 
risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country’.218 
The Commission explains the following within this context:
‘when subsidiary protection was introduced, it was assumed that this status 
was of a temporary nature. As a result, the Directive allows Member States the 
discretion to grant them a lower level of rights in certain respects. However, 
practical experience acquired so far has shown that this initial assumption 
218 According to the Commission the definition of subsidiary protection is largely based 
on international human rights instruments relevant to subsidiary protection, such as 
Article 3 of the ECHR, Article 3 of the CAT and Article 7 of the ICCPR. Though this 
is the case, there are differences in the protection provided by these treaties and the 
Directive. An example is the indication of Article 17 in the definition which contains 
an exclusion clause for subsidiary protection, while the non-refoulement principle 
of Article 3 ECHR and 3 CAT are absolute and cannot be restricted. On the other 
hand, while the ECHR only protects against refoulement, a beneficiary of subsidiary 
protection can claim several rights. Article 15 is the main provision regarding 
subsidiary protection and prescribes the qualification criteria. It contains three 
categories of harm, namely: a) death penalty or execution; or b) torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment of punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or c) 
serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict of which the last one 
is a controversial topic. 
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was not accurate. It is thus necessary to remove any limitations of the rights 
of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection which can no longer be considered 
as necessary and objectively justified. Such an approximation of rights is 
necessary to ensure full respect of the principle of non-discrimination, as 
interpreted in recent case law of the ECtHR and of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. It responds moreover to the call of the Hague 
Programme for the creation of a uniform status of protection’.
This idea is expressed in recital 39 of the recast Directive which states that 
‘with the exception of derogations which are necessary and objectively 
justified, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection should be granted the 
same rights and benefits as refugees, and should be subject to the same 
conditions of eligibility’. The distinction made between refugee and 
subsidiary protection status in several provisions is deleted and changed into 
beneficiaries of international protection. This is not the case with regard to 
the provisions concerning exclusion which will be discussed in the following 
subparagraphs. 
As stated above, the purpose of the recast Directive is expressed as to lay 
down standards for the qualification of third country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for 
the content of the protection granted. In accordance with the Tampere 
conclusions, the Directive is based on the full and inclusive application of 
the Refugee Convention and sees the Convention as the cornerstone of the 
international legal regime for protection.219 The definition of a refugee as 
stated by the Directive is almost similar to Article 1 (A) (2) of the Refugee 
Convention. Different from the Convention’s refugee definition is that the 
Directive only applies to third country nationals and that an extra phrase 
has been added to the text which states ‘and to whom Article 12 does not 
apply’. The latter refers to the exclusion clauses for refugees which will be 
dealt with in detail in this paragraph. It can be said that the Directive aims 
to clarify the constitutive elements of the refugee definition in the Refugee 
Convention and the rights that flow from refugee status, thus add more 
details to it. The Directive contains a clear lay-out in which Chapter II deals 
with the assessment of the application, which counts for all applications for 
protection, even when the issue of exclusion is raised.220 Chapters III and 
IV are devoted to the qualification criteria as a refugee and refugee status, 
while Chapters V and VI prescribe provisions on the criteria for subsidiary 
protection and this status. Articles 20 to 35 under Chapter VII lay down the 
219 Recitals 3 and 4 of the Recast Directive.
220 New Issues in Refugee Research, evidentiary assessment and the EU Qualification 
Directive, UNHCR 2005, p. 14. 
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content of international protection and state the rights assigned to refugees 
and subsidiary protection. 
A comparison between refugee and subsidiary protection status shows that 
the recast Directive assigns partly the same rights and, in some cases, a 
lower level of benefits for subsidiary protection. The latter is also expressed 
because the exclusion clauses for subsidiary protection are broader than the 
ones for refugees. With regard to refugees, the relevant provisions within 
the exclusion context can be found in Articles 12 (which prescribes when a 
person is excluded from being a refugee) and 14. The latter provision states 
in which cases a refugee status can be revoked or ended and is sometimes 
called the ‘revocation clause’. In the case of subsidiary protection, the 
equivalents to these provisions are Articles 17 and 19 of the Directive. 
Within the context of the recast all four of these provisions remain 
unchanged. Article 21 on the protection of refoulement is also unmodified. 
The UNHCR and ECRE commented on the proposal for a recast of the 
Qualification Directive and both also address the unchanged exclusion and 
revocation clauses.221 Attention is paid to Article 12 (2) (b) and UNHCR 
reiterates that this provision should be amended to reflect the wording of the 
Refugee Convention and that the sentence ‘which means the time of issuing 
a residence permit based on the granting of refugee status’ should be deleted. 
This is also proposed for Article 12 (3) of the Directive. Both organisations 
already criticised Article 14 in their comments on the original Directive. 
This way, the UNHCR notes that the Article should be changed to bring it 
in conformity with the Convention and ECHR recommends Articles 14 (4) 
and 14 (5) of the Directive should not be applied by Member States as they 
are not in line with the Refugee Convention.
Before discussing the provisions on exclusion,222 I want to briefly focus on 
what the Commission’s 2010 report on the application of the Qualification 
Directive states concerning these provisions. This report is based on a study 
221 UNHCR comments on the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection and the content of the protection granted (COM(2009)551, 
21 October 2009); Comments from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
on the European Commission Proposal to recast the Qualification Directive, March 
2010.  
222 The explanation of the provisions concerning exclusion is based on the discussions 
held and comments given on the original Qualification Directive. When the term 
‘Commission’s original proposal’ is used, this concerns thus the proposal for the 
previous Qualification Directive. As the recast Directive did not change the provisions 
with respect to exclusion, the discussions held about the original Directive are also 
applicable and relevant regarding the recast. 
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conducted on behalf of the Commission and on information from other 
studies which set forth that:223 
•	 The exclusion and revocation of a refugee status based on Articles 12 and 
14 (1), (3) of the Directive and of subsidiary protection on Articles 17 (1) - 
(2), 19 (1) and (3) are mandatory provisions, while a number of states 
merely allow the exclusion on these grounds instead of making them 
obligatory.
•	 The optional ground of exclusion in Article 17 (3) of the Directive has 
been transposed by 13 Member States while, on the other hand, certain 
Member States have introduced additional grounds for exclusion.224 
•	 When a permanent residence permit is issued to the refugee, termination 
of status is restricted or prevented in some Member States, despite the 
fulfillment of the criteria for exclusion.
•	 Some Member States grant an exceptional leave to remain in the country 
in the case of exclusion. This is possible when, for example, it concerns a 
persons’ ill-health or danger of refoulement.225 
•	 Article 14 (6) of the Directive has not been transposed in several 
countries.
•	 Articles 14 (2) and 19 (4), according to which the national authorities 
must demonstrate on an individual basis that a person has ceased to be, 
or has never been a refugee or a person eligible for subsidiary protection, 
are not, or only partially implemented by a number of states. 
§ 3.3.3.1 Article 12 of the Directive
This Article is a mandatory provision which similar to the Refugee 
Convention, excludes three groups of persons. Paragraph 1 covers Articles 
1D and E from the Refugee Convention. The third group which concerns 
223 Report from the Commission tot the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees 
or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection, 2010, p. 2.
224 According to a study of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee of 2012, four Member 
States include all exclusion grounds, including ‘threat to national security or host 
society’ under the same provision and terminology, while three states make a 
distinction between the exclusion grounds in Article 1F of the Refugee Convention 
and the additional ground of ‘threat to national security’, p. 41-42.
225 The ECRE report of 2008 on the implementation of the Directive in Member States 
(‘The Impact of the Qualification Directive on International Protection’) also showed 
that certain Member States allow excluded persons who cannot leave due to Article 
3 of the ECHR to stay legally in the country, while in others such as the Netherlands, 
Belgium and France, excluded persons who are usually tolerated, but often without 
any rights of status.
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Article 1F is laid down in paragraph 2. This paragraph contains three 
subsections which, to a great extent, correspond to clauses in Article 
1F and are prescribed as follows. A third country national or a stateless 
person is excluded from being a refugee where there are serious reasons for 
considering that:
a) he or she has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up 
to make provision in respect of such crimes;
b) he or she has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country 
of refuge prior to his or her admission as a refugee; which means the time 
of issuing a residence permit based on the granting of refugee status; 
particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political 
objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes;
c) he or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the UN as set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter 
of the UN. 
Subsection (a) is similar to Article 1F (a) and excludes persons who have 
committed crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
Subsection (b) in both instruments is quite different. Article 1F requires 
serious non-political crimes to have been committed outside the country 
of refuge and prior to admission to the country of refuge as a refugee. 
According to the UNHCR, the term ‘admission’ refers to the mere physical 
presence in the country of refuge, which means that the crime could have 
been committed anywhere, except in the country of refuge where the asylum 
seekers applies for a refugee status.226 The UNHCR explains that ‘such an 
interpretation is based on the rationale that crimes committed in the country 
of refuge are considered within the context of Article 33 (2) of the Refugee 
Convention, rather than in the context of the exclusion clauses’.227 Contrary 
to Article 1F (b), the Directive explicitly states that ‘admission as a refugee’ 
means ‘the time of issuing a residence permit based on the granting of 
refugee status’ which appears to lengthen the period during which a person 
could commit a crime and thus allow for exclusion of persons who commit 
a serious crime within the country but before their formal recognition as a 
refugee. According to Hailbronner this is not the case as, ‘it is evident from 
the provision’s wording that only a crime committed or presumed to have 
been committed “outside the country of refuge prior to his admission” is a 
226 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, para. 153. 
227 UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 
29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third 
Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise 
Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, January 
2005 (OJ L304/12 of 30.09.2004), p. 27. 
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ground for exclusion’. He also explains that before the issuance of a residence 
permit based on the granting of a refugee status, a person will normally not 
be able to move outside the country of refuge.228 Storey formulates that the 
‘teleological interpretation of subsection b) so as to refer to the Directive’s 
objects and purposes, which is based on a full and inclusive application of the 
Refugee Convention could somehow overcome the apparent difficulty’.229  
It should be noted that the Commission’s original proposal of the Directive 
did not contain the added phrase ‘which means the time of issuing a residence 
permit based on the granting of refugee status’ but prescribed in draft Article 
14 (1) (c) (ii) that ‘the applicant has committed a serious non-political crime 
prior to his or her admission as a refugee’. Though the Commission did not 
add ‘outside the country of refuge’ to the sentence as laid down in Article 
1F (b), the explanation to draft Article 14 (1) (c) in which the Commission 
refers to ‘situations covered by Article 1F of the Refugee Convention’, shows 
that the Commission intended to follow UNHCR’s interpretation.230
Another difference between Article 1F (b) and Article 12 (2) (b) of the 
Directive is that while Article 1F only mentions ‘serious non-political crimes’, 
the latter has the following additional phrase to the subsection: ‘particularly 
cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political objective, may be 
classified as serious non-political crimes’. The Commission explains that 
in applying subsection b) ‘the severity of the expected persecution should 
be weighed against the nature of the criminal offence of which the person 
concerned is suspected’ it and thus refers to a proportionality test. In the 
literature it is assumed that the second phrase of subsection b) implicitly 
acknowledges that such a test is inherent to Article 1F (b) of the Refugee 
Convention.231  
Article 12 (2) (c) of the Directive refers to the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 
of the Charter of the UN which Article 1F (c)232 does not have. The original 
proposal did not contain the reference and the Commission explained that 
this subsection ‘shall reflect the fact that the fundamental principles laid 
down in the Charter of the UN should govern the relations of its members 
with each other and in relation to the international community as a whole’.233 
Battjes states that France initiated the reference as within the Member States, 
it appears to be the only Contracting State that applies Article 1F (c) on a 
more or less regular basis.234 Moreover, Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter are 
also identified as the relevant provisions for the purposes of Article 1F (c) by 
228 Hailbronner 2010, p. 1117. 
229 Storey 2008, p. 24. 
230 Brussels, 12.9.2001 COM(2001) 510 final, 2001/0207 (CNS), p. 25.
231 Battjes 2006, p. 264.
232 Article 1F (c) of the Refugee Convention reads as: ‘or has been guilty of an act 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN’. 
233 COM (2001) 510 final, p. 25.
234 Battjes 2006, p. 286.
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the UNHCR. Recital 31 of the recast Directive relates to subsection c) and 
states that the purposes and principles of the subsection are, amongst others, 
embodied in the UN anti-terrorism resolutions.235 The UNHCR protested 
against this, because: 
‘an interpretation of the language of Article 1F (c) to include acts of ‘terrorism’ 
without proper qualification may lead to an overly extensive application of 
this particular exclusion clause, especially in view of the fact that ‘terrorism’ 
is without a clear or universally agreed definition. For the purposes of 
interpreting and applying Article 1F (c), only those acts within the scope of 
UN Resolutions relating to measures combating terrorism which impinge 
upon the international plane in terms of their gravity, international impact, 
and implications for international peace and security, should give rise to 
exclusion under this provision’.236   
Another point made by the UNHCR is that this subsection only concerns 
persons who have been in a position of power in their countries or in state-
like entities which is not in accordance with what is laid down in the recital. 
Hailbronner explains that no uniform state practice can be identified 
regarding this exclusion clause and that the wording as well as the recent 
international practice supports a broader interpretation than UNHCR’s 
notion. Reference is, inter alia, made to the case law of the ECJ which pointed 
to the binding character of Security Council decisions and to the exclusive 
responsibility of the Security Council to decide what constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security.237 
Article 12 of the Directive has one last paragraph stating that ‘paragraph 2 
applies to persons who instigate or otherwise participate in the commission 
of crimes or acts mentioned therein’. Paragraph 3 clarifies the scope of the 
exclusion clauses prescribed in paragraph 2. Article 1F is not formulated 
as such and it is generally accepted that mere membership of a group or 
organisation involved in violent crimes is not necessarily a sufficient basis 
to be individually responsible for excludable acts.238 Following the Canadian 
235 The UN Anti-Terrorism Resolutions declare that ‘acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN’ and that ‘knowingly 
financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the UN’.  
236 UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 
29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third 
Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise 
Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, January 
2005 (OJ L304/12 of 30.09.2004), p. 6.
237 Hailbronner 2010, pp. 1121-1122.
238 The International Military Tribunal accepted this, see Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 277; 
UNHCR Guidelines on the Application in Mass-influx Situations of the Exclusion 
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Federal Court Ramirez case,239 some countries require a ‘personal and 
knowing participation’ to exclude a person. The original proposal (draft 
Article 14 (2)) was in line with this practice as it stated that ‘the grounds for 
exclusion shall be based solely on the personal and knowing conduct of the 
person concerned’. No agreement could be reached on the precise meaning 
of the term ‘knowing conduct’ and its relevance to the different categories of 
subsections (a) - (c). The proposal was first changed into a reference to the 
personal and willing conduct of the person concerned and in the end entirely 
deleted. The new paragraph 3 on participation corresponds to recital 31 of 
the Preamble which excludes persons who instigate or otherwise finance, 
plan or incite terrorist acts.240 
Draft Article 14 (3) and (4) of the Commission’s original proposal which 
provided for additional rules besides the listed exclusion grounds were 
both cancelled. Paragraph 3 contained a judicial remedy against a decision 
to exclude but due to the general concept of the Directive to incorporate 
procedural issues in the Asylum Procedures Directive, it was dismissed 
during the Council negotiations.241 Paragraph 4 prescribed that the 
application of the exclusion would not in any manner affect obligations of 
Member States under international law, in particular those of the ECHR. 
Though this paragraph has been deleted, this does not mean that an excluded 
person who falls outside the scope of the Directive cannot invoke Article 3 
of the ECHR in the case of expulsion to his home country. Member States 
still have to respect the non-refoulement principle in accordance with their 
international obligations which is also laid down in Article 21 (1) of the 
Qualification Directive.242
§ 3.3.3.2 Article 14 of the Directive
On the basis of Article 14, a Member State must and may revoke, end 
or refuse to renew a refugee status. The provision was not included in 
the Commission’s original proposal but was included during Council 
negotiations. Hailbronner explains that: 
Clauses of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
paras. 18-19 and ECJ 9 November 2010, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B & D case.
239 Ramirez v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1992] 2 FC 306. After Ezokola v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40SC, 19 July 2013 the Canadian 
authorities replaced the personal and knowing participation test by the contribution-
based test. 
240 Hailbronner 2010, p. 1122. 
241 Article 39 (1) (a) of the Asylum Procedures Directives provides for a right to an 
effective remedy against a decision on the application for asylum as well as against a 
decision to withdraw refugee status was.  
242 Article 21 (2) of the Directive allows exceptions to the non-refoulement principle and 
will be discussed later on in this Chapter.
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‘the suggestion of some Member States to extend the list of exclusion 
grounds to cases dealt with in Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention and 
cases where the national security of the host state may be endangered and 
applicants arriving from safe third countries was discussed in the Council but 
eventually rejected due to objections by a number of Member States arguing 
the incompatibility of an extension of the list of exclusion grounds with the 
Refugee Convention. As a compromise, it was agreed that the suggested 
grounds should not be inserted into the draft Article 14 on exclusion but in 
the newly worded Article 14 on revocation of refugee status’.243 
Paragraphs 1 to 3 of the provision are mandatory and include a cessation and 
exclusion ground referring to Articles 11 and 12 of the Directive. According 
to paragraph 3 (a), the refugee status must be terminated when the person 
‘should have been or is excluded from being a refugee in accordance with 
Article 12’. The distinction between ‘should’ and ‘is excluded’ takes into 
consideration the different situations regulated by Article 12, covering 
subsequent events (Article 12 (1) (a)) or the existence of exclusion grounds 
before a person has applied for international protection.244 Paragraph 3 
(b) states that a Member State must also terminate refugee status when 
it is discovered that the person’s misrepresentation or omission of facts, 
including the use of false documents, were decisive for the granting of refugee 
status. Battjes expresses that this ground, though not explicitly mentioned in 
the Refugee Convention, is quite compatible with it, as a person who was 
recognised on the basis of false evidence, was never a Convention refugee.245 
The UNHCR commented that the mere use of false documents should not 
render a claim fraudulent nor result automatically in cancellation of refugee 
status. This should only be the case if the statements were objectively false 
and if there was an intention to mislead the decision maker.246 
An additional possibility to terminate the refugee status of a person is laid 
down in paragraph 4. This is the case when there are reasonable grounds 
for regarding a person as a danger to the security of a Member State in 
which he or she is present or where he or she constitutes a danger to the 
community of the Member State because of a conviction by a final judgment 
of a particularly serious crime. According to paragraph 5, in situations as 
stated under paragraph 4, Member States may decide not to grant a status 
243 Hailbronner 2010, pp. 1129-1130. 
244 Idem, p. 1132.
245 Battjes 2006, p. 268. 
246 UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 
29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third 
Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise 
Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, January 
2005 (OJ L304/12 of 30.09.2004), p. 28.
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to a refugee, where such a decision has not yet been taken.247 Contrary to 
paragraphs 1-3, paragraph 4 leaves it to the discretion of Member States 
to decide on the application. The wording is based on Article 33 (2) of 
the Refugee Convention which is also the reason why Article 14 has been 
criticised.248 The UNHCR expressed that Article 14 seems to conflate and 
confuse exclusion, cessation, cancellation and revocation.249 According to 
ECRE, Article 14 (4) serves no purpose other than to attempt to expand 
the criteria for exclusion from refugee status in ways the Convention does 
not permit and comments that it is misleading to call Article 14 a revocation 
provision as there is no meaningful difference between revocation and 
exclusion as prescribed in Article 12 of the Directive. Also the fact that 
the Directive’s Article 21 (2) allows Member States to revoke the right to 
non-refoulement for the same reasons as prescribed in Article 14 (4) of the 
Directive makes the latter provision redundant.250 
Under the Convention, Article 1F and Article 33 (2) serve different purposes, 
as the first deals with the exclusion clauses, while the latter is concerned with 
the treatment of persons who are deemed refugees, but who nonetheless 
may be removed under the Convention. This is why UNHCR commented 
that assimilating Article 33 (2) to the exclusion clauses of Article 1F would 
be incompatible with the Refugee Convention and moreover lead to a 
wrong interpretation of the Conventions provisions.251 Within this context, 
McAdam states ‘that a person who is excluded from refugee status is denied all 
the rights provided for by the Convention (and the Qualification Directive). 
By contrast, a refugee issued with an expulsion order in accordance with 
Article 33 (2) remains entitled to at least those rights that are not linked to 
lawful stay. Even though he or she may in practice not be able to benefit from 
them, thus rendering the difference insignificant in real terms, it is important 
not to entrench Article 33 (2) as a formal exclusion clause’.252
The Commission is of the opinion that Article 14 reflects the exception to 
the principle of  non-refoulement as set out in Article 33 (2) of the Refugee 
Convention. During the drafting stages, the Commission and Member 
247 This means that fulfillment of conditions for recognition as refugee does not imply a 
right to get a status, when it is apparent that the grounds for revocation or termination 
of a status are fulfilled.  
248 Though Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention and Article 14 (4) have the same 
wording, there is a relevant difference between the two. While the Directive deals 
with terminating refugee status, provides Article 33 (2) for an exception to the 
prohibition of refoulement, without ending or denying refugee status. 
249 UNHCR Annotated Comments 2005, p. 28.
250 ECRE, The Impact of the Qualification Directive on International Protection, 
October 2008, p. 24.
251 UNHCR Annotated Comments 2005, p. 31.
252 McAdam 2007, p. 15.
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States have argued that Article 14 (4) does not conflict with the scope of 
the Refugee Convention, because the person is not excluded from being 
a refugee as such; the provision merely allows Member States to decide to 
strip them of certain rights: ‘In other words, although the person is formally 
speaking a refugee, he/she cannot claim the rights and benefits attached to 
that status.253 Paragraph 6 provides that refugees to whom Article 14 (4) or 
14 (5) applies, remain entitled to some of the Convention rights that apply to 
all refugees, irrespective of the legality of their presence.254 This paragraph 
thus recognises that denial of the benefit of the principle of non-refoulement 
does not equate to a loss of refugee status.255 One of the provisions to 
which paragraph 6 refers to is Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, while 
the category of persons to whom Paragraph 6 applies is abstained from 
the benefit of protection under Article 33 (1) of the Refugee Convention. 
Hailbronner expresses that: 
‘the explicit reference to Article 33 has to be interpreted as a concession to the 
increasing overlapping of international refugee law by international human 
rights law providing for absolute protection against refoulement in the case 
of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or torture...It is generally 
recognised that even if international refugee law will not provide protection 
under Article 33 (2), international human rights law is still available’. 
He states that from paragraph 6, however, no conclusion can be drawn 
with regard to the application of Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention 
to ‘dangerous’ refugees. Whether they are entitled to protection against 
refoulement is a matter to be decided under Article 21 (2) of the Directive 
and Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention.256 
§ 3.3.3.2.1 The notion of ‘danger to the security of the Member State’
As previously mentioned the following phrase in Article 14 (4) of the 
Directive is taken from Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention: there should 
be ‘reasonable grounds for regarding a person as a danger to the security of 
a Member State in which he or she is present or where he or she constitutes 
a danger to the community of the Member State because of a conviction by a 
final judgment of a particularly serious crime’.257 The revocation clause is not 
253 Storey 2008, p. 24
254 Paragraph 6 refers to Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31, 32, 33 of the Refugee Convention or 
provisions which are similar to these. 
255 McAdam 2007, p. 15.
256 Hailbronner 2010, p. 1137.
257 Article 33 (2) reads as: ‘The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be 
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger 
to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final 
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the only provision in the Qualification Directive in which the whole phrase 
or almost similar wordings of the phrase are laid down. Articles 17 (1) (d) 
and 21 (2), to be dealt with later on, also use this phrasing and as shown in 
§ 3.3.1.1, Article 28 (1) of the Temporary Protection Directive includes a 
similar description as an exclusion ground.258 
While Articles 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention and 14 (4) of the 
Qualification Directive state that there should be ‘reasonable grounds for 
regarding’, also ‘serious grounds to consider’ from Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention is used in, inter alia, Article 17 (1) of the Qualification Directive. 
According to Zimmermann & Wennholz, the standard of proof to be used 
for both is identical.259 Hailbronner explains that reasonableness means that 
in an objective evaluation, at the time of making the decision there are facts 
indicating a probability for a future risk to the security of the state. This 
means that a reasonable observer would believe that the person constitutes a 
danger on the basis of information presented.260 
Regarding the concept of ‘danger to the security of the Member State’, 
Article 14 (4) of the Qualification Directive and Article 33 (2) of the Refugee 
Convention do not further indicate in which cases it may apply. It is generally 
assumed that states possess a margin of appreciation in this area.261 Grahl-
Madsen explains that acts qualifying as endangering national security can 
comprise such behaviour as engaging in activities aimed at facilitating the 
conquest of the country of residence by another state, working to overthrow 
the government of this country by force or other illegal means, or engaging in 
activities which are directed against a foreign government, which as a result 
threatens the government of the country of residence with repercussions of 
a serious nature. Espionage, sabotage of military installations and terrorist 
activities are among the acts which are considered to be threats to national 
security.262 Within the context of the latter act, recital 37 of the recast 
Directive prescribes that ‘the notion of national security and public order 
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of 
that country’.
258 Furthermore, Article 8 of the recast Reception Conditions Directive states ‘when 
protection of national security and public order so requires’ as a ground for detention 
and according to Article 31 (8) (j) of the recast Directive on Asylum Procedures, 
Member States can accelerate an examination procedure when the ‘applicant may 
for serious reasons be considered a danger to the national security or public order of 
the Member State, or the applicant has been forcibly expelled for serious reasons of 
public security or public order under national law. 
259 Zimmermann & Wennholz 2011, p. 1413.
260 Hailbronner 2010, p. 1135.
261 Lauterpacht & Bethlehem 2003, pp. 89-135.
262 UNHCR, Commentary of the Refugee Convention 1951 (Articles 2-11, 13-37), 
October 1997, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4785ee9d2.html> (last 
accessed on 21 September 2015), pp. 235-236.
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also covers cases in which a third country national belongs to an association 
which supports international terrorism or supports such an association.263 
Article 14 (4) is restricted to the security of the Member State in which the 
person is present. The thoughts on this issue differ among academics. Some 
believe that an application of the provision would be inappropriate when the 
threat is directed at another state or the international community generally, 
while Hathaway, for instance, states that the invocation of a national security 
argument is appropriate where a refugee’s presence or actions give rise to 
an objectively reasonable, real possibility of directly or indirectly inflicted 
substantial harm to the host state’s most basic interests, including the risk 
of an armed attack on its territory or its citizens, or the destruction of its 
democratic institutions.264 Agreeing with Hathaway, Hailbronner argues 
that the restriction is hardly in line with the development of the EU as an area 
of common interests and values which would seem to require that security 
threats to other Member States would have to be taken into account.265 
The second sentence of Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention, 
respectively Article 14 (4) of the Qualification Directive concerns cases in 
which the person constitutes a danger to the community of the Member State 
because of a conviction by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime. 
Final judgment refers to the ending of judicial proceedings; appeal rights 
have expired or have been exhausted. The term ‘serious crime’ includes acts 
such as homicide, rape, child molesting, wounding, arson, drugs trafficking 
and armed robbery. Commentary to Article 33 (2) explains that the use of 
‘particularly serious’ expresses that even when a person has committed a 
serious crime, refoulement is only warranted when account has been taken of 
all mitigating and other circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
offence. Finally, the refugee must constitute a danger to the community from 
which protection is sought. As danger follows from the refugee’s criminal 
character, it does not matter whether the crime was committed in the state 
of origin or country of asylum. The question whether the person has or has 
not served a penal sentence or otherwise been punished is not relevant and 
particularized refoulement cannot be based on the refugee’s criminal record 
per se.266 
Hathaway believes that no additional proportionality requirement has to be 
met when it is shown that a refugee falls under Article 33 (2) of the Refugee 
Convention. He states that ‘no purely individuated risk of persecution can 
offset a real threat to such critical security interest of the receiving state’ which 
does not require a balancing test. Other scholars, including Zimmermann & 
263 For more on the issue of terrorism see Zimmermann & Wennholz 2011, p. 1416. 
264 See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 236 et seq. 
265 Hailbronner 2010, p. 1135.
266 Hathaway 2005, pp. 349-351.
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Wennholz do not agree with this thought, stating that it is at odds with basic 
principles of human rights protection.267
With respect to the discussion on the notion of ‘danger to the security of the 
Member State’, alliance can be sought with Articles 27 and 28 of Directive 
2004/38 on the free movement of EU citizens and their family members. 
According to Article 27 (1) of Directive 2004/38, Member States may 
impose restrictions on the residence of Union citizens and their family 
members on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. The 
measures taken on these grounds must be based on the personal conduct 
of the person concerned and must represent a ‘genuine, present and 
sufficiently threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.268 
Justifications that are isolated from the particulars of the case or that rely 
on considerations of general prevention shall not be accepted (Article 27 
(2) of Directive 2004/38)’.269 The ECJ decided in P.I. v. Oberburgermeisterin 
der Stadt Remscheid that this threat ‘implies, in general, the existence in the 
individual concerned of a propensity to act in the same way in the future. 
Before taking an expulsion decision, the host Member State must take 
account of considerations such as how long the individual concerned has 
resided on its territory, his/her age, state of health, family and economic 
situation, social and cultural integration into that state and the extent of his/
her links with the country of origin’.270
Article 28 (3) of Directive 2004/38 prescribes that an expulsion decision may 
not be taken against Union citizens, unless the decision is based on imperative 
grounds of public security. The Court determined that this provision must 
be interpreted as meaning that ‘it is open to the Member States to regard 
criminal offences such as those referred to in the second subparagraph of 
Article 83 (1) TFEU271 as constituting a particularly serious threat to one 
of the fundamental interests of society, which might pose a direct threat 
267 Zimmermann & Wennholz 2011, p. 1420 and Hathaway 2005, pp. 353-355.  
268 Boeles, Den Heijer, Lodder & Wouters 2009 define this criterion as the ‘clear and 
present danger test’. 
269 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 
and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC.
270 ECJ 22 May 2012, P.I. v. Oberburgermeisterin der Stadt, App. No. C-348/09. See also 
ECJ 11 June 2015, Zh. And O. v. Staatssecretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie, App. No. 
C-554/13 which concerned the interpretation of the terms ‘risk to public policy’ in 
Article 7 (4) of the Returns Directive. 
271 These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings 
and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms 
trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, 
computer crime and organised crime.
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to the calm and physical security of the population and thus be covered by 
the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’, capable of justifying 
an expulsion measure under Article 28 (3), as long as the manner in which 
such offences were committed discloses particularly serious characteristics, 
which is a matter for the referring court to determine on the basis of an 
individual examination of the specific case before it’.272
§ 3.3.3.3 Article 17 of the Directive
The Commission used the similar wording of Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention for draft Article 17 of the Directive. In the final version, relevant 
changes have been implemented which make exclusion from subsidiary 
protection status broader than the refugee status under the Qualification 
Directive and the Refugee Convention.273 A comparison between Articles 
12 (2) and 17 (1) of the Qualification Directive shows that subparagraphs (a) 
and (c) are identical.274 Article 17 (2) corresponds with Article 12 (3) of the 
272 See para. 28 of the judgment.
273 Draft Article 17 (3) and (4) which were similar to draft article 14 (3) and (4) of 
the original proposal and provided for a judicial remedy and prescribed that the 
application of the exclusion would not in any manner affect obligations of Member 
States under international law, were also deleted. 
274 These read respectively as following: 
 Article 12 (2) 
 A third country national or a stateless person is excluded from being a refugee where 
there are serious reasons for considering that: 
 (a) he or she has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in 
respect of such crimes; 
 (b) he or she has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of 
refuge prior to his or her admission as a refugee, which means the time of issuing a 
residence permit based on the granting of refugee status; particularly cruel actions, 
even if committed with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious 
non-political crimes; 
 (c) he or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations as set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.
 Article 17 (1) 
 A third country national or a stateless person is excluded from being eligible for 
subsidiary protection where there are serious reasons for considering that: 
 (a) he or she has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in 
respect of such crimes; 
 (b) he or she has committed a serious crime; 
 (c) he or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations as set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations; 
 (d) he or she constitutes a danger to the community or to the security of the Member 
State in which he or she is present.
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Directive as both state that the exclusion clauses also apply to persons who 
instigate or otherwise participate in the commission of the crimes or acts 
mentioned therein.275 There is firstly a difference between the provisions 
in Article 12 (2) (b) and Article 17 (1) (b) of the Directive. While the first 
provision refers to a serious non-political crime, the latter requires the 
person to have committed a ‘serious crime’ irrespective of where the crime 
has been committed. The phrase ‘outside the country of refuge prior to 
this admission as a beneficiary of subsidiary protection status’ has been 
omitted from Article 17 (1) (b) indicating that a serious crime can either 
be committed before or after the issuance of subsidiary protection status. 
Whether a crime is considered a ‘serious crime’ is determined according to 
the same criteria as applied under Article 1F (b). According to the UNHCR 
Handbook, within this context a ‘serious crime’ ‘must be a capital crime or a 
very grave punishable act’. Minor offences punishable by moderate sentences 
are not grounds for exclusion under Article 1F (b), even if technically they 
are referred to as ‘crimes’ in the penal law of the country concerned. Once 
it can be shown that the act constitutes a ‘serious crime’, there is no need to 
determine whether it is a political or non-political crime.276 Study shows that 
Member States usually define the notion of a ‘serious crime’ as referring to 
the severity of the punishment provided in national criminal codes ranging 
for crimes where the sentence is longer than three to ten years.277          
Another difference between the refugee and subsidiary protection exclusion 
clauses relates to two additional exclusion grounds for subsidiary protection. 
This first ground concerns Article 17 (1) (d) which excludes a person when ‘the 
person constitutes a danger to the community or the security of the Member 
State in which he or she is present’. This phrase is not a new phenomenon 
as it is based on Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention and defined as a 
merger of Article 33 (2) and Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. While 
the extension of the exclusion clauses for refugees with cases dealt with 
under Article 33 (2) was rejected by Member States for being untenable with 
the Refugee Convention and eventually led to the creation of Article 14 (4) 
of the Directive, the legal objections were not relevant in case of subsidiary 
protection.278 This has to do with the lack of an international instrument on 
subsidiary protection as a result of which, no analogous legal argument could 
be satisfied with respect to subsidiary protection.279 The fact that a country 
275 In the draft provisions of both, the original wording was ‘the grounds for exclusion 
shall be based solely on the personal and knowing conduct of the person concerned’. 
276 McAdam 2005, pp. 495-496.
277 ECRE, The Impact of the Qualification Directive on International Protection, 
October 2008, p. 30.
278 While in case of Article 14 (4), a Member State ‘may’ terminate the refugee status, 
Article 17 (1) obliges to exclude when the provision can be applied.  
279 McAdam 2007, p. 23.
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excludes an applicant from subsidiary protection does not necessarily mean 
that the person can be removed. Just as in the case of excluding refugees, 
Member States have to respect the non-refoulement principle under human 
rights law as prescribed in Article 21 (1) of the Directive. This shows that 
exclusion from eligibility for subsidiary protection must be distinguished 
from refoulement. The application of Article 17 (1) means in practice that the 
applicant must either be sent to a safe third country or be allowed to remain 
in accordance with the prohibition of refoulement under, inter alia, Article 
3 ECHR, but without a residence permit and other rights derived from the 
subsidiary protection status.280 Within this context recital 15 of the recast 
Directive formulates that such persons are allowed to remain in the country 
but fall outside the scope of the Directive.281 
Contrary to Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention and Article 14 (4) 
of the Qualification Directive, the phrase ‘having been convicted by a final 
judgment of a particular serious crime’ has been left out of the provision. 
Article 17 (1) (d) only refers to ‘a danger to the community or to the security 
of the Member State in which he or she is present’ and requires ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ instead of ‘reasonable grounds’. Hailbronner 
states that the standard of proof of Article 33 (2) is thus not applicable; the 
application of subparagraph d) requires a lower threshold and its scope of 
application is broader than Article 33 (2) which gives Member States more 
discretion in applying the provision.282 
The second additional exclusion ground is prescribed under Article 17 (3) 
and reads as following: 
‘Member States may exclude a third country national or a stateless person 
from being eligible for subsidiary protection, if he or she prior to his or her 
admission to the Member State has committed one or more crimes, outside 
the scope of paragraph 1, which would be punishable by imprisonment, had 
they been committed in the Member State concerned, and if he or she left 
his or her country of origin solely in order to avoid sanctions resulting from 
these crimes’. 
Inclusion of this paragraph provides a remedy for preventing the escape 
of criminal responsibility of persons. However, it is questionable because 
there is no common agreement of what is meant with ‘punishable by 
imprisonment’.283
280 Boeles, Den Heijer, Lodder & Wouters 2009, p. 343.
281 Recital 9 reads in full as following: those third country nationals or stateless persons, 
who are allowed to remain in the territories of the Member States for reasons not due 
to a need for international protection but on a discretionary basis on compassionate 
or humanitarian grounds, fall outside the scope of this Directive. 
282 Hailbronner 2010, pp. 1159-1160.
283 The ECRE 2008 report on the implementation of the Qualification Directive shows 
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§ 3.3.3.4 Article 19 of the Directive
Article 19 of the Directive is the equivalent of Article 14 and like this provision 
it was not included until the Council negotiations. When comparing the 
provisions, there are some points of agreement and also some differences.284 
that for example Hungary and Slovakia require the crime to be punishable in national 
legislation with at least a 5-year imprisonment term, p. 30.
284 These read respectively as following: 
 Article 14 
 1. Concerning applications for international protection filed after the entry into 
force of Directive 2004/83/EC, Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew 
the refugee status of a third country national or a stateless person granted by a 
governmental, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body if he or she has ceased to 
be a refugee in accordance with Article 11. 
 2. Without prejudice to the duty of the refugee in accordance with Article 4(1) 
to disclose all relevant facts and provide all relevant documentation at his or her 
disposal, the Member State which has granted refugee status shall, on an individual 
basis, demonstrate that the person concerned has ceased to be or has never been a 
refugee in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 
 3. Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew the refugee status of a third 
country national or a stateless person if, after he or she has been granted refugee 
status, it is established by the Member State concerned that: 
 (a) he or she should have been or is excluded from being a refugee in accordance with 
Article 12; 
 (b) his or her misrepresentation or omission of facts, including the use of false 
documents, was decisive for the granting of refugee status.
 4. Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew the status granted to a refugee 
by a governmental, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body, when: 
 (a) there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to the security 
of the Member State in which he or she is present; 
 (b) he or she, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State. 
 5. In situations described in paragraph 4, Member States may decide not to grant a 
status to a refugee, where such a decision has not yet been taken. 
 6. Persons to whom paragraphs 4 or 5 apply are entitled to rights set out in or similar 
to those set out in Articles 3, 4, 16, 22, 31, 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention in so 
far as they are present in the Member State.
 Article 19 
 1. Concerning applications for international protection filed after the entry into force 
of Directive 2004/83/EC, Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew the 
subsidiary protection status of a third country national or a stateless person granted 
by a governmental, administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body if he or she has 
ceased to be eligible for subsidiary protection in accordance with Article 16. 
 2. Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew the subsidiary protection 
status of a third country national or a stateless person granted by a governmental, 
administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial body, if after having been granted subsidiary 
protection status, he or she should have been excluded from being eligible for 
subsidiary protection in accordance with Article 17(3). 
 3. Member States shall revoke, end or refuse to renew the subsidiary protection status 
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Article 19 (1) and (3) correspond to Article 14 (1) and (3) of the Directive as 
they are also mandatory and oblige Member States to terminate subsidiary 
protection in the case of cessation, or exclusion in accordance with Article 17 
(1) and (2) or misrepresentation or omission of facts which were decisive for 
granting subsidiary protection. Article 19 (2) provides Member States with 
the option to revoke, end or renew the subsidiary protection status granted 
when the person should have been excluded from a status in accordance with 
Article 17 (3) of the Directive, thus in case of the commission of one or more 
crimes prior to his or her admission to the Member State. As Hailbronner 
states, it is a logical conclusion that a person excluded under Article 17 (3) 
is not entitled to a subsidiary protection status and therefore such a status 
which has already been  granted may be terminated.285 
Article 19 (4) of the Directive prescribes that the Member State has to 
demonstrate that the person concerned is not eligible for subsidiary protection 
on any of the termination grounds. In the case of revocation of refugee status, the 
Member State has to carry the burden of proof only when it concerns cessation 
of refugee status in accordance with Article 11 of the Directive while in the 
case of termination of subsidiary protection status on the exclusion grounds or 
fraud, the burden of proof of Article 4 (1) of the Qualification Directive applies. 
Battjes explains that this results in an odd situation where subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries suspected of fraud or the commissioning of a crime have a better 
position than recognised Directive refugees do.286 With regard to Article 19 
(4), Noll notes that there are conflicting interests between the applicant’s duty 
to submit all elements needed to substantiate international protection and later 
procedures for exclusion from subsidiary protection. According to him, the 
provision must be interpreted in a manner avoiding collisions with the right 
to remain silent, emanating from human rights law.287 Article 14 differs from 
Article 19 because it does not have a paragraph on the resultant rights as under 
Article 14 (6) of the Directive.
of a third country national or a stateless person, if: 
 (a) he or she, after having been granted subsidiary protection status, should have been 
or is excluded from being eligible for subsidiary protection in accordance with Article 
17(1) and (2); 
 (b) his or her misrepresentation or omission of facts, including the use of false 
documents, was decisive for the granting of subsidiary protection status. 
 4. Without prejudice to the duty of the third country national or stateless person in 
accordance with Article 4(1) to disclose all relevant facts and provide all relevant 
documentation at his or her disposal, the Member State which has granted the 
subsidiary protection status shall, on an individual basis, demonstrate that the person 
concerned has ceased to be or is not eligible for subsidiary protection in accordance 
with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article.
285 Hailbronner 2010, p. 1164.
286 Battjes 2006, pp. 268-269. 
287 Noll 2005, p. 15.
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§ 3.3.3.5 Other relevant provisions concerning exclusion
Article 21 of the Directive has been mentioned a few times already in 
relation to exclusion of international protection under this Directive. As laid 
down in paragraph 1 of this provision, Member States have to respect the 
non-refoulement principle in accordance with their international obligations, 
thus also when it concerns excluded asylum seekers who fall outside the 
scope of the Directive. This principle is among the objectives of the CEAS 
and prescribed in, inter alia, Article 19 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Though paragraph 1 is the same as the provision in the Commission 
proposal288 and applies both to refugees and subsidiary protection status 
beneficiaries, two more paragraphs were added during the negotiation 
process with respect to refugees; paragraph 2 allows Member States to 
refoule a refugee, whether formally recognised or not, on the conditions 
which are similar to Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention and according 
to paragraph 3, Member States may revoke, end or refuse to renew or to grant 
a residence permit with regard to a refugee to whom paragraph 2 applies. 
The UNHCR commented on the fact that paragraph 2 makes no reference 
to Article 32 of the Refugee Convention. The organisation expresses that 
Articles 32 and 33 of the Refugee Convention are complementary and that 
Article 32 should be explicitly reflected in implementing legislation.289 With 
regard to the question to whom Article 21 applies, Battjes explains that this 
provision can only be addressed after status determination. This has to do 
with the fact that the provisions of the Qualification Directive address the 
content of the protection granted to persons who qualify for refugee status 
or subsidiary protection status. The words ‘whether formally recognised or 
not’ in paragraph 2 concerns persons who qualify for refugee status in the 
sense of Article 2 (d) and (13) of the Directive, but to whom the benefits 
of the Directive may be denied because the grounds for expulsion in Article 
33 (2) or 32 (1) of the Refugee Convention apply.290 It should be mentioned 
that paragraph 3 refers to the termination of a residence permit and not 
the refugee status as is the case in Article 14 (4) of the Directive. Refugees 
whose residence permit is revoked, ended or refused renewal on the basis of 
Article 21 (3) are residing unlawfully in the state and can be expelled to their 
288 The Commission stated in its Commentary to the Directive that ‘In accordance with 
Articles 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention, this Article confirms the Member 
States’ obligation not to expel refugees and to respect, in relation to them, the 
principle of non-refoulement. It confirms, in accordance with the ECHR, the same 
obligation in relation to the victims of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Finally, it requires Member States to not expel the beneficiaries of the 
other forms of subsidiary protection and to respect, in relation to them, the principle 
of non-refoulement within the same limits laid down in Articles 32 and 33 of the 
Geneva Convention’.
289 UNHCR Annotated Comments 2005, p. 37.
290 Battjes 2006, p. 309. 
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country of origin. If they are still present in the Member State, they can make 
a claim to the benefits under Chapter VII which applies to beneficiaries of 
refugee status, not residence permit holders.
Within the scope of Article 21 (3), reference must be made to Article 24. 
This provision states that as soon as their status has been granted, refugees 
shall receive a residence permit for at least three-years. This permit is 
renewable unless compelling reasons of national security or public order 
otherwise require, and without prejudice to Article 21 (3). The refusal of the 
permit on ‘compelling reasons of national security or public order’ refers to 
the grounds stated in Article 32 (1) of the Refugee Convention which has a 
wider scope than Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention on which Article 
21 (3) is based.291 As Battjes explains, ‘the grounds for expulsion meant in 
Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention are hence instances of the grounds 
mentioned in Article 32 of the Refugee Convention, which encompasses 
yet other cases’. He states that this also results from the wording that those 
compelling reasons apply ‘without prejudice to Article 21 (3)’.
Furthermore, this text confirms that refugees whose permit has been 
refused on the grounds of security under Article 24 (1) may also make a 
claim to the benefits under Chapter VII, as this claim requires a status and 
not a permit. There is no unambiguous answer how this relates to recital 40 
of the recast Directive which expresses that Member States may require the 
prior issue of a residence permit with regard to access to employment, social 
welfare, health care and access to integration facilities. Battjes believes that 
if the permit were to function as a condition for the benefits, it should have 
been laid down in the provisions of the Qualification Directive and not in a 
Preamble consideration.292 
The H.T. v. Land Baden-Würrtemberg case293 concerned the interpretation of 
Article 21 (2) and (3) and Article 24 of the Qualification Directive. The ECJ 
judged that this Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a residence 
permit, once granted to a refugee, may be revoked, either pursuant to Article 
24 (1), where there are compelling reasons of national security or public 
order within the meaning of that provision, or pursuant to Article 21 (3), 
where there are reasons to apply the derogation from the principle of non-
refoulement laid down in Article 21 (2). According to the Court, support for 
a terrorist organisation included on the list annexed to Council Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of 
291 Article 25 of the recast Qualification Directive on the issuance of a travel document 
to beneficiaries of a refugee or subsidiary protection status knows a similar reference 
to ‘compelling reasons of national security or public order’ as prescribed in Article 24 
(1) of the Directive. 
292 Battjes 2006, pp. 488-489.
293 ECJ 24 June 2015, H.T. v. Land Baden-Würrtemberg, App. No. C-373/13.
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specific measures to combat terrorism, in the version in force at the material 
date, may constitute one of the ‘compelling reasons of national security or 
public order’ within the meaning of Article 24 (1), even if the conditions set 
out in Article 21 (2) are not met. In order to revoke on the basis of Article 
24 (1), the competent authorities are nevertheless obliged to carry out, 
under the supervision of the national courts, an individual assessment of 
the specific facts concerning the actions of both of the organisation and the 
refugee in question. Where a Member State decides to expel a refugee whose 
residence permit has been revoked, but suspends the implementation of that 
decision, it is incompatible with that Directive to deny access to the benefits 
guaranteed by Chapter VII of the same Directive, unless an exception 
expressly laid down in the Directive applies. 
The second part of Article 24 (1) makes it possible for Member States to 
shorten the validity of residence permits for family members of refugees and 
refers to Article 23 (1) where it is laid down that states should ensure that 
family unity can be maintained.294 
Article 23 of the Directive thus concerns the maintenance of the family 
unity of family members of beneficiaries of international protection and 
provides them with a derivative status. According to paragraph 2 of this 
provision, these family members are entitled to claim the benefits as set 
out in Articles 24 to 35 of the Directive if they do not individually qualify 
for a refugee or subsidiary protection status. When a family member of a 
beneficiary of international protection applies for asylum, it must first be 
examined whether he or she qualifies for international protection. When this 
is not the case, family members can still claim full benefits, in accordance 
with national procedures and as far as is compatible with the personal legal 
status of the family member. Article 2 (j) of the recast Directive defines 
who falls under the term ‘family member’. It covers spouses, partners in 
a stable relationship if domestic aliens’ law treats unmarried couples in a 
way comparable to married couples and minor children of beneficiaries of 
international protection.295 Furthermore, it is required that the family bond 
should have already existed in the country of origin and the family member 
is present in the Member State. Though the term ‘family member’ is more 
restricted in comparison to the original draft, Article 23 (5) of the Directive 
gives Member States the power to extend the group of family members to 
‘other close relatives who lived together as part of the family at the time of 
leaving the country of origin, and were wholly or mainly dependent on the 
beneficiary of refugee or subsidiary protection status at that time’.  
294 Article 24 (2) of the Qualification Directive concerns subsidiary protection 
beneficiaries and their family members in which the term for a residence permit is set 
for a period of at least one year.  
295 Minor children have to be unmarried and dependent and it is not relevant whether 
they were born in or out of wedlock or adopted as defined under the national law.  
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Significant within the scope of the exclusion clauses are Articles 23 (3) and 
(4) of the recast Directive. It is obvious that family members of excluded 
persons under Articles 12 or 17 of the Qualification Directive cannot invoke 
the provision on family unity of this Directive as Article 23 (2) states that it 
concerns the family members of ‘the beneficiary of international protection’. 
If family members themselves are or would be excluded from refugee 
or subsidiary protection status under the Directive, paragraph 3 obliges 
Member States not to provide a derivative status to them.296 As an individual 
claim of the family member should first be examined before Article 23 
comes into the picture, it may be the case that the family member is already 
excluded. If this is so, paragraph 3 does not fulfill a role anymore. Paragraph 
4 lays down that ‘notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, Member States may 
refuse, reduce or withdraw benefits for reasons of national security or public 
order’, which refers to family members who have not been excluded under 
paragraph 3. 
Besides Article 23 of the Qualification Directive, the Family Reunification 
Directive may fulfill a relevant role for family members of refugees.297 This 
Directive is the first legislative instrument on legal migration at EU level and 
refugees are explicitly stated to fall under the Directive. Alternative kinds 
of protection such as subsidiary protection and temporary protection do 
not fall under the term ‘refugee’ as prescribed in Article 2 (b) of the Family 
Reunification Directive.298 The latter Directive should be distinguished from 
Article 23 as it addresses admission of family members of refugees while 
Article 23 concerns the situation in which the family member is already 
present in the Member State.299 Another important difference between 
the two is that the primary purpose of the Family Reunification Directive 
296 Article 21 of the Qualification Directive which contains the non-refoulement principle 
is not applicable to family members, which results in the situation that family 
members who face expulsion must e.g. claim Article 3 ECHR.
297 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification, Official Journal L 251, 03/10/2003. 
298 Hailbronner & Carlitz 2010 express that the explicit reference to the Geneva 
Convention for the explanation of the term ‘refugee’ must be interpreted as meaning 
the Geneva Convention in the way it is interpreted by the Qualification Directive 
as Member States which are bound by the Family Reunification Directive are also 
bound by the Qualification Directive, pp. 175-176.
299 The Family Reunification Directives defines ‘family reunification’ as the entry into 
and residence in a Member State by family members of a third country national 
residing lawfully in that Member State in order to preserve the family unit, whether 
the family relationship arose before or after the resident’s entry’. The fact that a 
‘lawfully’ residence of the third country national is required results in that a refugee 
whose residence permit is refused for compelling reasons of national security or 
public order under Article 24 (1) of the recast Directive cannot make a claim for 
family reunification under the Family Reunification Directive. 
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is to secure respect for Article 8 ECHR, ‘respect for family life’ while the 
Qualification Directive does not mention this provision.300 
In the same manner of Article 23 (4) of the Qualification Directive, the 
Family Reunification Directives provides in Article 6 that Member States 
have the option to reject an application to family reunification with family 
members who present a threat to public policy, security or health.301 They 
may withdraw or refuse to renew the family member’s residence permit on 
the same grounds but when doing so, the Member State has to consider ‘the 
severity or type of offence against public policy or public security committed 
by the family member, or the dangers that are emanating from such person’. 
Recital 14 of the Family Reunification Directive explains what falls under 
the terms ‘public policy and security’: ‘the notion of public policy may cover 
a conviction for committing a serious crime. In this context it has to be noted 
that the notion of public policy and public security also covers cases in which 
a third country national belongs to an association which supports terrorism, 
supports such an association or has extremist aspirations’.302 
Though Article 6 of the Family Reunification Directive is comparable to the 
public policy and security clause in Directive 2004/38 on the free movement 
of EU citizens, Boeles as well as Hailbronner & Carlitz have doubts whether 
the criterion in Article 27 of the Directive 2004/38, which requires that the 
measure of public order is based ‘exclusively on the personal conduct of the 
person concerned’, applies to family reunification of third country nationals. 
Both of them refer to the drafting history of Article 6 which suggests that 
measures under this provision may be based on reasons other than merely 
the personal conduct; as the original draft did provide a clear reference 
to the ‘clear and present danger test’, which was deleted later on.303 The 
Commission states in its evaluation report of 2008 that ‘recital 14 of the 
Preamble gives some indication of what might constitute a threat to public 
policy and public security, but otherwise it is left to Member States to set their 
standards in line with the general principle of proportionality and Article 17 
300 The recast Directive speaks of ‘the right to asylum of applicants for asylum and 
their accompanying family members’ (recital 16 of the recast Directive) and states 
that ‘Family members, merely due to their relation to the refugee, will normally be 
vulnerable to acts of persecution in such a manner   that could be the basis for refugee 
status’ (recital 36 of the recast Directive).  
301 Paragraph 3 of this provision expresses that ‘renewal of the residence permit may not 
be withheld and removal from the territory may not be ordered by the competent 
authority of the Member State concerned on the sole ground of illness or disability 
suffered after the issue of the residence permit’. 
302 This corresponds to recital 37 of the recast Directive, except for the last part of ‘or has 
extremist aspirations’ which is lacking in recital 37. 
303 Boeles, Den Heijer, Lodder & Wouters 2009, pp. 193-194 and Hailbronner & Carlitz 
2010, pp. 218-220.
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of the Family Reunification Directive’.304 The latter provision prescribes that 
in case of rejection, withdrawal or refusal to renew a permit, ‘Member States 
have to take due account of the nature and solidity of the person’s family 
relationships and the duration of the residence in the Member State and of 
the existence of family, cultural and social ties with his/her country of origin’ 
and thus obliges Member States to make a comprehensive assessment of 
all the circumstances which may be relevant in a certain case, which is in 
line with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR concerning Article 8 ECHR.305 
A study on the implementation of the Family Reunification Directive in the 
EU shows that Member States have used various methods of implementing 
Article 6.306 Some States have more or less copied the formulation of Article 
6,307 while in several Member States, membership of an organisation which 
has ‘anti-constitutional’ elements or ‘extreme ideas’ or which supports 
terrorism is one of the grounds for refusal.308  
§ 3.3.4 Directive on Asylum Procedures 
This Directive is the last one within the first stage of the CEAS and at 
the same time the one on which Member States had a hard time agreeing 
on the text. The negotiations of the Commission’s amended proposal for 
the Directive took almost three years due to the fact that countries have 
considerable differences in administrative frameworks for handling asylum 
claims and there is a lack of detailed international standards applicable in this 
field.309 The aim of the Directive is to establish minimum standards for fair 
and efficient asylum procedures in Member States. The difference between 
the Directive on Asylum Procedures and the Qualification Directive is 
that the first one imposes procedural rules and safeguards for the way an 
application is examined while the latter imposes, inter alia, the criteria for 
the determination of an application and withdrawal of the status. These 
Directives are complementary and several provisions of the one Directive 
refer to the other related provisions in the other Directive.
The Commission explains that the approximation of rules on the procedures 
for granting and withdrawing refugee status should help to limit the 
secondary movements of applicants for asylum between Member States, 
where such movements would be caused by differences in legal frameworks. 
The Asylum Procedures Directive applies to all asylum claims made in the 
304 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to Family Reunification, Brussels, 
8.10.2008 COM(2008) 610 final, p. 8.
305 Hailbronner & Carlitz 2010, pp. 276-277. 
306 See Groenendijk, Fernhout, Van Dam, Van Oers & Strik 2007. 
307 Cyprus, Estonia, Greece and Lithuania. 
308 Austria, Belgium, Germany and Latvia.
309 Michelogiannaki 2008, p. 22. 
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territory of EU Member States, including at the border or in transit zones 
which are based on the Refugee Convention. According to Article 2 (b) of 
the Directive ‘any application for international protection is presumed to be 
an application for asylum, unless the person concerned explicitly requests 
another kind of protection that can be applied separately. Furthermore, 
Member States may decide to apply the Directive in procedures for deciding 
on applications for any kind of international protection.  
Articles 6 to 22 in Chapter 2 of the Directive prescribe the basic principles and 
guarantees for the asylum procedure. It is relevant to mention Article 7 stating 
that applicants should be allowed to remain in the Member State pending the 
examination in first instance with the exception of subsequent applications 
and cases where the person is surrendered or extradited to another Member 
State or third country, or an international criminal court or tribunal.310 The 
right to stay in the country is not an entitlement to a residence permit. In its 
2010 report on the application of this Directive, the Commission states that 
this right is generally recognised in national legislation and that in a number 
of Member States, the extradition of an asylum seeker to the country of origin 
is only possible after a negative decision on the asylum request has been 
taken.311 Further, decisions on asylum applications have to be appropriately 
examined; applicants should be informed in a language they understand and 
have the right to legal assistance which, under certain circumstances, should 
be free. Article 18 of the Directive prescribes that Member States should not 
hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is an applicant 
for asylum and when the person is detained, the possibility of speedy judicial 
review has to be provided.
Chapter 3 of the Directive deals with the procedure at first instance. Besides 
dealing with the normal procedure, it also covers accelerated, inadmissible, 
unfounded and special procedures. 
According to Article 23 (1), applications must be assessed in accordance 
with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter 2. Recital 11 of the 
Directive states that it is in the interest of both Member States and applicants 
for asylum to decide as soon as possible on asylum applications. Though, six 
months is prescribed for the examination, Member States are not obligated to 
decide within this period. However, when this is the case they have to inform 
the applicant of the delay or set a date when the decision is expected. Based 
on Article 23 (4) of the Directive, Member States may choose to prioritise 
or accelerate procedures in several situations. As paragraph 3 of the same 
provision prescribes that ‘any’ case may be prioritised or accelerated, the 
list of situations under paragraph 4 is not exhaustive and contains examples. 
310 Peers & Rogers 2006, p. 368.
311 Brussels, 8.9.2010 COM(2010) 465 final, p. 45.
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The Directive does not specify what acceleration is nor does it give a time 
frame for a decision. It does specify that accelerated procedures must be in 
accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter 2.312 
The Commission and the UNHCR report that national practices with regard 
to the accelerated procedure are divergent. According to the Commission, 
the number of grounds set out in national law varies significantly, whereby 
some depart from the Directive’s wording. With respect to exclusion cases, 
the UNHCR states that applications raising potential exclusion questions 
are by law in several Member States not exempted from accelerated 
examination. It found that the law in one state establishes this as a ground 
for the accelerated examination of an application, but also that determining 
authorities in some other states thought that in practice, the prescribed 
time limits for examination would be exceeded if all questions relating to 
excludability have to be examined in detail.313 The ground specified under 
Article 23 (4) (m) is relevant within this framework as it states that a 
Member State may choose to accelerate the examination when ‘the applicant 
is a danger to the national security or public order of the Member State, or 
the applicant has been forcibly expelled for serious reasons of public security 
and public order under national law’.314 The time limits within which an 
accelerated examination has to be finished also differs in practice in some 
Member States. The Commission reports that these vary from 48-hours to 
three months and some countries have no formal time limits. While in some 
Member States, the time limits are not binding, in others exceeding the time 
limits may mean that a certain decision may no longer be issued, such as that 
the application cannot be rejected as manifestly unfounded.315 
Articles 25 to 27 of the Directive lay down the rules on inadmissible 
applications. Member States are not required to examine an asylum 
application when it falls within one of the situations mentioned in Article 25. 
One of these circumstances is when the applicant can receive protection in a 
non-EU State being his first country of asylum. This is a country where the 
applicant has been granted protection before coming to the EU.316 Another 
situation prescribed in Article 25 is the safe third country. In this case, 
Member States may send applicants to a non-EU State with which the 
applicant has a connection. The third country is considered to be a safe 
312 A personal interview may be omitted during certain accelerated procedures, see 
Article 12 (2) (c) of the Asylum Procedures Directive. 
313 Improving Asylum Procedures Comparative Analysis and Recommendations For 
Law and Practice. A UNHCR research project on the application of key provisions of 
the Asylum Procedures Directive in selected Member States, March 2010.
314 Recital 12 prescribes that the notion of public order may cover a conviction for 
committing a serious crime. 
315 UNHCR report on the Asylum Procedures Directive, March 2010, p. 55.
316 Article 26 of the Asylum Procedures Directive. 
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country when it meets the criteria of Article 27. As Boeles summarises; 
‘these conditions reflect the principles that (1) asylum seekers must in 
all circumstances be treated in accordance with the Refugee Convention 
and that (2) the safe third country must respect the principle of non-
refoulement’.317 Articles 29-31 of the Directive contain further provisions 
regarding this concept. The first two paragraphs of Article 29 which enable 
the Council to adopt a minimum list of third countries which all Member 
States have to regard as safe countries of origin, has been annulled by the 
ECJ on the grounds that these two paragraphs grant the Council a legislative 
power exceeding that provided for by the Treaty. Though the Court annulled 
the paragraphs on creating a common list, Member States can continue to 
apply the other substantive provisions on safe countries of origin.318 The 
standards as stated in Chapter 2 of the Directive also apply to procedures 
under Article 25. 
Chapter 4 of the Directive deals with the procedures for the withdrawal of a 
refugee status. An examination to withdraw the status may be started when 
new elements or findings are available which give cause for reconsidering the 
refugee status. Article 38 specifies the guarantees for the person concerned 
during a withdrawal examination in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Qualification Directive which was discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Peers & Rogers mention that when withdrawal of status leads to expulsion, 
the absence of certain procedural rights not mentioned in Article 38 may 
entail a breach of the general principles of Community law, in light of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.319 It is also noteworthy that withdrawal of 
the refugee status does not affect the protection provided by, for example, 
Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR which might stop the expulsion of the person 
concerned. 
The last provision to be discussed is Article 39 which prescribes that Member 
States shall ensure applicants to have the right to an effective remedy before 
a court or tribunal.320 According to the Directive, Member States should 
provide time limits and other necessary rules to allow the applicant to 
exercise his right. The question whether the appeal has suspensive effect, is 
left to the discretion of the Member States, though the rules have to be in 
accordance with international obligations. UNHCR states that ‘these have 
been established at regional level by the ECtHR, which has held that for a 
remedy to be effective, Member States must provide for the possibility of 
suspending removal in cases where it might lead to refoulement’. Further, 
317 Boeles, Den Heijer, Lodder & Wouters 2009, pp. 350-351. 
318 Spijkerboer & Arbaoui 2010, p. 1293. 
319 Peers & Rogers 2006, pp. 407-408. 
320 See Reneman 2013.
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the ECtHR found that ‘the notion of an effective remedy in relation to a 
claim for international protection requires rigorous scrutiny of an arguable 
claim, because of the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur. The 
remedy must be effective in practice as well as in law. It must take the form of 
a guarantee and not of a mere statement of intent or a practical arrangement, 
and it must have automatic suspensive effect’.321 The Commission reports 
that automatic suspensive effect applies to all appeals lodged with the first 
tier appellate body in six Member States and that in other Member States 
applicable exceptions are widely divergent and concern, inter alia, decisions 
falling under Article 23 (3) and (4) of the Asylum Procedures Directive. 
In some countries removal may be immediately enforced with respect to 
decisions on subsequent claims or where a person constitutes a danger to 
public order or national security.322 
§ 3.3.4.1 Recast Directive on Asylum Procedures 
The deadline for transposition of the Directive on Asylum Procedures was 1 
December 2007, except for Article 15 regarding legal assistance which had 
to be transposed a year later. As stated above, the Commission observed that 
important differences continue to exist between Member States regarding 
procedural guarantees in asylum procedures and that optional provisions 
and derogation clauses in the Directive contributed to this situation.323 The 
UNHCR and organisations such as the Immigration Law Practitioners’ 
Association had already commented on these points at the time of the 
Directive’s adoption.324 According to the Commission, the ‘Directive lacks 
the potential to back up adequately the Qualification Directive and ensure 
a rigorous examination of applications for international protection in line 
with international and Community obligations of Member States regarding 
the principle of non-refoulement’. As mentioned earlier, together with the 
Qualification Directive, the Commission presented a proposal for a recast of 
the Asylum Procedures Directives as well.325 This recast Directive on Asylum 
321 For more on the right to an effective remedy, see Chapter 4 concerning the discussion 
on the ECHR.
322 Brussels, 8.9.2010 COM(2010) 465 final, p. 14. 
323 Idem, p.15.
324 ILPA Response to the Hague Programme: EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy 
and UNHCR Provisional Comments on the Proposal for European Council Directive on 
Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing 
Refugee Status (Council Document 14203/04, Asile 64) of 10 February 2005.
325 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing 
international protection (recast), Brussels, 21.10.2009, COM(2009) 554 final. In 
2011, the Commission has also presented a modified proposal for a recast: Amended 
proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection status (recast), 
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Procedures was adopted on the same date as the Reception Conditions 
Directive.326 The original Directive remains in force until the 21st of July 
2015 which is the date that the recast becomes applicable. 
To get a consistent application of the asylum acquis and simplifying 
applicable arrangements, the recast provides for a single procedure in which 
applications have to be considered in both forms of international protection 
as set out in the Qualification Directive. Hence, the phrase ‘granting and 
withdrawing refugee status’ as prescribed in the title of the Directive has 
been changed into ‘granting and withdrawing international protection’ and 
the words ‘international protection’ also replace the terms refugee status, 
refugee and asylum throughout the Directive.327
The new recast Directive attaches suspensive effect to an appeal as was 
already laid down in the proposal for a recast and sets a maximum time limit 
of twenty-one months for concluding the asylum examination procedure.328 
Within the scope of the exclusion clauses, it should be mentioned that Article 
23 (4) (m) of the current Directive was deleted in the proposal for a recast 
Directive and has been reintroduced in a slightly different form. According 
to Article 31 (8) (j) of the recast Directive, Member States ‘may provide 
that an examination procedure in accordance with the basic principles and 
guarantees of Chapter 2 be accelerated and/or conducted at the border or 
in transit zones when: ‘the applicant may for serious reasons be considered a 
danger to the national security or public order of the Member State, or the 
applicant has been forcibly expelled for serious reasons of public security or 
public order under national law.329 Paragraph 9 of the latter provision states 
that Member States must set reasonable time limits for such cases and may 
without prejudice to paragraphs 3 and 5 of the same provision be exceeded 
when this is necessary to ensure an adequate and complete examination of 
Brussels, 1.6.2011, COM(2011) 319 final.
326 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection 
(recast). 
327 Several organisations have commented on the proposal for a recast Directive, 
among others, UNHCR comments on the European Commission’s proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing international protection 
(COM(2009)554, 21 October 2009); Opinion of the National Red Cross Societies 
of the Member States of the European Union and the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Brussels, 31 May 2010 and ILPA Comments on 
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on 
minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing 
international protection (recast) Com (2009) 554, 21 October 2009.   
328 Articles 46 (5) and 31 (5) of the recast Directive on Asylum Procedures respectively. 
329 See also ECRE comments on the Amended Commission Proposal to recast the 
Asylum Procedures Directive (COM(2011) 319 final), September 2011. 
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the application. In the case of applicants who are detained at borders or in 
transit zones, states have four weeks to decide on their application. When 
a decision has not yet been taken, the alien must be granted entry to the 
territory of the state in order for the application to be processed.330 
In connection with the binding effect of the Directives which are discussed in 
the foregoing, this raises the question of judicial protection for third country 
nationals. The ECJ plays an important role as it is the judicature that has to 
deal with interpreting the cases on the provisions. The next paragraph will 
focus on the ECJ’s case law on the exclusion clauses. 
§ 3.4 The role of the ECJ 
The Lisbon Treaty led to several changes within EU law concerning 
the protection of fundamental rights. Accordingly, the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights which is mainly based on the ECHR is now a legally 
binding instrument for the EU. The Charter which is part of primary law 
of the EU sees the Convention as a minimum standard. This follows from 
Article 52 (3) of the Charter in which is laid down that:
‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the 
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection’.
Weiß states that the wording of Article 52 (3) of the Charter does not merely 
point at an interpretational guideline but is a substantial incorporation of 
corresponding Convention rights which have become legally binding on the 
EU institutions.331 
The importance of the Charter for the alien is that it is directly enforceable in 
national courts, but only when the case in question involves the application 
of EU law. It is difficult to take a case directly to the Court of Justice as this 
Court was not primarily created to deal with individual complaints. Through 
the preliminary reference procedure, it is up to the national courts to decide 
whether a question over the meaning of EU legislation will be referred to 
the Court in Luxembourg. When an alien cannot rely upon the Charter in a 
case, he can still fall back on the procedural guarantees as laid down in the 
provisions of the ECHR as states are always obliged to respect the rights and 
freedoms as guaranteed under the Convention.332  
330 Article 43 of the recast Directive on Asylum Procedures. 
331 Weiß 2011, pp. 69-73. 
332 Background Paper, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: What can it do? Open 
Society European Policy Institute, February 2013. See also Brouwer 2005.  
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As far as it concerns remedies to the ECJ there are generally two kinds of 
appeals, namely a direct appeal, mainly through the legality of acts and an 
indirect appeal through the preliminary references by a domestic court.333 
As in practice the latter is the only way an individual can gain access to the 
ECJ, I will focus on this procedure. The preliminary reference procedure 
is laid down in Article 267 TFEU and its purpose is to uniformly interpret 
and apply EU law in all Member States. A reference for a preliminary 
ruling allows the courts and tribunals of the Member States, in disputes 
which have been brought before them, to refer questions to the ECJ about 
the interpretation of EU law. The ECJ does not decide the dispute itself but 
provides a guiding ruling. It is for the national court or tribunal to dispose of 
the case in accordance with the Court’s decision, which is similarly binding 
on other national courts or tribunals before which a similar issue is raised. 
Though requests for preliminary rulings were initially limited to questions 
raised by national courts of last instance, this limitation was abolished with 
the Lisbon Treaty and every court or tribunal is now allowed to request 
a preliminary ruling.334 The Treaty has also led to the introduction of 
paragraph 4 of Article 267 TFEU which prescribes that the ECJ has to 
decide with the ‘minimum of delay’ when a requested preliminary ruling 
concerns a person in custody.335 Another change involving the Lisbon 
Treaty and affecting asylum law is that the Court now has full judicial 
review capacities for provisions as well as organs operating in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice.
§ 3.4.1 Cases concerning exclusion
Up to now, four cases have been dealt with before the ECJ regarding the 
exclusion clauses of the EU asylum Directives of which one case indirectly 
involves Article 12 of the Qualification Directive. In the cases Nawras 
Bolbol v. Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal (Hungarian Immigration 
Service)336 and Mostafa Abed El Karem El Kott and Others v. Bevándorlási 
és Állampolgársági Hivatal, the Court gave a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of Article 12 (1) (a).337 Article 12 (1) corresponds to Article 
1D of the Refugee Convention and deals with cessation. This provision falls 
beyond the scope of this study and will, therefore, not be discussed further. 
333 Carlier 2007, p. 31. For an overview on direct actions see <http://www.pbookshop.
com/media/filetype/s/p/1350116239.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 2015). 
334 See Carrera, De Somer & Petkova 2012, for a summary of the ECJ’s role after the 
Lisbon Treaty.
335 In practical terms this paragraph can lead to the application of the urgent preliminary 
ruling of Article 23a of the Statute and Article 104 (b) of the Rules of Procedures.  
336 ECJ 17 June 2010, Nawras Bolbol v. Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal (Hungarian 
Immigration Service), App. No. C-31/09. 
337 ECJ 19 December 2012, Mostafa Abed El Karem El Kott and Others v. Bevándorlási és 
Állampolgársági Hivatal, App. No. C364-11.   
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The case of Shepherd338 indirectly involved Article 12 (2) as the key point of 
contention concerned Article 9 (2) (e) of the Qualification Directive. This 
provision provides that ‘acts of persecution’ upon which an application for 
refugee status could rely, include: e) prosecution or punishment for refusal 
to perform military service in a conflict, where performing military service 
would include crimes or acts falling under the exclusion clauses as set out in 
Article 12 (2).
The applicant, a US soldier deployed to Iraq in 2004 as a helicopter 
maintenance mechanic, left his unit while stationed in Germany and applied 
for asylum in 2008. In support of his application, he submitted that because 
of his refusal to perform military service in Iraq, he was at risk of criminal 
prosecution and that desertion being a serious offence in the US, it affected 
his life by putting him at risk of social ostracism in his country. Applicant’s 
claim was rejected and on appeal the Bavarian Administrative Court, Munich 
decided to stay the proceedings before it and request a preliminary ruling. 
The referring court asked in essence whether Article 9 (2) (e) of the 
Qualification Directive must be interpreted as meaning that certain 
circumstances, relating in particular to the nature of the tasks performed by 
the soldier concerned, the nature of his refusal to perform military service, 
the nature of the conflict in question and the nature of the crimes which that 
conflict is alleged to involve, have a decisive influence in the assessment which 
must be carried out by the national authorities in order to verify whether a 
situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings falls within the scope 
of that provision.
The ECJ stated that with regard to this case, only the reference to ‘war 
crimes’ in Article 12 (2) (a) is relevant and clarified that Article 9 (2) (e) 
could be invoked by all military personnel who are or will be involved with 
the direct or indirect commission of war crimes within an ‘actual conflict’. 
So as long as the applicant could establish that there was a high likelihood 
of committing war crimes in Iraq, the mere fact that such acts lay in the 
future at the time of his decision to leave the army and his mere indirect 
involvement with such crimes as a helicopter technician would not prevent 
him from invoking Article 9.339 
However, in order to establish a high likelihood of the commission of war 
crimes, the applicant would have to satisfy an extremely high burden of proof. 
According to the Court, when assessing applicant’s submissions, significant 
338 ECJ 26 February 2015, Shepherd v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, App. No. C-472/13. See 
also <http://cjicl.org.uk/2015/03/03/many-presumptions-no-guarantees-preliminary-
observations-shepherd-c-47213/> (last accessed on 21 September 2015). 
339 Idem, paras. 33-38.
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attention should be paid to the fact that the US’ actions were backed by a 
mandate of the UN Security Council, which offers in principle, every 
guarantee that no war crimes will be committed and that the same applies, 
in principle, to an operation which gives rise to an international consensus. 
Accordingly, although the possibility can never be excluded that acts 
contrary to the very principles of the Charter of the UN will be committed 
in war operations, the fact that the armed intervention takes place in such a 
context must be taken into account. Additionally, the existence of domestic 
US legislation outlawing war crimes renders applicant’s claim ‘implausible’. 
Finally, applicant would need to establish that his refusal to perform military 
services ‘constituted the only means by which the applicant could avoid 
participating in the alleged war crimes’.340
The last judgment to discuss is dated 9 November 2010 and the result of 
five questions asked by the German Federal Administrative Court in two 
combined cases.341 It regards a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the 
exclusion clauses of Article 12 (2) (b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive 
and Article 3 of this Directive which allows Member States to introduce or 
retain more favourable standards than laid down in the Directive. 
The parties in the main proceedings are the Federal Republic of Germany, 
represented by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: the Bundesambt 
v. B and D, who are Turkish nationals of Kurdish origin. 
The first case concerns B who was a sympathiser of Dev Sol (now DHKP/C) 
in Turkey during his youth and had supported armed guerrilla warfare 
in the mountains for a certain period of time. He got arrested in 1995 
and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2001, he was given another life 
sentence for killing a fellow prisoner: an offence to which he confessed. 
During a 6-month conditional release for health problems, he fled to 
Germany. B entered Germany at the end of 2002 and applied for asylum 
and recognition of refugee status. His application for asylum was rejected 
as unfounded based on the grounds that B had committed serious non-
political crimes. B fell into the second exclusion category as prescribed in the 
second sentence of Paragraph 51 (3) of the Auslandergesetz (Law on Entry 
and Residence of Aliens in Germany), subsequently Paragraph 60 (8) of the 
Aufenthaltsgesetz (Law on the Residence, Participation in Employment and 
Integration of Aliens in Germany) and Paragraph 3 (2), subparagraph 2 of the 
Asylverfahrensgesetz (Asylum Procedures Law) and was also declared eligible 
340 Idem, paras. 41-44.
341 ECJ 9 November 2010, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B & D case, App. Nos. C-57/09 
and C-101/09.
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for deportation to Turkey.342 In appeal, the decision of the Bundesambt 
was annulled by the administrative court of Gelsenkirchen after which the 
appeal of the Bundesambt against that decision was dismissed by the higher 
administrative court of North Rhine-Westphalia. The latter court explained 
that the exclusion clause of serious non-political crimes, does not only 
consider crimes committed in the past, but also regards the need to prevent 
the danger the person can pose to the host state, which makes the application 
of the clause require an overall assessment of the particular case because 
of the principle of proportionality. The Bundesambt appealed against this 
decision before the federal administrative court relying on the second and 
third exclusion clauses of the second sentence of Paragraph 51 (3) of the 
Auslandergesetz, nowadays Paragraph 3 (2), subparagraphs 2 and 3 of the 
Asylverfahrensgesetz, by arguing that these two exclusion clauses do not 
imply that there must be a danger to the security of the State; nor entail the 
need for an assessment of proportionality with regard to the particular case. 
The second case regards D who had been a guerrilla fighter and senior 
official of the PKK. Due to political differences with its leadership, he left 
the PKK in 2000 and since then had been under threat. In 2001, he applied 
for asylum in Germany, where he was recognised as a refugee on the basis of 
the national law in force at that time. In 2002, D’s refugee status was revoked 
as according to the Bundesambt, there were serious reasons for considering 
that D had committed a serious non-political crime outside Germany before 
his admission to its territory as a refugee and that he had been guilty of acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. The administrative court 
of Gelsenkirchen annulled the revocation decision and the appeal brought by 
the Bundesambt was dismissed by the higher administrative court of North 
Rhine-Westphalia on the same grounds as in the case of B. The Bundesambt 
appealed this judgment before the federal administrative court on grounds 
that are analogous to the case of B.  
The federal administrative court expresses that though, in both cases the 
conditions for a refugee status are met, B and D will not be recognised 
as refugees if the exclusion clauses of Article 12 (2) of the Qualification 
Directive apply. If these persons are excluded on the basis of the latter 
provision, they would be entitled to their right of asylum under Article 16a of 
the Grundgesetz (Constitutional Law) which does not exclude anyone from 
342 In 2002, the Terrorismusbekampungsgesetz (Law on Fighting Terrorism) entered 
into force, which resulted into including Article 1F of the Refugee Convention 
into Paragraph 51 (3) of the Auslandergesetz. This provision is replaced with 
Paragraph 60 (8) of the Aufenthaltgesetz which with the implementation of the 
Qualification Directive into German law and replaced by Paragraph 3 (2) of the 
Asylverfahrensgesetz. The latter provision corresponds to Article 12 (2) and (3) of 
the Qualification Directive.  
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that right. Against this background, the following questions are referred to 
the ECJ:343
1) Is membership of an organisation which is on an EU list of terrorist 
persons, groups and entities in relation to a person who has actively 
supported the armed struggle waged by that organisation and perhaps 
had a prominent position within that organisation a cause of serious 
non-political crime or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations within the meaning of Article 12 (2) (b) or (c) of the 
Qualification Directive?
2) If so, does exclusion from refugee status pursuant to Article 12 (2) (b) 
or (c) of the Qualification Directive require that the person concerned 
continues to represent a danger for the host Member State?
3) If question 2 is to be answered in the negative: Is it conditional upon a 
proportionality test being undertaken in relation to the particular case?
4) If a proportionality test applies, must it be taken into consideration 
that the person is protected against deportation under Article 3 of the 
ECHR and is exclusion disproportionate only in exceptional cases having 
particular characteristics?
5) Is it compatible with Article 3 of the Qualification Directive for a 
Member State to recognise that a person excluded from refugee status 
pursuant to Article 12 (2) of the Directive has a right of asylum under its 
constitutional law?344
which the ECJ answered with:
The fact that a person has been a member of an organisation included in an 
EU list of terrorist groups and that the person has actively supported the 
armed struggle waged by that organisation does not automatically mean that 
that person must be excluded from refugee status. This is conditional on an 
assessment on a case-by-case basis of the specific facts. To be able to apply the 
exclusion grounds in Article 12 (2) (b) and (c) of the Qualification Directive 
it must be possible to attribute to the person concerned an individual 
responsibility for the acts committed by the organisation in question while 
that person was a member. To do so, the true role played by the person 
concerned in the perpetration of the acts in question, his position within the 
organisation, the extent of the knowledge he had or is deemed to have had of 
its activities, and any pressure to which he was exposed or other factors likely 
343 Gyulai 2012, p. 38. 
344 With regard to the case of D, question 5 is slightly different: Is it compatible with 
Article 3 of the Qualification Directive if the foreign national continues to be 
recognised as having a right of asylum under national constitutional law even if one 
of the exclusion criteria laid down in Article 12 (2) of the Directive is satisfied and 
refugee status under Article 14 (3) of the Directive is revoked?
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to influence his conduct must be considered. Any authority which finds, in 
the course of that assessment, that the person concerned has - like D - occupied 
a prominent position within an organisation which uses terrorist methods 
is entitled to presume that that person has individual responsibility for acts 
committed by that organisation during the relevant period. It nevertheless 
remains necessary to examine all the relevant circumstances before a 
decision excluding that person from refugee status can be adopted. 
Furthermore, the Court explains that representing a danger for the host 
Member State is not a factor to be taken into consideration under Article 12 
(2) of the Qualification Directive which has to do with the fact that clauses 
(b) and (c) of Article 12 (2) which are based on Article 1F (b) and (c) of the 
Refugee Convention are intended as a penalty for acts committed in the 
past. The Court states that Articles 14 (4) (a) and 21 (2) of the Qualification 
Directive enable the competent authorities to revoke a refugee status or 
refoule a refugee when he/she represents a danger. Exclusion under Article 
12 (2) (b) or (c) is not conditional either on an assessment of proportionality 
in relation to the particular case. When the conclusion is reached that Article 
12 (2) applies, the authorities cannot be required to undertake an assessment 
of proportionality, as this would in fact imply a fresh assessment of the level 
of seriousness of the acts committed, which it has already undertaken to 
come to the conclusion that Article 12 (2) applies. According to the Court, 
the exclusion of a person from refugee status does not imply the adoption of 
a position on the separate question of whether that person can be deported 
to his country of origin. 
In conclusion, the ECJ expresses that Article 3 of the Qualification Directive 
must be interpreted as meaning that Member States may grant a right of 
asylum under their national law to a person who is excluded from refugee 
status on the basis of Article 12 (2), as long as that other kind of protection 
does not entail a risk of confusion with the refugee status within the meaning 
of the Directive.345 The Court explains that introducing or retaining more 
favourable standards as prescribed in Article 3 of the Directive is permitted 
as long as those standards are consistent with the Qualification Directive. 
This means that Member States cannot introduce provisions on granting 
refugee status to a person within the meaning of the Directive as that person 
is excluded on the basis of Article 12 (2). However, applying for another kind 
of protection, such as a discretionary and goodwill basis or humanitarian 
reasons, which falls outside the scope of the Directive is not prohibited.
345 Gyulai, 2012, p. 38-39 and Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 
111/10, Luxembourg, 9 November 2010. 
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§ 3.4.2 UNHCR’s statement on the B and D case
The B and D case gave cause for the ‘Statement on Article 1F’ in which 
UNHCR’s interpretation of Article 1F is reiterated. Comments on German 
practice regarding the exclusion clauses are given and attention is paid to the 
questions that are presented to the ECJ.346 In this subparagraph I will focus 
on UNHCR’s responses to the questions asked to the Court. Before dealing 
with this, it should be mentioned here that a study from the Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee shows that the B and D judgment did not lead to any 
legislative changes in any of the Member States, but only affected the 
practices of Germany, which had previously differed from these of other 
Member States.347 
The UNHCR states that for exclusion to be applied; individual responsibility 
must be established in relation to an act covered by Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention. Regarding the first question referred to the Court, the UN 
Refugee Agency believes that the requirement for individual responsibility 
is critical in cases of alleged membership of an organisation which engages 
in excludable acts. Such a membership should not automatically lead to 
exclusion and requires an assessment including a careful review of all 
specific circumstances of the case. UNHCR comments furthermore that 
‘the activities of an individual in supporting an organisation designated to be 
a terrorist organisation does not lead to exclusion merely because of the label 
‘terrorism’, but only if the particular crimes in question constitute excludable 
acts falling within the scope of Articles 12 (2) (b) or (c) of the Qualification 
Directive, for which the person concerned carries individual responsibility’. 
While membership of terrorist organisations or groups should not 
automatically lead to exclusion, it could nevertheless trigger consideration 
of the application of the exclusion clauses.348 In some cases, individual 
responsibility for excludable acts may arise if membership is voluntary, and 
when the members of such groups can be reliably and reasonably considered 
to be individually responsible for terrorist acts falling under the scope of 
Article 1F. When this is the case, decision makers need to examine each case 
on its own merits and take into consideration all the relevant facts.349 
346 UNHCR Statement on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, July 2009 <http://www.
unhcr.org/4a5edac09.html> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).
347 Gyulai 2012, p. 41. 
348 In such cases, the applicant must be given the opportunity to put forward any 
applicable defence regarding non-involvement or dissociation from any excludable 
act. If this is provided and there is no serious evidence on hand, the applicant should 
not no longer be considered a 1F applicant. 
349 The UNHCR Statement on Article 1F explains further that ‘due regard and caution 
should be given in particular to the actual activities of the organisation; its structure; 
the organisation’s place and role in the society in which it operates, and its purposes 
and methods. The individual’s role and involvement must also be examined, including 
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Further comments on the first question are though the association of a 
person with an organisation which is placed on an international list of 
terrorist organisations does not automatically lead to exclusion, it can trigger 
a consideration of the applicability of the exclusion clauses. ‘Such lists 
established by the international community should not generally be treated 
as reversing the burden of proof, in view of the fact that the evidentiary 
threshold for inclusion in at least some cases may not meet the standard of 
proof required for exclusion cases’.350 The UNHCR and the ECJ agree on the 
first question. In short, it can be concluded that according to both of them, 
exclusion cases should be decided on an individual assessment including the 
specific facts, even if there are strong considerations that the person could 
fall under the exclusion clauses. They also agree on the second question 
which is whether exclusion from refugee status pursuant to Article 12 (2) 
(b) or (c) of the Qualification Directive requires that the person concerned 
continues to represent a danger for the host Member State? The UNHCR 
explains in its Statement that: ‘the conclusion that exclusion grounds do 
not require a continuing danger to emanate from the person concerned is 
clear in relation to Articles 12 (2) (a) and (c) of the Qualification Directive 
and is based on the distinct conceptual framework of Articles 1F and 33 (2) 
respectively, since Article 33 (2) does not constitute a ground for exclusion’. 
Representing a danger to the host state is not included in Article 12 (2) (b) of 
the Qualification Directive either, as the central purpose of this paragraph is 
to ‘ensure that persons responsible for excludable acts shall not find refuge 
from prosecution and – if they cannot be returned or extradited – escape 
prosecution and moreover enjoy refugee status in the host state’.351
While answering the third question,352 the ECJ expressed that no 
proportionality test is required for exclusion under Article 12 (2) (b) or (c). 
According to the Court, such a test would mean that the authorities have to 
make a new assessment of the level of seriousness of the acts committed, 
which had already taken place at the beginning. The Court assumes that 
states already take great care in examining whether a certain act falls under 
an exclusion clause, taking into account all the circumstances of the case. 
In addition, the application of Article 12 (2) of the Qualification Directive 
does not say anything on the separate question whether the person can be 
expelled to his country of origin. 
his or her position in it; his or her personal involvement or substantial contribution to 
the criminal act in the knowledge that his or her act or omission would facilitate the 
criminal conduct; his or her ability to influence significantly the activities of the group 
or organisation; and his or her rank and/or command responsibility’.  
350 UNHCR Statement on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention 2009, pp.18-32.
351 Idem, pp. 32-33.
352 The third question reads as follows: Is it conditional upon a proportionality test being 
undertaken in relation to the particular case?
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The UNHCR’s view on this matter is the opposite. The organisation is of 
the opinion that the proportionality principle is an important safeguard in 
the application of the exclusion clauses given the serious consequences of 
exclusion for the person concerned. The proportionality test is seen as the 
last stage of the exclusion analysis and should, according to the UNHCR, also 
be applied in cases where other guarantees, such as protection under Article 
3 of the ECHR, could apply. The Statement lays down that: ‘in reaching a 
decision on exclusion, it is necessary to weigh the degree and the likelihood 
of persecution feared against the seriousness of the acts committed. In 
this context, the fact that there is another effective and accessible form of 
protection against removal, without the rights attached to refugee status, 
is a relevant consideration in the exclusion assessment’. Whether other 
forms of protection can be taken into account depends on the procedural 
safeguards and arrangements in the relevant state. The UNHCR explains 
that when a decision on exclusion is taken in an asylum procedure and the 
question on protection against removal comes after the asylum procedure 
is concluded, it is not possible to include the availability of protection in the 
exclusion assessment.353 In relation to this issue, the UNHCR Background 
Note prescribes that, state practice is not uniform as there are courts in some 
states that reject such an approach, generally in the knowledge that other 
human rights protection mechanisms will apply to the individual, while 
others take account of proportionality considerations.354 Cases concerning 
excludable acts which are so grave, including crimes against peace, crimes 
against humanity and acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN 
will not be found to be disproportionate while serious non-political crimes 
and war crimes can involve a wider range of misconduct and thus leave more 
scope for considering all interests.
Though the Court believes that the application of the exclusion clauses is 
unrelated to protection against removal, Advocate General Mengozzi 
supports the arguments of the UNHCR in his opinion and goes even a step 
further.355 He makes a distinction between balancing the seriousness of the 
conduct against the consequences of exclusion, on the one hand and applying 
the principle of proportionality, on the other. As regards the first element 
Mengozzi explains that:
‘for the purposes of applying Article 12 (2) (b) and (c) of Directive 2004/83/
EC, the competent authorities or the courts of the Member States seized 
of an application for recognition of refugee status must balance the 
seriousness of the conduct justifying exclusion from refugee status against 
the consequences of such exclusion. In the course of that appraisal, account 
353 Idem, p. 34. 
354 UNHCR Background Note 2006, para. 76.
355 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 1 June 2010. 
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must be taken of the fact that the applicant is entitled, on a different basis, to 
effective protection against refoulement. Where that protection is available 
and accessible in practice, the applicant will have to be excluded from refugee 
status, which entails a range of rights which go above and beyond protection 
against refoulement; if, on the other hand, recognition of refugee status is the 
only way of preventing the applicant’s forcible return to a country where he 
has serious grounds for fearing that – for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
adherence to a particular social group or political opinion – he will be subject 
to persecution likely to endanger his life or physical integrity or to inhuman 
or degrading treatment, it will not be possible to declare that that person 
is excluded from refugee status. In the case of exceptionally serious crimes, 
that balancing exercise is not permissible’.356
While the UNHCR expresses that another form of protection against 
removal is a relevant consideration in the exclusion assessment, the Advocate 
General explicitly states that a person should not be excluded from a refugee 
status when that would lead to removal as no other protection is available, 
except for exceptionally serious crimes. As already shown above, it is not 
always possible to include the availability of protection in the exclusion 
assessment, as it occurs in some countries that the question on protection 
against removal comes after the asylum procedure is closed. The last 
question referred to the Court, relates to this situation. It concerned whether 
it is reconcilable with Article 3 of the Qualification Directive for an asylum 
seeker to obtain an asylum status under national constitutional law despite 
the application of Article 12 (2) of the Qualification Directive?
According to the UNHCR, an exemption from the exclusion clauses cannot be 
justified based on Article 3 of the Directive which is similar to what the Court 
stated. Furthermore, the organisation explains that: ‘if the status granted 
is identical or very similar, whether granted under national constitutional 
law or as refugee status in the sense of the Qualification Directive, it would 
simply result in applying a different legal regime to the provision to those of 
the same form of protection. This could result in granting refuge protection 
to those who are undeserving of it. The legal consequences of the obligation 
to apply the exclusion clauses in a manner consistent with the Refugee 
Convention may not be circumvented simply by applying a different label 
356 With respect to the element on the proportionality, Mengozzi states that: ‘it is my 
view that the competent authorities and the courts of the Member States must ensure 
that points (b) and (c) of Article 12 (2) of Directive 2004/83 are applied in a manner 
proportionate to its objective and, more generally, to the humanitarian nature of 
the law on refugees. In essence, this means that the process of verifying whether 
the conditions for the application of those points are met must include an overall 
assessment of all the circumstances of the individual case’. 
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to an identical or largely identical status’.357 When the UNHCR’s response 
is compared with the judgment of the Court, it leads to the same outcome. 
The Court believes that states can provide another kind of protection; 
insofar it does not entail a risk of getting confused with refugee status under 
the Directive. Likewise, the UNHCR does not say that an excluded person 
cannot get another status under national law; the objection concerns a form 
of protection which would in the end be very similar to a refugee status under 
the Directive. Though the Court and UNHCR use different wordings, they 
eventually mean the same.
§ 3.5 Commentary and conclusion
The diversity of national asylum legislation and practices among Member 
States which is considered to be one of the main factors affecting asylum flows 
led to action. At Tampere, the European Council decided to work towards a 
Common European Asylum System with the aim of harmonising Member 
States’ legal frameworks on the basis of common minimum standards. 
The first stage of the CEAS resulted in the adoption of four Directives of 
which the Qualification Directive, containing the substantive criteria for 
international protection, forms the central piece of the current acquis. 
Following the Hague Programme, evaluation of the adopted instruments 
showed shortcomings and it became clear that a further harmonisation was 
necessary. To achieve higher and more harmonised protection standards, 
the Commission adopted proposals to amend the Directives which are by 
now adopted recasts. In the recasts, the reference to adopt measures for 
minimum standards changed into common procedures and a uniform status 
of asylum. Developing common standards in the states should, inter alia, 
reduce secondary movements as is aimed by the asylum law Directives. The 
objective is that similar cases should be treated alike and lead to the same 
outcome in all Member States.  
As prescribed in the Tampere Conclusions and expressed in the Directives, 
the CEAS should be based on the full and inclusive application of the Refugee 
Convention. The Qualification Directive has included in its Preamble that the 
Convention is the corner stone of the international regime for the protection 
of refugees and that the Directive aims to lay down standards to guide the 
Member States in the application of the Convention, thus provide for a 
uniform application. A look at the provisions in the Directives on exclusion 
shows that EU legislation goes further than Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention. This means that additional grounds to Article 1F have been 
laid down and revocation clauses have been introduced which the Refugee 
Convention does not provide for. One of these exclusion grounds is a copy 
of the text of Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention which states that 
357 UNHCR Statement on Article 1F of the 1951 Convention 2009, p. 35.
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there are ‘reasonable grounds for regarding a person as a danger to the host 
Member State or that the person having been convicted by a final judgment 
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the 
host Member State’. Another extra ground that Article 1F does not contain 
is that exclusion applies to persons who instigate or otherwise participate 
in the commission of the crimes or acts mentioned therein. With regard 
to exclusion from subsidiary protection, Member States are given even 
more power such as in Article 17 (3) of the Qualification Directive which 
prescribes that ‘Member States may exclude a third country national or a 
stateless person, if the person prior to his or her admission to the state has 
committed one or more crimes, which would be punishable by imprisonment, 
had they been committed in the Member State concerned, and if the person 
left the country of origin solely in order to avoid sanctions resulting from 
these crimes’. 
There are two remarks that I want to make on this matter of which the first 
concerns the following. While it is explicitly stated and recognised by the EU 
that the Refugee Convention is the main instrument concerning international 
refugee protection to be followed, the exclusion clauses in the Directives 
substantially differ from Article 1F. The UNHCR has repeatedly propounded 
that the exclusion grounds of Article 1F are exhaustively enumerated and 
though the grounds are subject to interpretation, they cannot be expanded in 
the absence of an agreement by all State Parties to the Convention. Bearing 
this in mind, the EU still chose to give Member States more possibilities 
to take action against the third country national. Furthermore, another 
question on this issue is how this commensurates with the objective that 
similar cases should be treated equally in all Member States and result in 
reducing secondary movements. Current practices in Member States show 
differences in the application of Article 1F. By providing optional exclusion 
and revocation clauses it is difficult to develop common standards as states 
will deal with these clauses to an even greater extent at their discretion which 
should be avoided regarding such a sore subject as exclusion. 
As mentioned earlier, the text of Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention 
is included in a few provisions as an exclusion and revocation clause.358 The 
UNHCR has explicitly stated that Article 33 (2) should be distinguished from 
Article 1F, as this provision deals with the treatment of refugees and defines 
the circumstances under which they could nonetheless be refouled. It concerns 
crimes committed in the country of refuge and aims at protecting the safety 
of the country or community. I question whether including Article 33 (2) 
of the Refugee Convention as an exclusion clause was necessary as Article 
72 of the TFEU also provides states with the authority to make public order 
358 This ground is included among others in Article 28 (1) of the Temporary Protection 
Directive and Articles 14 (4) and 17 (1) (d) of the Qualification Directive.
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exceptions regarding the entry and residence of third country nationals. This 
means that if the text in Article 33 (2) were to be omitted from the provisions 
on exclusion, states would still have options to deal with persons who pose a 
danger to the community and the Qualification Directive would be more in 
line with the Refugee Convention as is intended. The insertion of Article 33 (2) 
into the revocation clauses of Articles 14 and 19 of the Qualification Directive 
is contrary to the concepts of cancellation and revocation as is also criticised 
by the UNHCR. A status can be cancelled when it has been established that 
the person should never have been recognised, including cases where he or she 
should have been excluded from protection. Posing a danger to the community 
as prescribed in Article 33 (2) is unrelated to not meeting the eligibility criteria 
for a refugee status at time of RSD. Though revocation plays an important part 
when the refugee conducts criminal behaviour in the country of refuge, within 
the scope of the exclusion clauses, this should concern acts which fall under 
Article 1F (a) and (c).359 However, such acts do not necessarily have to lead 
to revocation. One of the findings of the Commission on the implementation 
of the Qualification Directive was that when a permanent residence permit 
is issued to a refugee, termination of status is restricted or prevented in some 
Member States, despite fulfilling the conditions for exclusion.360 From a 
practical viewpoint, it is not illogical that states choose to act this way. Taking 
back the status of a refugee who has already resided in the country of refuge for 
already a long period of time and who has integrated into the society, will lead 
to far-reaching consequences for the person concerned. On the other hand, 
this situation also causes difficulties for the state which is at the end burdened 
with a person who probably cannot be expelled to his country of origin due to 
the non-refoulement principle, and who does not have the right to stay either. 
Considering this, it is more reasonable that crimes committed in the country 
of refuge should be dealt with in accordance with the national criminal law 
legislation of the country concerned instead of leading to loss or revocation of 
status, with the exception of the worst offences which could be placed under 
Article 1F (a) or (c). 
My second point deals with Article 17 of the Qualification Directive. The 
discussion of this provision showed that the exclusion clauses for subsidiary 
protection are broader than those for refugee status.361 Recast Qualification 
Directive prescribes in recital 39 of its Preamble that: 
359 UNHCR Note on the Cancellation of Refugee Status, 22 November 2004.
360 Report from the Commission tot the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees 
or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection, 2010, p. 10.
361 For a discussion on the revocation clauses of Articles 14 and 19 of the Qualification 
Directive see § 3.3.3.4.
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‘while responding to the call of the Stockholm Programme for the 
establishment of a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and with the exception of derogations which are 
necessary and objectively justified, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection 
status should be granted the same rights and benefits as those enjoyed by 
refugees under this Directive, and should be subject to the same conditions 
of eligibility’. 
Within this scope, several provisions of the Qualification Directive that 
contained distinctions regarding the two categories of protection have been 
deleted. No changes have been made to the exclusion provisions. If one chooses 
to develop a uniform status and the same conditions of eligibility for both, I 
question why no similar treatment is provided for exclusion of a refugee or 
subsidiary protection status. Similar exclusion grounds will help to simplify 
and streamline procedures and reduce administrative costs as is eventually 
the aim. Currently, there are three differences between Articles 12 and 17 of 
the Qualification Directive. The first one concerns Article 17 (1) (b) which 
requires that a serious crime is committed instead of a serious non-political 
crime outside the country of refuge as prescribed in Article 12 (2) (b). Article 
17 (1) (d) and (3) are grounds which are not contained in Article 12. Article 17 
(1) (d) excludes a person when he or she constitutes a danger to the community 
or security of the Member State in which he or she is present. Based on what is 
explained regarding Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention, this clause can 
and should be omitted. Article 17 (3), which is stated above, is vague and will 
lead to several interpretations. In the first instance, it is not clear what is meant 
by ‘punishable by imprisonment’ as states have different perspectives on this 
issue. Another question on this ground is whether states will actually apply 
it. The Commission evaluation report of 2010 showed that the clause was 
transposed by only thirteen Member States.362 I believe ‘outside the country 
of refuge’ could be added to Article 17 (1) (b) in order to bring it in line with 
Article 12 (2) (b) and delete Article 17 (3) entirely. In view of the application 
of the broadened exclusion grounds in practice, it can be said that they are of 
minor significance. Bringing them in line with Article 12 will lead to more 
consistency and provide a clear guidance for Member States.  
In connection with the binding effect of the Directives, it raises the 
question of judicial protection for third country nationals. The ECJ plays 
an important role as it is the judicature that has to deal interpreting the 
362 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for 
the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees 
or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection, 2010, p. 9.
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cases on the provisions. The Court has underlined in the B and D case the 
importance of interpreting EU acquis provisions on asylum in line with the 
relevant provisions of the Refugee Convention and though the Court and 
the UNHCR have by and large the same thoughts on the issues which were 
under discussion in this case,363 they vary on one relevant point, namely 
whether a proportionality test should be undertaken. There is agreement 
on the fact that certain egregious behaviour which leads to exclusion is not 
disproportionate. The problem is that the UNHCR believes that with regard 
to acts falling under war crimes and serious non-political crimes which can 
involve a wider range of misconduct, the seriousness of the crime has to be 
weighed against the consequences of exclusion including the consideration 
of other forms of protection against removal. Whereas the Court is of the 
opposite opinion which is that an overall assessment already happens in the 
first place and sees the expulsion of a person as a separate issue that is unrelated 
to the question whether an act falls under the exclusion clauses. Despite 
the difference in notion on the moment when, it should be emphasised in 
the end, that both allow states to provide another kind of protection to the 
excluded person. Current state practice on the issue of proportionality is 
not uniform as there are courts in some states that reject such an approach, 
while others do take proportionality considerations into account. From the 
Court’s judgment in the cases of B and D it shows that many courts have 
also made rulings reflecting their opposition to proportionality, while other 
states are in favour of it.364 It is certain that this matter is not something on 
which states will reach agreement upon soon. The fact that the Court and 
the UNHCR differ on this topic is not conducive to conformity either, and 
raises the question how these accounts relate to each other in the light of the 
Preamble of the Qualification Directive that prescribes that, consultations 
with the UNHCR may provide valuable guidance for Member States when 
determining refugee status on the one hand, and that the objective of EU 
harmonisation is to guide the competent national bodies of Member States 
in the application of the Refugee Convention, on the other’. It is for the 
future to show to what extent the Court’s interpretation of the provisions 
of EU asylum Directives will differ from the UNHCR’s. For now it can be 
concluded that bringing States’ practices in line on this matter is difficult as 
those that reject a proportionality test will side with the EU Court, while the 
few states in favour will support the UNHCR’s view.  
363 With regard to the additional exclusion ground of posing a ‘threat to the national 
security’ the Court clearly confirms in the B and D case what the UNHCR has already 
pleaded, namely that being a danger for the host state is not a condition for exclusion 
and should not be considered in the context of exclusion.
364 Of the interveners, the French, German, UK and the Netherlands governments 
are opposed to a proportionality test, while the Swedish Government and the 
Commission are in favour of it.
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Chapter 4  The ECHR in respect of excluded  
asylum seekers
§ 4.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the ECJ as well as the UNHCR express 
that states can provide protection to excluded asylum seekers, but that this 
protection should be different than a refugee status under the Qualification 
Directive and Refugee Convention. When one thinks about ‘other kind of 
protection’, firstly the ECHR crosses one’s mind. There are many situations 
which fall outside the scope of the Refugee Convention, but are protected by 
the ECHR and while EU protection for asylum seekers started to develop 
from 1999 on, the ECHR proves to be an important instrument for aliens 
and asylum seekers in particular, for already a longer period of time.365 The 
ECHR is of great importance to the EU as its Charter is mainly based on this 
Convention and the ECJ regularly refers to the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case 
law.366 The other way around, the Strasbourg Court is also being influenced 
by EU legislation and jurisprudence.367 The relevant EU asylum law is 
dealt with in Chapter 3 and now it is time to concentrate on the Council 
of Europe’s ECHR. This chapter will particularly focus on some relevant 
provisions of this Convention which are related to the application of the 
exclusion clauses.368 As each of the Convention provisions viewed apart is 
365 Kamminga 2010, pp. 693-699.
366 EU accession to the ECHR has been discussed since the late 1970s and is seen as a 
major step in enhancing coherence in human rights protection in Europe. Though 
things have come a long way, the accession has currently been delay as the ECJ has ruled 
that the Draft Agreement on the accession is not compatible with EU law. The Court 
expressed amongst others that the approach adopted in the Draft Agreement, which 
is to treat the EU as a state and to give it a role identical in every respect to that of any 
other Contracting Party, specifically disregards the intrinsic nature of the EU and that 
when the ECHR would form an integral part of EU law, the mechanism established 
by that protocol could affect the autonomy and effectiveness of the preliminary ruling 
procedure provided for by the TFEU. The question is what will happen next: would the 
ECJ eventually agree on perhaps a revised Agreement? It is still to be seen how long 
the proceedings will take as the Agreement is also to be unanimously approved by the 
Council and Member States in accordance with their own respective national laws and 
ratification by all parties to the ECHR. There is thus a risk that one Member State may 
block the entire accession process for a long period of time.
367 Lawson 2010, pp. 783-796.
368 The ECHR provisions which are discussed under this Chapter are the most relevant 
ones in connection to an excluded alien. However, it should be noted that also other 
Convention provisions can play a role in proceedings. 
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worthwhile conducting a study on, the intention is not to elaborate on them. 
With a view to understanding their role for an excluded asylum seeker, only 
brief outlines will be given on their substance.
The first provision to be dealt with is Article 3. When all domestic remedies 
have been exhausted, the ECtHR can be a last option to prevent or suspend 
the removal of an excluded person to the country of origin on the basis 
of the refoulement prohibition and thus provide protection in that sense. 
After dealing with the terms of Article 3, I will discuss the applicability of 
the provision on removal cases, in particular in relation to excluded asylum 
seekers. Furthermore, the provision will be examined from the perspective 
of the consequences of a limbo situation in which excluded asylum seekers 
are not given a legal stay in the host country and not removed either. Another 
provision which plays a role within the context of ‘other kind of protection’ 
is Article 8 of the ECHR on the right to family life.369 The right to family 
life is often invoked by the excluded asylum seeker to regularise his stay in 
the Netherlands. In case of expulsion, the provision is appealed to when the 
spouse and children did receive a permit and removal of the alien would lead 
to separation of the family or other way around. Besides Articles 3 and 8, 
also Articles 5 and 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy) will be reviewed 
in this chapter. According to Article 5, no one shall be deprived of his liberty, 
except under certain circumstances, such as when action against a person is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition which often occurs in 
the case of excluded person to be removed. In conclusion, case law from the 
ECtHR concerning 1F applicants will be discussed.  
§ 4.2 Prohibition of refoulement
When Article 1F of the Refugee Convention applies to an asylum seeker, 
states have the right to remove the person from their territory. However, 
when expulsion would breach the non-refoulement principle, according to 
which an alien cannot be removed to a country where his life or freedom 
would be threatened, the state cannot proceed with it.370 The prohibition 
of refoulement is laid down in several human rights instruments. In EU 
perspective, the Qualification Directive (Article 21), Returns Directive 
(Article 5) and also the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Articles 4 and 
19 (2)) include the principle. Article 33 (1) of the Refugee Convention was 
already mentioned in the previous chapters. This provision contains an 
explicit prohibition to return a ‘refugee’ to the frontiers of territories where 
he would fear for his life on account of one of the grounds for persecution. 
369 This provision finds its equivalent in Article 7 of the EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights.
370 With the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment which is discussed under § 4.3.4, the 
Court showed for the first time that refoulement can also refer to the situation that a 
person is left in destitution and poverty. 
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As this provision concerns those who are granted protection, it cannot apply 
on those against whom Article 1F is held and is thus of no significance for 
these aliens. Another explicit prohibition is prescribed in Article 3 of the 
UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UN Convention against Torture) which states 
that no return of a person to another state should take place where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture. Besides these explicitly indicated prohibitions, there are 
other provisions which implicitly indicate the non-refoulement obligation. By 
prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Article 
3 ECHR and its equivalent in Article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights impose states not to refoule a person to a country 
where his life would be in danger.371 When the various non-refoulement 
provisions mentioned in the human rights treaties are compared with each 
other, there is no doubt that Article 3 ECHR is the one that is most often 
invoked for complementary protection which has to do with its absolute 
character and the fact that the ECHR’s enforcement mechanism, contrary 
to the other treaties, gives binding judgments. Besides its binding judgments, 
the ECtHR also has the power to issue interim measures. These are urgent 
measures which only apply where there is an imminent risk of irreparable 
harm. In the majority of cases, they consist in a suspension of an expulsion or 
an extradition for as long as the application is being examined.372 
Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited by Article 4 of the 4th Protocol 
to the ECHR and an individual assessment for each person has to take 
place.373 There are four situations in which the expulsion of an alien can raise 
a problem under Article 3 ECHR by way of its direct mental and physical 
effects.374 These are in cases of successive expulsion of a person, especially 
when the alien risks to being sent to an unsafe country; where an alien is to 
be expelled but does not have the physical condition to travel; the manner 
in which an expulsion is carried out and, when a removal takes place to a 
country where there are substantial grounds to believe that the person would 
371 Article 2 ECHR which prescribes a person’s right to life is also an implicit refoulement 
provision. Besides the mentioned provisions, also refoulement prohibitions are 
provided in Article 2 (3) of the OAU Convention governing specific aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa, Article 22 (8) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, Article 5 (2) of the American Convention and Article 5 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. See Wouters 2009 for an extensive study on 
the prohibitions of refoulement. 
372 <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Interim_measures_ENG.pdf> (last accessed 
on 21 September 2015).  
373 Also the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits collective expulsions (see 
Article 19 (1)). 
374 Lambert 2006, pp. 28-33.
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face a real risk of being subjected to treatment breaching Article 3. The latter 
situation happens the most and is therefore the one on which I will focus in 
the following. Article 3 ECHR is a provision on which much research has 
been conducted and extensive literature and case law is available. As already 
stated, with a view to understanding this provision within the scope of this 
study, I will only briefly discuss the substance and focus on its relevance on 
expulsion cases of aliens to whom Article 1F applies. 
§ 4.2.1 Applicability on removal cases 
The first case in which the ECtHR dealt with the question of applicability 
of Article 3 ECHR on removal was Soering v. UK which concerned an 
extradition case.375 The Court stated that the existence of other international 
instruments, which particularly refer to the question of returning persons to 
a country where they risk being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, could not ‘absolve the Contracting Parties from 
responsibility under Article 3 for all and any foreseeable consequences of 
extradition suffered outside their jurisdiction’. Furthermore, ‘the decision 
by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue 
under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under 
the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing 
that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected 
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the 
requesting country’. In the Cruz Varas376 and Vilvarajah377 cases, the Court 
ruled that the principle as pronounced in Soering was also applicable to 
expulsion measures. 
As already stated, Article 3 is an absolute right. This means that it makes no 
provision for exceptions and derogation is not even permitted in the event of 
a public emergency that threatens the life of the nation. Though governments 
put forward arguments to the contrary, the ECtHR has repeatedly underlined 
in expulsion cases that Article 3 prohibits in absolute terms expulsion to face 
a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and 
that it guarantees protection, irrespective of the context and conduct of the 
risk. In the Chahal case, in which the UK wanted to expel a Sikh separatist 
to India, arguing that he had been involved in terrorist activities and posed 
a risk to the national security of the country, the Court said that ‘Article 
3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. 
Though the Court is well aware of the immense difficulties faced by States 
in modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence, 
375 ECtHR 7 July 1989, Soering v. the UK, App. No. 14038/88. 
376 ECtHR 20 March 1991, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, App. No. 5576/89.
377 ECtHR 30 October 1991, Vilvarajah and others v. the UK, App. Nos. 13163/87, 
13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87 and 13448/87. 
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even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of 
the victim’s conduct’.378 
The Court’s judgment in Chahal has been reaffirmed in the Saadi case 
which concerned a Tunisian applicant also prosecuted for involvement in 
terrorist activities who complained to risk ill-treatment when returned to 
Tunisia. In Saadi, the UK government intervened as a third party aiming 
the ECtHR to alter and clarify the approach followed in refoulement cases 
under Article 3 concerning the threat created by international terrorism. 
One of the arguments put forward by the UK government and supported 
by the respondent country Italy, was that the threat presented by the person 
to be expelled should be a factor to be assessed in relation to the possibility 
and nature of the possible ill-treatment, thus to take into consideration all 
the particular circumstances of each case and weigh the protection assigned 
to the application on the basis of Article 3 against the protection of the 
community. The Court explained that this argument based on the ‘balancing 
of the risk of harm if the person is sent back against the dangerousness he 
represents to the community if not sent back is misconceived’. According to 
the Court, ‘it would be incorrect to require a higher standard of proof where 
the person is considered to represent a serious danger to the community as 
the level of risk is independent of such a test’.379 
Two more recent cases in which the same issues as in Saadi were raised and in 
which the Court reiterated that the prohibition of ill-treatment under Article 
3 is absolute are Ramzy v. the Netherlands and A. v. the Netherlands.380 In both 
of the cases the applicants unsuccessfully applied for asylum; were suspected 
of belonging to a criminal organisation and eventually acquitted of all charges. 
Exclusion orders (Ongewenstverklaring) were imposed on both applicants as 
the Dutch Immigration Services found them to represent a danger to national 
security. Similar arguments as in Saadi which were brought up by the four 
intervening governments, including the UK again, did not lead to any change 
in the Court’s  interpretation of Article 3 ECHR which accordingly led to 
the conclusion that A’s expulsion to his country of origin would breach this 
provision. With regard to the Ramzy case, the Court decided that the applicant 
had lost interest in pursuing his application and stroke out the case. This had 
to do with the fact that Mr Ramzy’s legal representatives did not know his 
whereabouts and could not answer the Court’s questions. 
378 ECtHR 15 November 1996, Chahal v. the UK, App. No. 22414/93, para. 79.
379 ECtHR 28 February 2008, Saadi v. Italy, App. No. 37201/06 [GC] (Ars Aequi 
RV20080001 includes annotation from R. Fernhout). 
380 ECtHR judgments of 20 October, App. No. 25424/05 and 20 July 2010, App. No. 
4900/06 (JV 2010/118). 
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The ECtHR’s case law is clear about the role of Article 3 in removal cases: 
no limitations or interferences are allowed when an alien could be subjected 
to refoulement. Though this provision is formulated in absolute terms, still 
certain requirements have to be fulfilled for its application on a case. First 
of all, ‘substantial grounds’ must be shown for believing that the person 
would face a ‘real risk’ of ill-treatment in the receiving country. In addition, 
ill-treatment ‘must attain a minimum level of severity’ in order to fall under 
the provision. The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture (CPT),381 uses the term ill-treatment for acts that qualify as torture 
or as inhuman or degrading treatment. In this study, the term will be used 
in a similar way referring to these acts as prohibited under Article 3 ECHR. 
§ 4.2.2 The terms of Article 3 ECHR
As stated above, the applicant must prove, i.e. show substantial grounds that 
he faces a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if he were returned to 
the country of destination. Meeting the requirement of a real risk means that 
in determining whether expulsion would constitute a violation of Article 3, 
an assessment of the likelihood or probability that ill-treatment will occur 
must be made.382 For such an assessment, the Court requires a high degree 
of proof, especially in cases regarding national security or protection of 
the public good.383 The Court considers all relevant evidence, thus both the 
general situation in the country of origin and the individual situation of the 
applicant. In the Vilvarajah case, the Court ruled that the mere possibility 
of ill-treatment is not sufficient and the person needs to be singled out 
from a situation of general violence. This case concerned five Tamils whose 
asylum applications had been rejected and three applicants who claimed that 
they would be subjected to ill-treatment if they returned to Sri Lanka. The 
Court found that the evidence did not show that the applicants’ position was 
any worse than the generality of other members of the Tamil community. 
According to the Court, ‘there existed no special distinguishing features 
in their cases that could or should have enabled the UK government to 
foresee that they would be treated in this way’. It is clear that the Court finds 
the individual situation of the applicant to be very important for its risk 
assessment. However, ‘this requirement has not been phrased by the Court 
as a general, doctrinal requirement but as the application of the real risk 
test in the context of some specific cases. At the heart of the Court’s test is 
foreseeability, not individualisation per se’.384 Where it is relevant to do so, 
381 In full: European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.
382 The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees, Asylum 
Seekers and Displaced Persons, UNHCR 1995, European Series, p. 16.
383 Lambert 2006, p. 28.
384 Spijkerboer 2004. 
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the Court will have regard to whether there is a general situation of violence 
in the country of destination. In the NA. v. the UK case385 which also concerns a 
Tamil who was facing expulsion to Sri Lanka, the Court considered its earlier 
decision in Vilvarajah and emphasised that the assessment of whether there 
is a real risk of ill-treatment must be made on the basis of all relevant factors. 
In its view, due regard should also be given to the possibility that a number of 
individual factors may not, when considered separately, constitute a real risk; 
but when taken cumulatively and when considered in a situation of general 
violence and heightened security, the same factors may give rise to a real risk. 
Both the need to consider all relevant factors cumulatively and the need to 
give appropriate weight to the general situation in the country of destination 
derive from the obligation to consider all the relevant circumstances of the 
case.386 With regard to the situation of the applicant, the Court took note 
of the current climate of general violence in Sri Lanka and found that there 
were substantial grounds for finding that he would be of interest to the Sri 
Lankan authorities in their efforts to combat the Tigers which would lead to 
a breach of Article 3 if the applicant were to be returned.
Following the NA. case, the sole question for the Court to consider is 
whether, in all the circumstances of the case before it, substantial grounds 
have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned, would 
face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
Convention. If such a risk exists and is established, the applicant’s removal 
would necessarily breach Article 3, regardless of whether the risk emanates 
from a general situation of violence, a personal characteristic of the applicant, 
or a combination of the two. However, it is clear that not every situation of 
general violence will give rise to such a risk.387 On the contrary, the Court 
has made clear that a general situation of violence would only be of sufficient 
intensity to create such a risk “in the most extreme cases” where there was a 
real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to 
such violence on return.388
Once substantial grounds and real risk have been established in a case, the 
last aspect which has to be met is that ill-treatment must ‘attain a minimum 
level of severity’ if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. According to the 
Court ‘the assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends 
on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its 
385 ECtHR 6 August 2008, NA. v. the UK, App. No. 25904/07.
386 Idem, para. 130.
387 ECtHR 1 June 2010, Mawaka v. the Netherlands, App. No. 29031/04 (NJCM 2010 
includes annotation from H. Battjes). 
388 ECtHR 28 November 2011, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, App. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, 
para. 218 (Ars Aequi RV20110003 includes annotation from K.A.E. Franssen and 
NJCM 2011 H. Battjes).
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physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health 
of the victim.389 There is no abstract, absolute standard for the kinds of 
treatment and punishment prohibited by Article 3 which makes it sometimes 
difficult to determine whether certain treatment is harsh or whether it 
amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment in the sense of Article 3. A 
certain act of ill-treatment may violate Article 3 in one case, while the same 
act may not violate this provision if the victim differs in sex, age and state of 
health. As Van Dijk et al. state, in this respect national authorities are often 
allowed a wide margin of appreciation.390 When certain treatment does 
reach a minimum level of severity, the Court must differentiate whether 
the conduct qualifies as torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment. It must be mentioned that for expulsion cases the existence of a 
real risk to be exposed to ill-treatment is more important than the gradation 
of the ill-treatment.  
§ 4.2.3 Different forms of ill-treatment
In its report on the Greek case, the European Commission of Human Rights 
(EComHR) paid attention to the differences between the three forms of ill-
treatment under Article 3 ECHR. According to the EComHR: 
‘It is plain that there may be treatment to which all these descriptions apply, 
for all torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman 
treatment also degrading. The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least 
such treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, 
which in the particular situation is unjustifiable’. The word torture is often 
used to describe inhuman treatment, which has a purpose, such as the 
obtaining of information or confession, or the infliction of punishment, 
and is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment. Treatment or 
punishment of an individual may be said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates 
him before others or drives him to act against his will of conscience’.391 
With regard to the difference between torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment, the ECtHR decided in Ireland v. the UK that the difference 
between these forms ‘proceeds mainly from a difference of intensity in the 
suffering’. Torture which is considered to be the most severe form of ill-
treatment is defined as ‘deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious 
and cruel suffering’. In its assessment whether the treatment suffered falls 
under torture, the Court often refers to Article 1 of the UN Convention 
against Torture which defines torture as the intentional infliction of severe 
389 ECtHR 18 January 1978, Ireland v. the UK, App. No. 5310/71, para. 162. 
390 Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 412-413.
391 EComHR report of 5 November 1969, The Greek case, Yearbook 12 (1969). 
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pain and suffering.392 The ill-treatment can thus be defined as torture when 
the ill-treatment contains the following three elements: a certain intensity of 
suffering that is to be distinguished from the other forms of ill-treatment; 
which is done on purpose with a specific goal, which will be often obtaining 
information or a confession.   
For a punishment or treatment to be inhuman or degrading, ‘the suffering 
or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element 
of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate 
punishment’.393 The ECtHR has added that treatment can be considered to 
be degrading ‘when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, 
anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and 
possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance.394 Like the difference 
between torture and other forms of ill-treatment, the distinction between 
inhuman and degrading treatment is one of gradation depending on the 
gravity of the inflicted harm. It should be noted that the ECtHR does not 
always make a clear distinction between the two forms and often makes use 
of both when qualifying the treatment.395 
The Court considers the ECHR to be a living instrument, which means it 
must be given a dynamic interpretation and applied in the light of prevailing 
conditions. Changes in society and thinking may change the interpretation 
of the Convention’s provisions and thus also of Article 3. Hence, certain acts 
which were in the past labeled as inhuman or degrading treatment, may at 
present or in the future be classified as torture.396 
§ 4.2.4 Applicability on excluded asylum seekers 
When the ill-treatment of a person is reasonably expected upon return to 
their country of origin, Article 3 ECHR prohibits expulsion and does not 
allow exceptions. The absolute character of Article 3 widens the international 
protection against refoulement in comparison to other refugee law and human 
rights instruments. This means that also asylum seekers who are excluded 
from a refugee or subsidiary protection status on the basis of Article 1F 
can claim protection against removal as by contrast to Article 33 (2) of the 
Refugee Convention, Article 3 does not deny protection in case of national 
security considerations. While Article 33 (1) of the Refugee Convention 
392 See ECtHR 28 July 1999 (2000) 29 EHHR 403, Selmouni v. France, App. No. 
25803/84, paras. 97-100.
393 ECtHR 25 April 1978, Tyrer v. the UK, App. No. 5856/72. 
394 ECtHR 13 May 2008, Juhnke v. Turkey, App. No. 52515/99, para. 70 (RvdW 2008, 
854). 
395 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 408; see also Hagens 2011. 
396 See for more on this, Letsas 2013.
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is linked to a limited number of grounds of persecution (race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion), the 
applicability of Article 3 solely depends on the character of the treatment, not 
on the source or the grounds of this treatment. Another difference between 
the two provisions is that Article 3 not only prohibits the risk of being 
subjected to certain acts after expulsion, but also the removal to a country 
where the situation apart from human activity is such by which the person 
can end up in inhuman circumstances. Contrary to Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention, Article 3 does not deal with the right to political asylum but 
aims to protect people from ill-treatment. 
In order to bring a case before the ECtHR under Article 34 of the ECHR and 
thus stop a removal, all domestic remedies must have been exhausted and 
an enforceable expulsion order must have been issued against the excluded 
asylum seeker. According to the Court, a violation of the Convention only 
occurs when there is an act of expulsion rather than a final decision to expel. 
The fact that a case is brought before the Court does not automatically 
mean that expulsion will be suspended while proceedings are pending. To 
stop a removal, the applicant or his representative can request the Court 
for an interim measure under Rule 39 of its Rules of Court with which the 
Court can indicate to the respondent government not to remove the person 
concerned to a particular country. Due to the short timeframes, the standard 
of proof applied in case of interim measures is not similar to individual 
applications under Article 34 of the ECHR. Nevertheless, when requesting 
such a measure, the applicant has to show, to the extent possible, that there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he is at real risk of irreparable 
harm when he is forcibly returned. In concrete, the applicant must submit 
all relevant documents regarding his case, which can include reports from 
NGOs and academic articles. After a request is submitted, the Court will 
decide as soon as possible on the case and inform the applicant and defending 
government by fax and post. The decision is taken in connection with 
proceedings before the Court without prejudging any subsequent decisions 
on the admissibility or merits of the case in question. 
The length of an interim measure generally covers the duration of the 
proceedings before the Court or for a shorter period with the possibility for 
prolongation. Such a measure is binding and failure to respect it leads to a 
violation of Article 34 of the ECHR. In case of a refusal, the applicant can still 
continue with the main proceedings before the Court.397 Most likely he has 
397 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Toolkit on How to Request Interim 
Measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of the European Court of Human Rights for Persons 
in Need of International Protection, February 2012, available at: <http://www.refworld.
org/docid/4f8e8f982.html>  (last accessed on 21 September 2015).
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then already been expelled to his country of origin; continues to live illegally 
in the host country or moved to another country where he will try to start a 
new asylum procedure. It should be noted that the Court is not precluded 
from having regard to information which comes to light subsequent to the 
expulsion and can still give a judgment on whether a violation has taken 
place. In case the Court decides to issue an interim measure concerning the 
excluded asylum seeker, he will be allowed to remain in the host country 
during the proceedings. When the complaint is declared admissible on the 
basis of Article 35 ECHR, it is up to the Court to examine the case and when 
necessary to undertake an investigation.398 Eventually, the application of 
Article 3 ECHR will take place in two steps: the Court has to decide whether 
the government’s act can be qualified as an interference with the right to 
personal and physical integrity and assess whether this interference serves a 
legitimate aim and is proportionate to it. If the interferences are not justified, 
the act is to be described as ill-treatment.399 Thus, the Court’s task is to 
consider whether the removal would be compatible with the Convention 
and not to review whether an individual is in fact such a threat. The material 
point in time must be that of the Court’s consideration and not when the 
decision to remove was made. Accordingly, the Court can revisit the decision 
months or even years later after it has been taken in the light of any changes 
in circumstances. 
When the Court holds that Article 3 of the Convention has been violated 
or would be violated if the respondent government proceeds with the 
expulsion of the applicant, this decision is final and binding on respondent 
states. Based on Article 41 ECHR, the Court may afford just satisfaction 
to the injured party provided that the consequences of the violation cannot 
be fully repaired according to the internal law of the state concerned. After 
the judgment, the case is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers which 
is responsible for its execution. In cooperation with the state concerned, the 
Committee will consider which measures need to be taken to comply with 
the Court’s judgment. These can be general measures to prevent further 
violations of a similar nature and individual measures including the payment 
of the compensation or legal costs as awarded by the Court; the revocation of 
a decision to expel and even facilitating the return of an individual who has 
been removed.400 
The latter situation is of course difficult when the removed person is in hands 
of the authorities which do not want to return him or her. On the other hand, 
though the respondent state must abide by the measures that are imposed, 
the question is whether the removing state is willing to take back an alien 
398 Article 38 ECHR.
399 Battjes 2009, p. 618.
400 Mole & Meredith 2010, pp. 233-234.
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who it suspects of war crimes and has already excluded from a status. Even 
when the authorities are cooperating, it can last for years after a judgment 
before a case can be actually closed.401 
The fact that the Court prevents the removal of an excluded asylum seeker 
does not automatically mean the person will be issued a residence permit. As 
mentioned previously, Article 3 provides protection, but it does not imply a 
right to stay in the host state. The Court has not ruled on what legal status 
should accrue to persons who cannot be removed, although it has stated that 
protection from refoulement under the Convention does not guarantee as 
such a right to a residence permit. It will thus depend on the regulation of 
the state concerned whether a person will be provided a status or his stay 
will only be tolerated without the issuance of a residence title. Tolerating an 
alien’s stay can be approached in different ways: it may mean that during his 
stay the person is entitled to certain rights and housing, but it may also imply 
solely a suspension of expulsion without any entitlement to social support. 
If the latter situation lasts for several years, it raises the question of whether 
exposing a person to the severe consequences of such a situation could lead 
to a breach of Article 3? The ECtHR has already tackled this issue in relation 
to 1F cases brought to Court.402 Also relevant to mention within the scope 
of this question is the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece403 case in which the Court 
found a violation of Article 3 regarding the applicant’s detention conditions 
in Greece. Additionally, the M.S.S. case is the first judgment in which the 
Court also found the living conditions of the applicant to be contrary to 
Article 3.404 
The case concerned an asylum seeker who was transferred from Belgium 
to Greece according to the Dublin Regulation. In its assessment, the 
Court points out to the Greek authorities’ obligations under the European 
Reception Conditions Directive and expresses that: ’the obligation to provide 
accommodation and decent material conditions to impoverished asylum 
seekers has now entered into positive law and the Greek authorities are 
bound to comply with their own legislation, which transposes Community 
Law, namely the Reception Conditions Directive’.405 The Court states that 
it has not excluded the possibility that the responsibility of the state under 
Article 3 might be engaged in respect of treatment where an applicant, who 
was wholly dependent on state support, found himself faced with official 
indifference in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with 
401 See Rainey, Wicks & Ovey 2014, pp. 502-506 regarding the possibilities available for 
the Committee when States do not comply with their obligations. 
402 See § 4.6-4.7.
403 ECtHR 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09 (JV 
2011/68 includes annotation from H. Battjes). 
404 See Mallia 2011 and Battjes 2011. 
405 ECtHR M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 250.  
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human dignity.406 According to the Court, the Greek authorities have not 
had due regard to the applicant’s vulnerability as an asylum seeker and must 
be held responsible, because of their inaction, for the situation in which he 
found himself for several months, living on the street, with no resources 
or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of providing for 
his essential needs. The Court considered that the applicant had been the 
victim of humiliating treatment showing a lack of respect for his dignity 
and that this situation had, without doubt, aroused in him feelings of fear, 
anguish or inferiority capable of inducing desperation. It finds that such 
living conditions, combined with the prolonged uncertainty in which he has 
remained and the total lack of any prospects of his situation improving, have 
attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of 
the Convention. The Court also found Belgium to be in breach of Article 
3 because, inter alia, it had transferred the applicant to Greece and thus 
knowingly exposed him to living conditions which amounted to degrading 
treatment.407
The approach taken by the Court in the M.S.S. case was relevant for the 
Court’s following judgments on Article 3 ECHR regarding the living 
conditions of asylum seekers.408 
One of these cases which also concerned Greece is Rahimi.409 The applicant 
who was an unaccompanied minor from Afghanistan, was held in the Pagani 
detention centre on the island of Lesbos and subsequently released with a 
view to his expulsion. In view of the failure to take into account the applicant’s 
406 Idem, para. 253.
407 The ECJ 21 December 2011, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
M.E., A.S.M., M.T., K.P. and E.H. v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform, App. Nos. C-411/10 and C-493/10 (NJCM 2011 
includes annotation from A.M. Reneman) joined cases also concerned transfers 
to Greece in which the European Court of Justice made a reference to the M.S.S. 
case. The question before the ECJ was essentially whether, and if so under which 
circumstances, a Member State is required under EU law to assume responsibility for 
examining asylum applications itself, even though another Member State is primarily 
responsible for the examinations under the Dublin II Regulation? The Court stated 
that if there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the 
asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the receiving 
Member State resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of 
Article 4 of the Charter, the transfer would be incompatible with that provision (para. 
86). Accordingly, the transfer to the Member State responsible is not allowed when 
the transferring Member State ‘cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the 
asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member 
State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a 
real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of 
Article 4 of the Charter’ (paras. 94 and 106).
408 See Bossuyt 2012.
409 ECtHR 5 April 2011, Rahimi v. Greece, App. No. 8687/08 (JV 2012/106).
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extremely vulnerable individual situation and the detention conditions in the 
Pagani centre, which were so serious as to be an affront to human dignity, 
the Court held that the applicant had been subjected to degrading treatment, 
despite the fact that his detention had lasted for only two days. The Court 
also found the authorities’ failure to take care of him as an unaccompanied 
minor following his release amounted to degrading treatment in breach of 
Article 3. With regard to the latter, the Court referred to M.S.S. in which 
it had noted “the particular state of insecurity and vulnerability in which 
asylum seekers are known to live in Greece” and had found that the Greek 
authorities were to be held responsible “because of their inaction”. 
The Tarakhel v. Switzerland case410 concerned an Afghan family with minor 
children who were to be transferred from Switzerland to Italy according 
to the Dublin Regulation. Applicants argued that if they were returned 
by the Swiss authorities to Italy ‘in the absence of individual guarantees 
concerning their care ’they would be subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment linked to the existence of ‘systematic deficiencies’ in the reception 
arrangements for asylum seekers. The Court considers it necessary to follow 
a similar approach to what is adopted in the M.S.S. judgment, in which 
it examined the applicant’s individual situation in the light of the overall 
situation prevailing in Greece at the relevant time, but states that the situation 
in this case is different than M.S.S. The Court notes that the overall situation 
of asylum seekers in Italy can in no way be compared to that of Greece at the 
time of the M.S.S. judgment411 and the specific situation of the applicants in 
the present case is also different from that of the applicant in M.S.S., whereas 
the applicants in this case were immediately taken charge of by the Italian 
authorities, while the applicant in M.S.S. was first placed in detention and 
then left to fend for himself, without any means of subsistence.412 Though 
the situation of the reception system is not comparable to the situation in 
Greece in M.S.S., the Court expresses that ‘the possibility that a significant 
number of asylum seekers removed to that country may be left without 
accommodation or accommodated in overcrowded facilities without any 
privacy, or even in insalubrious or violent conditions is not unfounded. It 
is therefore incumbent on the Swiss authorities to obtain assurances from 
their Italian counterparts that on their arrival in Italy the applicants will be 
received in facilities and in conditions adapted to the age of the children, 
and that the family will be kept together’. Accordingly, ‘were the applicants 
to be returned to Italy without the Swiss authorities having first obtained 
individual guarantees from the Italian authorities that the applicants would 
410 ECtHR 4 November 2014, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12 (EHRC 
2015/33 includes annotation from J.R. Groen). 
411 Idem, paras. 114-115.
412 Idem, para. 117.
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be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the 
family would be kept together, there would be a violation of Article 3 ECHR’. 
Also worthwhile to mention is the Sufi and Elmi v. the UK case.413 The two 
applicants were Somali nationals who were detained in the UK and facing 
removal to Somalia. They complained that their removal to Somalia would 
place their lives at risk and/or expose them to a real risk of ill-treatment. 
The Court held that the violence in Mogadishu is of such a level of intensity 
that anyone in the city, except possibly those who are exceptionally well-
connected to “powerful actors”, would be at real risk of treatment prohibited 
by Article 3 of the Convention.414 With regard to internal relocation, 
the Court accepted that it might be possible for a returnee to travel from 
Mogadishu International Airport to another part of southern and central 
Somalia without being exposed to a real risk of treatment proscribed by 
Article 3. However, a returnee with no recent experience of living in Somalia 
would be at real risk of ill-treatment if his home area was in - or if he was 
required to travel through - an area controlled by al-Shabaab, as he would not 
be familiar with the strict Islamic codes imposed there and could therefore be 
subjected to punishments such as beating, flogging, stoning or amputation. 
If a returnee had no family connections, or could not travel safely to an area 
where he had such connections, the Court considered it reasonably likely that 
a returnee would find himself in an IDP camp, such as those in the Afgooye 
Corridor, or in a refugee camp, such as the Dadaab camps in Kenya, where 
there would be a real risk that he would be exposed to treatment in breach of 
Article 3 on account of the humanitarian conditions there.415
Later on in this chapter I will reflect on to the question raised above, which 
is whether leaving a person in limbo for many years, without any entitlement 
to facilities, could lead to a breach of Article 3. Further, I will discuss in more 
detail the situation of those aliens who are protected against expulsion but 
who are not issued a residence permit. For now, there are two more matters 
related to Article 3 ECHR and the expulsion of aliens, including excluded 
asylum seekers, which should be mentioned under paragraph 3. These are 
the use of diplomatic assurances and the status of detention conditions. 
413 ECtHR 28 June 2011, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, App. Nos. 8319/07 and 
11449/0711449/07 (Ars Aequi RV20110003 includes annotation from K.A.E. 
Franssen and NJCM 2011 H. Battjes).
414 Idem, para. 250.
415 Idem, para. 296.
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§ 4.2.5 Relevant issues relating to Article 3 and expulsion
Diplomatic assurances can be described as a guarantee, given by the 
receiving state to which removal will take place, to the sending state which 
affirms treatment in accordance with the sending state’s human rights 
obligations under international law. Such assurances are legally non-binding, 
political bilateral agreements which are most often requested in extradition 
cases.416 Besides extradition, these agreements are also used in expulsion 
cases of aliens who are refused asylum, including those whom the sending 
state suspects of terrorist activities and/or considers a danger to national 
security.417 Contrary to the many extradition cases in which the ECtHR 
often accepted diplomatic assurances as a precaution against the risk of ill-
treatment,418 there are only a few expulsion cases settled by the Court of 
which in one recent judgment, assurances are accepted.  
In the Chahal case, India had provided assurances to the UK stating that 
applicant would enjoy the same legal protection as any other Indian citizen 
and that he would have no reason to expect to suffer mistreatment of any 
kind at the hands of the Indian authorities. The Court did not doubt the 
good faith of the Indian government, but was not convinced the assurances 
would guarantee an actual safety to Mr Chahal: ‘despite the efforts of the 
government, the National Human Rights Commission and the Indian courts 
to bring about reform, the violation of human rights by certain members 
of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India is a recalcitrant 
and enduring problem’. The Court further attached significance to the 
‘endemic nature of torture in police custody, the inadequate measures taken 
to bring those responsible to justice, problems of widespread, often fatal, 
mistreatment of prisoners and lack of systematic reform of the police’.419 
 
The Saadi case concerned a removal to Tunisia in which the Italian embassy 
in Tunis requested the Tunisian government to assure the applicant would 
not be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. Though Tunisia did 
not provide such assurances, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered the 
request by stating that the Tunisian laws in force guarantee and protect the 
rights of prisoners in Tunisia and secure to them the right to a fair trial. He 
also pointed out that Tunisia voluntarily acceded to the relevant international 
treaties and conventions. According to the ECtHR ‘the existence of 
416 UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee Protection, 
Protection Operations and Legal Advice Section Division of International Protection 
Services, Geneva, August 2006, pp. 2-3.
417 Cox 2010; Jillions 2015.  
418 See e.g. ECtHR 17 January 2012, Harkins and Edwards v. the UK, App. Nos. 9146/07 
and 32650/07 (RvdW 2012/1517).
419 Paras. 104-105 of the judgment. 
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domestic laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing respect 
for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to 
ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where as in 
the present case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted to or 
tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to the principles 
of the Convention.420 Even when the authorities would have given 
assurances as requested by Italy, this would not have absolved the Court 
from the obligation to examine whether these assurances, in their practical 
application, are a sufficient guarantee against ill-treatment. The weight to be 
given to assurances depends in each case on the circumstances prevailing at 
the material time’.421 
The latter principle is confirmed in Othman v. UK and led to another 
outcome than that of Saadi as the Court did accept the assurances which the 
Jordanian government gave to the UK.422 Like the Chahal and Saadi cases, 
this case also concerned the expulsion of a terrorist suspect. In its judgment, 
the Court lists several factors which it already mentioned in earlier case 
law that among others must be considered in order to decide whether the 
assurances can be relied upon. Some of these are, whether the terms of the 
assurances have been disclosed to the Court; who has given the assurances 
and whether that person can bind the receiving state; whether compliance 
with the assurances can be objectively verified through diplomatic or other 
monitoring mechanisms, including providing unfettered access to the 
applicant’s lawyers etc. According to the Court, ‘the UK and Jordanian 
governments have made genuine efforts to obtain and provide transparent 
and detailed assurances to ensure the applicant will not be ill-treated upon 
420 See also ECtHR 23 February 2012, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 
(JV 2012/171 includes annotation from M.Y.A. Zieck) which concerned the return 
to Libya of a group of Somalis and Eritrean nationals, who were intercepted by the 
Italian revenue police on the high seas. While various international organisations 
raised concerns and condemned the situation of irregular migrants in Libya, the 
Italian government argued that Libya was safe for return. They referred, inter alia, to 
the Italian-Libyan Friendship Treaty of 2008 in which Libya declares to comply with 
its obligations under international human rights law. As in Saadi, the Court repeated 
that the ‘existence of domestic laws and ratification of international treaties on 
fundamental rights is not sufficient to guarantee safety, while reliable sources report 
practices which are not in keeping with the Convention’. Furthermore, the Court 
expressed that Italy cannot evade its own responsibility by relying on its obligations 
arising out of bilateral agreements with Libya. When the applicants were removed, 
the Italian authorities knew or should have known that being irregular migrants, 
they would be exposed to treatment contrary to the Convention and would not be 
provided with protection. 
421 Paras 147-148 of the judgment. See also Gentili 2010. 
422 ECtHR 17 January 2012, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the UK, App. No. 8139/09 (JV 
2012/143 includes annotation from H. Battjes). 
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return. It finds the Memory of Understanding to be superior in both its detail 
and its formality to any assurances previously examined by the Court and 
concludes that upon return the applicant will not be exposed to a real risk of 
ill-treatment.423 Though the ECtHR ruled that the expulsion of the applicant 
would not violate Article 3 ECHR, it did conclude that removal to Jordan to 
be retried would give rise to a flagrant denial of justice in violation of Article 
6 of the Convention.
The fact that the Court often accepts assurances given in the context of 
extradition has to do with the fact that in such cases it is often clear what 
can be expected; it is clear what criminal charges are made and what penal 
sentence is sought. It is thus easier to determine the value and effectiveness 
of the assurances given. In expulsion cases it is more difficult to assess the 
value of the assurances given.424 The Court’s case law shows that in these 
cases and especially when there are reports showing widespread practices of 
ill-treatment in a certain country, it must be established that the assurances 
are not guaranteed in words but also in its factual application. 
Besides diplomatic assurances, also the conditions in aliens’ detention 
premises is a relevant topic with regard to Article 3. Aliens who have been 
issued an expulsion order are often placed in administrative detention before 
the actual removal takes place. Reasons for this can be that the person is 
suspected of intending to abscond, considered to be a threat to public order 
or hinders the preparation of his or her departure or the expulsion procedure. 
The state of detention conditions, possibly in combination with the length 
of period the applicants were exposed to bad living conditions can lead to a 
breach of Article 3 ECHR as was the case in the above discussed M.S.S and 
Rahimi judgments. As already mentioned earlier under the terms of Article 3, 
for such a breach, it is necessary for a minimum level of severity to have been 
reached. Such an assessment is relative and in each case the facts must be 
viewed in the light of the circumstances as a whole. 
According to the Court, ‘the State must ensure that a person is detained in 
conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that 
the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject 
him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level 
of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of 
imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured by, among 
other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance detention 
conditions must be compatible with respect for human dignity and a 
423 Grozdanova 2015; Giuffré 2013. 
424 Wouters 2009, p. 304.
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detained person’s health and well-being must be adequately secured’.425 This 
principle also counts for aliens who are awaiting expulsion or are detained by 
the immigration authorities.426
The Court judged in the Dougoz v. Greece case427 that when assessing 
conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects 
of these conditions, as well as the applicant’s specific allegations. In Aden 
Ahmed v. Malta, the applicant was kept in administrative detention for 14.5 
months where she, among others, claimed to have suffered from cold and 
heat as during the summer the dormitories in which detainees has been kept 
became oppressively hot and other times very cold and no proper blankets 
were supplied; there was a lack of female staff and the only access she had 
to open air, the exercise yard was closed for three months. The Court noted 
that taken as a whole and in the light of the applicant’s specific situation, the 
cumulative effect of the conditions had diminished her human dignity and 
had to have made her feel anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating 
and debasing her and possibly breaking her physical and moral resistance, 
thus constituting degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 
ECHR.428 The Popov. v. France case429 concerned spouses who were Kazakh 
nationals and applied for asylum in France. Together with their children they 
were placed in administrative detention from 28 August till 12 September 
2007. The Court found a violation of Article 3 ECHR in respect of the 
administrative detention of the children and noted that whilst the authorities 
had been careful to separate families from other detainees, the facilities 
available in the ‘families’ area of the centre were nevertheless ill-adapted 
to the presence of children: no children’s beds and adult beds with pointed 
metal corners, no activities for children, a very basic play area on a small piece 
of carpet, a concreted courtyard of 20 sq.m. with a view of the sky through 
wire netting, a tight grill over the bedroom windows obscuring the view 
outside, and automatically closing bedroom doors with consequent danger 
for children.430 Accordingly, in view of the children’s young age, the length of 
their detention and the conditions of their confinement in a detention centre, 
the Court is of the view that the authorities failed to take into account the 
inevitably harmful consequences for the children. It finds the threshold of 
seriousness for Article 3 of the Convention to be exceeded.
425 ECtHR 26 October 2000, Kudla v. Poland, App. No. 30210/96, para. 94 (USZ 
2001/37).
426 See ECtHR 22 July 2010, A.A. v. Greece, App. No. 12186/08 (JV 2010/336). 
427 ECtHR 6 March 2011, Dougoz v. Greece, App. No. 40907/98.
428 ECtHR 9 December 2013, Aden Ahmed v. Malta, App. No. 55352/12.
429 ECtHR 19 January 2012, Popov v. France, App. Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07 (JV 
2012/167 includes annotation from H. Battjes).
430 Idem, para. 95.
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An important source for the Court concerning detention conditions are the 
country and general reports of the CPT431 as also turned out in the Yarashonen 
v. Turkey case.432 The applicant, who is a Russian national of Chechen origin, 
complained among others about the detention conditions at the Kumkapi 
Removal Centre where he was detained for almost six months. One of the 
points of the applicant concerned the severe overcrowding in the centre. The 
Court noted that in view of the limited nature of the information provided 
by the government, it was not possible to establish with any certainty 
the personal space available to the applicant in the room. This led to the 
situation that the Court made an approximate assessment of the floor space 
per detainee and paid attention to earlier observations of the CPT regarding 
the problem of overcrowding at the Kumkapi Removal Centre.  
Besides Article 3 ECHR which can be at stake regarding detention conditions, 
another relevant provision with respect to the legality of detention itself 
is Article 5 ECHR. This article guarantees the right to physical liberty, 
except when detention is based on one of the 6 stated grounds. One of these 
grounds, sub (1) (f) concerns aliens’ detention which is also relevant with 
regard to excluded asylum seekers under Article 1F and will be discussed in 
the next paragraph.
§ 4.3 Article 5 (1) (f) in connection with Article 1F
Article 5 provides that ‘No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
1 (f) ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his affecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition’. Aliens’ detention is a 
familiar phenomenon within Europe which is imposed on immigrants who 
do not have valid residence documents for their stay in the country. Detaining 
those who enter the country without documents is mainly done to verify 
their identity. This group also includes those who apply for asylum. When it 
turns out during the proceedings that the official who questioned the asylum 
seeker has suspicions of a possible 1F situation, it is very imaginable that the 
person is kept in detention awaiting the investigation due to national security 
reasons. A different matter is when a decision is taken on the alien’s asylum 
application and he is excluded on the basis of Article 1F. In this case, the 
person would most likely not have the right to stay in the country, setting 
aside a possible non-refoulement or other issue, and is to be expelled. In 
such a situation, the risk of absconding and being a threat to public order 
are reasons for countries to impose pre-removal detention on these persons. 
Though in both situations states are able to detain the alien, in order to be in 
431 See Hagens 2011.
432 ECtHR 24 September 2014, Yarashonen v. Turkey, App. No. 72710/11. 
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line with Article 5 ECHR, the detention should not be arbitrary.433 As long as 
the detention is not arbitrary, the Court sees no need to determine whether 
it is necessary and proportionate.434 It is relevant to mention concerning the 
position of an excluded asylum seeker that the ECtHR ruled that when an 
interim measure is issued to stop the removal of the alien, it does not accept 
authorities’ to claim detaining a person with a view to removal.435 This means 
that the alien must be granted leave to stay in the country for the period the 
interim measure applies.
The practices among EU countries concerning the length of pre-removal 
detention varied as certain countries did not have a maximum time limit 
as others changed from a few months up to two- years.436 The entry into 
force of the Returns Directive which is presently implemented by the EU 
Member States sets the upper time limit at 18 months. In contrast with 
Article 5 (1) (f) ECHR, the Returns Directive does require detention to 
be necessary. This also counts for the EU Reception Conditions Directive 
and several instruments from other organisations such as the UNHCR, the 
CPT, the Committee of Ministers and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention.437 
A person who is detained on one of the grounds of Article 5 (1) ECHR 
is entitled to the procedural rights as prescribed in paragraphs 2 to 5 of 
Article 5.438 Pursuant to Article 5 (2) ECHR, ‘everyone who is arrested 
shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the 
reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him’. The Court ruled that 
it should be interpreted as meaning that anyone arrested, must be told in 
simple, non-technical language that he can understand the essential legal 
and factual grounds for his arrest, so that he can, if necessary, apply to a 
433 The Court judged in Saadi v. UK that the detention measure must comply with 
certain criteria in order not to be considered arbitrary. This means that, ‘detention 
must be carried out in good faith; be closely connected to the purpose of preventing 
unauthorised entry; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate and 
the length should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued’. In 
addition to the latter criteria the proceedings must be pursued with due diligence.
434 Mole & Meredith 2010, 149-150.
435 ECtHR 26 April 2007, Gebremedhin v. France, App. No. 25389/05 (Ars Aequi 
RV20070069 includes annotation from H. Battjes). 
436 See ‘Detention of third country nationals in return procedures’, EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ecf77402.pdf> (last accessed 
on 21 September 2015). 
437 Mole & Meredith 2010, pp. 158-162.
438 Several safeguards as laid down in the ECHR provisions are also included in the non-
binding ‘Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return’ of the Council of Europe’s Committee 
of Ministers.  
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court to challenge its lawfulness.439 This guarantee is especially relevant for 
aliens who are detained pending their expulsion and do not understand the 
language. In such a case, they should be assisted by an interpreter. According 
to the Court, the information offered in expulsion proceedings may be less 
comprehensive than in cases of an arrest on the basis of a specific criminal 
offence. 
Paragraph 4 lays down that ‘everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest 
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of 
his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if 
his detention is not lawful’. As this provision applies to everyone, irrespective 
of the reason for detention, it provides relevant safeguards for those to 
whom aliens’ detention is imposed. When the detention is ordered by an 
administrative body, it is especially important that a judicial review takes 
place. Paragraph 4 not only demands the initial detention to be reviewed 
on its lawfulness but also requires a regular periodic review by a court. 
The court to which the detainee has access does not have to be a ‘court of 
law of the classic kind integrated within the standards judicial machinery 
of the country’ but must be a body of a ‘judicial character’ offering certain 
procedural guarantees. The court must be independent both of the executive 
and of the parties of the case and have the power to order release if it finds 
the detention to be unlawful.440 The term ‘lawfulness’ has the same meaning 
as under Article 5 (1) and in case of detention awaiting expulsion, judicial 
control of legality is required only in relation to the decision concerning the 
detention prior to the expulsion. With regard to ‘speedily’ it refers to both 
access to judicial review and the decision of the review court. Whether the 
review happened speedily depends on the circumstances in each case, but it 
must be ensured that it is carried out in the shortest possible time.441 Though 
the issue of legal assistance is not explicitly mentioned in paragraph 4, the 
Court’s case law shows that the right to legal assistance is a fundamental 
guarantee for a detainee who would be unable to exercise his right really and 
effectively. 
With regard to the detention of aliens, also the Returns Directive and the 
recast Directive on Asylum Procedures offer guarantees in accordance 
with Article 5 (4) ECHR, such as the right to a speedy judicial review of the 
lawfulness of detention.442
439 Idem, p. 168.
440 Jacobs & White 2014, p. 153.
441 See ECtHR Guide on Article 5 of the Convention, Right to Liberty and Security, 
Council of Europe June 2014 pp. 30-34.  
442 See Article 15 (2) of the Returns Directive and Article 26 of the recast Directives on 
Asylum Procedures. 
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Article 5 ECHR is closely connected to Articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 
13 (right to an effective remedy) of the Convention.443 The procedural 
guarantees offered under Articles 5 (4), 6 and 13 ECHR may overlap and 
the Court has held the first two mentioned provisions to be leges speciales 
in relation to the more general requirements of Article 13. When Articles 
5 and 6 are violated, the Court does not find it necessary to hold a separate 
examination under Article 13.444 Considering the provisions on safeguards 
from the perspective of immigration matters, Article 13 can be considered 
to be the most relevant Convention provision for the alien as the Court’s 
standing interpretation with regard to Article 6 is that it does not apply to 
expulsion cases445 and Article 5 applies only in case of detention with a view 
to prevent a unlawful entry or when expulsion/extradition proceedings are 
pending.446 In the next paragraph Article 13 ECHR will be discussed. 
§ 4.4 Right to an effective remedy
Article 13 ECHR guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority 
to everyone who claims that his rights and freedoms under the Convention 
have been violated.447 Thus, the provision secures a remedy at national 
level to cases in which the alleged violation concerns one of the rights and 
freedoms of the Convention and can only be invoked in conjunction with 
these. In practice this means that aliens can only refer to Article 13 when 
a decision regarding entry, settlement or removal and the consequent 
threatened expulsion allegedly violates a Convention right, such as in Article 
3 or 8. 
In order to complain of a violation of Article 13, the applicant must have an 
arguable claim. The Court held that ‘where an individual has an arguable 
claim to be the victim of the rights set forth in the Convention, he should have 
a remedy before a national authority in order both to have his claim decided 
and, if appropriate, to obtain redress. In all the cases where a complaint is 
found to be admissible under Article 35 (3) ECHR, it is also considered to be 
arguable, thus the Court applies the same threshold for both.448  
443 See Boeles 1997, pp. 217-221 for a discussion of these three provisions. 
444 As stated by Cuenca 2012, p. 466; in recent years the Court has increasingly used 
Article 13 as a right/safeguard for the other rights. 
445 ECtHR 5 October 2000, Maaouia v. France, App. No. 39652/98; ECtHR 4 February 
2005, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99 (JV 
2005/89 includes annotations from B.P. Vermeulen and K. de Vries).
446 Also Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 should be mentioned, as according to this provision a 
legal remedy must be available in case of expulsion of an alien who is lawfully present 
in the territory of a Contracting State. The fact that Article 1 only concerns aliens 
who are lawfully resident in a country, limits the scope of the provision. 
447 ECtHR 6 September 1978, Klass and others v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71. 
448 Lambert 2006, p. 36.
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Article 13 requires the remedy to be effective. In the Conka case, the Court 
stated that: ‘the scope of the Contracting States’ obligations under Article 
13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint; however, 
the remedy required by Article 13 must be ‘effective’ in practice as well as 
in law. The ‘effectiveness’ of a ‘remedy’ within the meaning of Article 13 
does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. 
Nor does the ‘authority’ referred to in that provision necessarily have to be 
a judicial authority; but if it is not, its powers and guarantees which it affords 
are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective.449 Also, 
even if a single remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy the requirements of 
Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may 
do so’.450 
The relevance of Article 13 for an excluded asylum seeker who is facing 
expulsion will often be in the context of Article 3. When no effective and 
accessible remedy is provided for the applicant’s complaint under Article 3, 
this situation can lead to a violation of Article 13. The Court ruled that the 
notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires ‘independent and 
rigorous scrutiny of a claim that there exist substantial grounds for believing 
that there was a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 in the event of 
the applicant’s expulsion to the country of destination and a remedy with 
automatic suspensive effect’.451 According to the Court, this scrutiny must 
be carried out without regard to what the person may have done to warrant 
expulsion or to any perceived threat to the national security of the expelling 
State. 
The Court’s case law shows that the conduct of the person is not a relevant 
factor for the assessment of a violation of Article 3 ECHR. As stated 
before, this provision has an absolute character. Also an excluded asylum 
seeker facing expulsion and invoking Article 3 (or any other provision of 
the Convention), must be provided with the possibility to have his case 
scrutinised by national authorities. The fact that the appeal must have a 
suspensive effect, thus suspend any expulsion order which may be in force 
and should not be constrained by a restrictive time limit within which the 
application must be lodged are important guarantees for the alien.452 
449 The key element for the Court is the capacity of the authority to provide an effective 
remedy in practice and in law. It may in this regard have to conduct a thorough and 
effective investigation. 
450 ECtHR 5 February 2002, Conka v. Belgium, App. No. 51564/99, para. 75 (JV 
2002/117 includes annotation from B.P. Vermeulen).
451 ECtHR 22 September 2009, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, App. No. 30471/08 
(Ars Aequi RV20090003 includes annotation from T.P. Spijkerboer). 
452 ECtHR 2 December 2008, K.R.S. v. the UK, App. No. 32733/08 (JV 2009/41 includes 
annotation from HBA). 
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With respect to the right to an effective remedy and fair trial, the EU Charter 
must be mentioned as Article 47 includes the guarantees as accepted by the 
ECtHR in Articles 6 and 13 and goes further regarding protection. The 
latter means, among others, that the right to a fair trial applies to all claims 
under EU law and not only to those concerning civil rights and obligations 
or criminal charges, as is the case under Article 6 ECHR.453 Thus, under 
EU law immigration issues also fall under the right to a fair trial.454 The 
explanatory notes of the Charter state that nevertheless, in all respects other 
than their scope, the guarantees afforded by the ECHR apply in a similar 
way to the Union and that the implementation of the right to effective 
remedies should be in accordance with the criteria as developed by the 
ECtHR on the basis of Article 13.455 Article 47 of the Charter is, inter alia, 
reflected in the recast Directive on Asylum Procedures (Article 46) which 
provides the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal against a 
decision taken on the application for asylum and allows applicants to remain 
in the country pending the outcome of the remedy. Furthermore, the right 
to free legal assistance and representation is included.456 Also Article 13 of 
the Returns Directive provides aliens an effective remedy ‘to appeal against 
or seek review of decisions related to return, including return decisions, 
entry ban decisions and removal decisions, before a competent judicial or 
administrative authority or a competent body composed of members who 
are impartial and who enjoy safeguards of independence’. Paragraphs 2 and 
3 of the provision relate to the suspension of the decision on return and the 
possibility of legal advice, representation and where necessary linguistic 
assistance. The above-mentioned provisions in these Directives are not 
exhaustive; however, looking at the issue of the right to an effective remedy 
from the viewpoint of an excluded asylum seeker, these are the most relevant 
ones to mention. When the alien receives a rejection on his application and 
consequently a removal decision, it is important that he has these decisions 
reviewed and for him not to be removed pending these proceedings. 
Within this perspective, the Moussa Abdida case457 of the ECJ should be 
mentioned. The applicant applied to the Belgian authorities to remain in 
Belgium on medical grounds, stating he needed medical treatment there for 
a serious illness. His request to remain in Belgium was turned down and his 
social assistance was then withdrawn. He appealed against those decisions. 
453 Furthermore, the extensive protection of Article 47 of the Charter is apparent from 
the fact it does not request an arguable claim; an effective remedy is required when a 
right guaranteed by Community law is affected; the remedy must be brought before a 
court and legal aid must be available. 
454 See Wallage 2015.
455 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 14 December 2007, 
C303/17.
456 See Articles 20-23 of the recast Directive on Asylum Procedures. 
457 ECJ 18 December 2014, Moussa Abdida, App. No. C-562/13.
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The Belgian court to which he appealed found that, under Belgian law, 
applicant had no judicial remedy providing for suspension of the decision 
refusing him permission to remain in Belgium and he was not entitled to 
any form of social assistance other than emergency medical assistance. The 
Belgian court thus asked the ECJ whether as a matter of EU law he should 
have available a remedy with suspensive effect and whether he should receive 
basic social assistance other than the emergency medical care pending his 
appeal.
According to the Court, Articles 5 (non-refoulement principle) and 13 of the 
Returns Directive, taken in conjunction with Articles 19 (2) (non-refoulement 
principle) and 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national 
legislation which does not make provision for a remedy with suspensive 
effect in respect of a return decision whose enforcement may expose the 
third country national concerned to a serious risk of grave and irreversible 
deterioration in his state of health and are Member States required to provide 
for the basic needs of such an alien suffering from a serious illness in order 
to ensure that that person may in fact avail himself of emergency health care 
and essential treatment of illness during the period in which that Member 
State is required to postpone removal of the third country national following 
the lodging of the appeal.458
The last Convention provision to be discussed within the context of 
expulsion is Article 8 which establishes the right to respect for private and 
family life, home and correspondence.459 As most of the Court’s case law 
concerning aliens and Article 8 relates to the right to family life, I will restrict 
my comments to this aspect. 
§ 4.5 The importance of ‘family life’ for excluded asylum seekers 
The first case in which the ECtHR dealt with migration issues in relation to 
Article 8 was Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. UK.460 The Court held that 
states have a sovereign right to control immigration and that Article 8 does 
not confer on immigrants a right to choose their place of residence. Article 8 
ECHR can only limit state action when family life is not possible elsewhere, 
due to legal or factual obstacles.461 
458 Idem paras. 62-63.
459 See Van Dijk et al. 2006 Chapter 12 for a comprehensive discussion on all the aspects 
related to Article 8 ECHR.
460 ECtHR 28 May 1985, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. UK, App. Nos. 9214/80, 
9473/81 and 9474/8. 
461 Roca & Santolaya 2012, p. 347.
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An appeal to Article 8 ECHR in relation to admission can concern various 
situations.462 The most obvious one, which is referred to as negative 
obligation cases, relate to expulsion. In such a case, an alien who has close 
family ties or an established family unit in the host country is facing removal 
and thus risks to be separated from the other family members. With regard to 
asylum seekers, family life can be constituted in two ways. It is possible that 
during the asylum application proceedings, which can last for quite a long 
period, the person has entered into personal and family relationships. On 
the other hand, the situation may occur in which one of the family members 
has gained international protection and others who did not, want to remain 
with or join the protected individual on the basis of their relationship to that 
person.463 Both of these situations can apply in case of an excluded asylum 
seeker to whom Article 1F is enforced. 
Also falling within the scope of Article 8, is the right to family reunification.464 
Thus, in the case where a request for family reunion with family members 
living abroad is rejected, Article 8 may be invoked. A last category of cases 
in which Article 8 is frequently relied on, refers to aliens who are residing 
illegally in the host country. In such cases, the person claims his stay to be 
regularised in order that he/she can remain with his/her family members. 
This category is of importance regarding excluded asylum seekers who 
cannot be removed from the host country, but are not granted a legal stay 
either. The last two mentioned situations are defined as positive obligation 
cases in which states have to actively protect family life and private life of 
aliens. According to the Court ‘the boundaries between the state’s positive 
and negative obligations do not lend themselves to precise definition. The 
applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar. In both contexts regard must 
be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing 
interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both 
contexts the state enjoys a certain margin of appreciation’.465 
The Court expressed that Article 8 protects the nuclear family structure, 
thus spouses, parents and children, but also other forms of family ties may 
462 Thym 2008, p. 96. 
463 It also occurs that an alien who is issued a legal stay in the first instance risks removal 
after withdrawal and appeals to Article 8 in order to maintain his family life in the 
host country. 
464 Article 23 of the Qualification Directive requires Member States to ensure that 
family unity can be maintained. However, in paragraph 3 is stated that this is not the 
case when the family member is excluded from asylum. 
465 ECtHR 19 February 1996, Gül v. Switzerland, App. No. 23218/94, para. 38. 
Similarly in more judgments such as 30 July 2013, Berisha v. Switzerland, App. No. 
948/12 (EHRC 2013/223 includes annotation from A.J.T. Woltjer) and 3 November 
2011, Arvelo Aponte v. the Netherlands, App. No. 28770/05 (RV 2012, 23 includes 
annotation from Helmink).
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fall under Article 8, such as relations with grandparents. It is not necessary to 
have blood ties. In its Al-Nashif judgment, the Court expressed that:
‘the existence or non-existence of ‘family life’ is essentially a question of fact 
depending upon the reality in practice of close personal ties. Nevertheless, 
it follows from the concept of family on which Article 8 is based that a child 
born of a marital union is ipso jure part of that relationship; hence from the 
moment of the child’s birth and by the very fact of it, there exists between 
him and his parents a bond amounting to ‘family life’ which subsequent 
events cannot break save in exceptional circumstances. In so far as relations 
in a couple are concerned, ‘family life’ encompasses both families based 
on marriage and also de facto relationships. When deciding whether a 
relationship can be said to amount to ‘family life, a number of factors may 
be relevant, including whether the couple live together, the length of their 
relationship and whether they have demonstrated their commitment to each 
other by having children together or by any other means’.466 
Besides ‘family life’, the Court has treated the expulsion of long-term 
residents also under the head of ‘private life’ in which importance is attached 
to the degree of social integration of the persons concerned. Thus, the 
private life of a person only comes within the reach of  Article 8 after the 
lapse of a certain time period and gains weight the longer a person has  lived 
in a country and developed ‘the network of personal, social and economic 
relations that make up the private life of every human being’.467 
As stated above, states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when assessing 
whether an interference with a right protected by Article 8 was necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. The Court’s task consists of ascertaining whether the 
impugned measures struck a fair balance between the relevant interests, 
namely the individual’s rights protected by the Convention on the one hand 
and the community’s interests on the other.
In case of expulsion of long-term residents, the Court requires the state 
to show that the interfering measure is necessary in a democratic society; 
responds to a pressing social need, and in particular is proportionate to 
466 ECtHR 20 September 2002, Al-Nashif and others v. UK, App. No. 50963/99, para. 
112 (JV 2002/239 includes annotation from E. Guild).
467 ECtHR 9 October 2003, Slivenko v. Latvia, App. No. 48321/99 (JV 2003/494 includes 
annotation from B.P. Vermeulen).
Chapter 4 The ECHR in respect of excluded asylum seekers 
141
the legitimate aim pursued.468 In the Amrollahi and Keles cases, the Court 
repeated criteria which have to be taken into consideration when assessing 
whether expulsion of such persons is proportionate in cases where criminal 
offences have been committed: ‘In assessing the relevant criteria in such 
a case, the Court will consider the nature and seriousness of the offence 
committed by the applicant; the length of the applicant’s stay in the country 
from which he is going to be expelled; the time elapsed since the offence was 
committed and the applicant’s conduct during that period; the nationalities 
of the various persons concerned; the applicant’s family situation, such as 
the length of the marriage; and other factors expressing the effectiveness of 
a couple’s family life; whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time 
when he entered into a family relationship; and whether there are children 
in the marriage, and if so, their age. Not least, the Court will also consider 
the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in 
the country of origin, though the mere fact that a person might face certain 
difficulties in accompanying her or his spouse cannot in itself exclude an 
expulsion’.469 
In the Üner case,470 the Court added two more criteria in addition to the ones 
stated above. These are the best interests and well-being of the children,471 
in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the 
applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to 
be expelled and the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host 
country and the country of destination. The Court ruled that although all 
listed circumstances must be taken into consideration, the seriousness of the 
committed crime must be accorded predominant weight. Where expulsion 
measures against a juvenile offender are concerned, the obligation to take the 
best interests of the child into account includes an obligation to facilitate his 
or her reintegration.472  
In general it can be summarised that the Court’s case law on long-term 
immigrants shows that the period a person has lived in the host country 
468 ECtHR 18 February 1991, Mostaquim v. Belgium, App. No. 12313/86 and 9 October 
2003, Slivenko v. Latvia, App. No. 48321/99 (JV 2003/494 includes annotation from 
B.P. Vermeulen).
469 ECtHR 11 July 2002, Amrollahi v. Denmark, App. No. 56811/00 (Ars Aequi 
RV20020051 includes annotation from T.P. Spijkerboer) and 27 October 2005 Keles 
v. Germany, App. No. 32231/02 (JV 2005/450). The criteria were initially accepted 
in 2 August 2001, Boultif v. Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00 (JV 2001/254 includes 
annotation from PB)
470 ECtHR 18 October 2006, Üner v. the Netherlands, App. No. 46410/99 (JV 2004/369). 
471 See Smyth 2015 for more on the use of the ‘best interest of the child’ principle in the 
ECtHR’s case law. 
472 ECtHR 23 June 2008, Maslov v. Austria, App. No. 1638/03 (JV 2007/209). 
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and the social and cultural ties he has developed there, are relevant factors 
determining the proportionality of an expulsion measures. On the other 
hand, the Court has also stressed that very serious violent and drug offences 
may allow expulsion, even when the alien has spent a great part of his life in 
the host country and did not develop ties with his country of origin.473  
In case of a 1F applicant who is facing expulsion and invokes Article 8, 
the respondent state will appeal to the grounds of national security and 
prevention of disorder or crime to justify the taken expulsion measure. 
The above mentioned criteria for long-term immigrants can offer guidance 
to states regarding the balancing of interests and although the question 
whether the interest of public order outweighs the rights of the alien which 
will vary according to the specific circumstances of each case, the alleged 
committed serious crime which led to the exclusion of the asylum seeker 
will be strongly counted against him. This is also the case with regard to an 
excluded asylum seeker who stays illegally in the host country and appeals 
to Article 8 in order to regularise his stay. Important considerations which 
will be in the disadvantage of the alien concerned are also when he has a 
history of breaches of immigration law and when family life was created at 
a time when the person involved was aware that his immigration status was 
such that the persistence of that family life within the host state was from 
the outset precarious. In such circumstances ‘it is likely only to be in the 
most exceptional circumstances that the removal of the non-national family 
member will constitute a violation of Article 8’.474 
Thus in both situations, the Court will eventually balance the interest of public 
order against the rights of the alien. When the Court rules that Article 8 is 
violated, this does not guarantee, as such, the right to a particular type of 
residence permit as the Court is not empowered to rule on whether the 
individual concerned should be granted one particular legal status rather 
than another, that choice being a matter for the domestic authorities alone.475
Though several cases of excluded asylum seekers who appealed to Article 8 
ECHR have been brought to the Court, there has been no judgment yet. In 
the next paragraph I will deal with the Court’s case law relating to aliens who 
have been denied on the basis of Article 1F.
473 See ECtHR 10 April 2012, Balogun v. UK, App. No. 60286/09 (EHRC 2012/139 
includes annotation from G.G. Lodder).
474 ECtHR 31 January 2006, Rodrigues Da Silva & Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands, App. 
No. 50435/99, para. 39 and 3 October 2014, Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, App. No. 
12738/10 (NJ 2015/130 includes annotation from B.E.P. Myjer). 
475 ECtHR 17 January 2006 Aristimuño Mendizabal v. France, App. No. 51431/99, para. 
66 (JV 2006/72 includes annotation from PB).
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§ 4.6 ECtHR’s case law on 1F issues            
The cases brought before the Strasbourg Court by applicants who were 
rejected asylum because Article 1F was held against them, show quite some 
similarities in their substance as they are almost all versus the Netherlands;476 
they relate to Articles 3, 8 and 13 and concern mainly Afghan nationals who 
served the KhAD/WAD, which was the intelligence service during the former 
communist regime in Afghanistan.477 I will elaborate upon this specific group 
in Chapter 5 when I will deal with Article 1F in the Netherlands. 
To understand the issues the Court had to deal with, it is relevant to know 
the following:
Until 2011, it was practice in the Netherlands that an exclusion order was 
imposed on a person against whom Article 1F was held.478 This is based 
on Article 67 (1) of the Aliens Act 2000 which provides that a foreign 
national may be declared an undesirable alien, entailing the imposition of an 
exclusion order in the interest of international relations and to exert pressure 
476 Besides the Netherlands, there has been one case against France, ECtHR 1 July 2014, 
M.X. v. France, App. No. 21580/10.
477 To date, these cases are brought before the ECtHR and by now closed: 19 June 2012, 
H. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 37833/10; 10 July 2012, I. v. the Netherlands, App. 
No. 24147/11; 18 October 2011, K. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 33403/11; 4 June 
2013, Naibzay v. the Netherlands, App. No. 68564/12; 15 September 2005, Bonger 
v. the Netherlands, App. No. 10154/04 (JV 2006/33 includes annotation from B.P. 
Vermeulen); 13 December 2011, Betwata Khoushnauw v. the Netherlands, App. Nos. 
28244/10 and 32224/11; 2 November 2010, Joesoebov v. the Netherlands, App. No. 
44719/06 (Ars Aequi RV20100022 includes annotation from P. Boeles); 10 January 
2012, G.R. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 22251/07 (NJ 2013/565 includes annotation 
from E.A. Alkema); 17 March 2015, M.W. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 46938/10; 18 
April 2012, Hashimi v. the Netherlands, App. No. 20507/12; 18 October 2011, J. v. 
the Netherlands, App. No. 33342/11; 14 January 2014, N.F. v. the Netherlands, App. 
No. 21563/08 (NJB 2014/727); 14 January 2014, Y.A. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 
15439/09; 13 November 2014, H. and J. v. the Netherlands, App. Nos. 978/09 and 
992/09 (in this case, the applicants also called in Article 6 ECHR) and 30 June 2015, 
A.A.Q. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 42331/05. Currently, there are still cases pending 
at the Court, among which these have been communicated to the Dutch government: 
16 July 2012, Soleimankheel and others v. the Netherlands, App. No. 41509/12and 16 
October 2009, G.G.S. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 53926/09. The latter case is the 
only one in which also Article 5 of the Convention is invoked concerning the aliens’ 
detention imposed on the applicant. There is one more case worthy to mention. In the 
case of 11 September 2012, A.A. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 66848/10, Article 1F is 
not hold against the applicant, but she is the wife of an excluded asylum seeker and has 
invoked Articles 3 and 8 to stop her expulsion to Turkey.   
478 Since the implementation of the Returns Directive in Dutch national legislation in 
December 2011, the exclusion order is replaced by an entry ban with regard to aliens 
outside of Europe. The consequences of an entry ban are quite similar to that of an 
exclusion order, see Chapter 5 on the Netherlands for more on this issue. 
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on the alien to leave the country. Such an order entails a ban on residing in or 
visiting the Netherlands. Article 197 of the Dutch Criminal Code provides 
that an alien who stays in the country while he knows that an exclusion order 
has been imposed on him or her commits a criminal offence punishable by 
up to six months imprisonment or a fine. It is up to the Public Prosecutor to 
decide whether to prosecute or not. An exclusion order may be revoked upon 
request of the alien.479 
Furthermore, when a person for reasons based on Article 3 of the Convention 
cannot be expelled to his country of origin, but pursuant to Article 1F is 
ineligible for any kind of residence permit, no expulsion order will be issued, 
at least for as long as these reasons exist. This situation does not lead to a 
residence title and the alien concerned remains under the obligation to leave 
the Netherlands on his own will. Eligibility for an eventual residence permit 
may arise when the Article 3 obstacle is of a sustained nature. In practice, 
such a situation may arise after a period of unlawful residence of ten years 
whilst Article 3 continues to obstruct the removal and, without any prospect 
of change in that situation in the foreseeable future and, where the alien in 
question has demonstrated that despite his best efforts there is no possibility 
for him to relocate to a third country and where the continued withholding 
of a residence permit would be disproportional. 
In summary, with regard to Article 3, the complaints were that expulsion 
would expose the applicant to a real and personal risk of being subjected 
to treatment in violation of Article 3 if the person were to be returned to 
this country of origin. In the cases of I. and Naibzay v. the Netherlands, the 
question was raised whether the consequences of denying a residence permit 
could lead to an Article 3 violation.480 In relation to Article 8, the general 
complaint was that the continued denial to issue a residence title while no 
expulsion took place, violated the right to family life as in most cases spouse 
and children of the applicants were admitted to the Netherlands and had a 
lawful stay.481 In some cases, the applicants referred to the exclusion order 
and found it to be unjustly imposed in relation to Article 3. In others, the 
exclusion order was considered to violate Article 8. The reference to Article 
13 concerned in all the cases that in the complaints under Articles 3 and 8, no 
effective remedy was provided. 
Up till present, the Court has not delivered a judgment concerning the issues 
that arose in relation to Articles 3 and 8. It either found the application to be 
479 Aliens Circular (Vreemdelingencirculaire) A4/3.
480 In both cases, the Court did not found a minimum level of severity to be present. See 
§ 4.7.  
481 ECtHR H. and J. v. the Netherlands is the only case in which the applicant called in 
Article 8 with regard to his private life instead of family life.  
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manifestly ill-founded or stroke it out of its list of cases.482
According to the Court, ‘states have the right to control the entry, residence 
and expulsion of aliens. Neither Article 3 nor any other provision of the 
Convention or its Protocols guarantees the right of political asylum. Though 
expulsion may give rise to an issue under Article 3 and imply the obligation 
not to expel, in the absence of any realistic prospects for the expulsion of 
the applicant, he cannot claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 
34 ECHR as regards his complaint that the return to this country of origin 
would violate Article 3. To the extent that the applicant also complains that, 
pursuant to the exclusion order imposed on him, he is denied a residence 
permit for as long as he is not removed from the Netherlands, the Court 
considers that this complaint must be rejected for being incompatible ratione 
materiae as neither Article 3 nor any other provision of the Convention and 
its Protocols guarantees, as such, give a right to a residence permit’.483 
With respect to Article 8, the Court expressed that despite an exclusion 
order being imposed on an applicant barring his formal admission to the 
Netherlands, as long as the applicant is not under a threat of removal from the 
Netherlands and thus of being separated from his family in the Netherlands, 
he cannot be regarded as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the 
Convention for the purposes of Article 8.484 
Like the complaints on Articles 3 and 8, in all cases, except one, the reference 
to Article 13 was rejected as unfounded.485 Though the applicant alleged 
there had been a violation of his right to family life and did not rely on Article 
13, in the G.R. case486, the Court raised of its own will the question whether 
the right to an effective remedy was denied and eventually ruled in favour of 
the alien. Contrary to the other cases, Article 8 was not invoked because of 
a continued denial of a residence title while not being expelled, but for being 
refused an exemption from the obligation to pay an administrative charge 
to obtain a decision on his request for a residence permit. The Court found 
it more appropriate to consider the case under Article 13 by dealing with 
the question ‘whether the applicant had effective access to the administrative 
procedure by which he might, subject to fulfilling the conditions prescribed 
by domestic law, obtain a residence permit which would allow him to reside 
lawfully with his family in the Netherlands’. According to the Court, the 
applicant had an arguable case under Article 8 and was the procedure for 
482 Redactioneel 2010, pp. 367-369.
483 See the cases of ECtHR K.; H.; I.;Bonger and Joesoebov v. the Netherlands.
484 See the cases of ECtHR I.; K. and Joesobov v. the Netherlands. 
485 ECtHR H. and J. v. the Netherlands in which the applicant also referred to Article 6 was 
also found to be manifestly ill-founded. 
486 ECtHR 10 January 2012, G.R. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 22251/07 (NJ 2013/565 
includes annotation from E.A. Alkema). 
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obtaining a residence permit ‘effective in law’ as the applicant was fully 
entitled to make use of it and that it was capable of yielding the result sought 
by the applicant. Then the question remained whether it was also ‘available in 
practice’ given the financial threshold which the applicant could not meet. To 
be exempted from paying the administrative charge, the applicant submitted 
to the Minister for Immigration and Integration, a copy of his wife’s most 
recent social assistance pay slip, issued by the mayor and aldermen of the 
municipality where they lived. The Minister did not accept the request on 
the ground that the applicant had failed to submit a declaration of income 
and assets, verified by the same municipality, along with proof of his and his 
wife’s attempts to obtain funds from other sources and subsequently never 
considered whether the applicant would qualify for an exemption. The Court 
expressed that in view of the strict rules on receiving social assistance, it is 
superfluous to require more documents in addition to the pay slip and judged 
that the extremely formalistic attitude of the Minister - which was endorsed 
by the regional court, also deprived the applicant of access to the competent 
administrative tribunal - unjustifiably hindered the applicant’s use of an 
otherwise effective domestic remedy and therefore violated Article 13. 
§ 4.7 Conclusion
Though neither the ECHR nor its Protocols contain the right to political 
asylum as such, this treaty has become a significant tool for asylum seekers. 
The initial thought that the Refugee Convention would provide sufficient 
guarantees and it would not be necessary to include a provision on asylum in 
the ECHR does not hold, especially in the case of excluded asylum seekers. 
Several provisions of the ECHR may provide a way out for those who fall 
outside the scope of international protection. This way, an excluded asylum 
seeker who is facing expulsion and fears for his life upon return can rely on 
Article 3. A relevant aspect of this provision is its absolute character, which 
means that no limitations or interferences are allowed, irrespective of the 
victim’s conduct. To fall under the terms of Article 3, the applicant must show 
substantial grounds to substantiate that he faces a real risk of being subjected 
to ill-treatment on return and the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level 
of severity. An Article 3 complaint will often be submitted together with 
a request for an interim measure. The issuance of such a measure stops a 
removal and will allow the applicant to remain in the host country during the 
proceedings. 
Aliens’ detention is a familiar phenomenon in Europe in cases where the 
person is, inter alia, considered to be a threat to public order or is suspected 
to abscond. The state of detention conditions, possibly in combination with 
the length of period the applicants were exposed to bad living conditions can 
also lead to a breach of Article 3 ECHR. 
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With regard to the legality of detention itself, Article 5 is relevant. This 
provision guarantees the right to physical liberty, except when detention is 
based on one of the stated grounds, which includes alien detention. To be 
in line with Article 5, detention should not be arbitrary and in case of an 
interim measure, authorities cannot claim to detain an alien with a view 
to removal. A detained alien is entitled to the procedural grounds as laid 
down in Article 5 (2) to (5). Article 5 is closely connected to 6 and 13 of 
the Convention and the Court sees Article 5 and 6 to be leges speciales in 
relation to the general requirements of Article 13. In view of the Court’s 
current standing interpretation with regard to Article 6: stating that it does 
not apply to immigration proceedings, the right to an effective remedy 
before a national authority as provided under Article 13 is significant. An 
alien can only refer to the latter when a decision concerning entry, settlement 
or removal and the consequent threatened expulsion allegedly violates a 
Convention right. As shown from the Court’s case law relating to aliens 
to whom Article 1F is applied. The relevance of Article 13 for those facing 
expulsion will often be in the context of Articles 3 and 8. The Convention’s 
provisions regarding procedural rights and guarantees are also reflected in 
EU law as their equivalents are included in, inter alia, the Charter and asylum 
Directives. The right to family life under Article 8 ECHR plays a role for an 
excluded asylum seeker when his family members did receive protection and 
he is facing expulsion and thus separation from them, but as shown from 
the cases brought to the Court by excluded asylum seekers, the complaints 
under Article 8 mainly concerned situations in which the alien claimed 
his illegal stay to be regularised in order for him to remain with his family 
members. There was a continued denial of a residence permit irrespective 
of the refoulement issues. This situation actually concerns the core of the 
matter. Though an Article 3 obstacle can stop the removal of the excluded 
asylum seeker, it does not entail a right to a residence permit. This is also 
the standard phrase repeated by the Court in each case: ‘Neither Article 3 or 
any other provision of the Convention or its Protocols guarantees the right 
of a residence permit and as long as the alien is not under a threat of actual 
expulsion, the Court does not regard him to be a victim for the purposes of 
Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention’. 
The Court disposes of the problem of non-removable asylum seekers who 
do not receive a legal stay either, by assigning a broad amount of discretion 
to the states. In the case of the Netherlands, the policy is that after a period of 
ten years, whilst Article 3 continues to form an obstacle for removal and there 
is no prospect of change in that situation in the foreseeable future, it should 
be considered whether the continued withholding of a residence permit is 
disproportional. I already raised the question whether the consequences of 
leaving a person to live in limbo for many years, without any entitlement 
to social support, may lead to a violation of Article 3? This question is 
interesting within the scope of the Court’s case law on Article 3 in relation to 
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the living conditions of asylum seekers. In the M.S.S. case, the Court judged 
for the first time that the bad living conditions in Greece, in combination 
with the prolonged uncertainty in which applicant remained and the total 
lack of any prospects of his situation improving, led to a violation of Article 
3 of the Convention.487 
In the I. v. Netherlands and Naibzay v. the Netherlands cases, which both 
among others, concerned the living conditions of excluded asylum seekers 
in the Netherlands, the Court did not found a minimum level of severity to 
be present. In the first mentioned case, the Court stated that no indication 
was found that the applicant’s living conditions in the Netherlands would be 
comparable to the living conditions in Greece of the applicant in the M.S.S. 
case or that the applicant’s current living conditions and/or future prospects, 
either from a material, physical or psychological perspective, would be of 
such harrowing hardship.
This reasoning is understandable in view of the Greek authorities’ systematic 
failure to secure adequate living conditions. Though the two men in these 
cases were staying illegally in the country, did not have any right to social 
support etc., they did have a family to fall back on. Thus, despite all the 
difficulties, they were provided with housing which was not the case in 
M.S.S. where the applicant was living on the streets for months and had to 
survive on his own resources. The assessment of a minimum level of severity 
is relative and depends on all circumstances of the case. The Court’s Tarakhel 
judgment showed that even in case a state does have decent reception 
conditions for asylum seekers, Article 3 ECHR can stand in the way of 
removal. Thus, the fact that a minimum level of severity was not found in 
the two mentioned cases which were brought to Court by excluded asylum 
seekers does not mean that other cases cannot lead to another outcome. As 
stated before, there has not been a judgment on any of the cases brought 
to Court by excluded asylum seekers yet. The fact that the aliens were not 
under an actual threat of expulsion, resulted in the Court’s decision not to 
deal with the complaints. However, there are still cases pending at the Court 
and it remains to be seen when the first judgment will be passed. 
487 See also Rahimi v. Greece and Tarakhel v. Switzerland in which the Court reiterated its 
approach taken in the M.S.S case.  
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Chapter 5  Application of Article 1F: current  
policies and their development in the 
Netherlands
§ 5.1 Introduction
The Netherlands was one of the first signatories of the Refugee Convention 
and ratified in the Convention on 3 May 1956.488 The first Aliens Act dates 
back to 1849 and was replaced by the Aliens Act 1965. The latter Act 
contained a special asylum procedure based on the Refugee Convention and 
remained in force for quite some time. The changing influx of migrants to 
the country, including more and more asylum seekers from the mid-eighties 
onwards required new regulations to get a better grip on the developments. 
This led to the introduction of the revised Aliens Act 1994 which aimed to 
restrict the numbers of procedures regarding admission and removal and 
reduce the duration of the procedures.489 In practice, the revised Act of 1994 
did not solve the problems regarding the asylum procedure, resulting in the 
Minister and State Secretary of Justice at the time introducing a legislative 
proposal to the House of Representatives for a new Aliens Act (Aliens Act 
2000).490 While the revision of 1994 concerned the aliens’ policy in general, 
the focus of the new Act was especially on asylum. The Aliens Act 2000 
entered into force on 1 April 2001 and is currently still in force.491  
This chapter will focus on the application of Article 1F in the Netherlands 
which is known within Europe for actively dealing with this provision.492 A 
great interest in the application of Article 1F started at the end of the 1990s 
with the arrival of a group of Afghan men who served in the intelligence 
service named KhAD/WAD. Though these men are not the only ones who 
have been excluded from being granted asylum; for nearly the last two 
decades, the ex-KhAD/WAD members have been in the political spotlight 
with regard to the application of Article 1F. The consequences of exclusion, 
particularly the situation that these aliens do not qualify for a lawful stay (even 
in case of a refoulement obstacle) and at the same time cannot be removed, 
gave rise to developing further policy concerning the exclusion clauses. 
The previous and current policy and legislation on Article 1F within the 
488 The Refugee Convention entered into force in the Netherlands on 1 August 1956. 
489 Dutch Bulletin of Acts, Order and Decrees (Staatsblad) 1993, 707. 
490 House of Representatives II 1998/99, 26 732, No. 2.
491 Dutch Bulletin of Acts, Order and Decrees 2000, 495. 
492 Rafi 2008, p. 381.
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legal framework for the assessment of exclusion in the Netherlands will be 
discussed in more detail, with a particular focus on the post-exclusion phase. 
After this overview, I will go into the details regarding the situation of the ex-
KhAD/WAD members which is still a subject of discussion. Furthermore, 
attention will be paid to the Dutch jurisprudence regarding some relevant 
topics with respect to Article 1F followed by a conclusion to this chapter. 
§ 5.2 Legal framework
§ 5.2.1 Article 15 of the Aliens Act 1994
Until the introduction of the Aliens Act 2000, Articles 1A and 1F of the 
Refugee Convention were implemented in Article 15 of the Aliens Act 
1965 and later on 1994. Article 15 (1) of the Aliens Act 1994 elaborated on 
Article 1A of the Refugee Convention which defines a refugee. According 
to this paragraph, foreigners who came from a country where they had valid 
reasons to fear persecution because of their religious or political belief; their 
nationality; or because they belong to a certain race or social group could be 
admitted as a refugee. Though the definition of Article 1A of the Refugee 
Convention was not reproduced verbatim in Article 15 of the Aliens Act, 
it was the intention of the legislator to make the two provisions consistent 
with each other. This was explicitly repeated in a letter to the Standing 
Committee of Justice from the Minister of Justice at the time.493 In a later 
policy document, the State Secretary of Justice stated that both provisions 
have a similar category of persons in mind, namely those coming from a 
country where they have valid reasons to fear persecution because of their 
religious or political belief; their nationality; because they belong to a certain 
race or social group. Article 15 of the Aliens Act covered a wider scope of 
situations as it lacked a time limitation, but with the introduction of the 
Protocol this was no longer important because the limit in Article 1A of the 
Refugee Convention ceased to apply.494 
Article 15 (2) prescribed that admission could be refused for serious reasons 
on the basis of  general interests of the state and, until the end of 1997, it was 
general practice that aliens to whom Article 1F was applied, were rejected 
asylum on the basis of paragraph 2. In the policy document mentioned above, 
the State Secretary gave notice of a new assessment of Article 15 which can 
be summarised as follows:495 
First, it was to be judged whether there were serious reasons to consider that 
the person concerned had committed a crime within the meaning of Article 
493 House of Representatives 1973/74, Proceedings II (Handelingen), H. VI, no. 13.
494 House of Representatives 1997/98, 19637, No. 295, p. 5-6.
495 Idem, p. 6.
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1F of the Refugee Convention. If so, admission was refused and if not, it had 
to be examined whether the person could be recognised as a refugee under 
Article 1A of the Refugee Convention. If this question was affirmative, then 
the circumstances are reviewed within the meaning of Article 15 (2) which is 
the basis on which admission to the Netherlands was refused.496 
The latter examination shows that an asylum application is first tested against 
Article 1F instead of Article 1A of the Refugee Convention, the so-called 
‘exclusion before inclusion’. 
The government’s choice for this examination is substantiated by several 
reasons. In the first instance the practice is based on the thought that there 
is nothing in the Refugee Convention which deals with Article 1A first, 
as Article 1F states that the provisions of the Refugee Convention are not 
applicable to persons who are excluded under this provision. Furthermore, 
reference is made to Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the fact that the highest court in administrative cases, the Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak 
van de Raad van State), supports this view.497 The last point put forward is 
that in addition to Article 1F, Article 3 ECHR is also taken into consideration 
during the assessment which provides a sufficient guarantee that all aspects 
are taken into consideration in the decision-process. 
The exclusion before inclusion practice that is currently still applicable in the 
Netherlands is not in accordance with the UNHCR’s line of thought which 
believes that ‘the exceptional nature of Article 1F suggests that inclusion 
should generally be considered before exclusion, but that there is no rigid 
formula’.498 According to this organisation, ‘looking at inclusion before 
496 Also persons who did not fall under Article 1F and would qualify for a refugee status 
on the basis of Article 1A of the Refugee Convention could still be refused admission 
on grounds under Article 15 (2). This is because the State Secretary has the power to 
make an exception on the policy of admitting an alien as a refugee to the country. 
497 In its judgment of 8 April 1991, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division found 
that the serious character of Article 1F makes it necessary to find out first whether 
the Refugee Convention is applicable before looking at the question whether there 
is a matter of persecution in the sense of the Convention. See also Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 27 October 2003, No. 200305116/1 
(JV 2003/555) and 4 September 2002, JV 2002/358 in which the court ruled that 
the UNHCR Handbook as well as the Guidelines on the application of Article 1F 
do not contain rules which bind the authorities and would lead to a change in their 
procedure.  
498 In 1998, the UNHCR wrote a letter to the Dutch authorities in which the organisation 
plead for ‘inclusion before exclusion’, UNHCR’s views on the application of Article 
1F of the 151 Refugee Convention: Comments on the letter of the State Secretary 
of Justice to the House of Representatives, dated 28 November 1997 (document 
630201/97/DVB), dated March 1998, NAV 1998, pp. 5-6. 
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exclusion may often be helpful as it prevents unnecessary consideration 
of Article 1F in cases where non-inclusion arises and enables a fuller 
understanding of the circumstances and international protection concerns of 
family members to be addressed. Exclusion may exceptionally be considered 
without particular reference to inclusion issues where there is an indictment 
by an international criminal tribunal; in cases where there is apparent and 
readily available evidence pointing strongly towards the application’s 
involvement in particularly serious crimes, notably in prominent Article 1F 
(c) cases; and at the appeal stage in cases where exclusion is the question at 
issue’.499 
§ 5.2.2 The Sison-case 
The first high-profile case referring to Articles 1F of the Refugee Convention 
and 15 (2) of the Aliens Act concerns Jose Maria Sison, who was Chairman 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines 
(CPP) from 26 December 1968 to 10 November 1977, on which date he 
was arrested by the dictatorial regime of Marcos and detained until 5 
March 1986. He has lived in the Netherlands since 1987. He was granted a 
residence permit as he worked as a research consultant at Utrecht University, 
until he applied for political asylum in 1988. The asylum application was 
refused pursuant to Article 1F by decision of 13 July 1990 after which Sison 
submitted a request for reconsideration of his case. As no action was taken on 
this request within the three-month period provided for in Article 34 (2) of 
the Aliens Act, the request was considered as rejected. Sison made an appeal 
to the Judicial Division of the Council of State500 against this fictive rejection 
which nullified the decision of the State Secretary of Justice. According to 
the court, the State Secretary did not sufficiently show which supposed acts 
of Sison led to the exclusion under clause 1F (c). 
On 26 March 1993, the State Secretary again rejected Sison’s request for 
reconsideration of his case which was this time based on Article 1F (a) and 
(b). The main arguments for the rejection were that: 
•	  it appeared from a letter of the Internal Security Service (Binnenlandse 
Veiligheidsdienst) of 3 March 1993 that Sison was the chairman and 
leader of the CPP at that time. Furthermore, that the military arm of the 
CPP, the New People’s Army (NPA), fell under the CPP and, therefore, 
under Sison; 
•	 The Internal Security Service had ascertained that Sison was in fact in 
charge of the NPA and that the NPA - and those connected to it, were 
responsible for a great number of terrorist acts in the Philippines;
499 UNHCR Background Note 2003, para. 100. 
500 From 1 April 1994 on, the Judicial Division of the Council of State is changed into the 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State. 
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The State Secretary also pointed out the purge that took place in 1985 
among the CPP and NPA of which an estimated 800 members of these 
organisations were murdered without due process. Above all, according to 
the State Secretary, the Internal Security Service, had ascertained that the 
CPP/NPA maintained contacts with terrorist organisations over the whole 
world and there were also observations of personal contacts between Sison 
and representatives of similar organisations. Furthermore, it was stated as 
an alternative in the decision that even if Sison was eligible for protection 
under the Refugee Convention, he would still be refused admission for the 
sake of protecting the interests of the State, in particular in relation to its 
responsibilities to other countries. 
Sison appealed to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division which nullified the 
decision of 26 March 1993.501 The highest court stated that the mentioned 
materials made it very assumable that in the period of the contested decision, 
Sison indeed was the chairman and leader of the CPP; they also justify 
the conclusion that the NPA was under the CPP; that Sison tried to give 
direction to the NPA while he was residing in the Netherlands and that the 
NPA was responsible for a great number of terrorist acts in the Philippines. 
However, the court did not find the material offered sufficient evidence to 
substantiate the fundamental judgment that Sison had given direction and 
carried responsibilities for such activities so that Article 1F should to be 
applied. Consequently, the court ruled that the State Secretary on the basis 
of the above-mentioned material could not deny Sison the protection of the 
Refugee Convention. Moreover, it was decided that the general interest of 
Dutch society could not be a reason for refusing Sison admission as he would 
face the risk of undergoing treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR upon his 
return to the Philippines. What the court actually said with this judgment is 
that in a situation where a person is exposed to a danger as in the scope of 
Article 3, other interests should not be considered and the person cannot 
be removed. This does not prejudice the possibility to expel the person to 
another country where his admission would be guaranteed.
The answer of the State Secretary came in a decision of 4 June 1996 in which 
admission to the country was again refused on grounds of general interests of 
the state.502 Although the State Secretary ordered Sison to voluntarily leave 
the Netherlands, at the same time the State Secretary decided that Sison 
would not be removed to the Philippines as long as he fears persecution in 
the sense of the Refugee Convention or treatment which will breach Article 
501 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 21 February 1995, App. 
No. R02.93.2274.
502 Decision of 4 June 1996, reference Immigration and Naturalisation Service: 
8702.16.0027. 
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3 ECHR. No other country was willing to admit Sison and as Article 3 does 
not entail a right to stay in the Netherlands, in practice this decision meant 
that he would be living as an ‘illegal’ without a status. It was for the first 
time that the practice of ‘no removal and no admission’ was used.503 Sison 
appealed against the State Secretary’s decision to refuse admission, but 
by order of 11 September 1997, this appeal was dismissed.504 Though the 
district court confirmed the practice of ‘no removal and no admission’ which 
was created, the State Secretary stated that such a situation is in general 
undesirable and should be restricted to exceptions. Currently, Sison is still 
residing in the Netherlands. Officially he must leave the country but, at the 
same time, the authorities cannot remove him on the basis of Article 3 of the 
ECHR.505 
§ 5.2.3 Policy document of 1997
Though the Sison-case is the first high-profile case concerning the 
application of Article 1F of the Refugee Convention in the Netherlands, the 
provision draw the attention of political life at the end of the 1990s regarding 
a group of Afghan asylum seekers. The first influx of Afghan asylum seekers 
who came to the Netherlands between 1978 and 1992 were mainly students 
and intellectuals who fled their country because of the repression of the 
regimes collaborating with the Soviets. After the Mujahidin took over power 
in 1992, heads of the communist regime, such as ministers, generals, KhAD/
WAD-officials who were the oppressors of the first influx asylum seekers, 
fled abroad, including to the Netherlands. The fact that these persons were 
seen as victims by the Dutch authorities and no critical admission policy was 
applied to them led to unrest among other Afghan refugees. At the end of 
1994, the question was debated in the House of Representatives and it came 
to light that eight high officials of the former Afghan communist regime 
were residing in the Netherlands and that the State Secretary agreed that 
these persons, who had committed serious crimes, should not reside in the 
country. Furthermore, the State Secretary stated that if more information 
were to emerge, the matter would be further investigated. According to an 
article in the ‘Vrij Nederland’ news magazine, there were at least 35 leaders 
of the communist regime in Afghanistan residing in the Netherlands and 
503 Mus 1996.
504 District Court The Hague (REK) 11 September 1997, AWB 97/4707 (Sison III) (RV 
1997, 9 includes annotation from B.P. Vermeulen).
505 Sison did not receive residency under the general pardon of 2007 either, which the 
highest court found to be a correct decision Administrative Jurisdiction Division 
of the Council of State 12 May 2011, App. No. 201006689/1/V1. See also 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 29 January 2014, App. 
No. 201208507/1/A3. This case concerned a request from Sison to the mayor of 
Utrecht for a travel document for refugees. This was refused and confirmed by the 
highest court on appeal. 
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nothing had been done to investigate the matter.506 After the publication of 
the article, parliamentarians questioned the State Secretary regarding the 
matter,507 who eventually produced a document which established the policy 
framework concerning the application of Article 1F.508
 
In addition to what the State Secretary said about the assessment of Article 
15 of the Aliens Act as prescribed above, the State Secretary stated that 
given the consequences of Article 1F, the provision should be interpreted 
restrictively. In other words, that it should be applied only after a careful 
examination and thorough motivation has been carried out. Other relevant 
principles stated by the State Secretary were that:
•	 When the available information regarding the function of the person 
concerned; his activities; type of organisation where he worked as well 
as the political situation in the country of origin leads to Article 1F, there 
will be no hesitation to apply the provision. Moral and legal obligations 
of the State to prevent serious crimes do not match with accepting aliens, 
who committed these crimes, as refugees;
•	 She will make us of her power to declare persons to whom Article 1F is 
applied, as undesirable aliens and inform the Public Prosecution Service 
of the exclusion.509 It is emphasised that criminal prosecution is not 
necessary for the application of Article 1F;
•	 The exclusion ground under Article 1F (c): He has been guilty of acts 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations will not be 
used as an independent ground, but mostly in combination with Article 
1F (a);
•	 The personal and knowing participation test which has been developed 
in Canadian case law for the examination of complicity by being a 
member of an organisation is useful for Dutch practice.510 This means, 
for example, those cases where a person, whether highly placed or not, 
has been involved in a particularly cruel organisation and was aware of 
sharing a mutual goal with his colleagues, has an involvement in the acts, 
even though he did not commit them himself. There is an exception for 
individuals who can prove on the basis of their activities that they had 
dissociated themselves from the acts of the organisation. This test will be 
explored later on in the chapter;
506 Vrij Nederland is a weekly news magazine. The article in question was titled: ‘Het 
barst hier van de oorlogsmisdadigers’, 22 February 1997.
507 Appendix to the Proceedings (Aanhangsel van de Handelingen) 1996/97, No. 920.
508 House of Representatives 1997/98, 19637, No. 295 (Letter from the State Secretary of 
Justice). 
509 See Van Eik 2008, pp. 4-11.
510 See footnote 239. 
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•	 A person who is excluded on the basis of Article 1F will not receive a 
provisional residence permit based on the general situation in the country 
of origin;
•	 Family members can apply for asylum on their own records and in the 
case of a refugee status being granted to a family member, a 1F applicant 
is not eligible for a derivative status. It is also not possible for a 1F 
applicant to be admitted on the basis of family reunification/formation 
or Article 8 ECHR; 
•	 As was already shown in the Sison-case, when Article 3 ECHR prohibits 
removal from the Netherlands, this does not entail a right to stay in the 
country. 
§ 5.2.4 New Aliens Act 2000 
Besides the great interest for Article 1F at the end of the 1990s, the asylum 
policy in the Netherlands in general received a lot of attention too. This had, 
inter alia, to do with the large number of asylum applications. In 1998, the 
number of applications increased to 45.217, which made the Netherlands 
one of the European countries with the highest number of applications per 
year. In the same year, a new government was formed which announced that 
the Aliens Act would be amended, focusing on among others, a faster asylum 
procedure. On 1 April 2001, the New Aliens Act 2000 entered into force 
and replaced the Aliens Act 1994 in its entirety.511 Together with the new 
Act, also the Aliens Decree (Vreemdelingenbesluit) and Aliens Regulations 
(Voorschrift Vreemdelingen) came into effect. The Aliens Circular was 
drawn up on the basis of these regulations, which consists of policy rules 
and general directions for all officials who deal with the implementation of 
the Aliens laws. Unless indicated otherwise in the Aliens Act, the General 
Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht) also applies to 
proceedings on admission and residence. 
With the Aliens Act 2000, one residence permit for asylum was introduced 
for all asylum related grounds. The permit is initially issued for a period of five 
years after which a permit for an indefinite period of time can be obtained.512 
Article 29 (1) (a) of the Aliens Act states that ‘a residence permit for a specific 
time limit can be granted to the alien who is a refugee as stated in Article 1 
of the Refugee Convention’.513 However, when a person falls under Article 
511 See Scheltema 2006 <https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/voorbereiding-nul-
meting-evaluatie-vreemdelingenwet-2000.aspx> (last accessed on 21 September 2015). 
512 Article 28 (2) of the Aliens Act 2000.
513 In total, 6 grounds for admittance were laid down in Article 29 of the Aliens Act. With 
effect from 1 January 2014, the grounds of national protection for humanitarian reasons 
and national protection for special categories are deleted. Besides the refugee status, the 
refoulement risk; family reunion and extended family reunion are still present.
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1F, he becomes ineligible for a residence permit under Article 29 (1) (a). 
Pursuant to Article 3.107 of the Aliens Decree, the person concerned can 
neither be granted a residence permit on any of the other grounds referred to 
in Article 29 (1) of the Aliens Act. 
§ 5.2.4.1 Grounds for refusal of asylum
The Netherlands fully participates in harmonising its domestic legislation 
with EU asylum Directives which means that the Directives of the first-
phase as well as the recasts are implemented in its domestic legislation. 
Before the implementation of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive 
in national legislation on the 20th of July 2015, Articles 30 and 31 of the 
Aliens Act contained the grounds for refusal of an asylum application. From 
this date on, Article 30 is replaced by four new provisions.514 The current 
Article 30 prescribes that an asylum application is not considered when 
another country is responsible for handling the application. The following 
provisions contain grounds in which the State Secretary may declare an 
application to be inadmissible (30a); manifestly unfounded (30b); or to 
discontinue the examination (30c). Under the circumstances which are laid 
down in Article 30b (1), the State Secretary may consider the case to be 
manifestly unfounded. This means that the occurrence of a situation as in 
paragraph 1 does not automatically lead to a rejection, but it does place a 
heavier burden of proof on the asylum seeker who has to make plausible that 
he needs protection. It is relevant to mention within the context of Article 1F 
of the Refugee Convention that Article 30b (1) (j) contains the ground for 
constituting a danger to public order or national safety. According to Article 
31 (1), an asylum application will be rejected as unfounded in case the alien 
has not made it plausible that his application is grounded on circumstances, 
which on its own, or in connection with other facts, constitutes a legal ground 
for the issuance of a permit.  It also follows from this general refusal ground 
that the it is up to the applicant to make plausible that his/her application is 
eligible for granting a permit on one of the grounds stated in Article 29 of 
the Aliens Act 2000. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of this provision prescribes 
that the applicant has to submit as soon as possible all the elements needed 
to substantiate the application for international protection and that in 
cooperation with the applicant, the Member State is responsible for assessing 
the relevant elements of the application.
514 Article 30 contained four mandatory refusal grounds and when one of these grounds 
applied, the application was denied. These grounds were that: another country is 
responsible for handling the application; the alien has already a lawful residence; as 
long as another procedure is in progress and the alien has a lawful residence on the 
basis of this procedure; when the alien on the basis of a takeover agreement will be 
transferred to a third country of earlier residence. 
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Under sections C2/5 to 7 of the Aliens Circular, Articles 30 to 31 are 
specified, in which Article 1F is dealt with under C2/7.10.2. Aspects such 
as the grounds of Article 1F, burden of proof and responsibility with a focus 
on child soldiers, Article 3 ECHR and also the family members of persons to 
whom the provision is applied are discussed.
The examination of an asylum application which is carried out by the 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst, 
IND)515 can briefly be stated as following: 
After the review of the case against the refusal grounds as laid down in the 
Aliens Act, it is first considered whether there are serious reasons to believe 
the asylum seeker has committed a crime within the meaning of Article 1F. 
If this question is affirmative, the denial of the asylum application will be 
based upon Article 31 (1) in conjunction with 30b (1) (j) of the Aliens Act. 
This means that the person is not eligible for protection under the Refugee 
Convention and consequently no residence permit will be granted on the 
basis of Article 29 (1) (a) of the Aliens Act. If the answer to the question 
is negative, it will be considered whether the asylum seeker falls under one 
of the categories under Article 29 (1) or if there are other reasons based on 
Article 30b (1) of the Aliens Act which can lead to refusal of the application. 
Though the asylum seeker has to substantiate his claim for protection , when 
it concerns the application of Article 1F, it is the duty of  the authorities to 
prove that there are ‘serious reasons’, according to which it is assumes the 
person has committed one of the crimes prescribed under its limbs. Further 
explanations regarding the grounds for exclusion are given in the Aliens 
Circular.516 With regard to the crimes stated under clause (a) alliance is sought 
with the definitions as laid down in the Rome Statute and used by the ICC. 
Further, certain crimes are summed up which are by definition considered to 
be serious non-political crimes in the sense of Article 1F (b), namely: murder, 
killing and rape; war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, genocide and 
crimes, which fall within the description of any international instrument, 
which excludes the political offence exception or the status of refugee.517 The 
last exclusion ground clause (c) was not used as an independent exclusion 
ground until 2006 and has been used very rarely. Acts against the purposes 
and principles of the UN are activities specifically identified as such by the 
UN Security Council or General Assembly, as well as the International 
Court of Justice. In addition, crimes which have been made punishable by the 
515 The IND is part of the Ministry of Justice where the State Secretary is responsible for 
immigration issues. 
516 C2/7.10.2.1 - C2/7.10.2.3.
517 With regard to clause (b) also attention is paid to the question when a crime is 
considered to have a political character and also to purely political offences directed 
to the State such a high treason and interference with elections, which do not lead to 
exclusion. 
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Rome Statute towards the ICC are also against the principles and purposed 
of the UN. The Circular also explains that Article 1F (c) should be used for 
high-level functionaries or persons who were responsible for the carrying 
out activities falling under clause (c) which means that persons working for 
a state entity had to be active at a level that they were aware of the position 
their state occupied within the international community or they must be 
aware of the purposes and principles of the UN because of their personal 
background. The latter approach also counts for non-state actors.518 
§ 5.2.4.2 Burden of proof
The basic principle regarding the burden of proof is that an individual 
assessment has to take place for each asylum seeker. In case of assumptions 
of a possible 1F application, the file is referred to the IND’s specialised 
1F-unit which is responsible for investigating and deciding on such cases. 
This burden of proof does not meet the standard of proof as used in criminal 
law but has to be motivated carefully. When the 1F-unit believes that there 
are serious reasons for Article 1F to apply to the alien, it is then up to the 
person in question to give a reasoned refutation of the assumption. The 
decision whether a person meets the conditions under Article 1F is based 
on the ‘personal and knowing participation test’, thus if the person knew 
or must have known about the criminal offence and whether he personally 
participated in a certain manner.519 
According to the Circular,520 knowing participation is present when:
a) The alien was employed by an organ or organisation which, according to 
influential reporting has committed in a systematic or widespread manner 
crimes set out in Article 1F during the time period of his employment 
unless he can prove to be a  significant exception; 
b) The alien was employed in an organisation of which the Minister 
has determined that certain categories of persons belonging to that 
organisation will be considered to fall under Article 1F unless they can 
prove themselves to be  a significant exception;
c) An alien has participated in activities, which he knew or should have 
known, were activities as set out in Article 1F. 
Personal participation is present when:
a) It is apparent that the alien had personally committed a crime as set out 
in Article 1F;
b) A crime as set out in Article 1F has been committed under the order or 
responsibility of the alien;
518 Rikhof 2012, pp. 362-363. 
519 See Wijngaarden 2008 for more on the question of evidence in 1F applications.
520 See C2/7.10.2.4.
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c) The alien has facilitated crimes as set out in Article 1F in the sense that 
his commission or omission has contributed substantially to the crime;521
d) The alien belonged to a category of persons within an organisation, of 
which the Minister has determined that certain categories of persons 
belonging to that organisation will be considered to fall within the scope 
of Article 1F unless he can prove to be a significant exception.
Within the context of the burden of proof it should be noted that the defence 
of superior orders, duress and self-defence which may take away liability 
are set out in the Circular522 and those below the age of fifteen are not held 
responsible for acts as prescribed under Article 1F and consequently, this 
provision is not held against them.523 In case of child soldiers between the 
ages of fifteen to eighteen, several circumstances such as, the age of the child 
at the moment of joining the army, consequences when refusing to join the 
army and the forced use of drugs and/or medication are taken into account 
for the assessment of a knowing participation.524  
§ 5.2.5 Post-exclusion phase
As expressed earlier, an Article 1F application leads to no residence permit 
for asylum being issued based on one of the other grounds under Article 29 
of the Aliens Act 2000. Additionally, Article 3.77 (1) (a) of the Aliens Decree 
prescribes that a person who falls within the scope of Article 1F of the 
Refugee Convention will not receive consideration for a regular residence 
permit either. Thus, the path for claiming a right to stay in the Netherlands 
seems to be closed for the 1F applicant. When it turns out in retrospect that 
Article 1F has erroneously not been applied to an alien, an issued residence 
permit can still be withdrawn or not renewed.525 Before such a decision is 
taken, the alien must first be given the opportunity to react to the findings.526 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Benefit Entitlement (Residence Status) Act 
(Koppelingswet) and Article 10 of the Aliens Act an alien who does not have 
lawful residence in the Netherlands is not entitled to any benefits in kind, 
facilities and social security benefits issued by decision of an administrative 
authority. Derogation is possible if the entitlement is related to education, 
the provision of care that is medically necessary, the prevention of situations 
521 A substantial contribution means: ‘which had a factual effect on the commission of 
the crime and which would likely not have taken place if nobody had fulfilled the role 
of the person concerned or if the person concerned had taken the opportunity to 
prevent the crime’. 
522 C2/7.10.2.5.
523 Kloosterboer 2008, pp. 430-437.
524 See District Court The Hague 4 May 2005, AWB 04/22429; 12 January 2006, AWB 
05/7166 and 17 February 2005, AWB 04/23019. 
525 Article 32 of the Aliens Act 2000.
526 See C13 of the Aliens Circular. 
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that would jeopardise public health or the provision of legal assistance to the 
alien. According to Article 45 (1) of the Aliens Act, refusal to grant asylum 
entails that the person is required to leave the Netherlands voluntarily and, 
if he does not do so on his own will, will be removed by the authorities. To 
facilitate expulsion, aliens can be held in aliens’ detention. The Aliens Act 
2000 allows, on the one hand, for the detention of irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers at the border to prevent them from formally entering the 
territory (Article 6) and, on the other hand, for the detention of those who 
have already entered the Netherlands, such as rejected asylum seekers (Article 
59). Special detention centres are in use for the administrative detention of 
aliens whose detention can last for six months and extended with another 
maximum of twelve months.527 Though a rejection basically means the 
removal of a person, in practice this is often not realizable for several reasons, 
inter alia, if the alien does not have the required documents to leave or if it 
amounts to the violation of Article 3 ECHR. When the latter is the case, it is 
up to the asylum seeker to make a reasonable case for the fear of a real risk of 
exposure to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in his 
home country. If the alien manages to do this, it does not entail a right to stay 
in the Netherlands and he remains under the obligation to leave the country 
voluntarily. Though aliens who cannot leave the country because of Article 
3 ECHR will not be expelled by the authorities as long as the reasons for it 
exist, they are considered as illegal residents who do not have the right to stay 
in a reception centre or make use of other basic facilities as stated above. This 
leads to distressing situations for prolonged periods of time.528 Within this 
context, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR)529 has given two 
decisions in cases instigated against the Netherlands. The decisions are the 
result of a collective complaint which came from the Conference of European 
Churches concerning the fundamental social rights of undocumented 
adults530 and the European Federation of National Organisations working 
with the Homeless which dealt with the homeless and access to shelter.531 
527 This maximum period of aliens’ detention is in accordance with the EU Returns 
Directive. 
528 See Reijven and Van Wijk 2012, pp. 26-30 and 2014 pp. 259-263, who deal with 
the consequences of Article 1F in the post-exclusion phase, especially in case of ‘no 
removal, no admission’. 
529 This Committee rules on the conformity of the situation in states with the European 
Social Charter which was adopted in 1961, the 1988 Additional Protocol and the 
Revised European Social Charter of 1996. The Charter is a Council of Europe treaty 
which was established to support the ECHR which is principally for civil and political 
rights, and to broaden the scope of protected fundamental rights to include social 
and economic rights. Certain organisations are entitled to lodge complaints with the 
Committee which examines the complaint and, if the formal requirements have been 
met, declares it admissible.
530 Adoption: 1 July 2014, Complaint No. 90/2013. 
531 Adoption: 2 July 2014, Complaint No. 86/2012. 
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Under the European Social Charter, homeless persons are those who legally 
do not have at their disposal a dwelling or another form of adequate housing in 
terms of Article 31 (1). In light of the Committee’s established case law, shelter 
must also be provided to adult migrants in an irregular situation, even when 
they are requested to leave the country and even though they may not require 
that long-term accommodation in a more permanent housing be offered to 
them. In its decisions, the Committee recalls that the right to emergency shelter 
and to other emergency social assistance is not limited to those belonging 
to vulnerable groups, but extends to all individuals in a precarious situation 
pursuant to their human dignity. The ECSR considers that the legislation and 
practice of the Netherlands fails to ensure access to community shelter for 
the purpose of preventing homelessness. It finds that the practical and legal 
measures denying the right to emergency assistance accordingly restrict the 
right of adult migrants in an irregular situation and without adequate resources 
in the Netherlands in a disproportionate manner which leads to the violation 
of Articles 13 (4) and 31 (2)532 of the Charter.533 The ECSR’s decisions are 
not binding but can be seen as authoritative interpretations which are of 
importance in procedures before national courts.534 
The next step in the procedure after the Committee’s decision is that the report 
on the matter is forwarded to the Committee of Ministers which has to adopt 
a resolution. Though such a resolution is not binding either, the Committee of 
Ministers may urge the state to improve its monitoring of the implementation 
of the resolution and ask the government to inform it of the action taken. 
The Dutch authorities found that the ECSR’s interpretation was contrary 
to the Charter in view of paragraph 1 of its appendix which limits the 
Charter’s scope to alien’s who have a lawful stay in the state or work in the 
state concerned. The State Secretary expressed not to change anything 
in the current legislation and policy until a resolution was adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers regarding the matter.535 In the meantime, the Central 
532 In a previous decision which concerned children unlawfully present in the Netherlands, 
27 October 2009, DCI v. the Netherlands, Complaint No. 47/2008 (NJCM 2010 
includes annotation from A. Buyse) the ESCR had also ruled that the situation in the 
Netherlands constituted a violation of Article 31 (2). According to the Committee, 
‘State Parties are required, under Article 31 (2), to provide adequate shelter to children 
unlawfully present in their territory for as long as they are in their jurisdiction. Any 
other solution would run counter to the respect for their human dignity and would not 
take due account of the particularly vulnerable situation of children’. 
533 In the case relating to complaint no. 86/2012, the Committee found that Articles 13 
(1), 19 (4) (c) and 30 of the Charter were also violated. 
534 The Central Appeals Tribunal 21 July 2006, App. No. 03-3332 ANW.
535 Letter from the State Secretary of Justice to the House of Representatives dated 18 
December 2014, ref. 599478.
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Appeals Tribunal (for the public service and for social security matters)536 
gave two judgments in provisional relief cases involving the decisions of the 
ECSR. The municipality of Amsterdam has been instructed to immediately 
offer a number of homeless aliens who have exhausted all legal means food, 
shelter and clothing (known in Dutch as ‘bed, bad en brood regeling’).537 
Also the District Court The Hague538 took the Committee’s decisions into 
consideration and ruled that denying an asylum seeker who has exhausted all 
legal procedures access to any type of accommodation, food and clothing, 
infringes on the respect for human dignity in such a way that makes the normal 
development of private life impossible: on the basis of Article 8 ECHR, the 
state has the obligation to offer applicant food, shelter and clothing.539 The 
State Secretary expressed the intention to lodge an appeal against the district 
court’s judgment and promised to carry out the court’s judgment pending 
the appeal.540 The answer where the authorities were waiting for came at the 
15th of April 2015 with the Committee of Ministers’ adopted Resolution 
CM/ResChS(2015)5.541 Though one hoped that the resolution would bring 
clarity to the situation, the Committee did not make a clear recommendation 
to the Dutch government. It only requested the government to report on any 
possible developments on the issue. Though the governing parties differ in 
thoughts on the matter, they eventually agreed to temporarily maintain the 
basic necessary help to illegal asylum seekers who have exhausted all legal 
means with the restriction that it will be centralized and provided by only 
five large cities and the asylum seekers’ centre in Ter Apel.542
536 The Central Appeals Tribunal (for the public service and for social security matters) 
is the English translation of Centrale Raad van Beroep. 
537 Central Appeals Tribunal 17 December 2014, App. Nos. 14/5507 WMO-VV, 
14/5453 WMO-VV, 14/5444 WMO-VV.
538 District Court The Hague 23 December 2014, AWB 14/18686.
539 See also the same court’s judgment of 8 September 2015, AWB 15/1924 in which 
is reiterated that the right to private life on the basis of Article 8 ECHR can under 
circumstances impose obligations on a state in order to safeguard that right. The 
court expressed that though the decisions of the ECSR are not binding, they are 
significant for the interpretation of provisions of the ECHR, including Article 8. The 
applicant in this case did not have a legal stay in the country, was not able to support 
oneself and not entitled to social service benefits either. The court considers her to be 
part of the group as decided on by the Committee which makes that withholding her 
from food, shelter and clothing leads to a violation of Article 8 ECHR. With regard 
to the government’s argument about the scope of the Charter, the court finds that the 
Committee has discerned this and accepted an exception for this situation. 
540 Appendix to the Proceedings, 2014/15, No. 1015.
541 Resolution CM/ResChS(2015)5 Conference of European Churches v. the Netherlands, 
Complaint No. 90/2013.
542 See § 8.3.2 for more on this issue. 
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In addition to the fact that the excluded asylum seeker is not entitled to any 
rights, it was practice that he was declared an undesirable alien, entailing 
the imposition of an exclusion order which aims to prevent the 1F applicant 
from obtaining protection in the Netherlands. Thus, while the alien 
cannot be expelled due to refoulement, his residence in the country is made 
punishable by law.543 In accordance with its discretionary powers, the Public 
Prosecution Service decides in each individual case whether to prosecute or 
not. If it does, the alien risks being put into custody for a maximum period 
of six months or a maximum fine of EUR 8,100.544 There has been a change 
since the implementation of the Returns Directive in national legislation 
in December 2011. A heavy entry ban545 instead of an exclusion order 
is now imposed on aliens without a lawful stay and who are considered 
to be a danger to public order/safety (including those to whom Article 1F 
applies). The latter is now applicable to EU citizens who find themselves in 
the same situation.546 An alien who is subject to an entry ban cannot stay 
lawfully in the Netherlands and other EU countries for the duration of 
the ban. Violating the ban may, similarly as the exclusion order, lead to six 
months imprisonment or a fine of maximum EUR 7,800. An entry ban can 
be withdrawn ex officio or upon request of the alien concerned in the case 
where the alien makes demonstrable that he left the Netherlands and is not 
residing in another EU country. In the situation of an excluded asylum seeker 
who cannot return to his home country, it will be a difficult task to fulfil the 
criteria to lift the ban.547 An exclusion order may also be lifted upon request 
of the alien concerned, when there are special facts and circumstances which 
make the alien’s interest prevail over the public interest. In a case where the 
alien refers to Article 3 ECHR for revocation, the IND examines whether 
refoulement is a sustainable obstacle and, if so, whether the consequences for 
the alien of maintaining the exclusion order would be disproportional when 
weighed up against the interest of the Dutch State. The term ‘sustainable 
obstacle’ assumes a similar period of ten years as used in the durability and 
proportionally-test (De duurzaamheids- en proportionaliteitstoets) which will 
be discussed in the following paragraph. Eligibility for an eventual residence 
permit may arise during this test when withholding a residence permit is 
considered to be disproportional. 
543 Boeles 2008, pp. 396-402.
544 Article 197 of the Criminal Code. 
545 An entry ban counts normally for a period of max. 5 years, while a heavy entry ban is 
imposed for a period between the five and twenty years depending on the situation. 
546 See Boeles 2010, pp. 531-537.
547 According to data from the State Secretary of Justice, around 90 excluded aliens were 
imposed a heavy entry ban in 2013; see House of Representatives 2014/2015, 34000 
VI, No. 4. See also Research and Documentation Centre, ‘The fate of the entry ban’, 
(Het lot van het inreisverbod. Een onderzoek naar de uitvoeringspraktijk en gepercipieerde 
effecten van de Terugkeerrichtlijn in Nederland) The Hague, 2014. 
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§ 5.2.6 Durability and proportionality-test
According to section C2/7.10.2.6 of the Aliens Circular it is first to be judged 
whether a) Article 3 ECHR offers a sustainable obstacle against removal to 
the country of origin, and if so; b) whether a permanent denial of a residence 
title would be disproportionate in the particular circumstances of the case.  
The term ‘sustainable obstacle’ indicates that the alien has been living in the 
Netherlands for ten years without a permit in a ‘no removal, no admission 
situation’, in which a removal would lead to a breach of Article 3; that there 
is no prospect of change in the circumstances of the alien within a ‘not too 
long period of time’ and removal to another country than that of the country 
of origin is not possible, despite sufficient efforts by the alien to fulfill the 
obligation to leave the Netherlands.548 With regard to the latter situation, 
the IND expects the alien to undertake serious attempts to leave to another 
country with which he possibly has some bonding or has resided in the past.549 
When the question under section a) can be answered in the affirmative it is 
up to the alien to make a reasonable case for his situation which should be 
exceptional. On the basis of the information given by the alien, it will be 
assessed whether withholding a residence permit is disproportionate.550 
Though the principle in Dutch policy regarding Article 1F is that no 
residence permits will be issued to those who are excluded from asylum, an 
exception can be made in cases where the above described ‘durability and 
proportionality-test’ turns out positively for the alien.
The mentioned test has been introduced into the Aliens Circular in reaction 
to case law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of 
State of 2004.551 The highest administrative court did not specify a certain 
period of time which would identify the stay of the alien in such a situation 
as sustainable, but spoke about ‘a great number of years’. The period of ten 
years was first mentioned in the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs’ 
(Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken - ACVZ) advisory report of 2008552 
548 The period of ten years starts from the date of the first asylum application and the 
phrase ‘not too long period of time’ remains vague as it is not clear what it means. 
549 See letter from the IND, Department of Implementation policy (Uitvoeringsbeleid) to 
lawyer Ms. Van Eik, dated 27 August 2010. 
550 Sharma 2009, pp. 110-124. 
551 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 2 and 9 June 2004, App. 
Nos. 200308871/1 and 200308511/1 and reaffirmed in judgment of 18 July 2007, 
App. No. 200701663/1.
552 Advisory report from the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs: Article 1F of the 
Refugee Convention in the Dutch Immigration Law (Artikel 1F Vluchtelingenverdrag 
in het Nederlands Vreemdelingenrecht) The Hague, May 2008. The ACVZ is an 
independent committee that advises the Dutch Government and Parliament on 
immigration law and policy. The Committee was installed on 28 November 2001 as 
a result of the Aliens Act 2000. The advising report from the Committee on Article 
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and later on included in the Aliens Circular. Though the test seems to offer 
a way out for those who are residing illegally for quite a long period of time, 
the practice shows that it is difficult for an alien to meet the conditions and 
assumed to be in a special situation. According to recent data from the State 
Secretary it is unknown how often an appeal is made to the durability and 
proportionality-test, but up to April 2014 the authorities have accepted the 
excluded asylum seeker’s situation to be exceptional in 10 cases.553 
§ 5.2.7 Figures on 1F
To put the 10 cases (in which the excluded aliens succeeded the durability and 
proportionality-test) in a context it is relevant to have knowledge regarding 
the total numbers of 1F applications. The figures of the Ministry of Justice 
regarding 1F are based on data from the Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service Information System (INDIS) and the municipal personal records 
database. According to data published in a parliamentary report dated 14 
April 2014, around 870 aliens in total have been denied asylum on the 
basis of Article 1F from 1992 until 2013. In the year 2014, around 171 
investigations were carried out and 50 aliens were actually refused under 
Article 1F.554 These exclusions happened during the application for asylum 
or a regular procedure or based on a withdrawal of a permit. According to 
the State Secretary the top five nationalities were Afghans, Iraqis, Turks, 
Angolans and Iranians.555 It is important to note that these numbers only 
concern aliens who are excluded on the basis of Article 1F and not their 
family members. There are no recent data available regarding the position 
of family members.556 
With regard to the question how many excluded asylum seekers have left the 
Netherlands, a distinction can be made between the periods until 2008 and 
from 2009 onwards. 
According to data published in the 2008 policy paper regarding the 
application of Article 1F, of the about 700 persons who had been objected 
Article 1F, roughly 350 excluded asylum seekers were still residing in the 
Netherlands.557 The State Secretary assumes that this means that 350 aliens 
must have left the country. However, as the latter group includes aliens who 
1F dates from May 2008. It is to be noted that the Committee also issued an earlier 
report on 1F in 2001. 
553 House of Representatives 2013/14, 19 637, No. 1808. 
554 Letter from the State Secretary of Justice to the House of Representatives 3 March 
2015, No. 618655.
555 Idem, p. 15.
556 For more details regarding figures relating to family members until 2008 see Note 
concerning the application of Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, 6 June 2008 
(Notitie betreffende de toepassing van artikel 1F Vluchtelingenverdrag), pp. 5-9.
557 Ibidem.  
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left for an unknown destination and are not under governmental supervision, 
it is not known whether they have actually left the country. 
From January 2009 until March 2014, 250 excluded asylum seekers were 
removed from the caseload of the Repatriation and Departure Service 
(Dienst Terugkeer & Vertrek- DT&V) which coordinates the actual departure 
of foreign nationals without the right of residence in the Netherlands.558 With 
regard to around 190 aliens it is not known whether they have actually left 
the country as they have left for an unknown destination and are not under 
governmental supervision. From the 250 aliens, around 70 had an Article 3 
ECHR obstacle.559 
Though the aliens in whose case Article 3 was found to be an obstacle cannot 
be removed by the authorities, they still have a legal obligation to leave the 
country on their own. In practice it proves to be difficult to find a third country 
which is willing to receive them, which still maintains their situation of ‘no 
removal, no admission’.560 Those persons in whose case the non-refoulement 
principle is not at issue and who have exhausted all remedies also have the 
legal obligation to leave the Netherlands. Additionally, they may be forced to 
return and are required to cooperate with DT&V. The fact that these aliens 
are still in the country is due to different impediments, such as not having the 
right documents for removal or the fact that the alien or his home country is 
not cooperative for the repatriation. 
Formally, both categories have the option to request for a non-fault permit 
(Buitenschuldvergunning) which may be granted to aliens who, through no 
fault of their own, cannot leave the Netherlands. Such a permit can also be 
granted at the initiative of the authorities. In both cases, on the basis of a 
compelling recommendation from the DT&V, the IND assesses whether 
all conditions have been met. To obtain such a permit, the alien must 
demonstrate that the diplomatic representation of his country of origin or a 
third country does not provide him with documents to return. In its report 
on the non-fault policy, the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs states 
that ‘the permit is regarded by many as problematic and that the impression 
exists that it is virtually impossible to meet the conditions governing the 
558 <http://english.dienstterugkeerenvertrek.nl/About_us/> (last accessed on 21 September 
2015).  
559 It is from 2007 on that the authorities register figures on excluded asylum seekers 
who cannot be removed from the Netherlands due to refoulement. From 2007 till 
December 2013 on, this concerns a total of approximately 180 aliens. 
560 According to data from DT&V, from 1 January 2009 until 1 March 2014 on, less 
than 10 excluded asylum seekers who could not be removed due to refoulement have 
demonstrably left the Netherlands. It should be noted that in case of numbers which 
are less than five, in official records ‘less than ten’ is reported by DT&V. 
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granting of such a permit’.561 This particularly counts for those excluded 
asylum seekers in whose case refoulement plays a role: as the return to the 
home country is ruled out, finding a third country which will accept an alien 
to whom Article 1F is applied, is also very difficult. 
§ 5.2.8 Investigation and prosecution
All Article 1F cases are automatically sent to the National Public Prosecutors’ 
Office in order to assess whether a possible investigation and prosecution can 
take place. The assessment is done independently by the Public Prosecution 
Service, taking into consideration whether the Netherlands has jurisdiction 
on the matter and to what extent it is obliged to go over to prosecution.562 
When the Prosecutors’ Office believes there are possibilities for a criminal 
investigation, the file is sent to the Team for International Crimes (Team 
Internationale Misdrijven) which was set up in July 2003. The fact that the 
Public Prosecutor does not want to or cannot prosecute has no influence on 
the exclusion which is an administrative decision.
Though over the years, Article 1F has been applied to hundreds of persons, 
only a few are actually prosecuted. This has mainly to do with the difficulties 
in collecting evidence: often the alleged committed crimes took place some 
time ago and the witnesses are abroad.563 The State Secretary expressed 
that during the last ten years, fourteen persons have been prosecuted for 
involvement in international crimes. Out of these fourteen, 6 cases concerned 
Article 1F.564 With regard to these 1F cases, four cases led to a conviction;565 
in one case the alien was cleared of the charge of torture and other crimes 
against humanity and in another case the suspected alien passed away before 
the judgment of the court could be made. 
Besides prosecution and sentencing in the Netherlands, an excluded asylum 
561 Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs, Where there’s a will but no way (Waar een 
wil is, maar geen weg) The Hague, 1 July 2013.  
562 The International Crimes Act and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Courts are relevant within this perspective. 
563 See Swart 2008, pp. 424-427; Van der Vlugt & Van Zadelhoff 2013; Van Wijk 2011 
and Bolhuis & Van Wijk 2015.
564 These data are based on the Report Letters International Crimes (Rapportagebrief 
Internationale Misdrijven) which are yearly published by the Ministry of Justice. The 
last report letter is dated 29 June 2015, No. 649212. 
565 These include two Afghans who are convicted for torture; one Rwandese who was 
charged with committing war crimes during the genocide in Rwanda in April 1994 
and is sentenced to life imprisonment (Supreme Court 26 November 2013, App. 
No. 12/04592 (RvdW 2013/1442) and a Congolese citizen who was charged with 
committing torture in his home country and is sentenced to 2.5 years imprisonment 
(District Court Rotterdam 7 April 2004, App. No. 10/000050-03 Ars Aequi 
AA20040729 includes annotation from G.G.J. Knoops).
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seeker who fulfills certain criteria can be extradited; handed over to an 
International Criminal Tribunal or to the ICC566 or the other way round, 
suspects who are acquitted by a tribunal or the ICC who apply for asylum in 
the Netherlands may fall under Article 1F.567
§ 5.2.9 Family members 
The general rule with regard to family members of an excluded asylum 
seeker is that in principle also family members (referring to spouse/partner/
underage and of age children) do not receive a residence permit due to public 
order policy as laid down in Articles 3.77 and 3.107 of the Aliens Decree.568 
However, there are exceptions to the rule as family members can apply for 
asylum on individual grounds. When one or more members of the family 
obtain a residence permit based on their own record, this does not mean that 
the excluded asylum seeker will be considered for a permit on the basis of 
Article 29 (2) of the Aliens Act. In this situation, Article 1F will also be held 
against the alien. In the case of family members, Article 8 ECHR also needs 
to be considered. Later on in this chapter, I will discuss the role of Article 
8 ECHR in Dutch case law regarding the exclusion clauses. At present, 
according to Dutch policy, the interests of public order in principle outweigh 
the interests of family life when it concerns Article 1F.569 
In 2008, a new section regarding family members of 1F applicants was added 
to the Aliens Circular.570 Thus, family members who have been staying in the 
Netherlands for a long, continuous period, will no longer be subject to the 
contraindication of Article 1F if they meet three conditions: 
a) counting from the first asylum request, they should have been resident in 
the Netherlands for at least ten years;
b) the mentioned residence has to be a continuous one and
c) the process of expulsion should not have been frustrated by the person 
concerned. 
566 As the Rome Statute uses the complementarily principle as a basis, the primary 
responsibility for prosecution and trying the suspect rests with the states. 
567 See also the case of the three Congolese who were summoned to come over to the ICC 
in order to testify against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chu who were 
suspected of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Congo, applied 
for asylum in the Netherlands and were objected Article 1F <http://verblijfblog.
nl/2014/05/08/getuige-bij-het-strafhof-of-asielzoeker-in-nederland/> (last accessed 
on 21 September 2015).  
568 See Bruin 2008, pp. 438-442. 
569 See ‘Note concerning the application of Article 1F of the Refugee Convention’, 6 June 
2008, p. 26.
570 C2/7.10.2.7.
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In the previous paragraphs, the Dutch legislation on Article 1F has been 
expounded. The changes in the Aliens Circular concerning, inter alia, the 
durability and proportionality-test and family members have been included 
to resolve the problems attached to the situation of in particular the excluded 
Afghan men (who served the KhAD/WAD) and their families. 
Though the application of Article 1F in the Netherlands does not solely 
concern these ex-KhAD/WAD members, (the State Secretary explained that 
to date Article 1F is held against more than fifty different nationalities of 
aliens) it is a fact that since the mid-1990s legislation and policy regarding 
1F in the Netherlands has been designed in view of the Afghans. In the 
following paragraphs, the situation of this group, which is still a topic of 
debate in politics, will be discussed in which attention will also be paid to 
the prosecution of excluded asylum seekers. The core of the matter on the 
KhAD/WAD group lies in an official report which at request of the Minister 
of Justice, was drawn up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The request was 
done to understand the nature and activities of the intelligence services and 
consequently define a policy on them. 
§ 5.3 The excluded ex-KhAD/WAD members
§ 5.3.1 Official report on the KhAD/WAD
Similar to the Aliens Act, this official report was produced in 2000. The focus 
in the report is on the KhAD, which was set up in 1980 and transformed into 
a Ministry in 1986, the WAD, which remained operational until the fall of 
the communist regime in 1992. The central question to be answered in the 
report was if and if so, which former Afghan intelligence services members, 
particularly those from the KhAD and the WAD, had violated human rights. 
According to the report, ‘all non-commissioned officers and officers were 
active in the macabre divisions of the KhAD/WAD and were personally 
involved in the arrest, interrogation and sometimes execution of suspected 
persons’.571 More specifically, the report states:
‘As already mentioned, all non-commissioned officers and officers violated 
human rights. Non-commissioned officers and officers could not function 
within the KhAD and the WAD when they did not demonstrate in concrete 
their unconditional loyalty to the communist regime. […] The first placement 
of non-commissioned officers and officers was in divisions of the KhAD/
WAD which were specifically engaged in tracking down ‘elements that posed 
571 Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Intelligence services in communist 
Afghanistan (1978-1992), AGSA, KAM, KhAD and WAD’, 29 February 2000, para. 
2.7. 
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a threat to the State’. The rotation system ensured that operatives changed 
divisions frequently. A promotion or placement in a division or board with 
a more administrative or technical character was only attainable for those 
who had sufficiently proved their mettle during the first placement (s). In 
practice, this means that all non-commissioned officers and officers of the 
KhAD and the WAD took part in interrogating and torturing of opponents 
of the communist regime whether alleged or not’.572 
The report also mentions that it is based on communications from the Dutch 
Embassy in Islamabad and that reports from the UN Special Reporter 
for Afghanistan, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the 
literature on Afghanistan under communist regime had also been used. 
As a result of the report of 2000, the burden of proof is reversed and the 
current rule regarding Article 1F is that all former non-commissioned 
officers and officers of the KhAD/WAD are assumed to have personally and 
knowingly participated, unless they can prove that a significant exception 
applies in their individual case.573 Such an exception can be accepted when 
the following three cumulative conditions are met: 1) the alien joined the 
KhAD/WAD as a lateral-entry officer which makes it plausible that he did 
not complete the officers’ training; 2) the alien did not rotate within the 
organisation and 3) the alien was not promoted during the term of service. 
In practice, the person to whom Article 1F is applied, is hard-pressed to meet 
the conditions as it rarely happens that an ex-KhAD member falls outside 
the scope of Article 1F due to his exceptional situation.574 
In 2007, the Dutch government issued a general pardon for aliens who had 
claimed asylum before 1 April 2001 (under the old Aliens Act), but those 
to whom Article 1F was applied did not fall under the agreement. The same 
counts with regard to the children of 1F applicants who live illegally in the 
Netherlands; they fall outside the scope of the children’s pardon for under-
age asylum seekers and their families (Kinderpardon), which took effect 
from February 2013 on.575 For a group of Afghans who are currently in 
572 Idem, para. 2.9. 
573 Besides the ex-KhAD/WAD members also certain members from the Hezb-i-Wahdat 
and non-commissioned officers and officers who served at certain departments of 
the Afghan police during the period 1978-1996 are assumed to have personal and 
knowing participation. This also counts for heads from the General Intelligence 
Service, Military Intelligence Service, Special Security Department and the Military 
Security Department from Iraq.   
574 The State Secretary expressed in March 2013 that he had knowledge of 2 cases during 
the last 13 years in which the excluded Afghan managed to prove his innocence. See 
Appendix to Proceedings, 2012/13, No. 1774.
575 In September 2014 a joint motion is proposed by four opposition parties in the 
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the situation of not being removed, but neither have the right for a lawful 
stay, the official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the source of 
their predicament. Over the years, several organisations have criticised the 
Dutch official report including the UNHCR which in 2008 came with its 
own ‘Note on the KhAD/WAD’. In the following, attention will be paid to 
the criticism expressed against the official report and the response from the 
Dutch government. 
§ 5.3.2 Criticism576 
§ 5.3.2.1 The UNHCR’s ‘Note on the KhAD/WAD’
It was a stirring year in 2008 regarding the issue of Article 1F: besides the 
publication of the ACVZ advisory report to the government577 and a new 
policy paper by the State Secretary, it was in May 2008 that the UNHCR 
published its ‘Note on the Structure and Operation of the KhAD/WAD 
in Afghanistan 1978-1992’. The purpose of the Note was to provide 
information within the context of assessing the eligibility for international 
protection for Afghan asylum seekers who were members of the KhAD/
WAD. The Note was prepared by the UNHCR using information gathered 
through research over the years 2001-2008, including interviews with 
persons who were associated with the KhAD/WAD at the time and 
discussions with Dr Giustozzi, who is a leading expert on Afghanistan and 
the KhAD/WAD in particular. 
Section V, titled ‘Rotation and promotion within the KhAD/WAD’, includes 
the following conclusions:
The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs report on the security services 
in Afghanistan during 1978-1992 states that “As a first assignment, NCOs 
and officers were posted to KhAD and WAD sections actively engaged in 
tracking down ‘elements that posed a threat to the State’.” Other sources 
affirm that this practice was limited to KhAD/WAD officers and NCOs 
of the Operational Directorates listed in paragraph 16 above, and that the 
term “tracking down”, when translated from Dari, means surveillance, 
information collection and investigation. The tasks of KhAD/WAD officers 
and NCOs in practice included these aspects, in as far as preliminary 
current House of Representatives (Socialist Party, ChristianUnion, Greenleft and 
Democrats 66) in order to change the position of children with a 1F-parent in relation 
to the children’s pardon which is rejected. See House of Representatives 2013/14, 
Proceedings II, No. 105.
576 A considerable part of this paragraph is based on my paper in Bahtiyar 2010, pp. 23-
30.
577 See Van Os-Van den Abeelen 2008, pp. 392-395.
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investigations were concerned. However, beyond preliminary investigations, 
interrogations and further prosecutions were the responsibility of officers 
working at the Directorate of Interrogation and in provincial interrogation 
units, and the Attorney General’s office. 
The UNHCR is not able to confirm that there was a systematic rotation 
policy inside KhAD/WAD. Sources consulted by the UNHCR affirmed that 
rotations within the KhAD/WAD structures were largely based on expertise 
and experience. In emergency situations, staff may have been shifted to work 
on a given operation, but within its area of expertise. Military personnel 
operated within its rank and levels of expertise. One expert stated that, in his 
view, there was no mandatory rotation; he believes that people could change 
jobs within the KhAD/WAD, but that it was not a rule or requirement. In 
the view of that source, such a rotation policy would have gone against any 
sense of professionalism within the institution. Other sources state that the 
activities of KhAD/WAD officers were regulated by a number of principles, 
one of which was confidentiality. For this reason, they believe that the KhAD/
WAD could not resort to a general rotation policy, as this would have risked 
disclosure of information from one Directorate to another. 
The fact that the UNHCR’s conclusions regarding the rotation system within 
the KhAD/WAD are at odds with those from the report of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, made NGOs and other organisations in the Netherlands 
doubt the correctness of the Ministry’s report and criticise its sources.578 
§ 5.3.2.2 Other critical arguments
Organisations such as the Dutch Section of the International Jurists, the 
Refugee Council in the Netherlands and Amnesty International argue for 
the revision of the official report of 2000. Amnesty International asserts 
that it has extensively reported on human rights violations in Afghanistan 
during the period 1978-1992, but that it could not demonstrate the guilt 
of all officers and non-commissioned officers in the KhAD/WAD or 
the existence of a rotation system as described in the Ministry’s report. 
Amnesty also commented on the fact that the Ministry’s report is based on 
anonymous sources.579 The sources used by the Ministry are also subject to 
other criticism: the public sources mentioned in the report do not contain 
578 Also in two judgments of Dutch district courts, a reference was made to the UNHCR’s 
Note and the correctness of the official report was considered to be doubtful. However, 
in appeal, these judgments are set aside by the highest administrative court which 
supports the official report. (District Court The Hague 18 February 2009, App. No. 
07/39347 and District Court The Hague 25 February 2009, AWB 08/11368),
579 Position paper on Article 1F of the Refugee Convention (1F Standpunt Amnesty 
International 2008).
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information supporting the conclusions of the report and the anonymous 
sources are not made public.580 Another point of concern for many which is 
related to the report is the far-reaching reversal of burden of proof. The fact 
that the excluded alien has to prove to be an exception which is practically 
impossible makes one question whether it can be said that an individual 
examination is carried out. 
The expressed critique against the report resulted in a motion being handed 
in by the Dutch Democrat party in which it requested the government to 
come up with a new, independent research regarding the report which for 
example could be carried out by the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust 
and Genocide Studies.581 The Afghan Parliament also became involved f 
in this issue and advised the Dutch government that the conclusions in its 
official report were unreliable and incorrect as the main sources classified 
as confidential originated from communications from the Dutch Embassy 
in Pakistan. According to the Afghan authorities these memoranda were 
based on false statements issued by the Pakistani military intelligence, 
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which had political reasons for doing 
so. Furthermore, ‘the fact that the Dutch representatives could not enter 
Afghanistan at that time and consequently could not hear people on their 
own authority, gave Pakistan the chance to select and instruct the sources in 
such a way that made the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs unambiguously 
declare the guilt of all non-commissioned officers and officers’.582 
 
§ 5.3.2.3 Response from the Dutch authorities
The UNHCR’s Note prompted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have 
consultations with the UNHCR Netherlands, Brussels and Kabul. In his 
letter to the House of Representatives of 2 October 2009, in which the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs gave an account of these meetings, he stated 
that the consultations in Kabul made clear that the UNHCR’s interviews 
did not aim to discuss the rotation system. According to the Minister of 
the day, the UNHCR did not carry out a specific research on the rotation 
system regarding the relevant period up to the issuance of the official report 
on 29 February 2000, but that it simply had not come across it in its contacts 
with the KhAD/WAD.583 Unlike the UNHCR, the Ministry did conduct a 
580 See Van Eik 2007. 
581 The motion was rejected as the coalition parties (Social Democratic Labour Party 
and People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) including a few other opposition 
parties voted against it, House of Representatives 2013/14, Proceedings II 19637, No. 
106. 
582 Letters from Mr. Qanooni (former chair of the Afghan Parliament) to the Dutch 
House of Representatives dated 5 August 2007, 22 May 2008 and 17 February 2009.
583 House of Representatives 2009/10, Proceedings II 27925 and 19637, No. 363. 
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specific research into the rotation system in that period, said the Minister.584 
The Dutch authorities consider the sources consulted after the publication 
of the official report to be unreliable or less reliable; due to the fact that the 
Dutch 1F policy is widely known, new sources which are to be consulted 
must be assumed to have a reason for and/or interest in presenting a certain 
impression of things, which entails the risk of using politically or otherwise 
motivated statements.585 The concluding statement of the Minister in his 
letter is that neither the UNHCR, nor the Ministry has been able to find 
reliable additional information regarding the rotation system which raises 
the question whether it is still possible to obtain such information. The 
authorities believe this is not the case and therefore stick to the correctness 
of the official report of 2000.586
§ 5.3.2.4 Current affairs regarding the Afghans
The problems entailed in the policy of the ex-KhAD/WAD members stir 
up the interest of many in the matter. Besides political parties, the Dutch 
Section of the International Jurists, the Refugee Council in the Netherlands, 
Amnesty International and the Afghan Parliament which I already 
mentioned, also the Union of Afghan Associations in the Netherlands (Unie 
van Afghaanse Verenigingen in Nederland)587 and several lawyers who assist 
1F applicants are critical regarding the official report. Furthermore, several 
solidarity groups which devote themselves to the cause of the Afghans have 
been founded and are active such as the ‘Foundation 1F’ (Stichting 1F) and 
‘Sign for Justice’ (Teken voor Rechtvaardigheid).588 Another group, which is 
supported by Defence for Children and Justitia et Pax is the ‘Committee, 
there is no such thing as a wrong child’ (Comité Foute Kinderen Bestaan Niet). 
This Committee calls for attention for the situation of children without a 
permit due to the fact that Article 1F is held against their fathers.589 
An interesting development to mention is the case of the former mayor of the 
Giessenlanden municipality (Mrs Els Boot) who ordered the police not to 
584 House of Representatives 2009/10, Proceedings II 27925, No. 377.
585 Ibidem.
586 The current State Secretary of Justice holds the same opinion regarding the report.
587 Contrary to the Union of Afghan Associations in the Netherlands, the Federation 
of Afghan Refugee Organisations in the Netherlands (Federatie van Afghaanse 
Vluchtelingen Organisaties in Nederland - FAVON) and Afghanistan Watch remain 
distant from the group of ex-KhAD/WAD members to whom article 1F is applied. 
The latter two organisations focus on the position of the victims under the former 
communist regime in Afghanistan and want to the Dutch authorities to be more 
active in the criminal prosecution of these men. 
588 <http://www.tekenvoorrechtvaardigheidinnederland.nl/publicaties.html> (last accessed 
on 21 September 2015).  
589 See Van Os & Goeman 2008, pp. 443-448.
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cooperate in the removal of an Afghan national to whom Article 1F applied. 
This led to the situation in which she and the Minister for Immigration, 
Integration and Asylum at the time had very different views on the matter. 
The person in question, Mr Naibzay, was excluded from asylum as being an 
ex-KhAD/WAD member and he had already been living in the Netherlands 
for over 13 years. His spouse and four children had received a residence 
permit and, according to the mayor, his removal would lead to social unrest 
in the community. In an open letter to the Minister, the mayor asked for 
attention to be given to the situation of Mr Naibzay and criticised the fact 
that he had to prove his innocence, which is practically impossible given that 
evidence is not accepted.590 The mayor sent a second letter to the Minister, 
which was signed by ten other mayors. This time, they requested attention 
for the 1F situation applying to Afghans in general. The mayors discussed 
the reversed burden of proof and the individual examination attached to this. 
They requested the Minister to consider the policy regarding the official 
report on the KhAD/WAD and to suspend removal proceedings of Afghan 
men to whom Article 1F is applicable.591 More municipalities expressed 
their support for the 1F applicants and a meeting between the mayors and 
the Minister took place. In the end, the action did not lead to much as it was 
concluded that in the case of a removal, the police fall under the exclusive 
authority of the Minister: a mayor cannot frustrate the action by appealing 
to the disturbance of the public order.592 
Mr Naibzay, who was the focus of interest in the dispute between the mayor 
and the Minister has now left the Netherlands. After an unlawful stay of 
fifteen years and no perspective for any change regarding his situation in 
the Netherlands, he received in August 2011 a residence permit to stay in 
Belgium. The fact that Mr Naibzay was never prosecuted for the acts which 
made him fall under 1F and Belgium does not confirm the KhAD/WAD 
policy of the Netherlands made it possible for him to receive a lawful stay in 
Belgium which is based
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the EU and EEA Member States as he is 
living there with his family members who are EU citizens.
This case is a good example showing the struggle between the government 
policy and the municipalities which eventually carry the burden of it. 
According to an administrative agreement between the government and the 
Association of Netherlands Municipalities, municipalities are forbidden to 
590 The mayor’s letter is dated 23 May 2011. 
591 The letter is dated 27 June 2011, <http://inlia.nl/uploads/File/1F%20Brief%2016%20
burgemeesters%20aan%20minister%20Leers%2027juni2011.pdf> (last accessed on 
21 September 2015).
592 House of Representatives 2012/13, Proceedings II 19637, No. 1588.
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provide care to those aliens who have an unlawful stay in the Netherlands.593 
This also counts for excluded asylum seekers, as they do not have a residence 
permit and are obligated to leave the country, even when refoulement 
is at stake. The reality is that the majority of these aliens do not leave the 
Netherlands and have to live somewhere. Those who have members of their 
family members in the host country can rely on them but others who do not, 
are dependent on emergency accommodation provided by charity institutions 
or the municipalities which are thus actually not allowed by the government 
to provide this. See also § 5.2.7 on the European Committee of Social 
Rights’ decisions ruled against the Netherlands in which the Committee 
considered that the legislation and practice of the Netherlands fails to ensure 
access to community shelter for the purpose of preventing homelessness. 
The practical and legal measures denying the right to emergency assistance 
restrict the right of adult migrants in an irregular situation and without 
adequate resources in the Netherlands in a disproportionate manner, which 
according to the Committee, leads to the violation of the European Social 
Charter.
Another case that is also worthwhile to state is the case of Feda Amiri 
who, after a stay of eighteen years in the Netherlands, was removed to 
Afghanistan on 5 January 2015. Similar to the Naibzay case, Amiri was 
an ex-KhAD/WAD member, who accompanied by his family, applied for 
asylum in 1996. Initially, all family members (including the father) received a 
residence permit. When they requested naturalisation in 2004, father Amiri 
was rejected under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention which is based on 
the 2000 official report, and led to the withdrawal of his permit. Amiri was 
never prosecuted for the acts which were enforced against him and as his new 
asylum request before removal was of no avail, he is actually removed and 
thus separated from his spouse and children who live in the Netherlands.594 
According to Amiri’s lawyer, his case is still pending at the ECtHR as he 
maintained his right to respect to his family life. 
Despite the efforts by many as explained under the foregoing paragraphs, 
the current situation regarding the ex-KhAD/WAD members remains 
unchanged. The official report is maintained and is supported by the highest 
administrative court in the Netherlands.595 The State Secretary will continue 
593 Administrative agreement between the State Secretary for Justice and the Association 
of Netherlands Municipalities regarding the policy on migration. (Bestuursakkoord 
tussen de Staatssecretaris van Justitie en de Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten inzake 
het vreemdelingenbeleid) The Hague, 25 May 2007.
594 ‘Is Amiri ten onrechte uitgezet’?, De Volkskrant (daily Dutch newspaper) 7 January 
2015. 
595 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 30 November 2004, 
App. No. 2004040081/1; 24 September 2009, App. No. 200901907/1/V1 (JV 
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with the same policy as his predecessors and stand by his opinion that an 
individual examination is carried out.596 
Over the years, much jurisprudence has been developed on Article 1F of 
which quite a lot concerns ex-KhAD/WAD members. Besides the initial 
appeals against the application decisions, several topics relating to Article 1F 
were discussed in proceedings. To give an idea of the administrative court’s 
rulings on 1F, the following paragraph will provide an overview of some 
relevant judgments. 
§ 5.4 Case law on 1F 
With the entry into force of the Aliens Act 2000, the Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State became the highest court for 
asylum cases. Therefore, appeals against decisions of the IND can be made 
to the district courts with a further appeal to the highest court. Since the new 
Aliens Act, the way of reviewing asylum cases has changed as courts carry 
out the ‘test of reasonableness’ (Marginale toetsing) instead of a full review. 
With this test, which is a limited judicial review, it is examined whether 
administrative powers have been exercised reasonably. Thus, the Court does 
not judge on the substance of the appealed decision (whether it is a correct 
decision), but focusses on the procedural standards the administrative 
authorities had to observe; the latter keeps its discretionary powers.597 Thus, 
administrative courts can only annul a decision and are not able to decide 
differently on a case.598 As a result of a recent research called the ‘Dutch 
judge in migration law’, Professor Spijkerboer from the Free University in 
Amsterdam criticised the highest administrative court. He investigated 638 
judgments from the years 2010 and 2011 and states that the highest court 
mainly chooses the side of the government and rarely the side of the migrant. 
Further it puts forward that the highest court does not take up a position as 
the guardian of fundamental rights when it concerns migration law.599 
2009/416); 29 October 2009, App. No. 200902119/1/v1 and 2 October 2012, App. 
No. 201100646/1/V1.
596 See House of Representatives 2012/13, Proceedings II 19637, Nos. 1703 and 105.
597 Barkhuysen, Ouden & Schuurmans 2012.
598 <http://verblijfblog.nl/2013/09/30/inhoudelijke-toetsing-in-asielzaken-3/> (last accessed 
on 21 September 2015).  
599 Spijkerboer 2014. This is not the first time that Spijkerboer criticises the highest 
administrative court as he also did in 2002 during his inaugural lecture (‘Het hoger 
beroep in vreemdelingenzaken’). Spijkerboer does not stand alone in his criticism. 
In 2008, Groenendijk & Terlouw published a book: ‘Tussen onafhankelijkheid en 
hiërarchie. De relatie tussen vreemdelingenrechters en de Raad van State, 2001-
2007’, in which they reported on expressed criticism by lower court judges trying 
aliens cases on the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State.
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It is laid down in Article 4:6 of the General Administrative Law Act 
(Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht) that when an asylum claim is rejected, a 
request for a revision of the decision is only possible when newly emerged 
facts or altered circumstances have been adduced. When this is not the case, 
the administrative body may reject the new request with reference to the 
decision on the original request.600 
Official reports and burden of proof
There are two kinds of official reports issued by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: individual and general ones. Such a report is an independent expert 
report which has to be set up in accordance with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ operational instructions and gives a description of the situation in 
a particular country as far as this is relevant to the assessment of asylum 
requests from aliens originating from that country and to decisions on the 
return of rejected asylum seekers. The report is used by the IND to decide 
on asylum requests and the Ministry of Justice to develop an immigration 
policy. Based on settled case law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division 
of the Council of State, it is apparent that the Ministry of Justice may rely 
on the correctness of a general country report when the report gives insight 
into impartial and objective information and states as far as possible its 
sources, unless there are concrete leads which cast doubt on its correctness 
and completeness.601 The same counts for individual reports.602 
As shown above, the official report on the ex-KhAD/WAD members has been 
a matter of dispute for many. On a few occasions, the district courts judged 
to doubt the correctness of the report by referring to the UNHCR’s Note on 
the KhAD/WAD. On appeal in the court of last resort, these judgments are 
set aside.603 Interrelated to an official report is the question whether applying 
Article 1F to the alien was correct, thus whether there was ‘knowing and 
participation’. The majority of the cases brought to court concern this issue 
600 There is an exception to what is prescribed in Article 4:6: in the case of a repeat asylum 
application which also invokes the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, an 
assessment by the Court outside the scope of Article 4:6 is possible. 
601 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 12 October 2001, App. 
No. 200103977/1 (AB 2001, 359 includes annotation from I. Sewandono) and 23 
December 2003, App. No. 200305568/1 (JV 2004/78).
602 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 11 October 2002, App. 
No. 200204522/1 (Ars Aequi RV20020012 includes annotation from R.J.A. Bruin).
603 District Court The Hague 18 February 2009, App. No. 07/39347 (Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division 24 September 2009, App. No.  200901907/1/V1 – JV 
2009/416), District Court The Hague 25 February 2009, AWB 08/11368 
(Administrative Jurisdiction Division 29 October 2009, App. No. 200902119/1/V1) 
and District Court The Hague 27 May 2011, App. No. 10/17614 (Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division, 13 April 2012, App. No. 201106991/1/V1 – JV 2012/251 and 
JV 2012/279).
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and in general, the burden of proof lies with the authorities.604 In the case 
of the ex-KhAD/WAD members, ‘knowing and participation’ is assumed 
to exist and up to the alien to prove the contrary. An interesting judgment 
on the reversed burden of proof came from the District Court The Hague 
in which for the first time reference was made to the ECJ’s ruling in the B 
and D case of 9 November 2011.605 The case concerned an appeal of an ex-
KhAD/WAD member whose permanent residence permit was withdrawn 
by the authorities because he withheld information which would, in the first 
place, have led to the rejection of his asylum application. The court stated 
that ‘as Article 1F of the Refugee Convention is equivalent to Article 12 (2) 
of the Qualification Directive, it sees cause to take the European Court of 
Justice’s interpretation regarding Article 12 (2) into consideration in this 
case. According to the district court, the official report on the KhAD/WAD, 
to which the Minister referred to in this case, is correct. However, in view of 
the reasons adduced for the judgment of the Court of Justice as mentioned 
above, the mere reference to the report, with the option for the claimant to 
provide proof to contrary, is not satisfactory: ‘the Minister had to conduct an 
individual investigation on the specific facts in claimant’s case and assess the 
individual responsibility in the light of both objective and subjective criteria. 
Though the Minister proceeds on the fact that individual circumstances can 
play a role in the application of Article 1F, putting the burden of proof on 
the claimant is according to the district court no longer sustainable’. This 
judgment of the district court is set aside by the highest court as it stated 
that at the time the decision was taken, the implementation term of the 
Qualification Directive was not expired and consequently the Directive 
was not yet implemented in national law as a result of which the review for 
compliance with Article 12 (2) was unlawful.606 In a later judgment, the 
district court quashed another IND decision concerning an ex-KhAD/WAD 
member by putting forward this line of reasoning.607 On appeal, the highest 
court found the district court’s position concerning the reversed burden 
of proof to be erroneous and expressed that given the violent character 
604 See, inter alia, District Court The Hague 10 January 2006, AWB 03/40505; 1 March 
2006, AWB 04/35017; 17 January 2006, AWB 04/50120 (JV 2006/118); 10 June 
2002, AWB 02/5525 BEPTDN H; 4 June 2009, AWB 08/28564 and Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division 23 July 2004, App. Nos. 200402639/1 and 200402651/1; 1 
June 2011, App. No. 201005191/1/V1.
605 District Court The Hague 22 February 2011, AWB 06/24277 (Ars Aequi 
RV20110095 includes annotation from G.-R. de de).
606 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 13 April 2012, App. No. 
201102789/1/v1 (AB 2012/208).
607 District Court The Hague 4 May 2011, AWB 09/29907. See also the judgment of 10 
October 2011, App. No. 11/6096 which was not a KhAD/WAD case, but in which 
the district court put forward that seen in the light of the B and D case, the burden of 
proof should be on the authorities and not on the alien.
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of the KhAD/WAD, assuming personal and knowing participation with 
regard to persons who had held a certain position within the organisation, 
is compatible with Article 12 (2) of the Qualification Directive. The court’s 
reasoning is found upon § 98 of the B and D case in which is laid down that:
‘Any authority which finds, in the course of that assessment, that the 
person concerned has – like D – occupied a prominent position within an 
organisation which uses terrorist methods is entitled to presume that that 
person has individual responsibility for acts committed by that organisation 
during the relevant period, but it nevertheless remains necessary to examine 
all the relevant circumstances before a decision excluding that person from 
refugee status pursuant to Article 12 (2) (b) or (c) of Directive 2004/83 can 
be adopted’.608 
Durability and proportionality-test
To minimize the group of aliens living in limbo (no admission, no removal), 
the Administrative Jurisdiction Division introduced the durability and 
proportionality-test. This test was adopted in policy and accordingly, the 
asylum decision must show that the authorities have assessed whether the 
alien has argued convincingly that Article 3 ECHR is a sustainable obstacle 
for removal to the country of origin, if so, whether his exceptional situation 
makes it disproportionate to withhold a residence permit. Thus, while it 
is up to the alien to prove there is a real risk of ill-treatment upon return, 
the authorities have the task to carry out an Article 3 examination when 
deciding on the asylum request.609 The highest court confirmed the current 
policy in its case law by stating that the term sustainable obstacle means a 
residence of ten years, starting at the date of the first asylum application,610 
and that the questions whether Article 3 ECHR is a sustainable obstacle for 
expulsion and withholding a permit is disproportionate, should be assessed 
separately. The latter question only comes up for discussion after the finding 
608 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 29 February 2012, App. 
No. 201106216/1/v1 (JV 2012/178). 
609 The judgment of 30 January 2012 of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the 
Council of State App. No. 201008097/1/V2 (JV 2012/124) concerned the case of an 
Afghan who was granted asylum in 1996. In 2007, the authorities withdraw his status 
and imposed an exclusion order on him due to the application of Article 1F. Contrary 
to what the district court decided on appeal, the highest administrative court stated 
that when it concerns the withdrawal of a refugee status, it is not to the alien to show 
that he fears for his life upon return to the country of origin, but the authorities to 
make plausible that different from the time of the initial decision, currently there is 
not a refoulement obstacle.
610 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, 17 May 2011, App. No. 
201012016/1/V1.
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that there is a sustainable obstacle for removal.611 The Circular does not 
say much about the disproportionate requirement, as it only states that 
‘disproportionality is accepted when the alien proves to be in an exceptional 
situation’. The fact that up till now only a few cases have been decided in 
favour of the alien shows that the criterion of special circumstances is 
hard to please. An alien will for example not manage to succeed to show 
he is in an exceptional situation when he puts forward he has a family life 
in the Netherlands. According to the highest court, this situation does 
not make withholding a permit to be disproportionate.612 When the IND 
concludes that the alien satisfies the durability criterion, but withholding a 
permit not to be disproportionate, this is considered to be a return decision 
pursuant to Article 45 (1) of the Aliens Act 2000 and automatically implies 
the obligation to leave the country. In a case dated 26 June 2013, the alien 
expressed this situation to be against Article 6 (4) of the Returns Directive in 
which is laid down that ‘Member States may at any moment decide to grant 
an autonomous residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to 
stay for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons to a third country 
national staying illegally on their territory. In that event no return decision 
shall be issued. Where a return decision has already been issued, it shall be 
withdrawn or suspended for the duration of validity of the residence permit 
or other authorisation offering a right to stay’. The highest administrative 
court ruled that the Returns Directive does not oblige the authorities to issue 
a permit in case the alien fulfils the durability criterion and nor does it forbid 
the issuance of a return decision in such a case.613  
Exclusion order
Until the implementation of the Returns Directive in December 2011, the 
application of Article 1F on an alien was a ground for the imposition of an 
exclusion order on the person which has now been replaced by an entry ban. 
There are still a great number of excluded asylum seekers to whom an exclusion 
order was imposed and that remains in force which makes it worthwhile 
giving attention to the case law regarding this topic. The imposition of the 
order on a 1F applicant is done in the interest of international relations as 
the crimes for which the person is held responsible are also considered to 
be serious crimes in the Netherlands. The fact that the alien has not been 
in trouble with the police or the law in the Netherlands or country of origin 
for many years as was put forward by the alien, was according to the district 
611 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 10 August 2011, App. 
No. 201012044/1/v1 and 15 July 2011, App. No. 201005572/1/v2.
612 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 7 May 2012, App. No. 
201105182/1/v1. 
613 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 25 June 2013, App. No. 
201208588/1/v1 (JV 2013/306).
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court no argument for the authorities to take into account when deciding 
about the order614 and the fact that the alien has not been prosecuted for the 
crimes is unrelated to the imposition.615  
The Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State judged 
that imposing an exclusion order on an alien who is excluded from asylum, 
but cannot be removed from the country due to Article 3 ECHR is not 
disproportional as the interest of international relations is not less important 
because of Article 3. Furthermore, the question how the consequences of 
an exclusion order concerning criminal law relate to the fact that the alien 
cannot be removed to the country of origin is to be answered by the Public 
Prosecutor and criminal court. The question whether it is proportionate, is 
to be assessed as part of the decision on imposing an exclusion order on the 
alien concerned as it is not the duty of the criminal court to pass a judgment 
on the matter whether Article 3 ECHR forms an obstacle for removal, in 
which no overriding importance is given to the consequences concerning 
criminal law.616 With this ruling, the highest administrative court set aside 
the judgment of the district court which had ruled in favour of the alien. 
According to the latter court ‘imposing an exclusion order to exert pressure 
upon the alien to leave the Netherlands did not play a role, as it was not 
disputed he could not leave, while on the other hand, such an order provides 
that the alien is continuously exposed to prosecution which results in it 
being disproportional’.617 An alien to whom an exclusion order is imposed 
and who is criminally prosecuted on the basis of Article 197 of the Criminal 
Code may invoke circumstances beyond one’s control for the fact he is still 
illegally residing in the country. According to case law, the alien cannot be 
blamed when he has tried to make an end to his illegal stay by cooperating 
fully with the authorities in order to get travel documents.618 In case such 
an alien relies on force majeure due to Article 3 ECHR, he has to show that 
serious attempts are undertaken to leave to a third country.619 
When the alien makes a reference to Article 3 ECHR for lifting an exclusion 
order, it is examined whether refoulement is a sustainable obstacle. If so, the 
alien must also in this case show that he has undertaken serious attempts 
614 District Court The Hague 25 January 2013, AWB 12/12555.
615 District Court The Hague 10 January 2008, AWB 07/30085.
616 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 13 May 2009, App. No. 
200808081/1/v1 (JV 2009/268).
617 District Court The Hague 6 October 2008, AWB 08/4229 08/4230 06/38209 (JV 
2008/464).
618 The Supreme Court of the Netherlands 20 January 2009, App. No. 07/11353 (RvdW 
2009, 221). 
619 The Supreme Court of the Netherlands 1 December 2009, App. No. 07/12112 
(RvdW 2009, 1434). 
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to leave to another country than his country of origin and that no other 
country allows him admission for entrance. If the alien fails to do this, the 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division finds the maintenance of the exclusion 
order to be correct.620 
Article 8 ECHR
The right to family life is often invoked by the excluded asylum seeker to 
regularise his stay in the Netherlands.621 In case of expulsion, the provision is 
appealed to when the spouse and children did receive a permit and removal of the 
alien would lead to separation of the family or other way around when the alien 
cannot be removed due to refoulement and his family members face expulsion. 
The policy is that there is in principle no right to stay for a 1F applicanton the 
basis of Article 8 ECHR and the same line is to be observed in the jurisprudence 
as the Administrative Jurisdiction Division ruled that relying upon Article 8 
ECHR does not mean admission to the Netherlands should be granted to an 
alien against whom Article 1F is held.622 When a 1F applicantinvokes Article 8, 
it is easy for the alien to show ‘family life’ and that there is an ‘interference with 
the exercise of this right’, but the difficulty lies in the situation where the state’s 
interests are weighed against the alien’s. To date, there has not been a case of 
a 1F applicant concerning Article 8 in which the alien’s rights have prevailed 
over the state’s interests. .623 The highest administrative court considers that a 
person against whom Article 1F has been held by the international community 
is regarded as a danger to (international) public order and public safety and 
found that the State Secretary, when considering that the aim of the exclusion 
order is to prevent that an alien against whom Article 1F has been held can 
obtain protection in the Netherlands – thereby rendering the Netherlands as 
a host state for persons who have committed serious crimes – and to counter 
residence of that alien in the entire Schengen territory, has on good grounds 
and with sufficient reasoning adopted the position that interference in the 
alien’s family life is justified in the interest of public safety and security.624 An 
appeal to a breach of Article 8 ECHR of an excluded asylum seeker, who put 
620 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 16 June 2009, App. No. 
200806/85/1/v1 (JV 2009/345).
621 Article 8 ECHR has also been invoked regarding reception facilities in relation to illegal 
aliens in which the question was raised whether the right to private life on the basis 
of Article 8 ECHR can under circumstances impose obligations on a state to provide 
accommodation and living allowance in order to safeguard that right. See § 5.2.7.
622 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 12 November 2007, 
App. No. 200703870/1 (JV 2008/16).
623 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 13 April 2012, App. No. 
201106991/1/V1 (JV 2012/251 and JV 2012/279) and District Court The Hague 3 
October 2002, AWB 01/19014 OVERIO A5.
624 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 31 October 2008, App. 
No. 200801101/1 (JV 2009/8).
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forward that the interest of international relations on the basis of which an 
exclusion order was imposed on him did not fall under one of the interests of 
paragraph 2 which justify an interference into the right to family life, did not 
succeed.625 According to the authorities, the interest of international relations 
is connected to the public order in the broad sense.  
Though an Article 8 ECHR procedure is a regular one, when the authorities 
assess if withholding a residence permit is disproportionate, the arguments 
put forward by the excluded asylum seeker to show his situation to be 
exceptional may also concern the right to family life and must be take into 
consideration.626 The situation of an excluded asylum seeker, whose family 
was legally residing in the Netherlands and he himself could not be removed 
due to Article 3 ECHR, was advanced as an argument by the district court, 
not to establish an infringement of the right to family.627 
It has already been mentioned that the policy concerning family members 
of an excluded asylum seeker is that, in principle, they do not receive a 
permit either. Again, the general interests of the state prevails and the family 
members can only be granted a permit when their asylum application on 
individual grounds is accepted.628   
§ 5.5 Conclusion
The arrival of a group of Afghan men who served the KhAD/WAD during 
the communist regime in Afghanistan brought attention to the application of 
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention at the end of the 1990s and led to the 
development of policy concerning that provision. The official report on the 
KhAD/WAD on the basis of which the burden of proof regarding this group 
is reversed, led to the exclusion of many who could not be prosecuted and 
returned and caused commotion regarding their position. The Netherlands 
is the only country within the EU which follows the rule that all former non-
commissioned and commissioned officers are assumed to have personally 
and knowingly participated in the violation of human rights, unless they 
can prove their case to be a significant exception. The fact that it hardly ever 
happens that due to his exceptional situation, a person falls outside the scope 
of Article 1F, lead to many question whether it can be said that an individual 
625 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 22 September 2010, 
App. No. 201002668/1/V3.
626 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 15 July 2011, App. No. 
201005039/1/v2; 5 December 2011, App. No. 201008053/1/v2 and 12 November 
2007, App. No. 200703870/1 (JV 2008/16).
627 District Court The Hague 16 November 2010, Awb 10/14892.
628 District Court The Hague 1 August 2000, AWB 00/6095 (JV 2000/271 includes 
annotation from B.P. Vermeulen) and 4 July 2003, AWB 01/55596, 01/62136.
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examination is carried out. A study of the UNHCR on the KhAD/WAD 
which contained a different conclusion than the Ministry’s report, made 
several organisations doubt the correctness of the official report and criticise 
its sources. Though the UNHCR’s finding’s led to a new debate, it did not 
result in any change regarding the official report or policy. The authorities 
still stick to the correctness of the report and are supported in this by the 
highest administrative court. 
The exclusion of an asylum seeker means that he is ineligible for refugee 
protection and at the same time no residence permit for asylum based on 
another ground will be issued. As such a person will also not be considered 
for a regular residence permit, the path for claiming a right to stay in the 
Netherlands is actually closed. Family members of excluded asylum seekers 
can apply for asylum on individual grounds. A rejection means the removal 
of a person, but this is not possible in cases of refoulement. However, the 
fact that an alien cannot be returned due to fear for his life does not entail a 
right to stay and he still remains under the obligation to leave the country at 
his own will. If the excluded alien passes the durability and proportionality-
test, this can lead to the issuance of a permit. It is not a problem to show 
that Article 3 ECHR offers a sustainable obstacle, which means that the 
alien has been living in the Netherlands for ten years due to a refoulement 
issue, but claims often fail to meet the conditions of proving to have taken 
serious attempts to leave the country and show that they are exceptional. 
The problems in the post-exclusion phase have far-reaching consequences as 
aliens who do not have lawful residence in the Netherlands are not entitled to 
any social security benefits and facilities such as staying in a reception center. 
By accepting an Article 3 ECHR obstacle and not removing a person to 
his country of origin, the authorities comply with their obligation under 
international law and provide protection to the person. On the other hand, 
expecting a person to leave the country at its own will, which is practically 
impossible and furthermore, withholding a permit after ten years of 
residence if he has not shown sufficient efforts to leave and on top of it all, 
making his residence punishable, raises the question whether the argument 
of not wanting to be a safe haven for war criminals is at odds with the infinite 
situation of many aliens. Considering the fact that a criminal conviction 
comes to an end after serving the punishment, it seems this cannot be said 
for the position of 1F applicants in the Netherlands who are excluded on the 
basis of ‘serious reasons for considering’, which is a lower standard of proof 
than ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ as used in criminal law. 
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§ 6.1 Introduction
The UK has long been recognized as being an immigration country; 
however, it was the entry into force of the Aliens Act of 1905 which for the 
first time introduced a system of controlled immigration. Though the Act 
did not explicitly state the term ‘refugee’, it did include a provision on aliens 
who were seeking admission to avoid persecution on religious and political 
grounds. Though over the years legislative developments occurred in the 
field of immigration, including the adherence to the Refugee Convention 
after the Second World War,629 it was not until 1993 that the UK introduced 
with detailed legislation on asylum. With the passing of the Asylum 
and Immigration Appeals Act,630 the UK made reference to the Refugee 
Convention in statute law. Until that time, the provisions of the Convention 
were factors to be taken into account, but not directly enforceable as they 
had not yet been incorporated into domestic law. According to British 
constitutional law, a treaty must be incorporated into domestic law by an act 
of parliament, before persons can rely on it directly in national courts. The 
high increase of asylum applications in the 1980s and in the early 1990s was 
an important reason for the government to introduce measures for ‘a better 
system for making prompt and fair decisions’.631 It did not take much time 
before several Acts followed which focused on several aspects relating to the 
asylum proceedings.
From 2002 onwards Article 1F of the Refugee Convention became the 
centre of interest in the UK. The attacks on the Twin Towers in the USA led 
to the White Paper ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’ in which the government 
announced that the UK should not provide a safe haven for war criminals or 
those who commit crimes against humanity.632 In the same year, the Asylum 
and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) gave a relevant judgment in the Gurung case, 
629 The UK is party to the Refugee Convention as well as the Refugee Protocol, which it 
respectively ratified on 11 March 1954 and acceded on 4 September 1968.  
630 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1993/23/contents> (last accessed on 21 September 
2015).  
631 In the eighties, the UK received a high number of asylum applications from Tamils 
from Sri Lanka and faced an inflow of asylum seekers from the Former Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s.  
632 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/250926/cm5387.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
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which serves as precedent for further case law on the exclusion clauses.633 
In 2005, the UK government announced a five-year strategy plan for asylum 
and immigration in which it introduced tougher rules to deny asylum to 
those who have committed serious crimes, on top of excluding terrorists as 
one of the steps to be taken to tighten the asylum system to counter abuse.634
This chapter contains an extensive discussion on the application of Article 
1F in the UK with a focus on the post-exclusion phase. First, an outline 
of the legal framework will be given after which I will go into the asylum 
procedure, in particular what happens when exclusion questions rise. The 
second point to be dealt with, will be the current practice regarding those 
who are excluded but cannot be removed from the UK due to refoulement. 
In this connection, the introduction of the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act is interesting, which will also be reviewed. Further, attention will be paid 
to the application of Article 8 ECHR in relation to cases where 1F applicants 
have family members in the UK or file a claim on private life. Finally, I will 
deal with relevant case law and conclusions. To have a good understanding 
of what is meant by exclusion in this chapter, it is important to note that the 
use of the term ‘exclusion’ in the UK contains besides Article 1F also non-
asylum cases, in which a person is banned from entering the UK because 
the Secretary of State deems it to be in the public interest.635 As the focus of 
this study is on Article 1F, exclusion relating to the ban will not be examined 
further. Thus, when the term exclusion is used, it refers to Article 1F of the 
Refugee Convention. 
§ 6.2 Legal framework
When considering the legal framework of the exclusion clauses in the UK, 
it is important to denote the difference between the civil law system of the 
Netherlands on the one hand, and the common law system of the UK on the 
other. The legal framework in the UK comprises common law and statute 
law. Legislation with regard to immigration includes a wide range of legal 
instruments. Though it can be said that the Immigration Act 1971 (IA 1971) 
forms the foundation for the current legal framework on immigration, this 
Act made no special reference to refugees. Acts on asylum in particular, date 
from 1993 onwards. As stated above, the Asylum and Immigration Appeals 
Act 1993 provided for the incorporation of the Refugee Convention in 
domestic law and made it directly enforceable. It ensured the primacy of 
633 Gurung v. State Secretary for the Home Department, [2002] UKIAT 4870, 14 October 
2002.
634 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/251091/6472.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 2015). 
635 See ‘Exclusion or deportation from the UK on non-conducive grounds: consultation 
document Home Office’ <http://media.apn.co.nz/webcontent/document/pdf/ACFAIAt9 
aaKU.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
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the Refugee Convention over conflicting national immigration rules and 
provided a definition of a claim for asylum.636 Furthermore, the Act ensured 
an in-country right of appeal to be granted to asylum seekers with an 
exception in situations where national security was a ground for refusal.637 
Several acts relating to asylum and some containing relevant provisions 
within the context of the exclusion clauses have been passed since the 
latter Act including, inter alia, the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 and 
accompanying Appeals Rules, Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (IAA 
1999) and Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (NIAA 2002), 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 and 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act (IAN 2006). The Acts passed in 
the 1990s were a response to the high number of asylum applications and 
attempts to restrict the ability for asylum seekers to apply for asylum in the 
country and thus reduce the numbers. From the millennium on, the Acts 
show an additional focus as there is a special interest in national security and 
criminals. Thus, section 72 of the NIAA 2002 is named ‘Serious Criminal’ 
and prescribes that a refugee or asylum seeker sentenced to two years 
imprisonment or convicted of a specified offence loses protection under 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. Section 54 of the IAN 2006, among 
others, enlarges the scope of Article 1F (c) by including ‘acts of committing, 
preparing or instigating terrorism (whether or not the acts amount to an 
actual or inchoate offence)’ and acts of ‘encouraging or inducing others’ to 
do the same.638 
Another piece of relevant legislation is the Human Rights Act 1998. This 
Act has been in force since October 2000 and brings the domestic law into 
line with the rights set out in the ECHR. Accordingly, all public authorities 
are required to act in accordance with the rights as enshrined in the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and its statutes. Though its provisions do not deal with 
asylum seekers in particular, excluded asylum seekers often refer to the 
prohibition of torture or respect for their family life which can prevent a 
removal.639 The first judgment of the ECtHR on the applicability of Article 3 
on removal was ruled against the UK, after which other relevant judgments 
followed.640 Taking into account the Strasbourg case law, it is set out in the 
policy guidance concerning human rights claims that Article 3 ECHR is an 
absolute right and the UK’s obligations under Article 3 apply irrespective of 
any reprehensible/criminal conduct on the part of the applicant.641 As before 
636 Respectively sections 2 and 1. 
637 Stevens 2004, pp. 165-167.
638 For more details regarding the Acts mentioned above see Stevens 2004, pp. 164-218.
639 See Chapter 4 for an outline on the ECHR in relation to the exclusion clauses. 
640 See among others the Soering; Vilvarajah and Chacal cases. 
641 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/257425/consideringhrclaims.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
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the entry into force of the Act, violations of ECHR rights could only be 
addressed in Strasbourg, aliens who believe their rights have been violated 
under the ECHR now also have recourse to the UK courts. With respect to 
violations of refoulement, the UK jurisprudence has addressed issues such as 
detention conditions or poor medical or living conditions in the country of 
return. The issue of reliance on diplomatic assurances should be used with 
caution, especially with respect to countries where a detailed Memory of 
Understanding between the UK and another country has been negotiated 
at the highest level addressing specific human rights concerns in the country 
of return such assurances can be sufficient even if there is no provision for 
monitoring.642 
Also to be named within the context of the legal framework is the Refugee 
or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 
2006. The transposition of the EU Qualification Directive into domestic law 
occurred via this Regulation643 and amendments to the Immigration Rules 
(IR). So, this Regulation as well as the IR deal with exclusion from asylum 
and humanitarian protection that is based on the concept of subsidiary 
protection as included in the Qualification Directive. The IR contain the 
practical substance of immigration law and according to the IA 1971 they 
must ‘include provision for admitting (in such cases and subject to such 
restrictions as may be provided by the rules, and subject or not to conditions 
as to length of stay or otherwise) persons coming for the purpose of taking 
employment, or for the purposes of study, or as visitors, or as dependants of 
persons lawfully in or entering the UK’.644 The Rules do not have the status 
of legislation as they are administrative rules. However, they are binding and 
failure to act in accordance with the Rules can make a decision appealable.645 
Besides the Rules, several internal governmental instructions which set 
out the Home Office’s determination criteria, are of importance. These 
instructions of which the majority is available on the government website 
642 Rikhof 2012, pp. 443-445.
643 Came into force on 9 October 2006. Besides the Qualification Directive, the UK is 
also bound by other EU Asylum Directives of the first phase: Temporary Protection 
Directive from 2001, Reception Directive from 2003, Asylum Procedures Directive 
from 2005 and the Eurodac (new version will be available from 20 July 2015 on) and 
Dublin (new version is available from 1 January 2014 on) Regulations. The UK did 
not opt-in to the recast Qualification, Asylum Procedures and Reception Conditions 
Directives which means it remains bound by the first-phase instruments. Neither 
is it bound by the Returns Directive. The Government explained with regard to 
the recast Qualification Directive that: ‘Many of the proposals in the Directive are 
unobjectionable from our viewpoint as we already comply with the duties that they 
would impose on us’. Furthermore, the Government declared that it ‘has concerns on 
a CEAS and will not opt-in into any proposal which would weaken the borders’. 
644 Section 1 (4) Immigration Act 1971. 
645 Kneebone 2009, p. 239.
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provide guidance to immigration officers on, for example, the application of 
the Immigration Rules. Persons who come within the terms of an instruction 
can expect to be treated in accordance with the policy, aside from individual 
exceptions which may be made.   
The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 contains a part on 
immigration which directly concerns Article 1F. The Special Immigration 
Status which is a restricted immigration status for foreign criminals including 
those to whom Article 1F is applied, is included in part 10. Aliens with such 
a status may be required to comply with conditions as to their residence, 
employment, and compulsory reporting to the police or a government 
office and failure to comply is punishable by imprisonment. Though the Act 
received Royal Assent on 8 May 2008, part 10 has not come into force yet.  
The last piece of legislation to be stated is the Immigration Act 2014 (IA 
2014) which received Royal Assent on 14 May 2014.646 The government 
aimed to simplify and improve immigration law and with this Act some 
fundamental changes have been carried out. Sections which are of particular 
importance for those excluded under Article 1F concern among others, 
removal647 and immigration bail.648 Further, the right of appeal in most cases 
will be replaced by a system of administrative review in which Home Office 
staff, rather than the First-Tier Tribunal, will review the decisions of other 
Home Office staff (see section 15 of the IA 2014). This does not relate to 
excluded asylum seekers as those who have made an asylum (protection) or 
human rights application retain the right of appeal to the Tribunal. Section 
19 which is also included in Part 2 ensures that the courts and tribunals have 
regard to the Parliament’s view of what the public interest requires when 
considering Article 8 ECHR in immigration cases. This section has come 
into force and directly concerns excluded asylum seekers who are facing 
removal and have dependants in the UK. The issue of public interest in 
relation to Article 8 ECHR will be elaborated on later in this chapter when I 
deal with leave to remain on the basis of private/family life.  
The above-mentioned laws are the ones relevant with regard to the exclusion 
clauses. However, it should be noted that the list is incomplete. Acts such as 
646 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/22/contents/enacted> (last accessed on 
21 September 2015). 
647 Section 1 concerns the removal of persons unlawfully in the UK. It substitutes section 
10 of the IAA 1999 and increases the powers to removal (came into force on 20 
October 2014). Sections 2 and 3 are relevant in the case children are involved (came 
into force on 28 July 2014). Section 3 regulates the establishment of an Independent 
Family Returns Panel which has to be consulted in a family returns case on how best 
to safeguard and promote the welfare of children of the family.
648 Section 7 of the IA 2014 amends Schedule 2 IA 1971 and has come into force from 
28 July 2014. 
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the Borders Act 2007 and the Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006 also contain 
provisions which affect the application of Article 1F. 
§ 6.2.1 Asylum and exclusion proceedings 
Asylum applications can be filed at the port of entry or at a later stage after 
entry. In the latter case applications must be made in person at the Home 
Office in Croydon. A decision on exclusion is taken as part of the regular 
asylum determination process which is carried out by the Special Cases 
Unit of the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism.649 As determined 
in Gurung, the question whether or not a person falls under the exclusion 
clauses is not an optional one: it is an integral part of the Refugee Status 
Determination. The mandatory wording admits of no discretion.650 With 
regard to the position of the Secretary of State, the judges stated that: ‘even 
if exclusion issues are addressed first, it is highly desirable in the interests of 
justice that at all stages of his examination of an asylum claim he adopts a ‘belt-
and-braces’ approach651 and that he sets out in his Reasons for Refusal his 
decision on the appellant’s position under both the inclusion and exclusion 
clauses as only such an approach can ensure that at any further appeal stage 
the adjudicator knows the Secretary of State’s overall position’.652 Also the 
government’s Asylum Instruction on Exclusion (AI on Exclusion),653 which 
provides guidance on the assessment of exclusion, states that an ‘inclusion 
before exclusion’ approach should be followed which means that case 
649 With regard to asylum applications in which exclusion does not play a role, the 
examination is carried out by the Home Office’s Asylum Division falling under the 
directorate Visas and Immigration. Besides the Home Office, also the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office is concerned with migration in the UK focusing on subjects 
from a foreign affairs perspective. 
650 Gurung v. State Secretary for the Home Department, [2002] UKIAT 4870, 14 October 
2002, para. 38.
651 This approach means that double security is provided, thus more than one method is 
used to ensure safety.  
652 Gurung case, para. 148. The system of appeals to adjudicators (who were appointed 
by the Secretary of State) with the right of subsequent appeal to the AIT does not 
exist anymore. At the time of the judgment it did and with regard to adjudicators, 
the Tribunal held another view as it considered that adjudicators should first deal 
with the issue of exclusion whenever the claim disclosed an obvious issue of serious 
criminality. The Tribunal continued by stating that: ‘we emphasize that the issue must 
be one that is obvious, since, if there is no clear evidence of serious criminality, there is 
too great a danger of being unnecessarily diverted away from examination under the 
inclusion clauses. Even if the Secretary of State has not raised the exclusion clauses 
expressly or by implication in the Reasons for Refusal letter, the adjudicator must 
address them when obvious issues arise’. 
653 This instruction is dated 30 May 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257429/exclusion.pdf> (last accessed on 21 
September 2015).  
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owners should consider both whether an applicant has a well-founded fear 
of persecution as defined in Article 1A (2) of the Convention (inclusion) 
and then whether that applicant falls to be excluded by virtue of Article 
1F (exclusion).654 Though formally both inclusion and exclusion ought to 
be considered, which is in line with the UNHCR’s approach, the practice 
differs. Information provided by the Special Cases Unit shows that when it is 
obvious that Article 1F applies, there is no further consideration given to the 
question whether the person falls under the refugee definition of the Refugee 
Convention: he is then excluded and ECHR matters are checked in order to 
see whether there is an obstacle for removal.655 In this context, section 55 
of the IAN Act 2006 should be mentioned. Pursuant to this section, the 
Secretary of State issues a certificate in the case of an asylum appeal of an 
alien to whom Article 1F applies. As a result of the certification, the First-
Tier Tribunal or the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC)656 
must begin substantive deliberations on the asylum appeal by considering 
the statements in the Secretary of State’s certificate and when they agree with 
those statements, such a part of the asylum appeal as amounts to an asylum 
claim (before considering any other aspect of the case) must be dismissed 
before hearing it. Thus, the claim for inclusion is not heard at all. In case of 
certification, the appellate authority is not prohibited from considering all 
the evidence but is required to make a decision in respect of Article 1F only. 
§ 6.2.1.1 Part 11 of the Immigration Rules on Asylum
The procedures and principles by which asylum applications are decided 
are set out in part 11 of the IR.657 In order to be granted asylum, an asylum 
applicant must satisfy the criteria in paragraph 334 of the IR. According to 
this paragraph, an applicant will be granted asylum if the Secretary of State 
is satisfied that: (ii) he is a refugee, as defined in Regulation 2 of the Refugee 
or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 
2006. Regulation 2 of the 2006 Regulations defines a ‘refugee’ as a person 
who falls within Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention and to whom 
Regulation 7 does not apply. Regulation 7 sets out that a person is not a 
654 Kapferer 2000, p. 215.
655 The information is provided by a staff member of the Special Cases Unit at 25 
November 2014. 
656 The SIAC is set up by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act (SIACA 
1997) in order to hear appeals against immigration related decisions involving 
national security, usually exclusion (both the ban and 1F), refusal of entry as an 
asylum seeker, deportation or appeals against deprivation of nationality. The IA 2014 
inserted a new section 2E to the SIACA 1997.  
657 Part 11 of the IR is annexed. See also the Asylum Policy Instructions from the UK Visa 
and Immigration Directorate Asylum which provide guidance on the proceedings 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/asylum-decision-making-guidance-
asylum-instructions> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
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refugee if he or she falls within the scope of Article 1F of the Convention and 
explains the construction and application of Article 1F (b) in a similar way 
to Article 12 (2) (b) of the Qualification Directive.658 An alien who does not 
qualify for a refugee status can be granted humanitarian protection in the 
UK following paragraph 339C IR.659 However, an excluded person who falls 
within the scope of Article 1F is also likely to be excluded from humanitarian 
protection (paragraph 339D of the Immigration Rules) and when protection 
is granted, it will be revoked if Article 1F should have been applied.660 With 
the transposition of the Qualification Directive, a shift in assessment has 
taken place as previously, it was first examined whether an alien qualified as 
a refugee and then it was considered whether they were eligible for human 
rights protection under the ECHR. As stated above, currently the assessment 
of an asylum claim still comes first, after which humanitarian protection is 
assessed and thirdly a human rights claim is assessed under the ECHR.661 
When an alien qualifies for one of the categories, he needs specific permission 
from the immigration authorities to remain which is called ‘leave’. There 
is leave to enter or leave to remain for a limited or unlimited period. The 
authorities can also grant temporary admission to an alien, which is usually 
done when the applicant is awaiting his proceedings. This kind of admission 
allows a person who is liable to be detained to be temporarily admitted to 
658 Regulation 7 (2) (a) states that the reference to serious non-political crime includes a 
particularly cruel action, even if it is committed with an allegedly political objective; 
(b) the reference to the crime being committed outside the country of refuge prior 
to his admission as a refugee shall be taken to mean the time up to and including the 
day on which a residence permit is issued. In line with the Qualification Directive, 
paragraph 339A states that a person’s grant of asylum under paragraph 334 will be 
revoked or not renewed if the Secretary of State is satisfied that: he should have been 
or is excluded from being a refugee in accordance with Regulation 7 of Regulations 
2006.
659 Those granted asylum or humanitarian protection are issued a residence permit for 
the UK which is valid for five years (see paragraph 339Q IR) after which the person is 
eligible for indefinite leave when each requirement of paragraph 339R IR is met. 
660 See paragraph 339G of the IR regarding the revocation of humanitarian protection. 
An alien who is granted asylum and whereby afterwards appears he should have been 
excluded from a refugee status, the grant of asylum will be revoked under paragraph 
339A IR. Paragraph 339BA prescribes that ‘where the Secretary of State is considering 
revoking refugee status in accordance with these Rules, the person concerned shall be 
informed in writing that the Secretary of State is reconsidering his qualification for 
refugee status and the reasons for the reconsideration. That person shall be given the 
opportunity to submit, in a personal interview or in a written statement, reasons as to 
why his refugee status should not be revoked. If there is a personal interview, it shall 
be subject to the safeguards set out in these Rules. However, where a person acquires 
British citizenship status, his refugee status is automatically revoked in accordance 
with paragraph 339A (iii) upon acquisition of that status without the need to follow 
the procedure set out above’.
661 Storey 2008, p. 15. 
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the UK and they may be subjected to restrictions. Failure to obey may lead to 
detention again. Such a person can neither be removed nor is given leave: he 
is deemed not to have entered the UK. 
Pursuant to paragraph 339J, the assessment of asylum, humanitarian 
protection or human rights claim must be carried out on an individual, 
objective and impartial basis including taking into account all relevant facts 
such as those relating to the country of origin/country of return at the time of 
taking a decision. Family members accompanying a principal applicant may 
be included in his application for asylum as his dependant and in case asylum 
or humanitarian protection is granted, the dependants will be granted leave 
to enter or remain for the same duration. In case of exclusion of the applicant, 
family members will also be refused protection, unless the dependant has 
a claim in his/her own right (paragraph 349 of the Immigration Rules).662 
It is relevant to mention here section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and 
Immigration Act 2009 which ensures that immigration decisions are taken 
with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in 
the UK.663 The statutory duty to children includes the need to demonstrate 
that asylum applications and considerations of exclusion issues are dealt 
with in a timely and sensitive fashion where children are involved. The 
burden of substantiating a claim is on the applicant, who must prove to the 
required standard that they qualify for international protection, in which the 
decision maker must consider the credibility of a claim in light of all available 
evidence relating to the claim. As explained above, the question of whether 
or not an alien falls under the exclusion clauses is also part of the RSD which 
means that besides the assessment of the question whether an applicant has 
a well-founded fear of persecution, the decision maker must also investigate 
exclusion elements. 
Assessment of exclusion
While it is up to the alien to prove that he has a well-founded fear of 
persecution and qualifies for protection under Article 1A, in case of Article 
1F, the evidential burden of proof rests with the Secretary of State. Fact 
finding in exclusion cases is done in the same way as for other asylum 
claims with the credibility of the alien being the essential criterion. Thus, 
the Asylum Instruction prescribes that the applicant must be given the 
opportunity to explain his level of involvement in the crime or act and the 
motivation or reasoning behind his alleged actions. Other sources on which 
662 See also paragraphs 350A and 352D IR in case the spouse/child is seeking to join an 
applicant who is granted a refugee status. 
663 Section 71 IA 2014 confirms the duty which section 55 imposes on the Secretary 
of State or any other person. See also ZH (Tanzania) v. State Secretary for the Home 
Department, [2011] UKSC 4, 1 February 2011.
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the authorities rely are, inter alia, Operational Guidance Notes664 and the 
Home Office’s Country of Origin Information Reports.665 The latter report 
is based on information from documents of international organisations, 
human rights organisations, experts and state institutions. They attempt to 
focus on the main asylum and human rights issues in that country and also 
provide background information on geography, economy and history. The 
Home Office also has at its disposal the Country Guidance Cases which are 
binding as to a factual situation. The effect of such a Guidance Case is to 
establish the factual position until it is proved to have changed, which means 
that the Tribunal must consider new evidence and make a new decision.666 
One of the questions the Supreme Court dealt with in the Al Sirri and DD 
v SSHD667 case was the question what is meant with the words: ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ which is relevant regarding exclusion under 
Article 1F in general. In line with the view of the UNHCR to follow a 
restrictive interpretation of the exclusion clauses, the Supreme Court 
stated that ‘serious reasons’ are stronger than ‘reasonable grounds’ and that 
‘considering’ is stronger than ‘suspecting’ or ‘believing’. According to this 
Court, the standard required in criminal law does not have to be satisfied and 
it is unnecessary to import domestic standards of proof into the question. 
Furthermore, ‘if the decision maker is satisfied that it is more likely to than 
not that the applicant has not committed the crimes in question or has not 
been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN, it is 
difficult to see how there could be serious reasons for considering that he 
has done so. The reality is that there are unlikely to be sufficient reasons 
for considering the applicant to be guilty unless the decision maker can be 
satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he is. But the task of the decision 
maker is to apply the words of the Convention (and the Directive) in the 
particular case.668
Exclusion cases under Article 1F are sent to the Home Office’s Special Cases 
Unit which is responsible for investigating matters concerning counter 
terrorism, national security, extremism and international crimes. The Unit 
664 These are Home Office policy documents and provide country specific guidance to 
case owners on particular asylum seeking groups.
665 The Country of Origin Information Reports are set up by the Country of Origin 
Information Service and monitored by the Independent Advisory Group on Country 
Information, which is part of the Office of the Chief Inspector of Borders and 
Immigration.  
666 Clayton 2014, pp. 370-372.
667 Al-Sirri v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; DD (Afghanistan) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, [2012] UKSC 54, 21 November 2012. 
668 This approach is similar to what the Supreme Court decided in JS (Sri Lanka) v. the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] UKSC 15, 17 March 2010.
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handles 300 to 400 cases a year of which around 50 result in exclusion under 
Article 1F. Asylum applications in which 1F plays a role mainly concern 
aliens from Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Congo, Libya and Iran.669 
Determining whether an alien is to be excluded under Article 1F happens 
in a few steps. First, it is up to case owner to determine that there is good 
reason to believe the individual committed the act or crime or significantly 
contributed to it, and is potentially excludable under one or more of the 
exclusion clauses. The AI on Exclusion states that exclusion under 1F is 
not dependent upon being part of an organisation, thus membership of, or 
employment in, an organisation which uses violence, or the threat of violence, 
as a means to achieve its political or criminal objectives is not enough on its 
own to make a person guilty of an international crime, and is not sufficient 
to justify exclusion from refugee status.670 The individual’s membership 
must be examined in the context of the organisation’s behaviour at the time 
when he was part of the group. In JS (Sri Lanka),671 the Supreme Court 
decided that the exclusion clauses will apply if there are serious reasons for 
considering that the individual has voluntarily contributed in a significant 
way to the organisation’s ability to pursue its purpose of committing war 
crimes, aware that the assistance will in fact further that purpose. The Court 
gave factors which have to be considered when deciding on complicity, these 
are among others, the nature and (potentially of some importance) the size of 
the organisation and particularly that part of it with which the asylum seeker 
was himself most directly concerned, how the asylum seeker came to be 
recruited and his position, rank, standing and influence in the organisation. 
This test is now applied in order to establish complicity, however the Special 
Cases Unit also relies on established principles of international criminal law, 
such as joint criminal enterprise (JCE), to assess whether someone should be 
excluded under Article 1F. 
Once it has been established that the person committed or participated in 
the act, it is to be investigated whether he had the requisite understanding 
and intention at the time that he participated in or committed that act. 
The person intended to engage in the conduct at issue or to bring about a 
particular consequence and was aware that certain circumstances existed 
or knew that certain consequences would follow in the ordinary course of 
events. If the case owner considers that the alien acted with both ‘intent’ 
and ‘knowledge’ and thus had the necessary mens rea to be held individually 
669 The information is provided during an interview with a staff member of the Special 
Cases Unit at 22 April 2013.  
670 This corresponds to the judgment of the ECJ in joined cases App. Nos. C-57/09 and 
C-101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B and D. 
671 JS (Sri Lanka) case.
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responsible for the excludable act,672 the last step before finally determining 
whether or not the individual is excludable, is to see whether one of the 
defences is applicable.673
No balancing test is applied with regard to the application of Article 1F. Thus, 
when considering whether or not Article 1F applies in the case of a person 
who appears to have a well-founded fear of persecution, there should be no 
balancing of the extent of persecution feared against the gravity of the 1F 
crime or act. This is explicitly laid down in section 34 of the Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security (ATCS Act 2001) which provides that exclusion from 
refugee status ‘shall not be taken to require consideration of the gravity of 
events or fear’ which may give rise to refugee status. 
 
With regard to the interpretation of the exclusion clauses it can be mentioned 
that the definitions of the crimes laid down in Article 1F (a) are similar to those 
laid down in the UNHCR Handbook. When defining crimes against peace, 
war crimes or crimes against humanity, reference is made to international 
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes, such as 
the Rome Statute of the ICC.674 
According to Article 1F (b) of the Refugee Convention, the provisions of 
this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there 
are serious reasons for considering that: ‘he has committed a serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that 
country as a refugee’. Article 12 (2) (b) of the Qualification Directive expands 
this provision by prescribing that: he or she has committed a serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his or her admission 
as a refugee; ‘which means the time of issuing a residence permit based on 
the granting of refugee status; particularly cruel actions, even if committed 
with an allegedly political objective, may be classified as serious non-political 
crimes’. When implementing the Qualification Directive into UK domestic 
law, Article 12 (2) (b) is adopted in Regulation 7 of the Refugee or Person in 
Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006, by which 
the addition to Article 1F (b) is also adopted.675 By referring to the addition, 
the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion prescribes that a person who commits 
a serious non-political crime whilst applying for asylum and before being 
672 For the terms ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ the definitions as laid down in Article 30 of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is used. See Rikhof 2012, 
pp. 143-145 for more on mens rea. 
673 As valid defences are stated: superior orders, coercion/duress or self-defence/defence 
of others.
674 Rikhof 2012, pp. 174-177. 
675 With regard to Article 1F (a) and (b), Regulation 7 (3) also states that they shall apply 
to a person who instigates or otherwise participates in the commission of the crimes 
or acts specified in those provisions.
Chapter 6 Application of Article 1F: current  policies and  
their development in the UK
199
granted a residence permit in the UK, could also be excluded under Article 
1F (b). This is a different approach to that of the UNHCR as according to 
that organisation, ‘admission...as a refugee’ does not refer to the period in the 
country prior to recognition as a refugee and sees admission in this context 
as the mere physical presence in the country. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the general thought is that the Qualification Directive, which is based on a 
full and inclusive application of the Refugee Convention is in line with the 
UNHCR’s interpretation. Continuous crimes, such as conspiracy to import 
drugs, which were committed before the asylum seeker came to the UK - 
and continued in the UK after arrival can be considered for the purposes 
of Article 1F (b) as ‘being committed outside the country of refuge’. The 
UNHCR Handbook states that ‘a serious crime’ must be a capital crime (i.e. 
punishable by the death penalty) or a very grave punishable act.676 According 
to the AI on Exclusion, it may be appropriate to clarify a serious crime as 
one for which a custodial sentence of 12 months or more upon conviction 
might be expected (if that crime had been tried in the UK) which is also in 
keeping with the provision for automatic deportation (section 32 (2) of the 
UK Borders Act 2007).677 Furthermore, the AI sets out that as ‘it is difficult 
to predict what sentence might be passed in relation to a particular offence 
committed abroad, the likely sentence is less important than the nature of 
the crime, the actual harm inflicted, and whether most jurisdictions would 
consider it a serious crime’. In the T. v. SSHD case,678 the House of Lords 
held that Article 1F (b) applied to an asylum seeker who had been involved in 
terrorist acts which killed innocent people and rejected the argument that the 
acts were ‘political’ for the purposes of Article 1F (b). Therefore, under UK 
regulations, persons who engage in certain acts of terrorism may be excluded 
under Article 1F (b), as terrorist acts which are wholly disproportionate to 
any political motive will often be ‘non-political’.679 Besides clause (b), also 1F 
(c) is relevant regarding acts of terrorism as UN Security Council Resolutions 
1373 and 1377 declare that ‘acts, methods and practices of terrorism are 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN’ and ‘knowingly financing, 
planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations’. UK legislation broadened the scope of 
clause (c) as section 54 (1) IAN Act 2006 provides that acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations shall be taken as including, in 
particular: acts of committing, preparing or instigating terrorism (whether or 
not the acts amount to an actual or inchoate offence) and acts of encouraging 
or inducing others to commit, prepare or instigate terrorism (whether or not 
676 UNHCR Handbook 2011, Part 1, para. 155. 
677 Asylum Instruction on Exclusion, p. 17.
678 T. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1996] 2 All ER 865, House of Lords 
(Judicial Committee), 22 May 1996. 
679 See Singer 2015 for more on terrorism and exclusion in the UK. 
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the acts amount to an actual or inchoate offence).680 Further, section 54 (2) 
IAN Act 2006 defines ‘terrorism’ for the purpose of interpreting Article 
1F (c) in UK law as having the meaning given by section 1 of the Terrorism 
Act 2000 (as amended by the Terrorism Act 2006). Under the Terrorism 
Act 2006 it is a criminal offence to directly or indirectly incite or encourage 
others to commit acts of terrorism. ‘Encouraging’ terrorism is broader than 
‘inciting’ and includes the ‘glorification’ of terrorism.681 
In the Al-Sirri and DD v. SSHD case mentioned above, Al-Sirri petitioned the 
Supreme Court seeking clarification of the correct interpretation of Article 
1F (c). In its judgment the SC upheld what the Court of Appeal (CoA) had 
stated regarding the question: in construing Article 1F (c) in the domestic 
context, the meaning of terrorism was not as wide as that provided for in 
section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. This is because Article 1F (c) is given 
domestic effect by Article 12 (2) (c) of the Qualification Directive, which 
provides that a third country national or stateless person is excluded from 
being a refugee where there are serious reasons for considering that: (c) he 
or she has been guilty of acts contrary to the purpose and principles of the 
United Nations as set out in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter 
of the United Nations. The CoA concluded that Article 54 (2) ‘has where 
necessary to be read down in an Article 1F case so as to keep its meaning 
within the scope of Article 12 (2) (c) of the Directive’. According to the 
Supreme Court, the appropriately cautious and restrictive approach of the 
UNHCR Guidelines on clause (c) should be followed. It could be enough 
if one person plotted in one country to destabilize another. The test was 
whether the resulting acts have the requisite serious effect upon international 
peace, security and peaceful relations between states.  
The UK uses a national list in the form of organisations which are proscribed 
under the Terrorism Act 2000. The fact that a person may be on a list of 
terrorist suspects or be a member of an organisation designated as terrorist 
does not automatically lead to exclusion, but may be evidence of such 
involvement. According to the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion, applying 
the JS (Sri Lanka) test in terrorist cases would be answering the question 
whether the individual has voluntarily contributed in a significant way to the 
organisation’s ability to pursue its purpose of committing acts of terrorism/
680 The UNHCR has criticised the UK’s interpretation of Article 1F (c) and is concerned 
that ‘an automatic and non-restrictive use of Article 1F (c) to all acts designated as 
‘terrorist’ may result in a disproportionate application of the exclusion clauses, in 
a manner contrary to the overriding humanitarian object and purpose of the 1951 
Convention’. UNHCR is of the opinion that given the vague nature of clause (c) and 
potentially grave consequences, it must be read narrowly. <http://www.unhcr.org.uk/
fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/UNHCRCommentsonCJIBJuly07.pdf> (last accessed on 
21 September 2015).  
681 ECRE Country Report 2005 - UK, p. 326.
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serious crime (s), aware that the assistance will in fact further that purpose? 
Clause (c) covers all who commit an act which is contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the UN and not only those in power or a state or state like 
entity.682  
When it appears from the investigation that Article 1F applies to an alien, 
the decision to refuse asylum on grounds of the exclusion clauses is taken 
after the decision maker has discussed the case with a senior caseworker. 
The following explains the proceedings after such a determination has been 
made.
Proceedings after exclusion determination
As laid down in paragraph 336 of the Immigration Rules, an application 
which does not meet the criteria set out in paragraph 334, including when 
the exclusion clauses apply, will be refused. Where an application for 
asylum is refused, the reasons in fact and law are stated in the decision and 
information is provided in writing on how to challenge the decision. When a 
refusal is based on the application of Article 1F, the case owner must specify 
which clause applies and, the same appeals rights apply as in a case where the 
claim has been refused without any reliance on these exclusion grounds and 
an immigration decision has been taken under section 82 NIA 2002. Until 
the introduction of the IA 2014, section 82 (2) listed 14 different decisions, 
including refusal of leave to enter the UK; refusal of entry clearance and 
refusal to vary a person’s leave to enter or remain in the UK if the result of the 
refusal is that the person has no leave to enter or remain. Section 15 of the 
IA 2014 has substituted sections 82 and 84 NIA 2002 and repeals sections 
83 and 83A NIA 2002 regarding appeal rights in respect of asylum claims. 
Since section 15 has been brought into force as from 20 October 2014, a 
person may appeal to the Tribunal where the Secretary of State has refused 
a protection claim; human rights claim or revoked the applicant’s protection 
status.683 
Where it is certified that section 55 of the IAN Act 2006 applies, the appellate 
authority will commence its deliberations by considering the Secretary of 
State’s certificate (to the effect that the individual is excluded from the 1951 
Convention by virtue of Article 1F). If the certificate is upheld, the appeal 
should be dismissed to the extent that it relies on asylum grounds, though 
any ECHR considerations raised in the appeal will still have to be taken into 
account.684 
682 See KK v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKIAT 00101.
683 <http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/343> (last accessed on 21 
September 2015). 
684 Asylum Instruction on Exclusion, p. 14.
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Article 1F cases are not automatically forwarded to the Crown Prosecution 
Service. Though several cases have been referred by the police, no convictionof 
such an alien has taken place until now. An alien against whom Article 1F 
is held and has been refused asylum is also excluded from humanitarian 
protection under paragraph 339C IR and is liable to be removed. Paragraph 
338 IR states that: ‘When a person in the UK is notified that asylum has been 
refused he may, if he is liable to removal as an illegal entrant, removal under 
section 10 of the IAA 1999 or to deportation, at the same time be notified of 
removal directions, served with a notice of intention to make a deportation 
order, or served with a deportation order, as appropriate’. An alien can 
be removed when he has no leave to remain, thus actually no permission 
to stay in the country, while deportation is often used for those who are 
criminally sentenced and actually means forced/escorted removal. The main 
difference between the terms has to do with their consequences. A person 
who is removed from the UK, can apply to return at any time, although 
depending on the situation, some people who are removed are prevented 
from returning to the UK for several years. A deported person is prohibited 
from re-entering the country for as long as the deportation order is in force 
and invalidates any leave to enter or remain in the UK given to him before the 
order was made. Accordingly a deportation order can apply to any foreign 
national in the UK even if they hold a valid visa.685 When the Secretary of 
State certifies under section 97A (1) of the NIA Act 2002 that the decision 
to make a deportation order has been made on national security grounds, a 
deportation order may be made before any appeal is disposed of. This section 
disapplies section 79 of the same Act which states that a deportation order 
cannot be made where an appeal can be brought or is pending. The decision 
to remove or deport the alien allows the authorities to detain the person 
untill the removal/deportation is actually carried out as a person is liable 
to detention pending his removal from the UK. Detention can be imposed 
under Schedule 2 of the IA 1971, which concerns situations in which leave to 
enter is refused (concerns examination and removal) and Schedule 3 of the 
IA 1971 with respect to deportation.686 The UK does not have a statutory 
time limit for aliens’ detention and is not bound by the Returns Directive as 
it has not opted into this area of Union law. However, the UK has to respect 
Article 5 ECHR on the right to liberty and security.687 Before the question 
685 In this report, I will in general use the term removal, unless it specifically concerns 
a forced removal which is to be noted with deportation. For more on removal and 
deportation see <http://www.communitylawservice.org.uk/images/uploadpics/removal_
and_deportation.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
686 When there is a power to detain, there is also a power to grant bail. Paragraph 22 
of Schedule 2 of the IA 1971 deals with the grant of bail pending examination and 
removal, see footnote 627. 
687 See S. J. Silverman & R. Hajela, ‘Briefing Immigration Detention in the UK’, 
University of Oxford, 6 February 2015.
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regarding removal comes up, decision makers must consider whether the 
applicant would qualify for a human rights claim and thus receive leave. 
§ 6.3 Leave (Human Rights Claim)
Where an applicant does not qualify for asylum or humanitarian protection, 
decision makers must consider whether the applicant would qualify under 
Article 8 ECHR. Among others, this question becomes relevant when the 
excluded alien has dependants in the UK and he is facing removal. These 
dependants may apply for asylum in their own right and such claims are 
considered on their merits. The AI on Exclusion prescribes that ‘where it 
is proposed to remove the principal applicant (who has been excluded) but 
to allow a dependant to stay (or where it is proposed to remove a dependant 
covered by the exclusion clauses but not to remove the principal applicant 
who is not excluded), consideration will need to be given to whether removal 
of the excluded person would be a breach of Article 8 ECHR’. Though under 
Article 8 (2) of the ECHR, interference in an existing family life can be 
justified on the grounds that it is necessary and proportionate in order to 
prevent crime, also other interests have to be weighed. Since 9 July 2012, 
the Immigration Rules include provisions on family and private life. It is 
laid down in the IR that ‘where the Secretary of State or an immigration 
officer is considering deportation or removal of a person who claims that 
their deportation or removal from the UK would be a breach of the right to 
respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR that person 
may be required to make an application under Appendix FM or paragraph 
276ADE, but if they are not required to make an application, Part 13 of these 
Rules will apply’.688
If an applicant does not qualify on Article 8 ECHR grounds either, the last 
step for the decision maker is to consider whether Restricted Leave (RL) 
should be granted. Excluded asylum seekers under Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention who cannot be immediately removed from the UK due to the 
non-refoulement principle as laid down in Article 3 ECHR, are from 2 
September 2011 on, dealt with under the Restricted Leave policy.689 This 
policy replaced the grant of Discretionary Leave (DL) for such individuals. 
Before dealing with Restricted Leave which is thus currently applicable, an 
overview will be given of the development of policy in the UK regarding those 
who are excluded but cannot be removed in which the Afghan hijackers case 
played a central role.
688 Paragraph 276ADE IR on private life and Appendix FM on family life are elaborated 
under § 6.3.6 and 6.3.7. Part 13 IR which concerns deportation and Article 8 ECHR 
will not be discussed as deportation is not particularly applicable to excluded asylum 
seekers under Article 1F. 
689 This policy was formerly known as the Restricted Discretionary Leave. 
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§ 6.3.1 The Afghan hijackers case
On 6 February 2000, a group of nine Afghan men fleeing the Taliban regime 
hijacked a Boeing 727 aircraft which had 180 passengers and seven crew 
members on board. Flight 805 was a domestic flight in Afghanistan, but 
the hijackers forced the crew to fly to Stansted Airport in Essex, England 
after stops in Tashkent, Aktobe and Moscow. The siege of the aircraft 
lasted until 10 February. Though they were convicted of hijacking and false 
imprisonment690 in 2001 and sentenced to five years imprisonment, their 
convictions were quashed by the Court of Appeal in 2003, because the trial 
judge’s summing up made an error in law which may have misdirected the 
jury. The hijackers sought asylum from the Taliban regime and in 2004 a 
panel of adjudicators ruled that the respondents had disqualified themselves 
from any entitlement to asylum by virtue of Article 1F (b) of the Refugee 
Convention and that removing the men to Afghanistan would breach their 
human rights in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998 as they risked 
being killed if they were returned. The Home Secretary did not grant the 
men Discretionary Leave in accordance with the Home Office policy in force 
at that time, but gave them permission to remain in the UK on temporary 
admission which placed restrictions on them such as not being able to work 
or obtain travel documents. The High Court declared the policy unlawful and 
ordered the Home Secretary to grant them Discretionary Leave. According 
to the High Court, the Home Office was making ‘an abuse of power by a 
public authority at the highest level’ by ignoring its own laws which had 
allowed the men to stay. The Secretary of State then appealed to the CoA 
challenging the High Court’s decision and arguing that the Home Office 
‘should have the power to grant only temporary admission to failed asylum 
seekers who are only allowed to stay in the UK due to their human rights’. 
On 4 August 2006, the CoA dismissed the appeal. The Court stated that the 
government’s actions lacked parliamentary authority and commented ‘so far 
as the powers of the Home Secretary are concerned, the challenges created 
by the respondent’s presence in this country have been apparent since they 
landed here over 6 years ago. There has been ample time for the Home 
Secretary to obtain appropriate parliamentary authority, if he wished to be 
clothed with the powers he gave himself without parliamentary sanction’.691  
When the Court of Appeal stated that the government lacked parliamentary 
authority, the Court was referring to the situation that temporary admission 
is linked to the power to detain. The Court held that ‘temporary admission 
is available, as an alternative to detention, for people who have arrived in 
690 False imprisonment is a common law felony and a tort and means the restraint of a 
person in a bounded area without justification or consent. 
691 S & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2006] EWCA Civ 1157, 4 
August 2006. 
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the UK, pending their examination by an immigration officer and pending 
a decision to grant or refuse them leave to enter. It is not intended for those 
who have been already examined by an immigration officer and refused leave 
to enter, but who have been found on appeal not to be removable, because 
removal would breach their human rights.692 Leave to enter must be granted 
to such people’. The ‘leave’ mentioned here is Discretionary Leave which was 
applicable at time of the ruling and will be discussed briefly in the following. 
Discretionary Leave
Since the abolition of ‘Exceptional Leave to Remain’ in 2003, there have 
been two possible types of leave granted following a successful human rights 
claim. These are humanitarian protection and Discretionary Leave which 
are granted under provisions of the IA 1971, allowing the Secretary of State 
to grant leave to a person for a reason not covered by the Immigration Rules. 
With the transposition of the Qualification Directive, the humanitarian 
protection has been consolidated in the IR and as seen earlier, a person is 
not eligible for humanitarian protection when he is excluded on the basis of 
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. Before the introduction of Restricted 
Leave on 2 September 2011, Discretionary Leave was granted to those cases 
in which return would breach Article 3 ECHR but where humanitarian 
protection was not applicable. 
Discretionary Leave is governed by the Home Office Asylum Policy 
Instruction on DL and is normally granted for three years.693 Exclusion cases 
belonged to one of the exceptions to this rule as in such cases leave for six 
months was issued which could be extended with the same time period, when 
necessary.694 Before extension, an active review took place to see whether the 
circumstances of the case had changed significantly. When it was decided 
that the alien did not qualify for further permission to stay in the UK, he/
she had the right to appeal against the decision. After completing ten years 
of Discretionary Leave, the excluded alien would be eligible to apply for 
settlement.695 Contrary to what is the case with the concept of temporary 
692 For more on temporary admission see Kotzeva, Murray & Tam 2008, pp. 394-398. 
693 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/257381/discretionaryleave.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
694 Leave granted for more than six months does not lapse on leaving the country, thus a 
person arriving in the UK with continuing leave does not require a new leave to enter. 
By granting Discretionary Leave for six months, it is not possible for the alien to travel 
in and out the country during this leave. 
695 Applications for indefinite leave to remain are made under paragraph 276B(i)(a) of 
the IR which relate to the ten years continuous lawful leave. After ten years of stay 
under Discretionary Leave, it was still possible that settlement would be denied in 
exclusion cases where the Minister decided that in light of all the circumstances of 
the case the person’s presence was not conducive to the public good. When it was 
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admission, those granted this leave are eligible to work and have access to 
public funds.
The case of the Afghan hijackers caused a widespread political controversy 
and received great attention in the media. The then Prime Minister of the 
UK, Tony Blair, called the ruling ‘an abuse of common sense’. The Home 
Secretary responded to the CoA’s judgment by saying, ‘I continue to believe 
that those whose actions have undermined any legitimate claim to asylum 
should not be granted leave to remain in the UK. I plan to bring forward 
legislation to do this as part of the early Bill to strengthen our immigration 
laws’. As the Home Secretary announced, the government included a part 
in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 which deals with a new 
immigration status for foreign criminals, named the Special Immigration 
Status. 
§ 6.3.2 Special Immigration Status
The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act696 is a wide-ranging part of 
legislation which covers several policy matters.697 The Act aimed at a simpler 
but more effective criminal justice system in the UK and led to important 
changes by, inter alia, creating new powers to deal with anti-social and 
violent behaviour and introducing a new community sentence for young 
offenders. The Act also includes clauses on pornography, offences relating 
to nuclear material and facilities and international cooperation in criminal 
matters. Relevant within the scope of this study is the introduction of the 
SIS for terrorists and serious criminals who cannot be removed from the 
UK for legal reasons. Part 10 of the Act gives effect to the Home Secretary’s 
commitment following the Afghan hijackers judgment of the CoA: introduce 
legislation to deny leave to enter or remain to certain foreign nationals who 
cannot be removed from the UK or in other words, not to provide a safe 
haven for foreign criminals and terrorists. 
According to clause 130 of the Act, the Secretary of State ‘may’ designate 
persons if they are foreign criminals who are liable to deportation but who 
not possible to remove the person, a further period of Discretionary Leave would be 
granted. In such cases, a new decision had to be taken every three years in order to 
decide whether settlement should continue to be denied. For more on the ‘ten years 
long residence rule’ see § 6.3.5. 
696 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/4/contents> (last accessed on 21 
September 2015).  
697 On 26 June 2007 the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill was introduced into the 
House of Commons in the 2006/07 Parliamentary session by the Minister of State 
for Justice, David Hanson. The Bill was referred to committee and carried over to the 
2007/08 session. It was reintroduced into the House of Commons by the Secretary of 
State for Justice (Jack Straw) on 7 November 2007.
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cannot be removed as that would breach their rights under the ECHR. Also 
the family members of these foreign criminals may be designated if they did 
not make a claim on their own. Clause 131 of the Act states three categories of 
foreign criminals for these purposes among which those to whom Article 1F of 
the Refugees applies.698 British citizens and others with the right of abode in the 
UK cannot be designated and there is no right of appeal against designation.699 
A designated person is not deemed to be granted leave and may not be granted 
temporary admission. Though these aliens are not in breach of UK immigration 
laws, time spent in the UK as a designated person may not be relied on by a 
person for the purpose of an enactment about nationality. It is also unlikely that a 
designated person would fall under the ‘long residence’ rule under which a person 
who has been in the UK continuously for twenty years may apply for settlement 
even if some or all of that period was without leave as settlement can in any case 
be refused on public interest grounds or following a criminal conviction.700 As 
the Secretary of State for Justice (Jack Straw) at that time explained, ‘the new SIS 
was to ensure that foreign criminals and terrorists who could not be deported 
could not expect a settled status in this country’. Thus, the main point of the 
status is not to grant leave merely as a result of the irremovability of foreign 
criminals which was the case under Discretionary Leave. Designated persons 
are subject to immigration control and not entitled to a number of benefits and 
tax credits. 
Though these persons are allowed to stay in the country and work, conditions 
can be imposed on them. The conditions which are listed under clause 133 
relate to residence, employment and reporting including the possibility of 
electronic monitoring. The breach of a condition without reasonable excuse is 
a criminal offence which can be punished with a fine of maximum £ 5000 and/
or imprisonment of 51 weeks. Though the SIS is distinguished from temporary 
admission, the conditions that can be imposed and the available sentences after 
a breach are quite similar to those in case of temporary admission. Designated 
persons, who would be destitute, are entitled to support similar to asylum 
seekers under section 95 of Part VI of the IAA 1999. For the purposes of section 
95 (3) IAA 1999 a person is considered to be destitute if a) he does not have 
adequate accommodation or any means of obtaining it (whether or not his other 
essential living conditions are met) or b) he has adequate accommodation or the 
means of obtaining it, but cannot meet his other essential living needs. Support 
can be provided in three ways, consisting of accommodation only, subsistence 
only (regular cash payments or both accommodation and subsistence.  
698 The other two categories are those convicted of a specified offence and sentenced to 
any period of imprisonment and those convicted of any offence and sentenced to two 
or more years imprisonment. 
699 EEA nationals and their family members could be designated, but only if the effect 
would not breach their rights under Community treaties. 
700 Research paper 07/65, House of Common Library, 9 August 2007, p. 106. 
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§ 6.3.2.1 Development of part 10 
During the second reading of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, 
which took place on 8 October 2007, Members of the Home Affairs Select 
Committee raised a number of concerns as expressed by several groups such 
as the Refugee Council which reported to find the creation of an additional 
form of status to be unnecessary, disproportionate and an inappropriate 
response. The Council stated that: ‘though the government accepts these 
persons cannot be removed safely or to do so would be disproportionate to 
their family life it seeks to punish them and put them in an economic limbo. 
The means already exist to carry out the governments objectives’.701 In 
accordance with these arguments of the Council, Member Heath expressed 
to find ‘it impossible to reconcile the government’s stated objective of 
simplifying immigration law and its introduction of an entirely new 
immigration status.702 Liberty (The National Council for Civil Liberties) 
questioned whether the conditions can be seen as a backdoor route to 
criminalisation, as breach of a condition will be a criminal offence. Liberty 
also raised a concern with respect to the fact that spouse and children can 
be imposed with conditions.703 With regard to the conditions attached to 
the SIS, the State Secretary stated during the reading that ‘one of the aims 
of imposing conditions was to prevent a foreign criminal from establishing 
links with this country which might constitute an additional obstacle to his 
eventual deportation and another was to maintain contact with him and his 
family until such time as removal was possible’. Another point of concern 
related to the designation of persons under the term ‘foreign criminal’. 
UNHCR questioned in its parliamentary briefing on the Bill whether it 
was appropriate to designate excluded aliens under Article 1F as foreign 
criminals.704 The criticism refers mainly to section 54 of the IAN Act 2006 
which according to the UNHCR leads to a broad interpretation of Article 1F 
(c) of the Refugee Convention. 
Irrespective of the raised concerns, the clauses on the introduction of the 
new immigration status were agreed without division and amendment. With 
the insertion of part 10 in the 2008 Act, the government got what it wanted: 
ensure that ‘foreign criminals’, including those who fall under Article 1F of 
the Refugee Convention, are not issued leave due to their irremovability. 
However, seven years have already passed since the Act received Royal 
701 Refugee Council Briefing Special Immigration Status, October 2007, p. 7.
702 Research Paper 07/93, House of Common Library, 19 December 2007, p. 30.
703 <http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy08/criminal-justice-and-
immigration-bill-second-reading-lords-january-2008.pdf> (last accessed on 21 
September 2015).  
704 <http://www.unhcr.org.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/UNHCRCommentson 
CJIBJuly07.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
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Assent, and part 10 has still not yet come into force. According to information 
from the Home Office, the SIS will no longer enter into force: ‘the Restricted 
Leave which replaced Discretionary Leave from 2 September 2011 on, can 
do the same job in a simpler fashion’ and is the current applicable policy on 
those who are excluded from protection under Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention which will be maintained.705 
§ 6.3.3 Restricted Leave
The UK Border Agency706 issued a policy statement on 2 September 2011 
setting forth that, ‘from 2 September 2011 on, all cases excluded from the 
protection of the Refugee Convention by virtue of Article 1F but who cannot 
be immediately removed from the UK due to Article 3 of the ECHR will be 
subject to a new, tighter, restricted leave policy’.707 In such cases, Restricted 
Leave is granted to remain for a period of six months at a time, with the 
option for renewal, with some or all of the following restrictions: a condition 
restricting the person’s employment, occupation or residence place, 
requirement to report regularly to an immigration officer and prohibiting 
the person to study at an education institution. 
The Asylum Policy Instruction on RL (AI on RL) provides clearance on the 
conditions which can be imposed.708 As mentioned above, those who are 
granted Restricted Leave are not allowed to start a study in the UK, which 
has to do with the temporary nature of the leave. Employment must be 
broadly interpreted and includes voluntary work. A person under this leave 
will normally be restricted in his right to work instead of totally denied.709 
705 The information is provided during an interview with a staff member of the Special 
Cases Unit at 22 April 2013.  
706 The UK Border Agency was the border control agency of the British government and 
part of the Home Office. It was formed as an executive agency on 1 April 2008 and 
on 26 March 2013, following a critical report into the agency’s incompetence by the 
Home Affairs Select Committee, it was announced by Home Secretary Theresa May 
that the UK Border Agency would be abolished and its work returned to the Home 
Office. Its executive agency status is removed as of 31 March 2013 and the agency is 
split into two new organisations; directorate UK Visas and Immigration responsible 
for deciding applications for leave to enter or remain in the UK, and ‘Immigration 
Enforcement’ is responsible for enforcing immigration law and removals. 
707 Article 1F related cases granted Discretionary Leave before 2 September 2011 remained 
on their existing leave until it was time for renewal. The renewal application was considered 
in line with the Asylum Instruction on Restricted Leave and granted Restricted Leave 
unless exceptional circumstances justify divergence from the published policy. 
708 Though the policy statement of September 2011 only concerned non-removable 1F 
applicants, the Asylum Policy Instruction on RL prescribes that also those who are 
refused under Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention, but cannot be removed due 
to refoulement should be granted RL. 
709 A total ban on work will be applied only in case of those posing a particularly high 
protection risk. 
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Work is permitted only with the consent of the Secretary of State which 
in practice means that the alien has to apply for consent to the designated 
case owner and provide the relevant details in order to ensure that a decision 
can be made. According to the AI, the presumption is that excluded persons 
should not be permitted to work or volunteer in a job which requires a 
Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) check,710 such as public sector jobs, 
healthcare and roles in the legal profession. Regardless of the question 
whether an employment condition is imposed or not, a case of an excluded 
asylum seeker who is granted Restricted Leave is referred to the DBS in 
order to let them consider whether the person is to be barred from working 
with children and vulnerable adults.711 If an alien is not able to work, he is 
entitled to claim standard benefits such as jobseekers allowance and housing 
benefit when he shows to be destitute. 
Though removal cannot be currently enforced regarding those who are 
granted Restricted Leave, they stay under review and will be removed at the 
earliest opportunity. Because of this, it is important for the authorities to know 
where the person is residing. The Asylum Policy Instruction on RL states 
that contact is maintained with the aliens who are free to reside where they 
want, but can be required to live in a specific area where the accommodation is 
publicly provided as well. Besides the condition to notify the Secretary of State 
of the home address and any change of address, aliens can also be obliged to 
request for prior consent to any change of address.712 To monitor whether the 
person complies with the conditions, random home visits may be used. 
All excluded aliens who are granted Restricted Leave have to report 
regularly to the Secretary of State, which is also a way of monitoring aliens. 
The frequency and location of the reporting centre depends on several 
factors, among others, the imminence of removal and the perceived risk of 
absconding. According to the Agency’s policy document, monthly reporting 
should be considered to be the normal standards for Restricted Leave cases, 
which can be modified up or down.  
710 This is the former Criminal Records Check. The merger of the Criminal Records 
Bureau with the Independent Safeguarding Authority in 2012 led to the Disclosure 
and Barring Service. 
711 <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/disclosure-and-barring-service/
about> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
712 As each case has to be considered on its own facts and risks, in case of residence, the 
risks the person concerned may have towards individuals in his close neighbourhood 
have to be taken into account. It is also imaginable that the person will not be granted 
permission to live in a locality where there is a significant community from the alien’s 
country of origin which could lead to problems if it becomes know that the person is 
living there.    
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The policy document also makes a note concerning the dependants of the 
excluded alien who is issued Restricted Leave. If family members are not 
granted protection in their own right, they will also fall under the Restricted 
Leave policy, with restrictions applied at a minimum level necessary to 
maintain contact with them and in case of children, the decision maker must 
pay attention to the impact the imposition of any condition on the excluded 
alien may have on them and decide what is appropriate in the particular case. 
When Restricted Leave is granted, an Immigration Status Document is 
issued to the person, which is accompanied by a letter stating the conditions 
and a statement that a failure to comply with a condition may lead to 
prosecution. If it appears from the review for renewal that the circumstances 
have changed and Article 3 ECHR forms no obstacle anymore, further leave 
will be refused and removal proceedings will begin.713 Pending removal, 
the person can be on temporary admission/release or bail. With respect to 
this, the same restrictions may be imposed on the alien as in case he would 
have a grant of leave to remain, except with regard to employment, which is 
prohibited when the alien has temporary admission/release or bail. 
§ 6.3.4 Comparison of different leaves regarding 1F714
Until the introduction of Restricted Leave in 2011, the solution of the UK 
government for those who are excluded under 1F but cannot be removed, 
was to provide Discretionary Leave. Those who were granted Discretionary 
Leave had no conditions attached to the leave and were free to work, travel, 
receive public funds/taxes and eventually claim settlement. The fact that 
these aliens were actually free to do as they liked, while at the same time 
they were denied protection because of excludable acts, was found to be 
inconsistent by the authorities. When the Court of Appeal in the Afghan 
hijackers case pointed to the government’s own policy stated to stick to it or 
change it and this led to action. Though the Special Immigration Status has 
been introduced and has become statutory, it is not in force and neither will 
it be in force. The Restricted Leave can be considered to be its replacement 
and is the current leave which is issued to those who are excluded but cannot 
be removed.    
Granting Restricted Leave for a period of six months, with the option for 
renewal is similar to Discretionary Leave which was previously granted to 
such excluded aliens. The difference of the new policy is, amongst others, 
that the alien does not have recourse to public funds, unless he is destitute 
and that now the same conditions may be imposed on the alien as determined 
in the SIS. The Special Immigration Status and Restricted Leave correspond 
713 The alien does have the right to appeal against the refusal to renew the leave.
714 Part 10 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 as well as the Asylum 
Policy Instructions on Restrictive and Discretionary Leave are annexed. 
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to each other as in both cases breach of a condition can lead to imprisonment 
and/or a fine715 and when family members are not eligible for asylum on their 
own merits, they fall under the derivative status of their spouse. Both are 
besides the group of non-removable 1F applicants also applicable on those 
to whom Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention applies. According to this 
provision, a refugee cannot benefit from the non-refoulement principle in 
Article 33 (1) of the Refugee Convention when there are reasonable grounds 
for regarding him as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or 
who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country. For the term ‘foreign 
criminal’ in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, alliance is sought 
under section 72 of the NIAA 2002 which is applicable for the purpose of 
the construction and application of Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention. 
More important is the underlying notion of the SIS and Restricted Leave to 
prevent a prospect for settlement. Besides the public interest and protection 
also upholding the rule of law at international level is one of the rationales 
for imposing conditions to excluded aliens. The explanation given for the 
latter reason is that it means that ‘the policy supports the principle that those 
excluded from refugee status, including war criminals, cannot establish a 
new life in the UK and supports our broader international obligations. It 
reinforces the message that our intention is to remove the individual from the 
UK as soon as is possible’.716 Designation under SIS would make it impossible 
to apply for settlement,717 while those who are granted Restricted Leave can 
formally apply for indefinite leave under the ten years long residence rule as 
was also the case under Discretionary Leave. However, as stated in the AI on 
RL, ‘it will only be in exceptional circumstances that a person on Restrictive 
Leave will be eligible for settlement, which are likely to be very rare’. 
715 Contrary to the SIS, no legislative change or the creation of a new status has taken 
place with respect to the power of attaching conditions under the Restricted Leave. 
This is based on section 3 (1) (c) of the IA 1971. It is laid down in the Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Act that the breach of a condition of those who are designated can 
be punished with a maximum sentence of 51 weeks of imprisonment and/or a fine 
of £ 5000. In case of Restricted Leave, the failure to observe a condition leads to an 
offence in the virtue of section 24 (1) (b) (ii) of the IA 1971 Act which can be punished 
with a fine of not more than £ 5000 and/or with imprisonment for not more than six 
months. 
716 Asylum Policy Instruction on RL, p. 3. 
717 An alien who had been given SIS status could not have applied for settlement, as 
time spent in the UK following service of notion of liability to removal or notice of 
intention to deport is not counted towards the years regarding the long residence rule 
as laid down in part 7 of the Immigration Rules. 
Chapter 6 Application of Article 1F: current  policies and  
their development in the UK
213
§ 6.3.5 Ten years continuous lawful residence
Excluded asylum seekers under Article 1F who are issued Restricted Leave, 
qualify for indefinite leave to remain in the UK on the ground of long 
residence as laid down in paragraph 276B of the Immigration Rules. This 
paragraph sums up requirements that the applicant must meet to be eligible 
as follows:
1)  he must have at least ten years continuous lawful residence in the UK;718
2)  there must be no reason why granting leave is against the public good;
3)  the applicant does not fall under the general grounds for refusal;
4)  the applicant must meet the knowledge of language and life requirement;719
5) the applicant must not be in breach of UK immigration laws.720  
The phrase ‘continuous residence’ under the first requirement is considered 
to be broken if the applicant has been absent from the UK for a period of 
more than six months at any one time or is absent from the UK for a shorter 
period but does not have valid leave to enter the UK on their return, or 
valid leave to remain on their departure from the UK or has spent a total 
of 18 months outside the UK throughout the whole ten year period. On the 
other hand, continuous residence is not considered broken if the applicant is 
absent from the UK for six months or less at any one time and had existing 
leave to enter or remain when they left and when they returned. This can 
include leave gained at port when returning to the UK as a non-visa national. 
With lawful residence is meant that the applicant, during his continuous 
residence, is in the possession of valid leave.721 
It is beyond all doubt that in the application of a 1F applicant, requirements 
two and three will cause difficulties and give the Secretary of State a reason 
to refuse indefinite leave. The second requirement states that having regard 
718 Applications which are received more than 28 days before the applicant completes 
the required qualifying period for long residence must be refused. This is because the 
applicant has not completed the required period of leave in the UK. The IR state that 
applicants who are refused under the Long Residence Rules, due to them submitting 
their application too early, can reapply once they have completed their qualifying 
leave or up to 28 days before this. If the applicant has one single short gap in lawful 
residence through making one single previous application out of time, by no more 
than 10 calendar days, and meets all the other requirements discretion might be used 
in favour of the applicant.
719 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/302681/20140410_Immigration_Rules_-_Appendix_KOLL_MASTER.pdf> 
(last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
720 Pursuant to paragraph 276B (v), the exception is that any period of overstaying for 
a period of 28 days or less will be disregarded, as will any period of overstaying 
between periods of entry clearance, leave to enter or leave to remain up to 28 days and 
any period of overstaying pending the determination of an application made within 
that 28-day period. 
721 See paragraph 276A IR.
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to the public interest, there must be no reason which makes it undesirable to 
grant the applicant indefinite leave. Factors to be taken into account by the 
Secretary of State are the applicant’s age, strength of connections in the UK, 
personal history,722 domestic circumstances, compassionate circumstances 
and any representations received on the person’s behalf. According to the 
Home Office’s Guidance on long residence, personal history goes beyond 
criminal convictions and allows consideration whether the applicant’s 
activities in the UK or abroad makes it undesirable to grant indefinite leave, 
which can include concerns about the applicant on the basis of national 
security, war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious criminality and other 
activities that make the applicant’s presence in the UK not conducive to the 
public good.723 Under the third requirement, an applicant must not fall under 
the general refusal grounds either.724 One of the grounds under which leave 
to remain should normally be refused is ‘the undesirability of permitting the 
person concerned to remain in the UK in the light of his conduct (including 
convictions which do not fall within paragraph 322 (1C)), character or 
associations or the fact that he represents a threat to national security’. 
Besides the ground of public interest, the language requirement may also 
be difficult to meet for the applicant as it is required that he has a speaking 
and listening qualification in English at B1 level or above of the Common 
European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR). Though it is 
finally the Secretary of State’s decision who will take into consideration all 
relevant factors of the case, which will vary in each situation, there is a big 
chance that an excluded asylum seeker under Article 1F will not be issued 
indefinite leave due to public interest.725 A refusal means, in concrete, that the 
applicant is not eligible for settlement under the ten year long residence rule 
and will continue to be issued Restricted Leave for six months at a time as 
long as there are no changed circumstances which lead to another outcome. 
Moreover, the applicant will be considered on the grounds to leave under 
paragraph 276 ADE IR, the right to remain on the grounds of private life.
722 Including character, conduct, associations and employment record.
723 Home Office, Long residence and private life, Guidance based on the IR (valid from 
11 November 2013). 
724 The general grounds for the refusal of entry clearance, leave to enter or variation of 
leave to enter or remain in the UK can be found in part 9 of the IR.
725 See N, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009] 
EWHC 1581, 3 April 2009 in which the judge expressed that: ‘Thus if someone has been 
here for ten years and subjected to a series of discretionary leaves for that period he will 
normally be able to remain here indefinitely. He will, after all, be expected by then to have 
made his life in this country, to have settled here, perhaps to have established family life 
here. The view is, again as it seems to me, entirely reasonably taken that generally speaking 
- and of course each case has to be considered on its own merits - such an individual will 
have leave to remain indefinitely and thus will be entitled to settle here’ (para. 22).
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§ 6.3.6 Leave to remain on private life  
From 9 July 2012 on, the Immigration Rules include specific provisions on how 
Article 8 ECHR considerations are to be applied in different types of cases 
of which paragraph 276 ADE is one. According to the authorities, previous 
versions of the IR had referred to the need to respect the ECHR, but had not 
sought to codify the factors relevant in Article 8 ‘balancing exercises’. This 
left a ‘vacuum’ that was considered to have been filled by the amendments. 
As is laid down in the Home Office’s Statement of Intent: Family Migration 
dated June 2012: ‘the new IR are intended to fill this public policy vacuum by 
setting out the Secretary of State’s position on proportionality and to meet 
the democratic deficit by seeking Parliament’s agreement to the Secretary of 
State’s policy. The rules will state how the balance should be struck between 
the public interest and individual rights, taking into account relevant case 
law, and thereby provide for a consistent and fair decision-making process. 
Therefore, if the rules are proportionate, a decision taken in accordance with 
the Rules will, other than in exceptional cases, be compatible with Article 8’.726 
As stated earlier, by now also the new Immigration Act 2014 contains a section 
on Article 8 ECHR. Section 19 inserts a part 5 to the NIAA 2002 including 
three new provisions. Considerations are listed which the court or tribunal has 
to take into account when considering the public interest question in all cases 
and additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals.
Before the changes of July 2012, there was legislation on settlement in the 
UK consisting of the ten years long residence and fourteen year rule. The first 
mentioned still exists and as discussed above, it is applicable to those who 
hold a valid leave to remain. The latter which was laid down under paragraph 
276B(i)(b) IR has been replaced and subsumed within the current paragraph 
276ADE IR on private life. From the 9th July 2012 on, no applications can be 
submitted under the fourteen year rule which was a type of amnesty which, 
subject to certain conditions, meant you could be granted settlement, even if 
you had an unlawful residence in the UK. This rule was a way out for many 
living illegally in the country, including those excluded asylum seekers under 
Article 1F in whose cases, refoulement did not form an obstacle for removal 
to their countries of origin, but who did not leave the UK anyway for some 
reason. A major change concerning the old fourteen year rule is that the 
period has been increased to twenty years of residence, whether lawfully or 
unlawfully. Thus, after twenty years of residence (not counting any period of 
imprisonment) an alien can apply for leave to remain in the UK on the basis 
of Article 8 ECHR, respect for private life.727
726 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/257359/soi-fam-mig.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
727 <http://www.freemovement.org.uk/new-rules-on-long-residence/> (last accessed on 
21 September 2015).  
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Paragraph 267A0 IR provides for a valid application made on the basis of 
private life to be waived where, among others, an Article 8 claim is raised as 
part of an asylum claim, or as part of a further submission, in person, after 
the asylum claim has been refused. The latter situation will often be the 
case of an excluded asylum seeker. In order to fulfil all requirements under 
paragraph 276ADE, the applicant must be suitable and eligible.728 First, it is 
considered whether the applicant falls under refusal on the basis of any of the 
suitability grounds set out in Sections S-LTR 1.2 to S-LTR 2.3 and S-LTR 
3.1 in Appendix FM. S-LTR.1.6 states that ‘the presence of the applicant in 
the UK is not conducive to the public good because their conduct (including 
convictions which do not fall within paragraphs S-LTR.1.3. to 1.5.), 
character, associations, or other reasons, make it undesirable to allow them 
to remain in the UK. Furthermore, ‘the consideration whether the presence 
of the applicant in the UK is not conducive to the public good any legal or 
practical reasons why the applicant cannot presently be removed from the 
UK must be ignored’.729 The refusal ground under S-LTR 1.6 is very similar 
to the public interest ground under the ten years rule and may again cause 
difficulties in the case of a 1F applicant. It is up to the Secretary of State 
to decide whether the grounds of suitability are met. According to section 
19 IA 2014, little weight should be given to a private life or a relationship 
formed with a qualifying partner, that is established by a person at a time 
when the person is in the UK unlawfully. Also little weight should be given to 
private life established by a person at a time when the person’s immigration 
status is precarious. If the Secretary of State believes that the conditions are 
met and the applicant has lived continuously in the UK for at least twenty 
years, the applicant will be granted limited leave to remain on the grounds 
of private life for a period not exceeding thirty months. As laid down in 
paragraph 276DE IR, a stay of ten years of limited leave on the grounds of 
private life will make an applicant eligible for indefinite leave. Thus, to receive 
settlement under private life, a person needs to spend a period of thirty years 
in the UK. If the requirements of private life under paragraph 276ADE are 
not met, there may be exceptional circumstances which would make refusal 
and the requirement for the applicant to leave the UK a breach of Article 
8.730 The Home Office’s Guidance on Long Residence and Private Life 
728 With regard to the eligibility grounds it should be mentioned that in addition to the 
twenty years residence rule, there are three more subsections, namely: those who are 
under the age of eighteen and have lived in the UK for at least seven years; aliens who 
are aged eighteen or above and under twenty-five and have devoted half their lives in 
the UK and those who are aged and above and have no ties with the country where he 
would be returned to. See Home Office, Long residence and private life, Guidance 
based on the IR (valid from 11 November 2013) for more on paragraph 276ADE IR.
729 S-LTR 3.1 Appendix FM.  
730 This is rarely applied as it is difficult for an applicant to fall under ‘exceptional 
circumstances’.  
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states that ‘exceptional’ means circumstances when refusal and therefore 
removal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the individual 
such that refusal of the application would not be proportionate under Article 
8. To decide whether a case is exceptional an overall consideration of the 
facts is made and all relevant factors are considered.731 Although under the 
Immigration Rules, family life and private life are considered separately and 
they are not cumulative, in the assessment whether there are exceptional 
circumstances which would make refusal of the application and removal 
from the UK a breach of Article 8, both family and private life are taken into 
account.732 
We have seen above that an excluded asylum seeker who cannot be removed 
and is issued Restricted Leave may qualify for indefinite leave after a lawfully 
stay of ten years in the UK. The refusal of such a claim means in concrete that 
he has to wait for another ten years in order to be considered under the claim 
on private life. Though in both cases the public interest question will most 
likely lead to refusal of the application, it is still up to the Secretary of State to 
make an overall assessment and decide on the question whether the presence 
of the alien is undesirable and may thus be refused. Besides the claim on 
private life, Article 8 also relates to family life. In the following I will focus 
on the question whether an excluded asylum seeker would qualify for leave 
to remain on the basis of family life, should he have residing dependants in 
the UK.  
§ 6.3.7 Leave to remain on family life
Rules on a claim with respect to family life are laid down in Appendix FM. 
As is stated in GEN.1.1., the route on family life is ‘for those seeking to enter 
or remain in the UK on the basis of their family life with a person who is 
a British Citizen, is settled in the UK, or is in the UK with limited leave as 
a refugee or person granted humanitarian protection (and the applicant 
cannot seek leave to enter or remain in the UK as their family member under 
Part 11 of these rules)’. The right to family life will mainly play a relevant 
role in the case of an excluded asylum seeker who is facing removal and has 
dependants in the UK from whom he does not want to be separated. The 
spouse and/or children who possibly travelled along with the 1F applicant 
often make an asylum application on their own merits and when it is 
731 See Home Office, Long residence and private life, Guidance based on the IR (valid 
from 11 November 2013) for a discussion on the relevant factors, pp. 62-64. 
732 It should be noted that in section 19 IA 2014 is laid down that, ‘in the case of a person 
who is not liable to deportation, the public interest ground does not require the 
person’s removal where the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship 
with a qualifying child and it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the 
UK. 
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accepted, they receive protection and be issued with leave. The suitability 
grounds which the applicant has to satisfy are similar to those regarding 
the right to private life. Thus, as discussed above, there is a big chance that 
the Secretary of State decides that the applicant’s presence in the UK is not 
conducive to the public good because of his 1F-background.733 If it is decided 
that the suitability grounds have been satisfied, there are also eligibility 
requirements which have to be fulfilled in order to obtain a positive claim. 
Among these are, the applicant must not be in the UK under a valid leave 
granted for a period of six months or less or in breach of immigration laws, 
unless paragraph EX.1. applies.734 In concrete this means that those excluded 
asylum seekers who cannot be removed from the UK due to refoulement 
and who have been issued Restricted Leave are not eligible for a claim on 
family life either, as Restricted Leave is granted for a maximum period of six 
months at a time. Excluded asylum seekers who are illegally residing in the 
country are in breach of immigration laws and are also not eligible for the 
right to family life. However, both may nevertheless be eligible to remain on 
family life grounds if: there is a genuine and subsisting parental relationship 
with a child in the UK who is under 18 and is a British citizen or has lived 
in the UK continuously for seven years prior to the application and it would 
not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the UK or they have a genuine 
and subsisting relationship with a partner in the UK who is a British citizen 
or settled in the UK or who has been given refugee leave or humanitarian 
protection and there are ‘insurmountable obstacles’ to family life continuing 
outside the UK. In paragraph EX.2. is laid down that ‘insurmountable 
obstacles’ means the very significant difficulties which would be faced by the 
applicant or their partner in continuing their family life together outside the 
UK and which could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship 
for the applicant or their partner.
In these cases, successful applicants are granted permission to work, but are 
likely to be subject to a ‘no recourse to public funds’ condition unless they 
provide evidence of exceptional circumstances (e.g. that they are destitute). 
They become eligible for indefinite leave to remain after ten years’ continuous 
lawful residence in the UK with temporary leave to remain. 
In the R (on the application of Nagre) v. SSHD case,735 the High Court 
dismissed a judicial review challenging the lawfulness of the amended 
Immigration Rules, in particular paragraphs 276ADE and section EX.1. 
According to the High Court, the amended Rules do not cover and provide 
for every conceivable case in which the Secretary of State may be found to be 
subject to an obligation under Article 8 to allow a foreign national to remain 
733 See S-LTR.1.6. Appendix FM IR. 
734 See E-LTRP.2.1. and 2.2.
735 R (on the application of Nagre) v. State Secretary for the Home Department, [2013] 
EWHC 720 (Admin), 28 March 2013. 
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in the UK, but that there is nothing untoward in this, and it would not be 
feasible to produce clear and simple Rules that did so. The Upper Tribunal 
acknowledged in the MF Nigeria case736 that the rules have legal effect not 
because they are law but because the legal structure of immigration appeals 
allows the rules a mandatory rank and, apart from discretion under them 
(i.e the rules), disallows judges from exercising a discretion differently from 
the Secretary State for the Home Department. It was explained that there 
was ‘nothing unlawful about’ the Secretary State’s publishing guidelines 
giving effect to Convention obligations. Likewise it was also lawful for 
aspects of the public interest to be accorded weighty reasons for justifying 
interference. In this case and also in the Izuazu Nigeria case,737 the Upper 
Tribunal confirmed the two-stage approach, which firstly concerns the 
application of the IR and secondly, the evaluation of Article 8 by ‘applying 
the criteria as established by law’. The Home Office also refers to the two-
stage approach when handling an appeal in family and private life cases. 
According to the Home Office this means that: first it must be considered 
whether the applicant meets the requirements of the rules, and if they do, 
leave under these rules should be granted. If not, the case worker must assess 
whether, based on an overall consideration of the facts of the case, there are 
exceptional circumstances. This is the case when refusal of the application 
would result in unjustifiable harsh consequences for the individual or their 
family such that refusal would not be proportionate under Article 8. If 
there are such exceptional circumstances, leave outside the rules should be 
granted. If not, the application should be refused.738 
In the preceding paragraphs an outline is given on the application of Article 
1F in the UK, with the main focus on the post-exclusion phase, thus the 
question what happens when an excluded asylum seeker cannot be returned 
due to refoulement. In order to complete the part on the UK, I will discuss 
case law on Article 1F in the following paragraph. Over the years, much 
jurisprudence has been developed on the application of the exclusion clauses 
of which some have already been discussed in the previous paragraphs. 
Besides the initial appeals against the refusal decisions, several topics relating 
736 MF Nigeria v. State Secretary for the Home Department [2012] UKUT 00393 (IAC), 
31 October 2012.
737 Izuazu Nigeria v. State Secretary for the Home Department [2013] UKUT 45 (IAC), 30 
January 2013, paras. 40-41.
738 On appeal from the Upper Tribunal in the MF Nigeria case, [2013] EWCA Civ 
1192, 8 October 2013, the solicitor on behalf of the Secretary of State made clear 
that the rules should be interpreted consistently with the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
The Court of Appeal agrees with this and stated that a weighing of the public interest 
in deportation against ‘other factors’ must be a reference to all other factors which 
are relevant to proportionality and entails an implicit requirement that they are to 
be taken into account. See also M. Gower, ‘Article 8 of the ECHR and immigration 
cases’, Home Affairs Section, Standard Note: SN/HA/6355, pp. 19-24. 
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to Article 1F were discussed in proceedings. The following paragraph will 
provide an overview of the most relevant judgments on some specific topics. 
§ 6.4 Case law 
The UK does not have a single unified legal system as England and Wales 
have one system, Scotland another, and Northern Ireland a third. There are 
exceptions to this rule among others with regard to immigration law: the 
Immigration and Asylum Chamber’s jurisdiction covers the whole of the 
UK. On 15 February 2010, the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the 
First-Tier Tribunal took over the functions of the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal.739 As there is also an Upper Tribunal, the UK returned to a two tier 
system as was the case before the establishment of the AIT in 2005.740 If a 
party wants to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, permission may be given by the 
First-Tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal itself. When at appeal, the Upper 
Tribunal deems that an error of law has been made in the decision of the 
First-tier Tribunal, it can substitute its own decision in place of it, or order 
the First-Tier Tribunal to redecide the appeal. Decisions from the Upper 
Tribunal may be challenged by an appeal to the Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) on a point of law for which permission is required either from the 
Tribunal or the appellate court itself. According to the Supreme Court, the 
grounds upon which permission may be granted in a second-tier appeal are 
that: ‘the proposed appeal would raise some important point of principle or 
practice or there is some other compelling reason for the relevant appellate 
court to hear the appeal’.741 The Supreme Court is the court of last resort and 
the highest appellate court which also deals with immigration cases. 
Decisions which can be appealed are set out in sections 82-83A NIAA 
2002. The refusal of asylum, whether based on Article 1F or not, is not an 
immigration decision for the purpose of section 82 and thus not appealable. 
An asylum applicant will have the right to appeal under this section only if 
the refusal is accompanied by a relevant immigration decision or when an 
immigration decision is made at a later date. Though such appeals are usually 
made to the Tribunal, there are cases when an appeal lies to the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission instead. These cases concern national 
security and can relate to exclusion (both the ban and 1F), refusal of entry as 
an asylum seeker, deportation or appeals against deprivation of nationality. 
The Secretary of State is allowed to issue a certificate under section 97 NIA 
2002 when an appeal is pending before the Tribunal whereby the case is 
transferred to the SIAC. The Commission can hear appeals on the same 
739 This is based on the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
740 Before 2005 a two tier system existed with the right to an appeal to adjudicators who 
were appointed by the Secretary of State with the right of subsequent appeal to the 
AIT.
741 Clayton 2014, pp. 213-214. 
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grounds as those which may come up in the Tribunal. If the Commission 
accepts a submission from the Secretary of State that it is necessary to rely 
on closed material (which would be against the public interest to disclose), 
it has the power to exclude anybody from a hearing, including the applicant 
and their representative. Decisions from the SIAC can be appealed to the 
Court of Appeal on a point of law.742 The latter happened in the case of ZZ v 
SSHD743 which led to a request for a ruling of the European Court of Justice on 
the matter. The Court of Appeal asked whether it was permissible for SIAC 
not to disclose to applicant the essence of the grounds which constituted the 
basis of the decision to refuse him entry to the UK. First, the court ruled 
that national security could not be used to deny a deportee the essence of the 
right to reasons and to appeal under articles 30 and 31 of the EU Citizens’ 
Directive 2004/38. Second, the court stated that the national court must have 
power to examine all the grounds and related evidence against the deportee. 
Third, the national court can, in exceptional cases, order non-disclosure 
of grounds and evidence to the deportee, if the state proves that disclosure 
would in fact compromise state security and be disproportionate. Fourth, 
that the essence of the grounds for deportation must always be disclosed to 
the deportee in the appeal proceedings. This disclosure must be made in a 
manner that respects the confidentiality of the underlying evidence.744
Minors and exclusion
With regard to children, there cannot be ‘serious reasons for considering’ 
that a child has committed an international crime if that child is under the age 
of criminal responsibility which is ten years. The guidance of the Secretary 
of State for the Home Department in relation to young persons and children 
states that: ‘though children are not exempt from the exclusion clauses,745 it 
is important that the State Secretary carefully considers the specific context 
of each case, for example the child’s age and maturity, when considering 
how far the individual should be deemed liable for their actions. It is always 
important to treat each case on its merit. Personal circumstances, such as age 
or psychological functioning, may be relevant when investigating the level 
of knowledge a person had of what they were participating in as well as the 
child’s ability or power to take alternative action’.746 
Though it only happens rarely that a minor is excluded from protection 
under Article 1F, there have been a few cases. The R (ABC a minor) v. 
742 Idem, pp. 218-221.
743 ECJ 4 June 2013, ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, App. No. 
C-300/11. 
744 <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/case-watch-national-security-
secrets-and-deportation> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
745 See paragraphs 351 and 352ZC IR with regard to unaccompanied asylum seekers.
746 Guidance of the Secretary of State for the Home Department in relation to young 
persons and children, § 17.3. 
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SSHD747 case concerned an Afghan national who arrived in the UK at the age 
of fourteen. His asylum application was refused on the ground that he was 
alleged to have committed a serious crime whilst in Afghanistan and he was 
also refused Discretionary Leave. The decision was issued in three separate 
letters in which the decision to refuse Discretionary Leave was somewhat 
modified in the third letter. It was decided that it was unsafe to remove him 
to his country of origin at present, but that the decision would be reviewed 
every six months by the Secretary of State. The applicant was sixteen at the 
time of the proceedings before the High Court which he asked for a judicial 
review regarding the decisions to refuse asylum and issue a six months 
renewable leave to remain. According to the court ‘a starting point must be 
a correct analysis of the law in this country and the country where the crime 
is said to have occurred. The individual factual matrix of the alleged crime 
must be examined with care and the age and circumstances of the alleged 
offender are also important. The likely punishment, if found guilty, is also 
to be considered. The court also regarded it as being important that the 
minister keeps a sense of proportion and balance about the case. It is only 
when the matter has been examined in this way may the decision be regarded 
as lawful’. The court found that the decision to exclude the youngster and 
refuse asylum was not lawful as in this case ‘there was simply no coverage, 
let alone analysis, of the culpability of the claimant, or even reference to the 
guidance of the Secretary of State herself as stated above’. With regard to the 
question of the grant of six monthly periods of Discretionary Leave, the court 
judged again against the state. The welfare of the applicant (minor), ‘now 
sixteen and estranged from well-disposed members of his family (including 
and especially his mother) had not been pivotal when the decision to grant 
six month reviews had been taken. The court reasoned that the strain of not 
knowing whether he would face removal every six months was not in the 
best interest of a sixteen year old. The court also found that if the applicant 
were to have a fair trial for any alleged crime it should be conducted within 
a reasonable time. Since it would breach his Article 3 rights to return him 
immediately, the decision to review the case every six months is ‘contributing 
to the unfairness of potential future proceedings in Afghanistan’.
Membership of a terrorist organisation
The Gurung judgment, which is mentioned earlier in this chapter has 
precedent value as a starred determination for the purpose of giving clarity 
regarding the exclusion clauses. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal dealt 
with several aspects regarding the clauses in its judgment, including the 
question whether mere membership at the time of the commission of acts 
or crimes proscribed by Article 1F is enough to conclude that an appellant 
747 R (on the Application of ABC (A Minor) (Afghanistan) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department) [2011] EWHC 2937.
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should be excluded under this provision? The tribunal referred to the line of 
tribunal case law to the effect that mere membership of such organisations 
is not enough and highlighted two further principles.748 The tribunal 
expressed agreement with the formulation in an UNHCR document that 
where there is sufficient proof that an asylum seeker belongs to an extremist 
international terrorist group such as those involved in the 11 September 
attack, ‘voluntary membership could be presumed to amount to personal 
and knowing participation, or at least acquiescence amounting to complicity 
in the crimes in question’.749 The AIT observed that it was necessary, in order 
to adequately reflect the realities of modern-day terrorism, that complicity 
in this type of case should be sufficient to bring an appellant within the 
exclusions: the terrorist acts of key operatives are often possible only by virtue 
of the infrastructure of support provided by other members who themselves 
undertake no violent actions. The second principle was that ‘whilst 
complicity may arise indirectly, it remains essential in all cases to establish 
that the appellant has been a voluntary member of such an organisation who 
fully understands its aims, methods and activities, including any plans it has 
made to carry out acts contrary to Art 1F’. By way of illustration, the tribunal 
drew a contrast between the provision of a safe house for LTTE combatants 
and the transporting of explosives for them in circumstances where it must 
have been known what they were to be used for.750 
Thus, following the previous case law, mere membership of a proscribed 
terrorist organisation was not sufficient to justify exclusion unless the 
organisation is so extreme that voluntary membership could be presumed to 
amount to at least acquiescence amounting to complicity.
In MH (Syria), DS (Afghanistan) v. SSHD,751 the appellant (MH) appealed 
against a decision of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal dismissing her 
asylum appeal. The appellant had been a member of the PKK, a proscribed 
organisation under the Terrorism Act 2000, for eleven years. She had 
worked as a nurse and engaged in other non-violent activities during that 
time. Dismissing her asylum appeal, the tribunal found that there were 
serious reasons for considering that she had been guilty of acts contrary to 
748 See for instance the PKK Omer Dogan case, No. 11793, 10 January 1995 in which the 
AIT decided that it is an error of law to exclude a person simply for their connections 
with a group or organisation, as the question of exclusion must be decided in reference 
to the individual and not the organisation.  
749 UNHCR Addressing Security Concerns without Undermining Refugee Protection: 
UNHCR’s Perspective, 29 November 2001, para. 18.
750 Paras. 104-108 of the judgment.
751 MH (Syria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department: DS (Afghanistan) v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, [2009] EWCA Civ 226CA (Civ Div226), 24 March 
2009.
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the purposes and principles of the UN, so that she was excluded by article 
1F (c) of the Convention.752 The Court of Appeal judged that the tribunal 
had failed to apply the guidance in Gurung as explained above. MH had been 
only thirteen when she joined the PKK and her activities for the organisation 
were relatively minor. Further, there was no suggestion that the PKK fell 
at the extreme end of the continuum referred to in Gurung where mere 
membership might be sufficient to establish complicity in the acts of an 
organisation.
The question with regard to the second applicant, DS, in the case concerned 
one of complicity which will be dealt with in the following. 
752 The tribunal’s reasoning on the asylum appeal No. 5: “… [W]e find that there are 
serious reasons for considering that the appellant has been guilty of acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations (Article 1F (c)). The appellant had 
voluntarily become a member of the PKK in 1993 and this is an organisation whose 
main aim is to set up an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. The PKK is 
involved in illegal military operations and is proscribed by the UK as a terrorist group 
by Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The appellant left school when she was 
12 years old but after meeting Abdullah Ocalan, she decided to join the PKK after 
attending a ceremony when two of her cousins who had been killed as guerrillas were 
declared as national heroes. Although the appellant was still young at the time, she 
was elected to carry a banner in a large demonstration in support of El-Assad who in 
turn was supported by the PKK. During this demonstration the appellant was beaten 
by security officers after which she left the PKK. The PKK wanted them to be armed 
and she volunteered for this. She passed over into Iraq at the beginning of 1994. The 
appellant had a duty of resolving disputes on behalf of the PKK and in 1996 after 
three months training in first aid, she became an assistant/nurse in the hospital in 
the camp. She found she was suitable for this particular duty as she was not afraid 
of handling injured people. The appellant then visited PKK camps in the mountains 
to make them more informed about the guerrillas’ situation in the mountains. 
She visited a hospital there, which was particularly educational for her. We found 
that although the appellant did not have a high level role in the PKK, she was fully 
aware at the time of the activities of the PKK and from her SEF statement, there is 
no indication that she was unhappy about her role with the PKK and supporting 
it through her duties. It was during a visit to the Shehid Ayhan camp, that she got 
caught up in a clash between the Turkish security forces and the PKK after which she 
received severe injuries from a mine in November 1997. Until this point the appellant 
was a voluntary member of the PKK and had personal knowledge of their activities 
which involved illegal military operations and she supported their infrastructure for 
this by her nursing the wounded and other duties. The appellant did not ask to resign 
from the PKK until 2003. Although it had been decided in 1996 that she would not 
be a fighter she contributed to the PKK by other means. The burden of proof is on the 
respondent to show that there are serious reasons for considering that the appellant 
has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
and we find that by her involvement with the PKK, that she is therefore excluded by 
Article 1F (c) from benefiting from the 1951 Convention for refugees.” 
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Complicity
As discussed above, the test for complicity as expressed in JS (Sri Lanka) 
is that Article 1F will apply if there are serious reasons for considering 
that the individual has voluntarily contributed in a significant way to the 
organisation’s ability to pursue its purpose of committing war crimes, 
aware that the assistance will in fact further that purpose. In MH (Syria) and 
DS (Afghanistan) v. SSHD [2009] the Secretary of State sought to exclude 
DS under Article 1F (a) because of various senior positions he had held 
within the KhAD (the intelligence service of the communist government 
in Afghanistan in the late 1980’s). The Court found that the evidence did 
not establish that the KhAD had committed widespread torture or killings 
directed at the civilian population and that these acts did not fall under 
crimes against humanity to the international statutes. This is why DS’s 
asylum claim could not be excluded under clause (a). The Court also rejected 
an argument that the judge should have considered whether any of the other 
exclusion clauses applied, even though the Secretary of State had not sought 
to rely on the, as it was not obvious that they applied.753 
In SK (Zimbabwe) v. SSHD the female applicant had been involved in farm 
invasions in Zimbabwe and the question was whether her participation in 
them made her criminally responsible. The Upper Tribunal states to accept 
the generality of the evidence, and specifically that no one was murdered. 
Also that she was a lesser participant, and that others, below the ringleaders, 
were more active and brutal. However, the Tribunal expressed that the 
appellant was not merely present. She was on each occasion a voluntary, 
even if reluctant, actual and active participant in beatings; even taking her 
evidence at face value, beating many people hard as part of the aim of driving 
them away. She specifically tried to demonstrate her loyalty to Zanu-PF 
in her actions. According to the judges, applicant was plainly criminally 
liable on a joint enterprise domestic law basis. Furthermore, ‘if there is an 
additional requirement that, in these circumstances, there be a substantial 
contribution to the crime, we consider that she provided it. That expression 
is not intended to exclude all but ringleaders and major participants. Each 
of those who guard extermination camps, for example, make a substantial 
contribution to genocide’.754 In the AA (Iran) v. SSHD case, the Court of 
Appeal found the applicant to be complicit: ‘even though he had not himself 
tortured or abused civilians, as a long-serving local commander of the Bassij, 
on his own evidence he had handed individuals over knowing that they 
would be seriously ill-treated and ‘closed his eyes’ to abuses by others. He 
753 The exclusion net, ‘Joe Middleton on recent exclusions under the Refugee 
Convention’, 29 May 2009. http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/nlj/content/exclusion-
net (last accessed on 21 September 2015). 
754 SK (Zimbabwe) v. State Secretary for the Home Department, [2010] UKUT 327 (IAC), 
15 September 2010, paras. 41-44.
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had seen the injuries resulting from torture and beatings and had felt uneasy 
but continued to hand over people’.755   
Detention pending removal 
Excluded asylum seekers in whose case the ECHR no longer plays anymore 
or did not play any role, do generally not qualify for leave to enter or remain 
in the UK and ought to be returned to their country of origin. These aliens 
may be detained pending arrangements for the removal under Schedule 2 of 
the IA 1971. Schedule 3 of the same Act, concerns detention in the case of 
deportation. In the R (Hardial Singh) v. Governor of Durham Prison756 case 
important principles regarding the use of powers to detain someone for 
immigration purposes are set out, which have become known as the Hardial 
Singh principles: ‘the Secretary of State must intend to deport or remove the 
person and can only use the power to detain for that purpose; the detainee 
may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances; 
if, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the 
Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation or removal within 
a reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention; 
the Secretary of State should act with all diligence and expedition to effect 
removal. Thus, while the power given to the Secretary of State to detain 
aliens is not subject to an express time limit, it is set to be bound by these 
principles.757 After the Hardial Singh case, several judgments with respect 
to the question whether detention pending removal was lawful are passed, 
including those concerning the duration of the detention. Accordingly, it 
is amongst others decided, that the phrase ‘pending removal’ in paragraph 
16 (2) of Schedule 2 of the IA 1971 means ‘until removal’. If the Secretary 
of State continues to order the removal of the detainee, then they can 
continue to be detained until their removal was possible.758 According to 
the High Court, the continued detention of a failed asylum seeker, who 
had already spent over 21 months in detention, would be unlawful due to 
being unreasonable and disproportionate in cases of low risk of reoffending. 
Especially when there was uncertainty over the length of time of further 
detention. A high risk of absconding could be solved by applying appropriate 
conditions of reporting such as electronic tagging.759 In the Stephen Masimba 
Kambadzi case, the Supreme Court decided that failures by the UK Border 
Agency to conduct regular reviews of detention, regardless of whether that 
755 Clayton 2014, p. 478.
756 R (Hardial Singh) v. Governor of Durham Prison, [1984] 1 All ER 983, [1984] 1 WLR 
704, [1983] Imm AR 198, 13 December 1983.
757 As well as by Article 5 (1) (f) ECHR. 
758 R (on the application of Khadir) v. State Secretary for the Home Department, [2005] 
UKHL 39; [2006] 1 AC 207.
759 See inter alia, R (on the application of A (Iraq)) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, [2010] EWHC 625 (Admin), 19 February 2010.
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review would have led to release, made the detention unlawful. This was 
so even though there had been no breach of the Hardial Singh principles.760 
According to the Supreme Court, these principles which are still in place, 
should not be applied rigidly; specific circumstances to the case must be 
taken into account.761 
§ 6.5 Conclusion 
The exclusion clauses under Article 1F attracted interest in the UK after the 
attack on the Twin Towers in the USA. From 2002 on, the government took 
various steps, such as publishing a white paper in which it announced that the 
UK should not provide a safe haven for war criminals or those who commit 
crimes against humanity and set up a Special Cases Unit which is responsible 
for investigating matters concerning national security and international 
crimes. Several Acts contain relevant provisions in relation to the application 
of Article 1F, including the Human Rights Act 1998, Refugee or Person in 
Need of International Protection Regulations 2006 and the Immigration 
Rules. The assessment of exclusion is part of the asylum proceedings as 
prescribed in part 11 of the IR and an inclusion before exclusion approach 
is formally directed by the government. An alien who is excluded under 1F 
does not qualify for a refugee status or humanitarian protection. Though 
refusal makes a person liable to removal, it has to be examined whether the 
alien would qualify for a human rights claim. 
With regard to those excluded asylum seekers who cannot be removed due 
to Article 3 ECHR several developments occurred during the past years in 
which the judiciary also played an important role. In the S & Other v. SSHD 
case (known as the Afghan hijackers case) the hijackers were refused asylum 
and Article 3 ECHR was an obstacle for removal. When the Home Secretary 
did not grant these men Discretionary Leave in accordance with the Home 
Office policy at that time, but gave them permission to remain in the UK 
on temporary admission, the High Court and Court of Appeal blew the 
whistle on the Home Secretary. The CoA stated that the government lacked 
the parliamentary authority to do so, as temporary admission is available as 
an alternative to detention for people who have arrived in the UK and are 
awaiting their proceedings. According to the court, those whose asylum 
case has already been examined and were found not to be removable due 
their human rights, cannot be left to live in limbo. This judgment caused a 
widespread political controversy and it led to action on the part of the UK 
Home Secretary. The government wanted to change the situation whereby 
760 Shepherd Masimba Kambadzi v. State Secretary for the Home Department, [2011] 
UKSC 23, 25 May 2011. 
761 Walumba Lumba v. State Secretary for the Home Department; Kadian Mighty v. State 
Secretary for the Home Department, [2011] UKSC 12, 23 March 2011.
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excluded asylum seekers who could not be removed were free to do as they 
liked and received settlement. Therefore, it introduced the SIS for terrorists 
and serious criminals, including excluded asylum seekers under Article 1F, 
who cannot be removed from the UK. An alien who is so designated is not 
granted leave and may not be granted temporary admission. Nevertheless, 
he has certain rights which can be restricted with imposed conditions 
regarding work, reporting and residence. Though the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act received Royal Assent in 2008, part 10 on the Special 
Immigration Status has not come into force yet. Currently, Restricted Leave 
is issued to those who are excluded but cannot be removed due to refoulement. 
From 2 September 2011 on, Restricted Leave replaced Discretionary Leave 
with the main difference that as is determined with regard to the SIS, also 
under Restricted Leave, conditions may be imposed on the alien. In addition, 
Restricted Leave is issued for a period of six months and after at least ten 
years continuous lawful residence in the UK, an excluded asylum seeker may 
qualify for settlement. Among the requirements of this rule are that there 
must be no reason why granting a permanent permit is against the public 
good and that the applicant does not fall under the general grounds for 
refusal. The public interest ground will present difficulties in the application 
under this rule, but at the end it is up to the Secretary of State to make a final 
decision after considering all fact of the day of the case. 
Besides Article 3, Article 8 ECHR is often at stake in the case of an excluded 
asylum seeker, particularly when the alien is facing removal and has 
dependants in the UK. From July 2012 on, the IR include specific provisions 
on how Article 8 ECHR considerations are to be applied in different types 
of cases. The fourteen year rule which existed alongside the ten years long 
residence rule has been replaced and subsumed within the current paragraph 
279ADE IR on private life which increased the period of residence, whether 
lawfully or unlawfully, up to twenty years. The claim on family life is laid down 
in Appendix FM. Both claims require the person to satisfy the suitability and 
eligibility grounds which, inter alia, state that the presence of the applicant in 
the UK is not conducive to the public good because their conduct, character, 
associations, or other reasons, make it undesirable to allow them to remain 
in the UK. Like under the ten years long residence rule, the public interest 
ground will raise difficulties in such applications and outweigh the family or 
private life of the alien. Also the Immigration Act 2014 contains a section 
on Article 8 ECHR in which  considerations are listed which the court 
or tribunal has to take into account when considering the public interest 
question in all cases and additional considerations in cases involving foreign 
criminals. When a person does not satisfy the requirements as laid down in 
the IR and is refused leave on the basis of Article 8 ECHR, the Secretary of 
State still has discretion powers to grant leave outside the rules. 
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Chapter 7  Comparison on the application of  
Article 1F in the Netherlands and the UK
§ 7.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters dealt with the application of Article 1F in the 
Netherlands and the UK. I have tried to reflect on my understanding of the 
provision by stating, inter alia, how these countries have developed their policy 
on 1F, how their assessment of exclusion takes place and I have especially 
focused on the question what the practice is regarding excluded asylum 
seekers who cannot be removed due to refoulement. Though both countries 
ratified the Refugee Convention shortly after its date of commencement, 
there is a difference in the periods adopting legislation on asylum. The Aliens 
Act 1965 of the Netherlands contained a special asylum procedure, including 
a provision on Article 1F, while the UK did not apply detailed legislation on 
asylum until 1993. Until 1993, the provisions of the Convention were factors 
to be taken into account, but not directly enforceable as they had not yet been 
incorporated yet into domestic law. Both countries as being EU Members 
States, have implemented the relevant asylum Directives of the first phase 
into their domestic legislation, including the Qualification Directive which 
gives a definition of the term ‘refugee’ and states who is to be excluded from 
protection. Contrary to the Netherlands, the UK government chose not to 
participate fully in the reform process which led to recasts.762 This means 
that the UK remains bound by the first-phase instruments.763 
The exclusion clauses drew political attention in the Netherlands at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The arrival of Afghan asylum seekers (mainly 
KhAD/WAD members) who served during the communist regime in 
Afghanistan and were the oppressors of the first influx of asylum seekers, 
raised questions. It finally led to the official report of 2000 on the KhAD/
WAD which is a main part of the basis of the policy/legislation development 
regarding Article 1F. Excluded asylum seekers in the Netherlands do not only 
consist of Afghan men. However, as everything still revolves around the ex-
KhAD/WAD members and their families, they have a decisive role in the 1F 
discussion. The discussion in the UK about 1F started almost a decade later. 
The provision became the centre of interest in the UK from 2002 onwards. 
762 See Chapter 3 on the EU legislation for an elaboration regarding the Asylum 
Directives. 
763 With regard to the exclusion and revocation clauses of the recast Qualification 
Directive can be mentioned that no amendments have been made to Articles 12, 14, 
17 and 19. Also Article 21 on protection of refoulement is unmodified.
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The white report ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’ in response to the attack on 
the Twin Towers, the Gurung judgment and later on the Afghan hijackers 
case have all contributed to the policy development. 
Both countries have a very clear common goal, which is that ‘they do not want 
to provide a safe haven for war criminals or those who commit crimes against 
humanity’. This raises the question, how do they interpret this common goal. 
In the following paragraphs, the two countries will be compared with regard 
to a number of relevant aspects relating to exclusion in order to gain an 
insight into the similarities and disparities in the way they deal with the issue. 
The aspects which will be discussed are the assessment of exclusion, practice 
regarding those who are unremovable, in other words the post-exclusion 
phase, and the role of Article 8 ECHR, after which a conclusion will follow. 
§ 7.2 Assessment of exclusion 
In the Netherlands as well as in the UK, the decision on exclusion is taken as 
part of the regular asylum determination process. Though both countries 
follow the approach that ‘when a person falls under the exclusion clauses, 
he should be excluded’, their policy differs when Article 1F is involved in the 
RSD. In the Netherlands, an asylum application is first tested against Article 
1F instead of Article 1A of the Refugee Convention, the so-called ‘exclusion 
before inclusion’, while the UK formally applies ‘inclusion before exclusion’.764 
As explained by the Tribunal in the Gurung case, ‘only such an approach 
can ensure that at any further appeal stage the Secretary of State’s overall 
position will be known’.765 This practice is in accordance with the UNHCR’s 
line of thought which states that such an approach, inter alia, enables a fuller 
understanding of the circumstances. According to the Netherlands, there is 
nothing stated in the Refugee Convention which indicates that Article 1A 
should be dealt with first. The highest administrative court supports this 
view and finds that ‘the serious character of Article 1F makes it necessary to 
find out first whether the Refugee Convention is applicable before looking 
at the question whether there is a matter of persecution in the sense of the 
Convention’.766 
764 Though the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion states that inclusion before exclusion 
applies, information provided by the Special Cases Unit shows that when it is obvious 
that Article 1F applies, there is no further consideration given to the question whether 
the person falls under the refugee definition of the Refugee Convention: he is then 
excluded and ECHR matters are checked in order to see whether there is an obstacle 
for removal.
765 Gurung case, para. 148.
766 Kosar 2013, pp. 95-101.
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The Netherlands has drawn up the exclusion clauses in its domestic law as is 
laid down in the Refugee Convention and follows the UNHCR interpretation. 
With regard to the UK the implementation of the Qualification Directive 
into domestic law, the addition to clause (b): ‘which means the time of issuing 
a residence permit based on the granting of refugee status; particularly cruel 
actions, even if committed with an allegedly political objective, may be 
classified as serious non-political crimes’, has been adopted.767 Thus, a person 
who commits a serious non-political crime whilst applying for asylum and 
before being granted a residence permit in the UK, could also be excluded 
under Article 1F (b) which is a different approach than that from the UNHCR 
as according to the UNHCR ‘admission...as a refugee’ does not refer to the 
period in the country prior to recognition as a refugee and sees admission 
in this context as the mere physical presence in the country. Though the 
Qualification Directive has an addition to clause (b), as it is based on a full 
and inclusive application of the Refugee Convention, the general thought is 
that clause (b) should be applied in line with the UNHCR’s interpretation. 
While the Netherlands hardly uses clause (c) as an independent ground,768 
the UK broadened the scope of this clause in virtue of Article 54 (2) IAN Act 
2006. However, according to the Supreme Court, an appropriately cautious 
and restrictive approach of the UNHCR Guidelines on clause (c) should be 
followed.
Both countries have a special unit to investigate 1F cases, thus when an alien 
is heard as a result of his asylum application and information is brought up 
which might be interesting within the scope of the exclusion clauses, the 
case will be referred to the special units for investigation. The unit in the 
Netherlands is called the 1F-unit and focuses only on the exclusion clauses, 
while the Special Cases Unit in the UK is responsible for a broader work 
area. Besides 1F, also others matters concerning counter terrorism, national 
security and extremism are investigated by the unit. The specially trained 
officials are capable of formulating questions which go into particulars to 
find out whether the person has participated in a certain international crime. 
The information given by the alien, in combination with the country of origin 
data from the unit in question, will eventually lead to a decisive answer with 
respect to the investigation.769     
767 Article 1F (b) of the Refugee Convention reads as: ‘he has committed a serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as 
a refugee’. 
768 Article 1F (c) of the Refugee Convention reads as: ‘he has been guilty of acts contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the UN’. Until 2006, clause (c) was not used as an 
independent grounds but mostly in combination with clause (a). After the change of 
policy in 2006, it has only been applied in two cases. 
769 Moore & Van Wijk 2015, pp. 94-95.
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The ‘data’ as mentioned above are collected by the Country of Origin 
Information Service in the UK and the Asylum and Migration Affairs 
Division and the Country and Language Information Unit in the Netherlands, 
respectively.770 The Netherlands knows country reports which contain e.g. 
regular and individual reports, while the UK has, inter alia, Operational 
Guidance Notes and the Country of Origin Information Reports.771 The 
primary sources of information are institutions in the country of origin 
directly involved in gathering information such as embassies and NGOs. 
Also fact-findings missions are organised to the countries and other sources 
include reports from international/human rights organisations and experts. 
In the UK, embassy reports are only used as background information and all 
source documents are made public: information that cannot be made public 
is not quoted. This is not the case in the Netherlands where also confidential 
information is used in reports. On the other hand, in the UK, administrative 
decisions refusing entry into national territory that are adopted on the basis of 
information whose disclosure would be liable to prejudice national security, 
may be contested before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. In 
such proceedings, neither the person who has contested such a decision nor 
his own lawyers have access to the information upon which the decision was 
based when its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. However, 
in such a case, a special advocate, who has access to that information, is 
appointed to represent the interests of the person concerned before SIAC. 
The special advocate cannot communicate with the person concerned about 
matters connected with the proceedings once material which the Secretary 
of State (the competent UK authority) objects to being disclosed has been 
served on the special advocate. The special advocate may, however, request 
directions from SIAC authorising such communication.772
The Advisory Panel on Country Information is the formal monitoring body 
of the reports in the UK. Though the Netherlands does not have such a body, 
the court assesses in appeal cases the quality of the background reports 
on which the country report is based. These background reports are then 
treated as confidential.773 
770 All reports from the Service in the UK are publicly available. The same counts for the 
reports from the Dutch Asylum and Migration Affairs Division, but not for those for 
those from the Country and Language Information Unit which is only for internal 
use. 
771 The UK considers documents older than two years to be outdated and only uses them 
when no recent data is available, while in the Netherlands documents are considered 
outdated when they no longer reflect the current situation. 
772 See ECJ Press release 70/13 belonging to 4 June 2013, ZZ v. State Secretary for the 
Home Department, App. No. C-300/11. 
773 See International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Comparative Study on 
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The Dutch country report on the KhAD/WAD from 2000 has been and 
still is a matter of dispute. The Dutch government assumes that founded 
on an systematic rotation system, all commissioned and non-commissioned 
officers of the KhAD/WAD took part in interrogating and torturing of the 
opponents of the communist regime whether alleged or not. The UNHCR 
came up with a Note based on its own research, including discussions with Dr 
Giustozzi, who is a leading expert on Afghanistan and the KhAD/WAD in 
particular, and could not confirm the rotation system. Much of the criticism 
on the country report relates to its sources as the public sources mentioned 
in the report do not contain information supporting the conclusions of the 
report and the anonymous sources are not made public. Several organisations 
have argued for quite some time for the revision of the report and recently, a 
motion was submitted in Parliament by two Members of Parliament which 
was rejected as the coalition parties stick to the correctness of the report.774 
The main reason for maintaining the report is that the authorities believe it 
is not possible to find reliable additional information regarding the rotation 
system. Though some district courts have also doubted the correctness 
of the report, the highest administrative court supports the report and no 
change regarding the KhAD/WAD policy in the Netherlands is in sight in 
the short term.
The UK does not have a similar problem with regard to a specific report and 
given its guidelines concerning the sources used for the reports: ‘information 
that cannot be made public is not quoted’, it seems that such a matter will not 
occur. There has been a case before the CoA in which the Dutch report on 
the KhAD/WAD was also relevant to the case as it was used as one of the 
source for the Secretary of State’s decision.  
In the MH (Syria) and DS (Afghanistan) v. SSHD case, the Secretary of State 
sought to exclude DS under Article 1F (a) because of the various senior 
positions he had held within the KhAD. On appeal to the Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal by DS, the judge found that DS’s asylum claim could 
not be excluded under clause (a) as the evidence did not establish that the 
KhAD had committed widespread torture or killings directed at the civilian 
population and that these acts did not fall under crimes against humanity 
to the international statutes. Further, the judge found that there was a real 
risk that DS would face persecution and treatment contrary to Article 3 
ECHR upon return to Afghanistan. In reconsideration, the Senior Judge 
Country of Origin Information Systems – Study on COI Systems in Ten European 
Countries and the Potential for further Improvement of COI Co-operation, Vienna 
2006. 
774 Motion by Members Schouw and Gesthuizen, House of Representatives 2013/14, 
19637, No. 1886. 
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decided that the first Immigration Judge’s decision should stand to which the 
Secretary of State responded with an appeal to the CoA.
The focus of the case before the First Immigration Judge was on the 
Secretary of State’s certificate that Article 1F (a) applied by reason of 
DS’s involvement in KhAD. The evidence relevant to that issue included a 
number of reports: (i) a report entitled “Afghanistan – Security Services in 
Communist Afghanistan (1978-1992)”, published in 2001 by the Council of 
the European Union and referred to as “the Netherlands report”;775 (ii) a War 
Crimes Unit report dated 16 March 2006 which used the Netherlands report 
as its main source and made the recommendation on which the Secretary 
of State’s decision was based; (iii) an expert report dated 16 September 
2007 by Dr Antonio Giustozzi which was submitted on behalf of DS; (iv) a 
commentary by the War Crimes Unit on Dr Giustozzi’s report; (v) a letter 
by Dr Giustozzi replying to that commentary; and (vi) a Country of Origin 
Information Report on Afghanistan, dated September 2007, which referred 
in turn to various other sources.776
In this case, the judge preferred the evidence given by Dr Giustozzi. She stated 
that: ‘Dr Giustozzi was well-known to the tribunal and that his evidence had 
in the past been found to be independent and reliable. He was a frequent and 
recent visitor to Afghanistan, had written many papers and reports during 
his career, had given evidence and advised many courts and international 
bodies, and had interviewed large numbers of people in Afghanistan’. 
Furthermore, the Immigration Judge referred to Dr Giustozzi’s criticisms of 
the Netherlands report and the fact that he was supported in this by a district 
court in the Netherlands.777 
According to the CoA, the Senior Immigration Judge was correct to find that 
there had been no material error in the Immigration Judge’s decision. She 
was entitled to prefer the evidence of Dr Giustozzi and to conclude on the 
evidence as a whole that those targeted by KhAD were not civilians.  
A relevant aspect regarding the assessment is the question to whom the burden 
of proof lies. The UK has laid down in paragraph 339J of the Immigration 
Rules that the assessment of an asylum, humanitarian protection or human 
rights claim must be carried out on an individual, objective and impartial basis, 
including taking into account all relevant factors. Also in the Netherlands 
each case is examined individually (Individualiseringsvereiste). While it is 
up to the alien to prove that he had a well-founded fear of persecution and 
qualifies for protection, in case of Article 1F, the evidential burden of proof 
775 This report was submitted by the Dutch delegation and is similar to the Dutch official 
report on the KhAD/WAD from 2000.
776 See para. 54 of the judgment.
777 See para. 57 of the judgment.
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rests with the Secretary of State. In both countries, it is up to the authorities 
to demonstrate that there are serious reasons to believe that the person has 
committed one of the crimes prescribed under the exclusion clauses. The 
standard of proof required in criminal law does not have to be met, but the 
assumption has to be motivated carefully. As already explained above, the 
information given by the alien, in combination with the country of origin 
data from the 1F-unit will eventually lead to a decisive answer with respect 
to the investigation. When it is decided that the exclusion clauses apply, it is 
up to the alien in question to refute the assumption. The Netherlands uses 
the personal and knowing participation test to determine whether a person 
meets the conditions under Article 1F. The Aliens Circular prescribes that 
there is ‘personal and knowing participation’ if the person belonged to a 
group which the Minister has appointed having committed 1F-crimes. In 
such a case, the alien must prove that he is a significant exception to the rule. 
The KhAD/WAD is one of the groups to which the reversed burden of proof 
applies.778 The practice shows that the authorities rarely accept that a person 
falls outside the scope of the rule due to his exceptional situation which 
makes one question whether it can be said that in such a case an individual 
examination is carried out. 
The UK does not recognise a reversed burden of proof regarding specific 
groups which would automatically lead to exclusion. The Asylum Instruction 
on Exclusion states that membership of an organisation which uses violence 
to achieve its political or criminal objectives is not enough on its own to 
make a person guilty of an international crime, and is not sufficient to justify 
exclusion from refugee status. This also counts when a person’s name is on 
a list of terrorist suspects or is a member of an organisation designated as 
terrorist. Though, this may be evidence of such involvement, the individual’s 
membership must be examined in the context of the organisation’s behaviour 
at the time when he was part of the group. In the authoritative case JS (Sri 
Lanka), the Supreme Court gave factors which have to be considered when 
deciding on complicity, such as the nature and the size of the organisation, 
the position of the asylum seeker and his influence in the organisation. Once 
it has been established that the person committed or participated in the 
act; it is to be investigated whether he had the requisite understanding and 
intention at the time that he participated in or committed that act.779 Thus, 
the key is whether the person made a knowing and significant contribution 
to the crime/criminal enterprise. 
In both of the countries, children are not exempt from the exclusion, but 
778 The Netherlands is the only country within the EU which recognises a reversed 
burden of proof regarding the KhAD/WAD. See footnote 637 for the other groups 
which are named besides the KhAD/WAD. 
779 With regard to these terms, the UK follows the definitions as stated in Article 30 of 
the Rome Statute. 
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the age for holding the child responsible differs. In the UK, there cannot be 
‘serious reasons for considering’ that a child has committed an international 
crime if that child is under the age of ten, whereas in the Netherlands this 
applies to children up to the age of fifteen. 
The Dutch authorities regularly publish figures with regard to the application 
of Article 1F which also specifies those in whose case refoulement plays a role. 
Between 1992 and 2013 around 870 aliens have been rejected under Article 
1F. More specifically from 2008 on, around 180 aliens were excluded. In 
contrast to the Netherlands, the UK does not release numbers with regard to 
those who are excluded on the basis of Article 1F or the ones who are granted 
Restricted Leave. Based on information from the Special Cases Unit, around 
50 cases a year result in exclusion under 1F. 
§ 7.3 Post-exclusion phase
When it has been decided that a person is excluded from protection, a 
rejection of the asylum application follows which makes the person ineligible 
for a residence permit on asylum or subsidiary protection grounds. Contrary 
to the UK, in the Netherlands an excluded person cannot be considered for 
a regular residence permit either. Though rejection basically leads to the 
removal of a person, in both countries it is first checked whether on the basis 
of Article 3 ECHR, refoulement forms an obstacle for removing the alien. 
It is up to the excluded asylum seeker to make a reasonable case for the fear 
of a real risk of exposure to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in his home country. The question that follows when the alien 
manages to do this, differs enormously in the two countries. 
In the Netherlands, refoulement does not entail a right to stay in the country 
and the person remains under the obligation to leave the country at his own 
will. Though he will not be removed by the authorities as long as refoulement 
is at stake, the person is not granted a lawful residence during that period. 
Such a person is not entitled to any facilities and social security benefits, with 
the exception of entitlement related to medical necessary care, the prevention 
of situations that would jeopardise public health or the provision of legal 
assistance to the alien. In addition to the fact that an unremovable asylum 
seeker does not have a legal stay and is not entitled to any facilities such as the 
right to work, it was practice that such an alien was declared an undesirable 
alien, entailing the imposition of an exclusion order. The imposition of the 
order is done in the interest of international relations and makes the alien’s 
residence in the Netherlands punishable pursuant to Article 197 of the 
Criminal Code. This leads to the awkward situation that while the alien 
cannot be expelled due to refoulement, his residence in the country is made 
punishable by law. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council 
of State judged that imposing an exclusion order on an alien who is excluded 
from asylum, but cannot be removed from the country due to Article 3 is not 
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disproportional as the interest of international relations is not less important 
because of Article 3 ECHR. In accordance with its discretionary powers, 
the Public Prosecution Service decides in each individual case whether to 
prosecute or not. If it does, the alien risks being put in custody or receiving 
a fine. An exclusion order may be lifted upon request of the alien concerned, 
when there are special facts and circumstances which make the alien’s 
interest prevail over the public interest. When appealing to Article 3 ECHR 
for lifting an exclusion order, the alien must show that he has undertaken 
serious attempts to leave to another country than his country of origin and 
that no other country allows him admission for entrance. When the alien 
fails to do so, the highest administrative court finds the maintenance of the 
order to be correct. Since the implementation of the Returns Directive in 
the Netherlands in December 2011, the exclusion order has been replaced 
by the entry ban when it concerns aliens outside the EU, thus aliens without 
a lawful stay and who are considered to be a danger to public order/safety 
(including those to whom Article 1F is applied) are imposed with an entry 
ban instead of an exclusion order.780 
In contrast to the Netherlands, an unremovable excluded asylum seeker 
does have a legal stay in the UK as he will receive Restricted Leave. This 
is granted outside the Immigration Rules and issued for a period of six 
months, with the option for renewal. With the RL, some or all of these 
restrictions concerning employment, occupation or residence place, 
requirement to report regularly and prohibiting the person to study at an 
education institution can be imposed. When the alien is not able to work, he 
has recourse to public funds, but only when he can show to be destitute.781 
A failure to comply with a condition may lead to prosecution. Restricted 
Leave is the substitute for Discretionary Leave which was issued until 2011. 
In the Afghan hijackers’ case, the excluded men could not be removed to 
Afghanistan due to refoulement, but were not granted Discretionary Leave, 
which was the applicable policy at that moment. The High Court as well the 
Court of Appeal expressed that this was unlawful and that the government 
had to stick to its own policy. Those who were granted Discretionary Leave 
had no conditions attached to the leave and were free to work, travel, receive 
public funds/taxes and eventually claim settlement. That these aliens were 
actually free to do as they liked, while they were denied protection because 
of excludable acts, was found to be inconsistent by the authorities and led to 
action. In 2008, the Special Immigration Status was introduced but has not 
780 See Chapter 5 for more on the entry ban. 
781 A person is deemed to appear to be destitute if a) he does not have adequate 
accommodation or any means of obtaining it (whether or not his other essential living 
conditions are met) or b) he has adequate accommodation or the means of obtaining 
it, but cannot meet his other essential living needs (section 95 IAA 1999).
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yet entered into force. Thus, from  2 September 2011 on, all cases excluded 
from the protection of the Refugee Convention by virtue of Article 1F but 
who cannot be immediately removed from the UK due to Article 3 of the 
ECHR are subject to the tighter Restricted Leave policy. 
In the Netherlands as well in the UK, a stay of ten-years leads to an important 
moment. The UK provides excluded asylum seekers who were issued 
Restricted Leave the option of indefinite leave after a lawful stay of ten years. 
The requirements laid down in paragraph 276B IR have to be fulfilled in order 
to qualify. Among these requirements is also stated that having regard to the 
public interest, there must be no reason which makes it undesirable to grant 
the applicant settlement. In this context, the personal history of the alien is one 
of the factors to be taken into account. Personal history goes beyond criminal 
convictions and allows considering whether the applicant’s activities in the 
UK or abroad makes it undesirable to grant indefinite leave. In case of a 1F 
applicant, the alleged acts which led to exclusion will play an important role 
resulting in a decision against him. As stated in the Asylum Policy Instruction 
on Restricted Leave, only in exceptional circumstances such an alien will be 
eligible for settlement. In case of such a rejection, the alien will continue to 
be issued Restricted Leave for six months at a time if there is no change in the 
circumstances which lead to another outcome. 
The ‘no removal, no admission situation’ concerning excluded asylum seekers 
who cannot be removed in the Netherlands has far-reaching consequences. The 
alien who cannot claim any entitlements has to rely on family, acquaintances 
or live of charity. The question is how long this ought to last for this group. 
Though the principle in Dutch policy is that no residence permits will be 
issued to those who are excluded, an exception can be made for those who 
succeed through the durability and proportionality-test. This test has been 
developed in case law by the highest administrative court and adopted in the 
Aliens Circular. The first step is to examine whether Article 3 ECHR offers a 
sustainable obstacle against removal to the country of origin and if so, whether 
a permanent denial of a residence title would be disproportional in the 
circumstances of the case. The term sustainable obstacle refers to a residence 
of ten years starting at the date of the first asylum application. When the alien 
complies with the first condition, it is up to him to convince the authorities that 
withholding a permit would be disproportionate. According to the Circular, 
disproportionality is acceptable when the alien proves to be in an exceptional 
situation. Until present, disproportionality has been accepted in only a few 
cases, which shows that it is hard to meet the criterion of special circumstances. 
As stated above, a ten year stay of an unremovable asylum seeker leads to an 
important moment: in the UK, to the question whether settlement can be 
obtained and in the Netherlands whether the alien can change his unlawful 
stay into a lawful one. As in both countries it is hard for the alien to succeed 
in their efforts, it often does not lead to any change in their situation. 
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Restricted Leave in the UK is issued for a period of six months and every 
six months it is assessed whether the refoulement obstacle still exists. In the 
Netherlands a regular check is made to see whether it is safe for the alien to 
return to his country of origin. If Article 3 ECHR would cease to exist for an 
excluded asylum seeker, the person is in principle removable to his country 
of origin. In the UK it means in concrete that the alien’s Restricted Leave will 
not be renewed. The decision to remove the alien allows the authorities to 
detain the person until the removal is actually carried out. In the Netherlands, 
aliens’ detention may only be used if there is good reason to assume that 
the alien withdraws from government supervision during the departure 
procedure and if there is an actual chance of departure. A maximum period 
of six months of detention is applied with the option for an extension of 
another twelve months as is implemented from the Returns Directive. 
The UK is not bound by this Directive and does not have a statutory time 
limit for aliens’ detention. Still, the authorities are bound by the so-called 
Hardial Singh principles as developed in case law and both countries have to 
respect Article 5 ECHR on the right to liberty and security. Contrary to the 
Netherlands, the UK applies the rule that when there is a power to detain, 
there is also a power to bail. 
§ 7.4 Article 8 ECHR 
The Netherlands and the UK follow the rule that in case of exclusion of the 
main applicant, family members will also be refused protection, unless the 
dependant has a claim in his/her own right. If the dependants succeed in 
their application, they will initially be issued a temporary residence permit, 
after which they can qualify for settlement. 
Should the dependant’s individual asylum application be rejected, the UK 
grants leave in line with the main applicant. This means that they will fall 
under the Restricted Leave policy with restrictions applied at a minimum level 
necessary to maintain contact with them. In the Netherlands, the situation 
differs as such family members are also objected the contraindication of 
Article 1F and as a result they are not allowed a lawful stay. In 2008, a section 
was added to the Aliens Circular in which it is laid down that family members 
who have been staying in the Netherlands for a long, continuous period, will 
not be remonstrated with Article 1F if they meet three conditions: there have 
been resident in the Netherlands for at least ten years, from the first asylum 
application on; the mentioned residency must be for a continuous period 
and, the process of expulsion should not have been frustrated by the person 
concerned. 
Article 8 ECHR relates to several aspects, but when it is considered within 
the context of Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, the right to family 
life is of particular importance, especially when a measure is taken that 
would lead to separation of the excluded asylum seeker and his family. An 
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unremovable1F applicant does not have a lawful stay in the Netherlands and 
Article 8 ECHR is often invoked to regularise his stay. In these cases, the 
excluded asylum seeker refers to the fact that he is being withheld from a 
lawful stay for a long period of time and therefore cannot maintain family 
life with his dependants who are legally residing in the country. According 
to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, the continuance of an unlawful 
stay after an unlawful stay of already ten years does not violate Article 8 
ECHR as the unremovable alien can actually live in the Netherlands with 
his legally residing family. The jurisprudence of the highest administrative 
court confirms the policy regarding Article 8 ECHR which is that in 1F cases 
the alien will not be issued a residence permit: the interests of public order 
outweighs the interests of family life. Up till now, no excluded asylum seeker 
has succeeded in winning an Article 8 ECHR claim. 
Though the UK does not explicitly state beforehand that a claim to family 
or private life will fail for those who are excluded under Article 1F, it will be 
hard for the alien to succeed in meeting the stricter requirements that count 
from July 2012 on, as set in paragraph 276ADE (right to private life) and 
Appendix FM (right to family life). In both situations, the applicant must be 
suitable and eligible. One of the suitability grounds is that ‘the presence of the 
applicant is not conducive to the public good’. This refusal ground is almost 
similar to the public interest ground under the ten years rule and may lead to 
difficulties in the application. Additionally, private life can only be appealed 
to after twenty years of residence and those who are issued Restricted Leave 
are not eligible for the right to family life because the applicant must not be in 
the UK with valid leave granted for a period of six months or less. There is an 
exception to the latter. When the excluded asylum seeker has a genuine and 
subsisting parental relationship with a child in the UK who is under 18 and 
is a British citizen or has lived in the UK continuously for seven years prior 
to the application and it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave 
the UK or they have a genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner in 
the UK who is a British citizen or settled in the UK or who has been given 
refugee leave or humanitarian protection and there are ‘insurmountable 
obstacles’ to family life continuing outside the UK. Concerning the role of 
children in immigration cases it is explicitly stated in UK legislation that such 
decisions must be taken with regard to the need to safeguard and promote 
the welfare of children in the UK. The Netherlands does not recognise an 
explicit reference but as it is bound by the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, it must act in the best interest of the child.782 As the ECtHR reiterated 
in the Jeunesse v. the Netherlands case, ‘where children are involved, their best 
interests must be taken into account. Whilst alone they cannot be decisive, 
782 In several provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child have reference to 
the ‘best interest of the child’, among which Articles 3 (1); 9 (1) (3) (4); 18 and 21. 
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such interests certainly must be afforded significant weight. Accordingly, 
national decision-making bodies should, in principle, advert to and assess 
evidence in respect of the practicality, feasibility and proportionality of any 
removal of a non-national parent in order to give effective protection and 
sufficient weight to the best interests of the children directly affected by it’.783
As regard to Article 8 ECHR, it is eventually the Secretary of State who 
will make an overall assessment and decide whose interest will outweigh the 
case. The Netherlands is clear about its policy as public order prevails in 1F 
cases. In view of the public interest ground, there is a big chance that the 
claim in the UK will lead to a rejection too. An unremovable asylum seeker 
whose claim is refused under Article 8 ECHR in the UK does not undergo 
the same far-reaching consequences as in the Netherlands as such a person 
is already issued a lawful stay under Restricted Leave. In the Netherlands, 
it is a way for the alien to change his unlawful stay into a legal one. The fact 
that the claim does not result in a change raises the question whether there is 
anything which could stop the dead-end situation of the unremovable alien 
in the Netherlands. There are formally two options for the alien in which 
he most likely will not succeed as it rarely happens that these claims are 
allowed. The first one would be to rely on the discretionary powers of the 
Secretary of State who can issue a permit to those who are in ‘distressing 
circumstances’, like, for example, serious medical issues, particularly when 
children are involved. Also in the UK, exceptional circumstances make it 
possible to be granted leave outside the IR. The second option is to apply 
the non-fault permit which may be granted to those who cannot leave the 
Netherlands, through no fault of their own. In order to obtain such a permit, 
the alien must show that the relevant mission of his country of origin or 
a third country does not provide him with documents to return. It can be 
concluded from the foregoing that it is impossible for an excluded asylum 
seeker to obtain a lawful stay in the Netherlands. This was also the case in the 
situation of Mr Naibzay who sought a solution outside the Netherlands. In 
2013, it became known that this man, an excluded Afghan ex-KhAD/WAD, 
who already had an unlawful stay of fifteen years in the Netherlands, moved 
to Belgium following his dependants and received a residence permit for five 
years. The basis for the permit lies in Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States. The fact that Mr Naibzay was 
never prosecuted for the acts which made him fall under 1F and Belgium 
does not adhere to KhAD/WAD policy of the Netherlands made it possible 
for him to receive a lawful stay in Belgium. 
783 ECtHR Jeunesse v. the Netherlands, 3 October 2014, App. No. 12738/10, para. 109 
(NJ 2015/130 includes annotation from B.E.P. Myjer).
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§ 7.5 Conclusion
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, both countries have a very clear 
common goal which is that ‘they do not want to provide a safe haven for 
war criminals or those who commit crimes against humanity’. However, 
the way this goal ought to be achieved shows with regard to Article 1F and 
several aspects related to the application of the exclusion clauses, that there 
are more differences than similarities. To start with the assessment phase, 
in the Netherlands, an asylum application is first tested against Article 1F 
instead of Article 1A of the Refugee Convention, the so-called ‘exclusion 
before inclusion’, while the UK formally applies ‘inclusion before exclusion’. 
Both countries make use of country reports which are considered before a 
decision is taken on an asylum application. In the UK, all source documents 
are made public as information that cannot be made public is not quoted. 
This is different in the Netherlands, where the authorities make use of 
confidential information in reports. The latter happened when writing an 
official report on the KhAD/WAD, which led to much critique. As a result 
of the report, all former commissioned and non-commissioned officers of 
the KhAD/WAD are assumed to have personal and knowing participation 
in this organisation. It is up to the alien to be prove to be an exception which 
is not easy.  
The UK does not recognise a reversed burden of proof regarding specific 
groups which would automatically lead to exclusion: though membership 
of an organisation which uses violence to achieve its political or criminal 
objectives may be evidence of involvement, is not enough on its own to 
make a person guilty of an international crime and is not sufficient to justify 
exclusion from refugee status. 
The decision to refuse an asylum application on the basis of Article 1F, in 
both countries, leads to checking whether Article 3 ECHR forms an obstacle 
for removing the alien to his country of origin. If so, this means that in the 
Netherlands the alien will not be removed by the authorities, but on the 
other hand, he will not be granted a lawful residence either. The person is 
not entitled to any benefits and moreover, he is imposed with an exclusion 
order which makes his stay in the Netherlands punishable. After a stay of 
ten years it is assessed whether continuing to withhold a permit would be 
disproportionate. It is hard for an alien to succeed in their efforts and it 
often does not lead to any change in their situation. The same counts with 
regard to a claim under Article 8 ECHR as the principle in Dutch policy is 
that the interests of public order outweigh the interests of family life. It is 
no exaggeration to state that an unremovable excluded asylum seeker lives 
in a hopeless situation in the Netherlands as the paths for a lawful stay are 
blocked. The main difference with the UK is that when refoulement is at stake 
in case of a 1F applicant, a perspective is offered to the excluded alien, as 
such a situation does lead to a lawful stay. Though Restricted Leave is issued 
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for a period of six months at a time, it does give the person the chance to 
live a ‘normal’ life. The Court of Appeal played an important role in this 
policy as it prohibited temporary admission (in other words a no removal, 
no admission) with regard to unremovable excluded asylum seekers. The 
highest administrative court in the Netherlands did not prohibit such a 
situation but introduced the durability and proportionality-test to minimize 
the group of aliens who live in limbo. In addition, the court often supports 
the government’s policy concerning 1F. The times that lower courts have 
doubted the correctness of the official report on the KhAD/WAD, the highest 
court set aside those judgments and supported the government’s policy. This 
is also the case for the reversed burden of proof and the imposition of an 
exclusion order. Though an unremovable 1F applicant can obtain a lawful 
stay in the UK, it is not easy to qualify for settlement. The main rule is that 
the 1F applicant should return to his country of origin when possible and as 
in case of settlement, also with respect to Article 8 ECHR, the public interest 





§ 8.1 Introduction 
The last chapter of this study is a summary of the foregoing and provides an 
answer to the central question of this research, which reads:
Which solutions can be formulated on a national and European level to deal with 
the dilemmas surrounding 1F applicants who cannot be removed?
At the beginning of the Introduction, I described the case of Mr X which is a 
good starting point to explain the layout of this chapter which consists of two 
parts; namely the procedure of the application of Article 1F, in others words, 
the assessment and what follows after the exclusion decision, i.e. the post-
exclusion phase. To recall what the case was about, a brief outline follows:
Mr X fled in 2005 from Turkey to the Netherlands where he applied for 
asylum. Dutch official reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
General Intelligence and Security Service show that the applicant had been 
involved in violent activities within the Kurdish Hezbollah and after applying 
the so-called  ‘personal participation and knowing, test, the authorities 
decided to reject  Mr X’s asylum application under Article 1F. The objection 
under Article 1F also means that Mr X is not entitled to another form of legal 
residence in the Netherlands, even when Article 3 ECHR forms an obstacle 
for removal. 
As stated above, the first part of this conclusion will deal with the application 
of Article 1F. Important aspects in the assessment are, inter alia, the required 
standard of proof and the question concerning the burden of proof in 
order to exclude a person. The standard of proof used in Article 1F is 
‘serious reasons for considering’ which is not known in other areas of law. 
The Refugee Convention does not state what is meant by serious reasons 
for considering, yet it is clear that the standard of proof is less than the 
one required in criminal proceedings. The authoritative, but non-binding 
UNHCR documents which are discussed in Chapter 2, provide guidance 
to states but do not ensure that countries interpret terms in the same way. 
The same is true for the Qualification Directive which includes the exclusion 
clauses. This asylum Directive and several Directives as are dealt with in 
Chapter 3 have been adopted within the framework of a common asylum 
procedure within Europe. Though the EU Member States have included the 
exclusion clauses in their national legislation, it does not mean that they apply 
these in the same way. This is where Chapters 5 and 6, on the Netherlands 
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and respectively, the UK become interesting. If we return to Mr X, it is very 
well possible that if he had fled to the UK instead of the Netherlands, he 
would not have been excluded from protection and issued with a permit as, 
contrary to the Netherlands, the UK does not use the personal participation 
and knowing test. 
All in all, the fact that the three grounds for exclusion under 1F are subject 
to interpretation and the competence to decide whether an alien is to be 
excluded lies with the state in whose territory he seeks protection, leads 
to different practices within the EU. The main question to be solved in 
the discussion of the first part of this chapter is whether and how a general 
standard for assessment can be reached within the EU. In this discussion, 
particular attention will be paid to the group of ex-KhAD/WAD members in 
the Netherlands to whom a reversed burden of proof is applied under Article 
1F. 
The second part of this chapter will focus on the post-exclusion phase 
concerning those excluded aliens who cannot be removed due to refoulement. 
Exclusion under Article 1F makes an alien ineligible for a status as laid down 
in the Refugee Convention and Qualification Directive, but does not mean 
that another kind of protection cannot be provided to these aliens. The ECHR 
which is discussed in Chapter 4 contains relevant provisions within this 
context of which Article 3 is especially of importance. This non-refoulement 
stipulation prevents the alien from being removed to a country where he fears 
for his life but does not say anything about the residency of this person in the 
host country. This means that as in the case of the application of exclusion, 
states are again free to decide whether they wish to provide excluded non-
removable persons with a status or no status at all. In the situation of Mr X 
the application of the exclusion clauses means that he was not provided with 
a refugee status, but as the Netherlands does not provide a legal status to any 
excluded asylum seekers, it leads to an unlawful stay without any perspective 
and with far-reaching consequences for the person concerned. If Mr X had 
fled to the UK, he would have been issued Restricted Leave under which he 
is entitled to a lawful stay in the UK and may claim certain rights. It was as 
far back as in 2001 that the EC called for a solution at European level on 
the issue of excluded non-removable persons, but the comparison between 
the two EU countries in this study shows how awful the differences are. In 
this chapter, I will, among others, deal with the Dutch practice and question 
whether it is sustainable to maintain such disparities within the EU. Besides 
recommendations at European level on this matter, also concluding remarks 
on the Netherlands and the UK will be provided. 
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§ 8.2 Application of Article 1F 
§ 8.2.1 Standard of proof and individual assessment
The Refugee Convention was created to provide protection for those 
who were forced to leave their countries and fall under the definition of a 
refugee. Being a post-Second World War instrument, the memories of the 
war were very much alive during the drafting of the treaty, In addition to the 
Convention’s main goal of safeguarding those in need, states also agreed that 
war criminals should not be protected, which eventually led to the insertion 
of Article 1F. The Ad Hoc Committee proposed to use the words ‘The High 
Contracting Parties shall be under no obligation to apply the terms of this 
Convention’ to those to whom Article 1F can be applied. However, in order 
to make sure that notorious war criminals would not be considered as a 
refugee, the present wording of ‘The provisions of the Convention shall not 
apply’ was adopted. Thus, when there are serious reasons to believe that a 
person falls under 1F, the country assessing the asylum claim will not issue 
a refugee status to that person. The last point is clear, but determining when 
there are ‘serious reasons’ is more problematic. As Grahl-Madsen states:
‘There may be honest doubt as to whether ‘serious reasons’ exist in any 
particular case. A person may therefore be considered to fall under the 
provisions of Article 1F in one country but not in another. However, extreme 
cases apart, the recognition of a person as a refugee will hardly cause any 
dispute between states. And after all, ‘it was the notorious cases which the 
drafters of the Convention had in mind’.784
Neither the travaux preparatoires nor the Convention itself give any guidance 
to the question how the phrase ‘serious reasons for considering’ should be 
interpreted. Additionally, the absence of an international refugee court to 
adjudicate on the interpretation of the Convention also contributes to the lack 
of a single valid interpretation of the Convention. The UNHCR documents 
on the Refugee Convention and the exclusion clauses in particular provide 
the countries with basic guidelines. The UNHCR Handbook states that it is 
not necessary for an applicant to have been convicted of the criminal offence, 
nor the criminal standard of proof has to be met785 and this is followed by the 
majority of states.786 However, indictments or arrest warrants put together 
by international criminal tribunals would, according to the UNHCR, satisfy 
the standard of proof and give rise to exclusion.787 This has to do with the 
784 Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 263.
785 Guidelines on exclusion, para. 35.
786 Rikhof 2012, pp. 110-114.
787 This is different when an indictment is set up by another country. In such cases, 
accurate country of origin information is to be examined in order to for example 
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fact that an international indictment or arrest warrant is put together in a 
more rigorous manner when compared to the evidence used for exclusion 
in RSD procedures. As the criminal standard of proof does not have to be 
met, the question remains, what is sufficient evidence for exclusion. In the 
first place clear and credible evidence which leads to a substantial suspicion 
is required: simple suspicions are not enough. A confession by the applicant 
and testimonies of witnesses count as satisfactory evidence if they are 
reliable. Thus, it is relevant to assess the relevant country’s compliance with 
international standards on criminal justice. The fact that an applicant does 
not want to cooperate, does not itself prove guilt when there is no clear and 
credible evidence available. With regard to other sources the Handbook 
lays down that exclusion should not be based on evidence which cannot 
be challenged by the applicant concerned. As an exception, reliance on 
anonymous evidence where the source is kept secret if possible where ‘this 
is absolutely necessary to protect the safety of witnesses and the asylum 
seeker’s ability to challenge the substance of the evidence is not substantially 
prejudiced’. When it is a case of concealing the source because of national 
security interests, these  interests may be protected by introducing procedural 
safeguards which also respect the asylum seeker’s due process rights.788  
Along with the standard of proof concerning exclusion there is also the 
question on whom the burden of proof rests. Article 4 (1) of the recast 
Qualification Directive prescribes that Member States may consider it the 
duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all the elements needed 
to substantiate the application for international protection. In cooperation 
with the applicant, it is the duty of the Member States to assess the relevant 
elements of the application. Furthermore, the assessment has to be carried 
out on an individual basis.789 According to the UNHCR, to exclude a person, 
individual responsibility must be established in relation to an act which falls 
under Article 1F, which has to be proven by the authorities. Thus: 
‘Individual responsibility flows from the person having committed, or made 
a substantial contribution to the commission of the criminal act, in the 
knowledge that his or her act or omission would facilitate the criminal conduct. 
The individual need not physically have committed the criminal act in question. 
Instigating, aiding and abetting and participating in a joint criminal enterprise 
can suffice. The fact that a person was at some point a senior member of a 
repressive government or a member of an organisation involved in unlawful 
violence does not in itself entail individual liability for excludable acts’.790
check whether a confession made in a criminal investigation is reliable.
788 UNHCR Handbook, Part 1, para. 113.
789 Article 4 (3) recast Qualification Directive. 
790 ‘UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion 
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With respect to the last sentence, a distinction should be drawn between 
mere membership of an organisation which engages in international crimes 
and actual complicity.791 During the Nuremberg trials, the International 
Military Tribunal accepted that mere membership was not sufficient to 
establish liability.792 However, according to the UNHCR a presumption of 
responsibility may arise ‘where the individual has remained a member of a 
government clearly engaged in activities that fall within the scope of Article 
1F. Moreover, the purposes, activities and methods of some groups are of 
a particularly violent nature, with the result that voluntary membership 
thereof may also raise a presumption of individual responsibility. Caution 
must be exercised when such a presumption of responsibility arises, to 
consider issues including the actual activities of the group, its organisational 
structure, the individual’s position in it, and his or her ability to influence 
significantly its activities, as well as the possible fragmentation of the group’. 
In the UNHCR’s view and endorsed by the ECJ, exclusion is also not 
automatically justified when an individual is associated with a terrorist 
organisation which is on an international list.793 However, again a presumption 
of individual responsibility may arise when the person can reasonably be 
considered to be individually involved in violent crimes.794 In each case, the 
degree of involvement of the person concerned has to be carefully assessed. 
The consequence of a presumption of responsibility is that it is assumed 
that the person falls under 1F and therefore has the possibility to refute the 
presumption. 
§ 8.2.2 European harmonisation?
As discussed in Chapter 3, it was in 1999 that the European Council 
decided in Tampere to work towards ‘a CEAS within the EU, which is 
based on the full and inclusive application of the Refugee Convention’. 
By creating uniformity, the EU wants to contest the diversity in national 
asylum systems and practices among states which is seen as one of the main 
Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees’, HCR/
GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003, paras. 18-19. 
791 In the Canadian jurisprudence, the personal knowing and participation test is 
developed in order to assess whether individual responsibility exists. In the Valere v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) case, 2005 FC 524, 19 April 2015 
the Canadian court recalled the principles regarding participation which are required 
in order to establish complicity. See Goodwin-Gill 2008, p. 170. After Ezokola v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2013 SCC 40SC, 19 July 2013 the 
Canadian authorities replaced the personal and knowing participation test by the 
contribution-based test. 
792 Goodwin-Gill 2008, p. 168. 
793 See § 3.4.1 of this study. 
794 See § 2.6.2 of this study. 
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reasons for asylum flows within Europe. Thus, the notion is that a common 
standard in the EU will ensure that one Member State is not perceived as 
a more attractive destination than another. In order to realise the set goal, 
several legislative measures have been adopted, including the Qualification 
Directive. This instrument is seen as the most important one as it deals with 
the substantive asylum law of Europe. The initial Directive was adopted 
in 2004 with a deadline for implementation in the Member States on 10 
October 2006. The Directive prescribes who falls under refugee protection 
and the rights that flow from a refugee status. It also establishes a status for 
extra Convention refugees (subsidiary protection) which is to be seen as 
additional protection to the refugee protection as laid down in the Refugee 
Convention. Furthermore, the Directive contains provisions regarding 
exclusion which is relevant within the scope of this study.795 The evaluation 
of the Directive’s implementation among states enabled the Commission to 
conclude that a higher degree of harmonisation was necessary to obtain a 
common asylum procedure. This led to the amendment of the Qualification 
Directive. In 2011, the recast Directive was adopted and is now in force. 
The distinction between refugee and subsidiary protection status in several 
provisions has been deleted and changed into beneficiaries of international 
protection. This does not count for the provisions concerning exclusion. 
Thus, an asylum seeker who falls under the terms of the exclusion provisions 
of Articles 12 and 17 does not receive a refugee status or subsidiary 
protection. However, the recast Qualification Directive does not prohibit 
allowing an excluded asylum seeker a permit on any other ground: this is left 
to the discretion of states. Pursuant to Article 21 (1), states must respect the 
non-refoulement principle in accordance with their international obligations. 
Where not prohibited by these international obligations, Member States 
may refoule a refugee, whether formally recognised or not, when: 
(a) there are reasonable grounds for considering him or her as a danger to the 
security of the Member State in which he or she is present; or (b) he or she, 
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State. 
Now that Article 1F has entered into the Directive which is transposed into 
national legislations in Member States, it raises the point what this means 
for its application in practice. Are exclusion cases treated alike in Member 
States? This is a relevant question within the framework of a CEAS as 
the main goal of a common system is to remove diverse practices between 
European countries. The response to the above question is negative and the 
outcome of the comparison between the Netherlands and the UK in Chapter 7 is 
795 See § 3.3.3.1 - § 3.3.3.4 for a discussion of these provisions. 
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a prime example of this situation.796 Both countries treat sources underlying 
the authorities’ decisions on exclusion differently and use different tests 
regarding the assessment of evidence. There is also a marked difference 
between them because the UK does not recognise a reversed burden of 
proof regarding specific groups which would automatically lead to exclusion, 
whereas the Netherlands is at a loss with the aftermath of the exclusion of a 
group of ex-KhAD/WAD members. I will deal with the latter in more detail 
in the following paragraph. 
Including the exclusion clauses in EU legislation is not sufficient to reach 
uniformity between states. The fact that this legislation goes further than the 
Refugee Convention regarding exclusion as additional grounds to Article 1F 
have been laid down and revocation clauses797 have been introduced, does 
not contribute to the alignment of countries’ practices either.798 This means, 
in concrete, that for the interpretation of the terms of the clauses as laid down 
in Articles 12 and 17 of the recast Qualification Directive, countries are still 
dependent on non-binding UNHCR documents which were also available 
to countries before the adoption of the EU Directive. As explained earlier, 
the Tampere Conclusions as well as the other relevant asylum Directives 
state that a common asylum system should be based on the full and inclusive 
application of the Refugee Convention, which implies a role for the UNHCR. 
Close cooperation with the UNHCR is also recognised in recital 22 of this 
recast Directive which states that consultations with the UNHCR may 
provide valuable guidance for Member States when determining refugee 
status.
§ 8.2.2.1 The Dutch practice with regard to the KhAD/WAD
As an exclusion assessment takes place during the Refugee Status 
Determination procedure, countries must respect Article 10 of the recast 
Asylum Procedures Directive which sets forth requirements for the 
examination of an asylum application.799 This provision states, among 
others that applications are examined and decisions are taken individually, 
796 See also UNHCR Asylum in the European Union. A study on the implementation of 
the Qualification Directive, Brussels November 2007.
797 See Articles 14 and 19 of the recast Qualification Directive. 
798 Here I refer, inter alia, to Article 12 (3) of the recast Qualification Directive in which 
is laid down that exclusion of a refugee status applies to persons who instigate or 
otherwise participate in the commission of the crimes or acts mentioned therein and 
a copy of the text of Article 33 (2) of the Refugee Convention in Article 17 (d) of the 
recast Qualification Directive which states that a third country national or a stateless 
person is excluded from being eligible for subsidiary protection where there are 
serious reasons for considering that he or she constitutes a danger to the community 
or to the security of the Member State in which he or she is present. See § 3.5 for 
more on the enlargement of the clauses. 
799 See also Article 4 (3) recast Qualification Directive. 
Chapter 8 Synthesis
252
objectively, impartially and that precise and up-to-date information is 
obtained from various sources, such as the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) and UNHCR and relevant international human rights 
organisations, as to the general situation prevailing in the countries of 
origin of applicants and, where necessary, in countries through which they 
have transited, and that such information is made available to the personnel 
responsible for examining applications and taking decisions.800 This 
corresponds to the UNHCR’s line of thought as the basic principle is that 
assessing an asylum application as well as determining on exclusion from 
asylum should be based on individual responsibility. This particular aspect is 
one of the issues under discussion in the Netherlands concerning the group 
of ex-KhAD/WAD members. The following is a short summary: an influx of 
Afghan asylum seekers in the 1990s and rumours that there were members 
of the Afghan KhAD/WAD intelligence service among them led to action 
by the Dutch authorities. In 2000, an official report was issued regarding 
this group in which the conclusion read: ‘all non-commissioned officers and 
officers were active in the macabre divisions of the KhAD/WAD and were 
personally involved in the arrest, interrogation and sometimes execution 
of suspected persons. A rotation system ensured that operatives changed 
divisions frequently. A promotion or placement in a division or board with 
a more administrative or technical character was only attainable for those 
who sufficiently proved their mettle during the first placement (s)’. On the 
basis of this reports results, the burden of proof was reversed which means 
that all former non-commissioned officers and officers of the KhAD/WAD 
are assumed to have personally and knowingly participated, unless they can 
prove to be a significant exception.   
In 2008 the UNHCR came with its own Note on the matter in which it 
could not confirm that there had been a systematic rotation system within 
the KhAD/WAD. This result made several organisations, mayors of various 
Dutch municipalities and lower courts doubt the correctness of the official 
report and criticise its sources. Some points of critique concern the fact 
that the report’s conclusions relate to ‘all’ non-commissioned officers and 
officers which is very absolute and cannot be confirmed. That it is based 
on anonymous sources which are not made public and on the fact that the 
Netherlands could not enter Afghanistan at the time the report was drawn up 
and used communications from the Dutch Embassy in Pakistan. Moreover, 
as it is extremely difficult for an excluded Afghan to prove to be an exception, 
it makes one question whether an individual examination is carried out.801 
800 See Article 10 (3) (a) and (b).
801 Such an exception can be accepted when the following three cumulative conditions 
are met: 1) the alien joined the KhAD/WAD as a lateral-entry officer which makes 
it plausible that he did not complete the officers’ training; 2) the alien did not rotate 
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Though the Dutch report and its practice is still subject to critique, it is still 
currently in use and supported by the highest administrative court. The 
Dutch authorities insist on its correctness and stand by their opinion that 
individual examination is carried out.802 
§ 8.2.2.2 The Dutch practice in EU context
The Dutch legislation regarding the exclusion clauses is no different to that 
of other EU countries as it is based on Article 1F of the Refugee Convention 
and the implementation of the recast Qualification Directive. Yet, the results 
of a SCIFA questionnaire on Article 1F which is distributed among EU 
Member States shows that the Netherlands implements a more proactive 
1F-policy within Europe because most of the other EU countries rarely 
apply the exclusion clauses. The reason for the Netherlands’ active position 
is because it does not want to be a safe haven for war criminals and it wants 
to uphold its obligations in the interest of international relations. Besides 
the Netherlands being at the forefront of applying the exclusion clauses on 
asylum seekers, it is also the only country within Europe that acknowledges 
the categorical exclusion of ex-KhAD/WAD members. This is based on the 
personal and knowing participation test and, in particular, the following text 
which is included in the Aliens Circular: ‘knowing participation is present 
when the alien was employed in an organisation of which the Minister has 
determined that certain categories of persons belonging to that organisation 
fall under Article 1F unless he can prove that there was a significant exception 
in his individual case. Personal participation is present when the alien has 
belonged to a category of persons within an organisation, of which the 
Minister has determined that certain categories of persons belonging to that 
organisation will be considered to fall within Article 1F unless he can prove 
that there was a significant exception in his individual case’.803 
Though the UNHCR confirms the possibility of a reversed burden of proof 
in certain cases, the basic principle is still that each case should be examined 
individually. This means that even these cases should be considered with care and 
all relevant circumstances have to be examined before excluding a person. The 
ECJ clarified this issue by stating that mere membership of a criminal/terrorist 
organisation does not automatically mean that the person must be excluded: this 
is conditional on an assessment on a case-by-case basis of the specific facts.804 
within the organisation and 3) the alien was not promoted during the term of service. 
In practice, the person to whom Article 1F is applied is hard-pressed to meet the 
conditions as it rarely happens that an ex-KhAD member falls outside the scope of 
Article 1F due to his exceptional situation.
802 See Chapter 5 for more on the Netherlands. 
803 See Wijngaarden 2008. 
804 ECJ 9 November 2010, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B & D case, App. Nos. C-57/09 
and C-101/09, para. 99.
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The fact that the Netherlands stands alone within the EU regarding the 
reversed burden of proof on the KhAD/WAD group does not mean the 
country is not allowed to do so. In the end, the highest court supports its 
policy and no other court at European level has ruled against the country’s 
practice concerning the matter. Yet, it is interesting to question how this 
situation is to be seen within the framework of working towards a common 
standard within Europe.The EU wants to oppose the diversity in national 
asylum practices among states which is seen as one of the main reasons for 
asylum flows to Europe. This way, more uniformity would be favourable to 
European countries, but let’s reverse the situation. The EU also wants to be 
an area in which people who need protection feel safe and are treated fairly. 
Is it defendable that there is a big chance that an asylum seeker who was 
excluded in the Netherlands on the basis of a questionable report, with all 
the consequences that it entails, probably would not have been excluded if he 
had applied for asylum in another EU country? 
The Netherlands has often repeated that it follows an active 1F approach as 
it does not want to be a safe haven for war criminals and that it does so in the 
interest of international relations. It seems to me that the one thing all EU 
countries have in common is that they do not want to provide a safe haven for 
war criminals, so the Netherlands is not unique in its approach. Howshould 
this standpoint on international relations be interpreted, if one places it in 
the following perspective? 
In Chapter 5 regarding the Netherlands, I described the situation of an 
excluded asylum seeker who received a lot of media attention because 
of a dispute between a mayor and the former Minister for Immigration 
and Asylum.805 The man in question, Mr Naibzay, was excluded on the 
basis of the official KhAD/WAD report and was not allowed to remain 
legally in the Netherlands, but his spouse and four children had received a 
residence permit and were already naturalised Dutch citizens. When the 
Minister wanted Mr Naibzay to be expelled to Afghanistan, the mayor of 
the municipality of Giessenlanden where Mr Naibzay was residing with 
his family, drew attention to his situation and criticised the fact that it was 
practically impossible for Mr Naibzay to prove his innocence due to the fact 
that none of the evidence would suffice. Though he was not removed to his 
home country, there were no prospects for any change in his status in the 
Netherlands. This situation forced him look for a solution elsewhere. In 
2013, after a stay of over fifteen years in the Netherlands, he followed his 
family members and moved to Belgium where he received a residence permit 
for five-years. The basis for this permit lies in Directive 2004/38/EC on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
805 See § 5.3.2.4.
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freely within the territory of the Member States. The fact that Mr Naibzay 
was never prosecuted for the acts which made him fall under 1F and Belgium 
does not recognise the KhAD/WAD policy of the Netherlands made it 
possible for him to legally reside in Belgium.806 
I think that the case of Naibzay is a good example of what the EU wants to 
avoid with regard to excluded asylum seekers as it leads to a situation which 
is hard to explain within the context of international relations and uniformity 
within Europe: is Belgium not bound by the same Refugee Convention and 
asylum Directives? Solely on the basis of the asylum Directives and the recast 
Qualification Directive in particular, which includes substantive asylum law, 
there will be no change in the current situation as it is simply not enough to 
induce countries to carry out the same measures. In the following paragraph 
I will discuss which steps I believe must be taken, within a European context, 
to ensure that the uniformity which is pursued, comes a step closer. 
§ 8.2.3 How to reach uniformity within the EU? 
It is no exaggeration to state that European countries face an enormous 
challenge when it concerns managing migration flows, in particular with 
regard to the high influx of Syrian asylum applicants, due to the ongoing 
conflict in Syria. It requires the necessary care from states to select those 
who are undeserving and to provide rights and entitlements to aliens who are 
in need of protection.807 As Foster states: ‘the overwhelming purpose of the 
Refugee Convention is in the end a human rights one. In essence, the treaty 
provides for refugees’ rights and entitlements under international law’.808 
Though this Convention is seen as a living instrument which means it has 
to be interpreted and applied within the framework of current conditions,809 
one main aspect should never be in dispute concerning the application of 
Article 1F, which is that ‘it was the notorious cases which the drafters of the 
Convention had in mind’.810 
806 The case of Naibzay is not an exception as there more cases known about asylum 
seekers who have been excluded in the Netherlands and who have managed to get a 
permit in another EU country. See also Reijven & Van Wijk 2014, pp. 265-266.
807 At the end of 2014 a questionnaire is circulated within the framework of the European 
Migration Network in order to get an impression about the findings of EU Member 
States with regard to the applicability of article 1F Refugee Convention in Syrian 
cases in which 13 out of the 16 responding countries reported to have active efforts 
to detect article 1F (exclusion) indications in Syrian cases. See also Bolhuis & Van 
Wijk 2015 for more on the situation in the Netherlands. 
808 McAdam 2011, p. 92. 
809 Idem, pp. 103-104.
810 Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 263.
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The European Commission states on its website that:811
‘Asylum must not be a lottery. EU Member States have a shared responsibility 
to welcome asylum seekers in a dignified manner, ensuring they are treated 
fairly and that their case is examined to uniform standards so that, no matter 
where an applicant applies, the outcome will be similar’.
Though this is a noble ambition and the EU is working hard to achieve a 
common asylum system, the current practice dealing with asylum claims, 
including the exclusion of those who fall under Article 1F, renders little 
results, let alone a similar outcome. I believe that it is much more important 
to create uniformity in dealing with claims is than to achieve the same 
outcome at all costs. This is in any case a difficult task as long as for the 
application of Article 1F, the standard of proof of ‘serious reasons for 
considering’ is in use. As already discussed, neither the Convention itself, nor 
the travaux preparatoires provide further guidance to what ‘serious reasons 
for considering’ really means. States agree that no criminal standard of 
proof has to be met and the UNHCR Handbook explains that these serious 
reasons should be based on clear and credible evidence. In addition to what 
is stated in the UNHCR documents, I recommend to also include a provision 
on the assessment of exclusion in the recast Asylum Procedures Directives. 
Though Article 10 of this Directive, which also relates to exclusion, sets 
forth requirements for the examination of an asylum application, it would 
be wise to insert a specific provision in this Directive on the requirements of 
the standard of proof concerning exclusion. The adopted asylum Directives 
which are implemented in the Member States’ national legislations is an 
essential step towards uniformity, but it is not sufficient.812 It is clear that 
further steps are required to achieve an actual common practice within 
Europe which will lead to a fairer examination of the applications: Thus what 
can be done? 
•	 Official country reports at European level
The asylum seeker’s account of reasons for their request for asylum is an 
important source of evidence in the asylum application assessment. When 
on the basis of this information an official believes that he is dealing with 
a potential 1F applicant, it is the task of the authorities to find additional 
information to substantiate the notion. Often an official country report 
on the country of origin of the person in question will be decisive. States 
have special services which are responsible for collecting information and 
811 <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm> 
(last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
812 See also Lambert 2009, pp. 519-543.
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drawing up reports as also discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 regarding the case 
of the Netherlands and the UK. The practices concerning these reports can 
differ which is also the case between these two countries as shown in the 
comparison in Chapter 7. The UK uses embassy reports only as background 
information and makes all source documents public, while the Netherlands 
makes use of confidential information in reports. On the other hand, in 
the UK, administrative decisions refusing entry into national territory that 
are adopted on the basis of information whose disclosure would be liable 
to prejudice national security may be contested before the SIAC. In such 
proceedings, neither the person who has contested such a decision nor his 
own lawyers have access to the information upon which the decision was 
based when its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest.813 Another 
difference is that the UK has an Advisory Panel on Country Information as a 
monitoring body of reports, whereas in the Netherlands it is up to the courts 
to assess in appeal cases the quality of the background reports on which the 
country report is based.814 A good example of how countries may differ in 
drawing up and using country reports is the Dutch KhAD/WAD report of 
2000. As already explained, this report has been criticised regarding, among 
others, its sources and it is still a matter of dispute. An extraordinary fact is 
that, within the EU, the Netherlands stands alone concerning the conclusions 
of its report which has far-reaching consequences for the alien concerned. It 
is an illusion to create uniformity within Europe regarding asylum systems 
as long as such undesirable situations occur. A close cooperation between 
Member States concerning country of origin information (COI) is a 
requisite, which is also encouraged by the EC and the UNHCR.815 
Up to now, several steps have been taken in EU context regarding this issue. 
For example, the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on 
Asylum (CIREA) was established and succeeded in 2002 by Eurasil. The 
EC set up the latter committee as an EU network for asylum practitioners 
providing a forum for the exchange of COI, best practices and a variety of 
policy-related matters among EU Member States, asylum adjudicators and 
the EC, which aimed to improve and maximize convergence on approaches 
to, and assessment of, the protection needs of asylum seekers. In 2006, the 
Commission delivered a communication to the Council and Parliament 
on strengthened practical cooperation, including the exchange of COI 
and called for the creation of a common portal which would be an easily 
accessible common entry point for existing information; propose guidelines 
813 See § 6.4 for a discussion of the ECJ 4 June 2013, ZZ v. SSHD case which concerned 
the non-disclosure of information in proceedings before the SIAC. 
814 See § 7.2 for more on this. 
815 See UNHCR Country of Origin Information: Towards Enhanced International 
Cooperation, Geneva February 2004. 
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on the production of COI and on the longer term the development of a fully-
fledged EU COI database containing information based on EU common 
principles should be envisaged.816 What was already suggested with the 
start of the Hague Programme, eventually led to the creation of the EASO 
which has taken over responsibility for Eurasil. Since February 2011, EASO 
acts as a centre of expertise on asylum providing support to Member States 
in order to develop a CEAS. COI is responsible for gathering and sharing 
information, but moreover, one of its tasks is to write and publish its own 
reports (the EASO COI report). Experts of the European COI units come 
from Member States on a voluntary basis and are involved in the production 
of COI reports on countries and topics defined by EASO.817 EASO primarily 
focuses its COI-related activities on countries which have been identified 
using an internal ‘country determination methodology’, which is based 
on a combination of statistical indicators (including number of applicants, 
number of affected Member States, number of pending cases, etc.) and 
qualitative information provided by senior Member State experts.818 To 
date, EASO has issued reports on Chechnya, Somalia, Eritrea, Pakistan and 
three on Afghanistan. 
The establishment of EASO is a substantial improvement within the 
framework of founding one asylum system within Europe, but I do not 
believe its current activities regarding COI can prevent future examples like 
the KhAD/WAD report as outlined above. This has to do with the fact that 
EASO-COI reports lack binding force.  Thus, national services continue to 
draw up their own reports of which the content concerning to the country 
in question may differ from the EASO conclusions. Though states are 
entitled to do so and will not be very keen on giving up their freedom, the EU 
needs binding European COI reports in order to get common assessments 
concerning the situation in countries of origin. The binding effect upon 
states does not have to cover all reports which are issued by EASO, but when 
the EU is exposed to an inflow of asylum seekers from certain countries that 
are contending with problems or organisations known to be notorious, all 
Member States must use the same information from European reports. 
816 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006 
DC0067&from=NL> (last accessed on 21 September 2015). 
817 The EASO COI report is drawn up conform the methodology as drafted by a working 
party in 2011  with the participation of EASO and the representatives of Country of 
Origin Information units
 Working for, inter alia, Staatendokumentation, Bundesasylamt - Austria; 
Dokumentations- og Projektkontoret, Udlændingestyrelsen - Denmark and Lifos, 
Migrationsverket - Sweden. 
 The methodology is based on the ‘Common EU guidelines for processing COI’ as 
well as on the ‘EU common guidelines for (joint) fact finding missions’.
818 Information provided by EASO by means of e-mail on the 1st of April 2015. 
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The determination of the countries and organisations selection must not be 
limited to the EASO as is currently the case. When an EU Member State 
makes an early observation that there is need for a joint report, this must 
be noted and action taken. As stated above, staff members at the EASO 
COI units consist of country experts from Member States. The current 
practice is that about three or four EU countries are responsible for writing 
the COI report, to which sometimes supportive research is delivered by 
representatives from other countries and the report is reviewed by experts 
from again different EU States.819 The cooperation between EU countries 
and their rotation as authors of the reports is a good way of raising mutual 
trust between states and creating a learning environment. This also 
counts for the involvement of UNHCR as a reviewing party. However, the 
voluntary character of contributing to the reports constitutes the risk that 
it will always involve the same countries, while it is necessary that also 
inexperienced Member States build up expertise. This is why I propose a 
mandatory contribution by countries in which the senior Member States 
play an important consultancy and advisory role. In view of EASO’s limited 
research capacity and its dependence on Member States, I think it would 
be an improvement if EASO’s expertise concerning country of origin 
information is enlarged by working in close collaboration with Council of 
Europe institutions. Besides paying attention to judgments of the ECtHR, 
the CPT and the Commissioner for Human Rights they can also provide 
valuable information and knowledge transfer given their work experience 
in the human rights field. The fact that the EU has set up the Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) for 2014-2020 with a total of 3.1 
billion euros for the period of 7 years to strengthen and develop a common 
Union regarding asylum and immigration, shows that Europe is ready to 
move forward.820  
•	 A joint decision on the reversed burden of proof
Each asylum application has to be examined individually and to exclude 
a person from a refugee status, individual responsibility must also be 
established regarding the crime which falls under Article 1F. What this means 
is discussed under § 8.2.1 where it is also explained that although each case 
should be examined on its own merits, it is possible for authorities to reverse 
the burden of proof in case of membership of an organisation or government 
819 Contrary to the other reports, the COI Report on Chechnya: Women, Marriage, 
Divorce and Child Custody is written by one EU Member State and reviewed by a 
few others. 
820 <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-
borders/asylum-migration-integration-fund/index_en.htm> (last accessed on 21 
September 2015).  
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engaged in activities that fall within the scope of 1F. The consequence of 
such a presumption of responsibility is that the authorities assume that the 
person falls under 1F. However, it is possible for the applicant to refute this 
presumption. 
As discussed under Chapter 5 and shown under § 8.2.2.1, the policy on the 
ex-KhAD/WAD members in the Netherlands is based on an official report on 
this organisation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Based on the results 
of the 2000 report, the burden of proof is reversed concerning all former 
non-commissioned officers and officers of the KhAD/WAD. Thus, these 
men are assumed to have personally and knowingly participated, unless they 
can prove themselves to be a significant exception.   
The fact that the Netherlands is the only EU country which applies a 
reversed burden of proof on members of this organisation shows once again 
the importance of creating official reports at a European level. Thus, my 
second remark refers the previous discussion regarding country reports. 
I believe that such an important decision as reversing the burden of proof 
on certain members of a group or government must be based on a joint 
decision by the EU Member States. This is a role for the Commissioner for 
Migration and Home Affairs (who can act as a facilitator) and the Council of 
Ministers, in particular the Justice and Home Affairs Council. The Council 
comprises ministers from each Member State who are responsible for the 
policy area under discussion such as migration in this instance. The duties 
of the Council include coordinating states’ policies and adopting measures 
in relation to Justice and Home Affairs policy. These duties are in line with 
reaching a possible decision on whether the burden of proof for a specific 
group should be reversed. Only when all states apply the same rule to the 
group in question, can a fair and uniform system without divergences in 
national implementation be achieved within Europe.821  
§ 8.3 Post-exclusion phase
In the foregoing, attention was paid to the first phase relating to exclusion, 
which is the assessment and application of Article 1F. A logical sequel to this 
discussion is the examination of what happens to those asylum seekers who are 
actually excluded. The ideal situation for states is that they return to their home 
country, but this does not happen very often due to several reasons such as: 
that the person is not willing to leave; has no documents; the other authorities 
are not cooperating or removal would breach the  refoulement principle. 
As seen in the Introduction in Chapter 1 and the discussion in the subsequent 
821 A positive development to mention within the scope of European cooperation and 
creating uniformity is EASO’s pilot project named Joint Processing in which, inter 
alia, IND staff members are being exchanged for the purpose of hearing asylum 
seekers and deciding on claims in other EU Member States. See IND Context, 
Tijdschrift voor relaties van de IND, No. 1 March 2015, p. 9. 
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chapters, the focus of this study is on this post-exclusion phase; in particular 
regarding those excluded aliens who cannot be removed to their countries 
of origin because of refoulement. Within the aim of creating a CEAS it is not 
only important that states have a common approach to how they apply Article 
1F, but also how they deal with the applicants who are excluded. The recast 
Qualification Directive affirms in its Preamble the principle of non-refoulement 
and prescribes under Article 21 (1) that ‘Member States shall respect this 
principle in accordance with their international obligations’. The latter phrase 
refers, among others, to Article 3 ECHR in which it is laid down that, ‘No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’. Article 3 ECHR is a very relevant provision for the excluded 
asylum seeker within Europe as it states in absolute terms that a person cannot 
be removed from the host country when he fears for his life. Though this 
finding in this Article gives the alien a certain amount of protection, there is 
another side to the coin: Article 3 does not entail a right to stay. Thus, states 
are not expressly prescribed to issue a permit to the alien in case of refoulement. 
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention and its equivalents in the recast 
Qualification Directive are mandatory provisions, which means that when 
one of the clauses applies to a person, he has to be excluded and is not given 
a refugee status as provided by the Convention, respectively international 
protection (standing for refugee status and subsidiary protection) as 
provided by the Directive. However, this situation does not mean that states 
are not allowed to issue permit to the alien on another ground, such as, for 
example on the basis of discretionary powers for humanitarian reasons. In 
the end, it is within the domestic domain of EU states to decide how to deal 
with excluded non-removable asylum seekers. The results of the comparison 
between the Netherlands and the UK, as explained in Chapter 7, is a good 
illustration how different the practices in two of the EU countries are. I 
will elaborate further on these countries in the following paragraphs, but 
to summarise it means  that an excluded asylum seeker in the Netherlands 
cannot obtain a residence permit on any other grounds, irrespective of 
whether refoulement is at issue. Thus, also in case of refoulement, the alien 
is not granted a lawful stay. Though the person will not be removed by 
the authorities, he remains under the obligation to leave the country at his 
own will. During his stay in the country, the excluded alien is not entitled 
to work, use facilities or receive social security benefits, with the exception 
of the necessary medical care and legal assistance. Contrary to the policy 
in the Netherlands, the UK does provide a lawful stay to an excluded non-
removable asylum seeker in the form of Restricted Leave. Such a Leave is 
issued for six months with the option for renewal. The alien is free to work 
and live where he wants, but restrictions can be imposed on him as well a 
requirement to regularly report himself. 
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§ 8.3.1 Solutions at European level
The question that raises with respect to the observation as stated above is 
whether such contrasts between EU countries is compatible with the aim 
of creating a CEAS. In my opinion, creating uniformity in Europe does not 
only mean that states are in line with how they apply Article 1F, but also in 
how they deal with the aliens who are excluded. This is an essential requisite 
if we want to talk about a fair system within Europe. From this perspective, 
it should not make a difference in which EU Member State Mr X from the 
case in the introduction ends up. In the current situation, his exclusion in 
the Netherlands offers him no perspective for a lawful stay whereas he 
could have lead a ‘normal life if he was in the UK. Although the European 
Commission has been urging for a solution at European level for more than 
ten years, nothing has as changed so far.822 In the following paragraphs I will 
discuss what I consider should be done to diminish the disparities between 
EU countries. 
•	 Mandatory provision on non-removable aliens 
I have explained that exclusion results in the ineligibility to obtain protection 
under the Convention, respectively recast Qualification Directive but that 
states are free to decide whether or not to provide another type of status to 
these aliens. On the other hand, it has been shown that Article 3 does not 
entail a right to stay in the host country. This means that when the provision 
applies, the excluded alien may not be removed but his situation regarding a 
residence permit is not certain either. The practice in the Netherlands shows 
that applying Articles 1F and 3 ECHR at the same time can leave such a 
person in limbo. Putting an alien in a position without any status is in itself 
undesirable, but when it concerns a person who cannot be removed due to 
refoulement, it is not only undesirable but also inexplicable. This is why I am 
of the opinion that in addition to Article 21 (1) of the recast Qualification 
Directive on respecting this principle, a clause should be inserted in the 
Directive which reads that excluded asylum seekers who are non-removable 
due to refoulement should not be left without a status.823 There are a few 
relevant reasons why this is the case: 
- The ECtHR has stated in Chacal and reaffirmed in the Saadi case that 
‘Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic 
822 Commission Working Document, The relationship between safeguarding internal 
security and complying with international protection obligations and instruments 
COM/2001/0743 final. 
823 This also counts with regard to family members who did not manage to gain protection 
on individual grounds. The question of extension of stay must be connected to the 
position of the excluded asylum seeker. 
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society. Though the Court is aware of the immense difficulties faced by 
states in modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist 
violence, even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits in 
absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
irrespective of the victim’s conduct’. Thus, no limitation or interferences 
are allowed when an alien would be subjected to refoulement. The mere 
possibility of ill-treatment on return is not enough to fall under the scope 
of Article 3 as a high degree of proof is required. This way, the alien must 
show substantial grounds that he faces a real risk of ill-treatment in the 
receiving country on his return and this ill-treatment must attain a minim 
level of severity for it to fall under the scope of the provision.  When 
exclusion under Article 1F is not a subject under discussion and the 
person does not qualify as a refugee, an Article 3 obstacle would normally 
lead to a residence permit based on subsidiary protection. I understand 
that an unremovable person who is excluded from asylum is not given 
protection similar to someone who is not excluded, but the fact that 
such a person is not given any kind of legal status during his stay in the 
host country short-changes the significance of the refoulement principle. 
Not removing shows on the one hand that the state concerned seems to 
act consistent with a democracy based on the rule of law, while on the 
other hand, the value of Article 3 is being undermined which makes the 
provision meaningless. In the end, not enabling the person to stay legally 
is equating him to others living illegally in the country for any reason 
whatsoever. 
- My second point relates to the standard of proof concerning exclusion in 
relation to leaving a non-removable alien in limbo. As discussed under § 
8.2.1, Article 1F requires that there are ‘serious reasons for considering’ 
that the alien has committed a crime which would fall under one of its 
limbs. The phrase is unknown in other areas of law and what it actually 
means, it is unclear. Nevertheless, it is an established fact that the criminal 
standard of proof does not have to be met. In this connection it hardly 
occurs that the excluded alien is prosecuted, let alone gets convicted for the 
committed crime, which has mainly to do with the difficulty of collecting 
proof against the person. This observation raises the question whether 
the vague administrative standard of proof which is used, outweighs the 
situation of leaving a non-removable excluded asylum in limbo? 
If one considers this question in the light of the Dutch practice, I believe it 
is untenable. How can one justify that an alien who has not been criminally 
convicted and who the authorities decided that he cannot be removed to his 
home country, is left in uncertainty for many years, often for a period of more 
than a decade. A good example of this practice is the case of Sison who has 
lived in the Netherlands for 25 years already but still does not have a legal stay 
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and yet he cannot be removed.824 Besides the uncertainty of his predicament, 
he is not entitled to any social benefits.825 If one looks at the matter from 
a purely legal perspective, it is defensible that exclusion from protection 
means an entire exclusion, but what about the moral values to which a state 
is bound? Boeles already expressed years ago that the refoulement principle 
should be respected and non-removable excluded asylum seekers should 
be protected instead of withholding them from all basic means to support 
themselves. According to him, the focus should be on criminal prosecution, 
‘because 1F applicants are human beings, they should be protected; and 
as they are criminals, they should be punished’. Currently, the opposite is 
happening, they are not protected and they are not tried either’.826 According 
to Bruin: ‘they are not criminally prosecuted, but considered to be guilty for 
good’.827 I wonder whether such a practice as in the Netherlands regarding the 
group of non-removable excluded asylum seekers is perhaps a more severe 
punishment than serving a sentence after a criminal conviction? In the latter 
case, the person at least knows where he stands. In relation to this discussion, 
I would like to focus on the Vinter and others case828 of the ECtHR. 
This case concerned three applicants who are life sentence prisoners with 
‘whole life’ tariffs, which means that they will never be considered for release 
other than on compassionate grounds, with a test which is almost never 
reached as no whole life prisoner has ever been released under section 30 of 
the 1997 Crime Sentences Act or any other power. The applicants argued 
that such a sentence without review was inhuman and degrading and thereby 
a violation of Article 3 ECHR. The sentence not only resulted in lifelong 
imprisonment but the denial of any hope. According to the Chamber, there 
had been no violation of Article 3 as whole life prison sentences were not of 
themselves inhuman or degrading and it was not argued in any of the cases 
that the point had been reached when the detention had become such as a 
matter of fact.829 After this judgment, the applicants asked for a referral to the 
Grand Chamber for a review of the judgment which turned out differently 
than the first outcome. 
The Court states that ‘Indeed, there is also now clear support in European 
and international law for the principle that all prisoners, including those 
824 See § 5.2.2 for more on the Sison-case. 
825 I will elaborate on this under § 8.3.2 and discuss the situation in the Netherlands. 
826 Boeles 2008, p. 396.
827 Bruin 2013, p. 216.
828 ECtHR Vinter and others v. the UK, 9 July 2013, App. Nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 
3896/10 with an annotation from Van Kalmthout, European Human Rights Cases 
2013/254.  
829 <http://www.gcnchambers.co.uk/news/echr_whole_life_tariffs_judgment_vinter_
and_others_v_uk> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
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serving life sentences, be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the 
prospect of release if that rehabilitation is achieved. While punishment 
remains one of the aims of imprisonment, the emphasis in European 
penal policy is now on the rehabilitative aim of imprisonment, particularly 
towards the end of a long prison sentence’.830 From this viewpoint, ‘the 
Court considers that, in the context of a life sentence, Article 3 must be 
interpreted as requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the sense of a review 
which allows the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in 
the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation 
has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued 
detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. 
Where domestic law does not provide for the possibility of such a review, 
a whole life sentence will not measure up to the standards of Article 3 of 
the Convention.831 In this case of Vinter and others, the Court expressed that 
‘this contrast between the broad wording of section 30 (as interpreted by 
the Court of Appeal in a Convention-compliant manner, as it is required to 
be as a matter of UK law in accordance with the Human Rights Act) and the 
exhaustive conditions announced in the Prison Service Order, as well as the 
absence of any dedicated review mechanism for the whole life orders, the 
Court is not persuaded that, at the present time, the applicants’ life sentences 
can be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. 
It accordingly finds that the requirements of Article 3 in this respect have not 
been met in relation to any of the three applicants’.832
The ECtHR emphasises in its judgment that those who are sentenced with 
life imprisonment for committing crimes of the worst kind should also 
be given a perspective. Having regard to this judgment, I again want to 
underline that I find it indefensible that an alien who is excluded on the basis 
of assumptions; not criminally prosecuted and cannot be removed is offered 
no perspective for a legal stay in the host country. 
•	 Judgment from the ECtHR is necessary
Chapter 4 deals with the role of the ECHR in case of exclusion and focuses 
on the ECtHR’s case law on 1F issues. Until present, several cases have been 
brought to Court which are almost all versus the Netherlands and concern 
mainly Afghans who served the KhAD/WAD. Unfortunately, no judgment 
has been delivered yet concerning the issues that have arisen in relation 
to Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. With regard to certain cases on Article 3, the 
Court rejected these complaints for ‘being incompatible ratione materiae as 
830 See Vinter and others judgment, paras. 114-115.
831 Idem, paras. 119-121. 
832 Idem, para. 130.
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neither Article 3 nor any other provision of the Convention and its Protocols 
guarantees, as such, a right to a residence permit’. From a legal point of 
view, this is correct as the essence of Article 3 is to prevent the expulsion 
of a person in case he fears refoulement. On the other hand, it is undeniable 
that this establishment does not suffice anymore in view of the problems 
attached to it. It is very understandable that the Court has not ruled on what 
legal status should be accrued to persons who cannot be removed as it wants 
to leave the responsibility on deciding to the states. But what if a country 
does not take that responsibility? Let’s consider the situation of excluded 
non-removable asylum seekers in the Netherlands who do not get a lawful 
stay, which lasts for many years and have no right to claim benefits etc. I have 
already mentioned that leaving a person in such a situation actually short-
changes the significance of Article 3 ECHR. As the alien cannot be blamed 
for the fact he cannot be removed, it does not make sense to punish him in 
this way, which all adds up to withholding him what is necessary to be part 
of the society. Does this situation not also raise the Court with a duty? I 
stated above that I find that the Court’s argument, that Article 3 does not 
guarantee as such a right to a residence permit does not suffice anymore, but 
additionally it does not do justice to Article 3 ECHR either. This is why the 
Court should comment on the situation of non-removable aliens who are left 
in limbo, especially focusing on the positive obligation ensuing from Article 
3 ECHR.  
In the cases in which the applicants relied upon Articles 3 ECHR, also the 
question is raised whether the consequences of a continuous denial of a 
permit, while no expulsion has taken place, leads to an Article 3 violation. In 
these cases, reference is made to the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case in which 
the Court found the living conditions of the asylum seeker to be contrary to 
Article 3.833 With regard to the two cases of the excluded asylum seekers in 
the Netherlands, the Court did not find a minimum level of severity to be 
present as was the case in M.S.S., but one should not be surprised if, in future 
cases, the Court rules against the Netherlands. This would give an interesting 
turn to the discussion that is arisen in the country after two decisions of the 
ECSR in which the Committee considered that the legislation and practice of 
the Netherlands fails to ensure access to community shelter for the purpose 
of preventing homelessness and found that the practical and legal measures 
denying the right to emergency assistance accordingly restrict the right of 
adult migrants in an irregular situation and without adequate resources in the 
Netherlands in a disproportionate manner leads to the violation of Articles 
13 (4) and 31 (2) of the Charter.834 In the following I will elaborate on this 
833 See § 4.2.4.
834 Complaint no. 90/2013. Adoption: 1 July 2014, notification: 9 July 2014 and publicity: 
10 November 2014 and complaint no. 86/2012. Adoption: 2 July 2014, notification: 
9 July 2014 and publicity: 10 November 2014.
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issue and look at the position of excluded asylum seekers in the Netherlands 
with the prospect of urgent future changes. Finally, concluding remarks on 
the UK will be provided in § 8.3.3.
§ 8.3.2 What future changes are needed in the Netherlands? 
The initial response from the State Secretary to the two decisions of the 
European Committee of Social Rights was not to change anything in the 
current legislation and policy and to wait for a resolution to be taken by the 
Committee of Ministers regarding the matter. In the meantime, the ESCR’s 
ruling has been followed by Dutch courts which obliged the authorities to 
temporarily give financial support to municipalities so that they can provide 
food, shelter and clothing to illegal aliens.835 The group of illegal aliens relates 
to asylum seekers, whose applications for protection have been rejected and 
have exhausted all legal means, which may include excluded asylum seekers.
In April 2015, the Committee adopted a resolution in which it did not make 
a specific recommendation to the government. This kindled the discussion 
on the matter between the two coalition parties as the Social-Democratic 
Labour Party wants to maintain the support and the People’s Party for 
Freedom and Democracy does not. The latter party believes that providing 
such an assistance would attract even more asylum seekers to the Netherlands 
and lead to the situation where fewer leave the country. Theoretically this 
reasoning is correct, but what about the consequences of the practice for the 
person concerned and society? The authorities remain adamant being that 
these aliens are not welcome. However, the matter of the fact is they are in 
the country. In everyday life the municipalities are the ones who are stuck 
with the problems which often lead to tensions between central and local 
governments. It is not difficult to understand that illegal immigrants who 
wander around with no means of support may commit survival crimes and 
thus create insecurity and social unrest which is an undesirable situation for 
the community. The same is true for the group of non-removable excluded 
asylum seekers. Though the authorities insist that it does not want to be a 
safe haven for such criminals, the fact is they in the country and cannot be 
removed. The Dutch authorities must take responsibility as leaving these 
aliens to fend for themselves with all the consequences it entails, is no way 
to deal with this group of persons. In my opinion depriving ‘a person’ from 
all basic needs is not compatible with a democratic state as it breaches 
certain principles, primarily that of respect for human dignity. In order to 
substantiate my claim, I want to refer to a judgment of the District Court The 
Hague in which the court stated that decisions of the ECSR are significant 
for the interpretation of provisions of the ECHR, including Article 8. An 
applicant who was not allowed a legal stay in the country, was not able to 
support herself and not entitled to social service benefits was considered to 
835 See § 5.2.7. 
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be part of the group as decided on by the Committee. On this basis the court 
judged that withholding the applicant from food, shelter and clothing led to a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR.836 Relevant to mention within this perspective is 
recital 12 of the Returns Directive in which also lays down that ‘the situation 
of third country nationals who are staying illegally but who cannot yet be 
removed should be addressed and that their basic conditions of subsistence 
should be defined according to national legislation’. The determination 
of refoulement in the case of an excluded asylum seeker means the person 
cannot be sent back to his country of origin. The next step for authorities 
should be to check whether it is possible to expel the person to another safe 
country. This will not be an easy task and realistically there is little chance of 
success. As already mentioned in the previous paragraph, I believe that these 
non-removable excluded asylum seekers should be given a legal status for 
which the UK practice can be used as an example.837 
The initial policy from the UK concerning non-removable excluded asylum 
seekers was the issuance of Discretionary Leave for six months with the 
possibility for extension. Under this leave, the alien has the right to work 
and access to public funds: no restrictions are imposed on the person. From 
September 2011 on, Discretionary Leave for excluded asylum seekers was 
replaced by Restricted Leave. Again this leave is for the duration of six months 
after which it is examined whether the alien can be removed. If not, leave is 
extended with another six months at a time. The main difference between 
the two forms of leave is that the latter introduces restrictions that can be 
imposed on the alien regarding, inter alia, work and residence. Considering 
the fact that asylum seekers are excluded and are not provided protection for 
a certain reason, I can understand why Discretionary Leave was considered 
as too easy for a lawful stay for these aliens as they were free to do what they 
wanted without any restrictions. In the end, one should not forget that there 
is a reason why a person is not provided with protection under the Refugee 
Convention. Imposing restrictions on a person increases the possibility for 
authorities to not lose sight of the person and it gives a clear message to the 
person that his stay is not a matter of course. In my view, the main point of 
the UK practice is that the alien is not left without a status. The High Court 
as well as the Court of Appeal played a relevant part in this. I will discuss this 
later further in § 8.3.3 on the UK. I believe that temporary leave is a good way 
of providing a legal stay for non-removable 1F applicants, but I do not think 
it makes sense to examine whether there is a change in the situation every six 
months to make removal possible. The state of affairs in the country of origin 
is often so serious that it is unlikely that refoulement is no longer important 
836 District Court The Hague 8 September 2015, AWB 15/1924.
837 This is in line with, inter alia, Ferdinandusse who also argued for a temporary 
residence permit and refers to Member of Parliament Van Oven who did the same in 
1998. See Ferdinandusse 2002. 
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within such a short period of time. This is why I recommend an examination 
of the person’s position each year which will give a better review of the 
situation. To return to what I have discussed above regarding the necessity 
to provide basic needs for non-removable 1F applicants. It is worthwhile 
mentioning that although those aliens under Restricted Leave do not have 
recourse to public funds, when they are destitute, they are provided with 
accommodation, subsistence or both.838
Prior to the introduction of the durability and proportionality-test, there was 
no clarity or any policy on the question until when the dead-end situation of 
the non-removable excluded asylum seeker could last. With this test, which 
is developed in the jurisprudence and adopted in the Aliens Circular,839 it is 
first judged whether Article 3 offers a sustainable obstacle against removal 
to the country of origin, and if so, whether permanent denial of a residence 
title would be disproportionate in the particular circumstances of the case. 
The term sustainable obstacle refers to a stay of ten years in the Netherlands 
in a ‘no removal, no admission’ situation. Additionally, the IND expects the 
alien to undertake serious attempts to leave to another country with which 
he possibly has some bonding or has resided in the past. Though this latter is 
already a difficult condition to fulfil, it seems to be more difficult for the alien 
to make a reasonable case for his situation to be exceptional which makes 
it disproportionate to withhold a permit. The introduction of the test is a 
positive development as it created a way to grant the alien a legal resident 
status. However, the fact that the test leads to a temporary stay after so 
many years and it is practically impossible to fall under its terms makes it 
inconsequential. As discussed above, I argue for a temporary legal stay for 
those non-removable 1F applicants and their family members and do not 
believe these persons should wait ten years for their time in limbo to end.840 I 
838 A person is deemed to appear to be destitute if a) he does not have adequate 
accommodation or any means of obtaining it (whether or not his other essential living 
conditions are met) or b) he has adequate accommodation or the means of obtaining 
it, but cannot meet his other essential living needs (section 95 IAA 1999).
839 C2/7.10.2.6 of the Aliens Circular.
840 The current situation with regard to family members of excluded asylum seekers 
is that they normally do not receive a permit either. They can apply for asylum on 
individual grounds and are provided with a refugee status in case of eligibility for 
protection. When no asylum claim on individual grounds is accepted, family members 
experience the same terms as the excluded asylum seeker. Thus, when refoulement 
forms an obstacle for removal of the 1F applicant, family members are not expelled 
either which is in line with the case law of the ECtHR. See 8 November 2005, 
Bader v. Sweden, App. No. 13284/04 (Ars Aequi RV20050004 includes annotation 
from H. Battjes) and 22 June 2006, D. v. Turkey, App. No. 24245/03 (Ars Aequi 
RV20060003 includes annotation from H. Battjes). After a residence of ten years, 
family members are in principle no longer objected the contraindication of Article 
1F. A recent case which received attention concerned that of the children Glaucio and 
also think that at a certain point in time, these persons should be considered 
for settlement. As the High Court judged in the N, R case: ‘Thus if someone 
has been here for ten years and subjected to a series of discretionary leaves 
for that period he will normally be able to remain here indefinitely. He will, 
after all, be expected by then to have made his life in this country, to have 
settled here, perhaps to have established family life here. The view is, again 
as it seems to me, entirely reasonably taken that generally speaking - and of 
course each case has to be considered on its own merits - such an individual 
will have leave to remain indefinitely and thus will be entitled to settle here’.841 
Given the government’s view on 1F applicants, it is unrealistic to state that 
the whole group of non-removable 1F applicants should automatically be 
given a permit for an indefinite period of time after a stay of ten years. This is 
why I recommend to make a differentiation of subgroups who are offered a 
perspective for a permanent permit after ten years. The first group concerns 
those aliens who have legally residing family members in the Netherlands. 
As 1F applicants in the Netherlands are not entitled to any benefits, they are 
often dependent on their relatives and live together with them. With regard 
to those who fall into this category, there have been several cases before 
court in which the excluded alien invoked his right to family life in order to 
get a residence permit. The policy rule is that the interests of public order 
outweigh the interests of family life when it concerns a 1F applicant and there 
has not been a case to date in which an appeal to the right of family life has 
been accepted. It is very well possible that in a certain case the interests of the 
state outweigh the interests of the excluded asylum seeker, but I believe that 
the contrary is also possible: the outcome of such an assessment depends on 
the circumstances of the case such as the age of the children and the period 
of stay in the country and that is why Article 8 should not be ruled out from 
the very start. In any case, a permanent residence should be provided to the 
1F applicant after ten years. Such a practice will prevent future cases such as 
of Amiri who after a stay of eighteen years is removed to Afghanistan and 
separated from his family.842 
A second group of applicants who in my opinion qualify for settlement are 
those with a mental illness. In view of safety concerns for the society and 
stability regarding the alien’s physical and mental constitution, it is relevant 
Marcia from Angola. The family arrived in 2000 in the Netherlands and were rejected 
asylum in 2005 as Article 1F was applied to the father. In August 2015, the family 
was to be removed to Angola which caused commotion in the society. Eventually, 
the mother and children had the choice of two alternatives which were; leaving to 
Angola altogether or the expulsion of the father alone. They chose the latter option 
and received residence based on the discretionary powers of the State Secretary. Until 
now, the father is not removed to Angola due to his medical situation.
841 N, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2009] 
EWHC 1581, 3 April 2009, para. 22.





that he is given a decisive answer regarding his stay, so that a plan of care 
can be made for the person’s future in the Netherlands. The last group to 
be mentioned concerns the ex-KhAD/WAD members. These aliens are 
excluded from asylum on the basis of the official report from 2000 in which is 
concluded that ‘all non-commissioned officers and officers were active in the 
macabre divisions of the KhAD/WAD and were personally involved in the 
arrest, interrogation and sometimes execution of suspected persons’.843 This 
conclusion led to a reversed burden of proof and thus a collective exclusion 
regarding those who belonged to this organisation. In view of settlement, it 
is relevant that is once again examined what the person’s position was within 
the organisation and that those with a lower rank are eligible for settlement. 
Since 2006 excluded asylum seekers, including those who cannot be 
removed, are declared undesirable aliens, entailing the imposition of an 
exclusion order. In 2011, the exclusion order was replaced by an entry ban, 
but not much changed as the consequences of both are similar: the person’s 
stay in the Netherlands is punishable by criminal law. In addition, pressure 
is exerted on the person to leave; make sure he cannot obtain a legal stay in 
the country or legally enter the Netherlands for a certain period of time after 
his departure. According to the authorities, these measures are applied for 
the sake of public order, including the obligation to maintain international 
relations. This reasoning is difficult to understand with regard to the 
position of non-removable 1F applicants. Does it make sense to state that 
these measures serve the obligation to maintain international relations, if 
you are trying to put the burden concerning such alien’s on another state?844 
The order/ban only criminalises their stay in the Netherlands while it is not 
their fault they cannot be removed. The fact that the Public Prosecutor does 
not proceed by prosecuting these persons, makes it even more pointless and 
therefore this practice has to stop.845 In addition, this is necessary in order to 
enable the non-removable excluded asylum seeker to get a legal stay as I have 
explained and proposed in the foregoing. 
§ 8.4 Concluding remarks on the Netherlands 
The Dutch 1F-policy as developed over the years mainly referred to excluded 
ex-KhAD/WAD members and the consequences of this policy affected them 
the most. It is impossible to conclude this part on the Netherlands without 
843 Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Intelligence services in communist 
Afghanistan (1978-1992), AGSA, KAM, KhAD and WAD’, 29 February 2000, para. 
2.7. 
844 Van Eik 2008, pp. 6-7.
845 That the Public Prosecutor rarely proceeds with prosecution has to do with the fact 
that the alien will invoke circumstances beyond one’s control for the situation he is 
still illegally residing in the Netherlands.
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paying particular attention to this group which is almost the symbol of Article 
1F in the Netherlands. Chapter 5 and § 8.2.2.1, give a detailed analysis of 
the problems and critique on the authorities relating to the KhAD/WAD. 
Though the Dutch official report from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
is the central point of the whole discussion, dates from 2000, one has not 
come any further over a period of already fifteen years. In view of the line of 
thinking of the governing parties and what is written down in the coalition 
agreement, it seems that no initiative for change is to be expected within the 
foreseeable future. 
In 2008, the UNHCR came with its own Note on the KhAD/WAD and 
looking back I would say 2008 would have been a good opportunity to come 
to a solution. Besides the Note which gave occasion to consultations between 
the authorities and the Office, also the ACVZ came with an advisory report 
on 1F. Unfortunately, the discussions did not result in anything concrete. 
According to the authorities, the UNHCR did not conduct a specific research 
on the rotation system and new sources consulted after the publication of 
the 2000 report are unreliable or less unreliable. In other words, the Dutch 
government does not believe it is still possible to obtain reliable additional 
information. This is what the governing parties (consisting of the Christen 
Democrat Appeal, Labour Party and Christian Union) said in 2008 and this 
is what is said these days, which also explains why motions brought forward 
by opposition parties calling for a new independent research do not receive 
support in Parliament. There is no doubt that the Netherlands is facing a 
difficult task and it is undeniable that the government is at a loss with what to 
do with these persons. On the one hand, the government knows it has made 
a mistake by drawing such a far-reaching, absolute conclusion which led to 
the exclusion of a whole group of people and is based on a report containing 
anonymous sources. The fact that this situation has already lasted for such a 
long period of time and it is now heavily politicised makes it twice as hard to 
admit that it was not a very wise step, as the consequences are incalculable. 
On the other hand, the situation for this group of aliens has gone on long 
enough and the Netherlands is pursuing a dead-end 1F-policy and it must 
now take responsibility for this group. 
Although a new investigation with respect to the conclusions of the KhAD/
WAD report would be a good initiative, I do not believe this will be realised. 
Over the years, the authorities have refused to budge concerning the reports’ 
correctness in which it is supported by the highest administrative court and 
it is just too late to take a step backwards. This does not mean that this group 
of men who are excluded on the basis of the report and who are still in the 
country must just be tolerated without an eventual lawful stay in prospect. 
As discussed in the previous paragraph, I find that instead of applying the 
durability and proportionality-test after ten years, which for the major part 
of the group turned out to be negative, a new policy rule must be introduced 
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to include subgroups who are eligible for settlement after ten years. The 
excluded KhAD/WAD members are one of these groups for which I 
propose a new individual examination of the person’s position within the 
organisation. Those who did not have a high rank or great authority qualify 
for settlement while the others must be issued with a temporary legal stay 
with the option for extension. To this end, it is necessary to lift the exclusion 
orders/entry bans imposed on these men. 
In 2013, the children’s pardon was introduced which issues a legal stay to 
illegal children and their families in case the child has spent five years in 
the Netherlands before reaching the age of eighteen. In 2008, the ACVZ 
recommended to grant a legal residency to children of 1F applicants when 
they have reached the age of majority and actually spent at least five years 
in the Netherlands. The recommendation was of no avail as these children, 
which mainly concern Afghans with ex-KhAD/WAD fathers, fell outside 
the scope of the arrangement. At the age of 18 a young adult without a legal 
stay is not able to get any further education anymore. Given this relevant 
fact, I support the Advisory Committee’s recommendation as well as other 
organisations such as Defence for Children who urge to enlarge the scope of 
the arrangement to include the children of excluded asylum seekers too, so 
that they do not have to stagnate in their development.846 
The problems that the KhAD/WAD report presented in the Netherlands are 
ones to learn from and, in order to prevent such a situation from reoccurring 
the authorities should be cautious in drawing an absolute conclusion with 
respect to a whole group of people. The basic principle is to carry out an 
individual assessment for each person and to this end it is preferable to use 
individual reports when it concerns exclusion under Article 1F.  In view 
of time and the efforts which are needed for individual reports, the reality 
is that often general country reports are used as a basis for exclusion. For 
both types of reports the use of anonymous evidence should be restricted to 
a minimum and in order to work correctly, it is relevant that more sources 
are available to substantiate which can back up certain conclusions. For 
this purpose, a close cooperation within the EU on data exchange is a must. 
The points and recommendations I have made under § 8.2.3 are relevant 
within this perspective as to reach uniformity between Member States one 
needs common official reports and a joint decision on reversing the burden 
of proof concerning a certain group. Furthermore, one should invest more 
time and effort into investigation leading to prosecution of the person. The 
846 See also judgment of District Court Groningen 5 December 2014, AWB 14/7765 (JV 
2015/36). The court ruled that the ten years rule for family members of a 1F applicant 
also counts for applications within the scope of the children’s pardon. Currently this 
case is pending at the highest administrative court as the Secretary of State lodged an 
appeals against the judgment. 
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crimes which fall under Article 1F are serious ones and as stated earlier ‘it 
was the notorious cases which the drafters of the Convention had in mind’. 
Though a criminal judgment is not necessary to apply Article 1F to an alien, 
the current tendency in countries, so also in the Netherlands and the UK is 
that it hardly happens. Prosecution and the fact that the case is eventually 
criminally judged will attach a certain value to the exclusion of the alien 
for which again data exchange on national as well as international level is 
essential. I would like to discuss one more aspect concerning 1F and that is 
the role of the judiciary. 
The highest administrative court, Administrative Jurisdiction Division of 
the Council of State, played an important part in the fact that the Dutch 
authorities have insisted for years on the correctness of the KhAD/WAD 
report and still do. The data as provided by the UNHCR in 2 008 and also 
the ECJ’s ruling in the B and D case made lower district courts question the 
official report and the practice of the reversed burden of proof with regard 
to ex-KhAD/WAD members. Each time, the highest court sided with the 
government and this is also a point of critique about this court.847 Further 
it is put forward that the highest court does not see its role as the guardian 
of fundamental rights when it concerns migration law. In order to minimize 
the group of aliens who live in limbo, the highest court has introduced the 
durability and proportionality-test. Though this is a positive development 
adopted by the authorities, it is a pity that the court did not take it a step 
further by stating that non-removable excluded asylum seekers should not 
be left in limbo at all. The highest court must take on a greater supervisory 
role in order to point out to the authorities to take their responsibility as is 
consistent with a democracy based on the rule of law. 
§ 8.5 Concluding remarks on the UK 
The UK holds a distinctive position within the EU with regard to immigration as, 
for example, it does not participate in the Schengen cooperation which abolished 
internal border controls across the EU. As regards the CEAS, the UK has chosen 
to participate in this policy area and is bound by the EU asylum Directives which 
are adopted in the first phase such as the Qualification Directive. This is not the 
case with respect to the recasts adopted in the second phase, judging it not to 
be in ‘Britain’s best interests’.848 Though this decision does affect the idea of 
European unity, I do not think it will mean that the UK is taking a step down 
concerning sharing responsibility in relation to asylum matters within the EU. 
As is already expressed by the Home Office:849 
847 See § 5.4 for more.  
848 <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/policy-primers/uk-common-european-
asylum-system-and-eu-immigration-law> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
849 Home Office Commitment to Write: Debate on the Report of the European 
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‘We have strong advocates for practical cooperation within the EU. In our 
view such practical cooperation has a more useful impact than the further 
layer of legislation represented by the CEAS, and we are committed to 
continue working with our EU partners in order to address the challenges 
we all face in preserving the integrity of our asylum systems and helping 
those who are genuinely in need. On this basis, we fully support the work of 
the EASO, and have sent our own experts to other Member States such as 
Greece to help build capacity and share best practice’.  
The last-named commitment is very positive in light of my recommendation 
to set up joint official reports within Europe. The UK’s participation in 
EASO is significant given the Country of Origin Information Service’s 
experience in data collecting and its staff can play a valuable role within the 
organisation. As I have already stated above concerning the Netherlands; 
a close cooperation within the EU on data exchange is a must. Though the 
UK states its determination to provide help to those who are in need, it is 
also resolute in excluding those who do not deserve it. In the country’s fight 
against terrorism, great caution is required to make sure that those who are 
excluded are actually the ones who do not deserve protection. 
Contrary to the Netherlands, the UK is not stuck with a problematic group of 
excluded men like the ex-KhAD/WAD members as no reversed burden of proof 
is applied to any group. The policy as developed in the last ten years concerning 
those who are excluded under Article 1F has been strongly influenced by the 
judiciary, in which the judgment in the Afghan hijackers case played a crucial 
role.850 These hijackers fell under Article 1F and it was established that the men 
could not be removed to Afghanistan due to refoulement. Under the policy 
which was applicable at that time, they should have been granted Discretionary 
Leave. Thus a legal stay for six months at a time, which could be extended with 
the same time period. When the authorities gave them temporary permission 
to stay in the UK instead, the High Court as well the Court of Appeal blocked 
the Home Secretary and ruled that the government had to keep to its own rules 
as temporary permission is not intended for those who are already examined; 
excluded and found not to be removable. The judgments of both courts has 
been of vital importance, because if they had not made these judgements, it 
would mean that a non-removable excluded asylum seeker, would have been 
left in a ‘no removal, no admission situation’. 
Union Committee on the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 2013 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-f/GAMM/
debatelettertaylor220613.pdf> (last accessed on 21 September 2015).  
850 Another example in which the judiciary showed to play a relevant role is in the MH 
(Syria) and DS (Afghanistan) v. SSHD case. The authorities excluded DS because of 
his involvement in the KhAD and used among others the 2000 Dutch official report 
on the KhAD/WAD as evidence. The court did not accept this by referring to the 
criticism levelled at this report. 
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The Home Secretary decided to contest this decision and stated that he 
did not believe that ‘those whose actions have undermined any legitimate 
claim to asylum should be granted leave to remain in the UK’ and put his 
plan into action. This resulted in a separate part to the 2008 Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act called Special Immigration Status. This is a 
specially created status for foreign criminals who cannot be removed due to 
refoulement, including those aliens who are excluded on the basis of Article 
1F. The outstanding features of the status are that an alien who would falls 
under part 10 is not deemed to be granted leave nor temporary admission. 
Further, he can be imposed with conditions relating to residence, work and 
reporting and though such an alien is not in breach of immigrations laws, 
he is not eligible for a settled status in the end. This last mentioned was also 
the main goal of the Home Secretary’s initiative, ‘making sure that foreign 
criminals (including 1F applicants) would not be granted leave merely as a 
result of the fact they cannot be removed’. Though the Act received Royal 
Assent years ago, and thus part 10 it was approved by Parliament, it is still not 
in force and neither will it enter into force. Looking back at the government’s 
actions after the Afghan hijackers case, it seems that the public indignation 
about the judgment is the main cause for the fact that something new was 
devised and eventually even convinced the majority of Parliament. I consider 
it meritable that given the efforts put in preparing part 10 of the Act, one 
realises it is not wise and necessary to bring into force a whole new status 
for unremovable ‘criminal aliens’ which was already put forward by several 
groups such as the Refugee Council. My main concern as regards the SIS is 
that it remains vague what the status actually would have implied as it is not 
similar to leave nor to temporary admission either. Given the fact that I think 
that non-removable excluded asylum seekers should be granted a lawful stay 
which was the case in the UK, it is good that it remains the way it is. The 
replacement of Discretionary Leave and what thus came instead of the SIS 
is namely Restricted Leave. This new form of leave offers a middle course: 
‘likewise Discretionary Leave, the alien maintains a lawful stay for six months 
which can be extended with the same period each time. On the other hand, 
restrictions may be imposed on the person regarding, inter alia, employment 
and residence like was intended under part 10. The major change is that the 
permissive character of Discretionary Leave is taken away. Family members 
of excluded asylum seekers may apply for asylum on individual grounds. In 
case it does not lead to protection and the excluded asylum seeker cannot be 
removed due to refoulement, they also fall under the current Restricted Leave. 
With regard to a claim by an excluded asylum seeker on the right to family 
life based on Article 8 ECHR this option is not ruled out from the very start, 
but it will not be easy to succeed, given the suitability and eligibility grounds 
that have to be met by the applicant.851  
851 See § 6.3.7 for a discussion on the right to family life in the UK. 
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In the previous paragraph relating to the Netherlands, I advocated for 
providing a lawful stay to non-removable excluded asylum seekers and their 
families and mentioned that the UK practice can be well used as an example. 
Additionally, I recommended to issue leave/permits for a year instead of 
half a year each time. Similar to my reasoning as stated for the Netherlands, 
often the state of affairs in the country of origin is so serious it is unlikely for 
refoulement to be an option anymore within such a short period of time as 
six months.
UK rules enable aliens to receive indefinite leave after at least ten years 
continuous lawful residence in the UK. To be eligible for settlement, the alien 
must meet certain conditions, among which, that there must be no reason 
why granting such a leave is against the public good and the applicant does 
not fall under the general grounds for refusal.852 As Restricted Leave is a 
lawful stay and non-removable excluded asylum seekers may legally qualify, 
the two mentioned conditions make it difficult for the alien to successfully 
qualify. Though it is finally the Secretary of State’s decision who has to 
examine each case on its own merits and take into consideration all relevant 
factors of the case, when a 1F applicant is not issued indefinite leave due to 
public interest, this means, in concrete, that the policy of six months leave 
will still be maintained and that he has to wait for another ten years in order 
to be considered for a claim on the right to private life.853 Similar to what I 
have urged above concerning the Netherlands, I reiterate that, at a certain 
point in time, an end has to come to the excluded asylum seeker and his 
family’s uncertain situation because they cannot be blamed for the fact they 
are unremovable. It does not contribute anything to both parties to maintain 
a temporary stay after a residence of already ten years. 
852 See § 6.3.5 for the details of these conditions. 
853 From July 2012 on, the old fourteen year rule (which existed next to the ten years long 
residence rule) and made it possible to apply for leave to remain in the UK on the basis 
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The procedures set out in these Rules shall apply to the consideration of asylum and 
humanitarian protection. 
326B. Where the Secretary of State is considering a claim for asylum or humanitarian protection 
under this Part, she will consider any Article 8 elements of that claim in line with the provisions 
of Appendix FM (family life) which are relevant to those elements and in line with paragraphs 
276ADE to 276DH (private life) of these Rules unless the person is someone to whom Part 13 
of these Rules applies. 
 
Definition of asylum applicant 
 
327. Under the Rules an asylum applicant is a person who either; 
(a) makes a request to be recognised as a refugee under the Geneva Convention on the 
basis that it would be contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under the Geneva 
Convention for him to be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom, or  
(b) otherwise makes a request for international protection. "Application for asylum" shall 
be construed accordingly.  
327A. Every person has the right to make an application for asylum on his own behalf. 
 
Applications for asylum 
 
328. All asylum applications will be determined by the Secretary of State in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention. Every asylum application made by a person at a port or airport in the 
United Kingdom will be referred by the Immigration Officer for determination by the Secretary of 
State in accordance with these Rules. 
328A. The Secretary of State shall ensure that authorities which are likely to be addressed by 
someone who wishes to make an application for asylum are able to advise that person how and 
where such an application may be made. 
329. Until an asylum application has been determined by the Secretary of State or the Secretary 
of State has issued a certificate under Part 2, 3, 4 or 5 of Schedule 3 to the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 no action will be taken to require the 
departure of the asylum applicant or his dependants from the United Kingdom. 
330. If the Secretary of State decides to grant asylum and the person has not yet been given 
leave to enter, the Immigration Officer will grant limited leave to enter. 
331. If a person seeking leave to enter is refused asylum or their application for asylum is 




Officer will consider whether or not he is in a position to decide to give or refuse leave to enter 
without interviewing the person further. If the Immigration Officer decides that a further interview 
is not required he may serve the notice giving or refusing leave to enter by post. If the 
Immigration Officer decides that a further interview is required, he will then resume his 
examination to determine whether or not to grant the person leave to enter under any other 
provision of these Rules. If the person fails at any time to comply with a requirement to report to 
an Immigration Officer for examination, the Immigration Officer may direct that the person's 
examination shall be treated as concluded at that time. The Immigration Officer will then 
consider any outstanding applications for entry on the basis of any evidence before him. 
332. If a person who has been refused leave to enter applies for asylum and that application is 
refused or withdrawn or treated as withdrawn under paragraph 333C of these Rules, leave to 
enter will again be refused unless the applicant qualifies for admission under any other 
provision of these Rules. 
333. Written notice of decisions on applications for asylum shall be given in reasonable time. 
Where the applicant is legally represented, notice may instead be given to the representative. 
Where the applicant has no legal representative and free legal assistance is not available, he 
shall be informed of the decision on the application for asylum and, if the application is rejected, 
how to challenge the decision, in a language that he may reasonably be supposed to 
understand. 
333A. The Secretary of State shall ensure that a decision is taken by him on each application 
for asylum as soon as possible, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination. 
Where a decision on an application for asylum cannot be taken within six months of the date it 
was recorded, the Secretary of State shall either: 
(a) inform the applicant of the delay; or  
(b) if the applicant has made a specific written request for it, provide information on the 
timeframe within which the decision on his application is to be expected. The provision of 
such information shall not oblige the Secretary of State to take a decision within the 
stipulated time-frame.  
333B. Applicants for asylum shall be allowed an effective opportunity to consult, at their own 
expense or at public expense in accordance with provision made for this by the Legal Services 
Commission or otherwise, a person who is authorised under Part V of the Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999 to give immigration advice. This paragraph shall also apply where the 
Secretary of State is considering revoking a person's refugee status in accordance with these 
Rules. 
 





333C. If an application for asylum is withdrawn either explicitly or implicitly, consideration of it 
may be discontinued. An application will be treated as explicitly withdrawn if the applicant signs 
the relevant form provided by the Secretary of State. An application may be treated as impliedly 
withdrawn if an applicant leaves the United Kingdom without authorisation at any time prior to 
the conclusion of his or her asylum claim, or fails to complete an asylum questionnaire as 
requested by the Secretary of State, or fails to attend the personal interview as provided in 
paragraph 339NA of these Rules unless the applicant demonstrates within a reasonable time 
that that failure was due to circumstances beyond his or her control. The Secretary of State will 
indicate on the applicant's asylum file that the application for asylum has been withdrawn and 
consideration of it has been discontinued. 
 
Grant of asylum 
 
334. An asylum applicant will be granted asylum in the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State 
is satisfied that: 
(i) he is in the United Kingdom or has arrived at a port of entry in the United Kingdom;  
(ii) he is a refugee, as defined in regulation 2 of The Refugee or Person in Need of 
International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006;  
(iii) there are no reasonable grounds for regarding him as a danger to the security of the 
United Kingdom;  
(iv) he does not, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, he does not constitute danger to the community of the United Kingdom; and  
(v) refusing his application would result in him being required to go (whether immediately 
or after the time limited by any existing leave to enter or remain) in breach of the Geneva 
Convention, to a country in which his life or freedom would threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group.  
335. If the Secretary of State decides to grant asylum to a person who has been given leave to 
enter (whether or not the leave has expired) or to a person who has entered without leave, the 
Secretary of State will vary the existing leave or grant limited leave to remain. 
 
Refusal of asylum 
 
336. An application which does not meet the criteria set out in paragraph 334 will be refused. 
Where an application for asylum is refused, the reasons in fact and law shall be stated in the 
decision and information provided in writing on how to challenge the decision. 
337. DELETED 
338. When a person in the United Kingdom is notified that asylum has been refused he may, if 




Asylum Act 1999 or to deportation, at the same time be notified of removal directions, served 




Revocation or refusal to renew a grant of asylum 
 
339A. A person's grant of asylum under paragraph 334 will be revoked or not renewed if the 
Secretary of State is satisfied that: 
(i) he has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of nationality;  
(ii) having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or  
(iii) he has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new 
nationality;  
(iv) he has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which 
he remained owing to a fear of persecution;  
(v) he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been 
recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the 
protection of the country of nationality;  
(vi) being a stateless person with no nationality, he is able, because the circumstances in 
connection with which he has been recognised a refugee have ceased to exist, to return 
to the country of former habitual residence;  
(vii) he should have been or is excluded from being a refugee in accordance with 
regulation 7 of The Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) 
Regulations 2006;  
(viii) his misrepresentation or omission or facts, including the use of false documents, 
were decisive for the grant of asylum;  
(ix) there are reasonable grounds for regarding him as a danger to the security of the 
United Kingdom; or  
(x) having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime he 
constitutes danger to the community of the United Kingdom.  
In considering (v) and (vi), the Secretary of State shall have regard to whether the change of 
circumstances is of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the refugee's fear of 
persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded. 
Where an application for asylum was made on or after the 21st October 2004, the Secretary of 
State will revoke or refuse to renew a person's grant of asylum where he is satisfied that at least 




339B. When a person's grant of asylum is revoked or not renewed any limited leave which they 
have may be curtailed. 
339BA. Where the Secretary of State is considering revoking refugee status in accordance with 
these Rules, the person concerned shall be informed in writing that the Secretary of State is 
reconsidering his qualification for refugee status and the reasons for the reconsideration. That 
person shall be given the opportunity to submit, in a personal interview or in a written statement, 
reasons as to why his refugee status should not be revoked. If there is a personal interview, it 
shall be subject to the safeguards set out in these Rules. However, where a person acquires 
British citizenship status, his refugee status is automatically revoked in accordance with 
paragraph 339A (iii) upon acquisition of that status without the need to follow the procedure set 
out above. 
 
Grant of humanitarian protection 
 
339C. A person will be granted humanitarian protection in the United Kingdom if the Secretary 
of State is satisfied that: 
(i) he is in the United Kingdom or has arrived at a port of entry in the United Kingdom;  
(ii) he does not qualify as a refugee as defined in regulation 2 of The Refugee or Person 
in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006;  
(iii) substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if he 
returned to the country of return, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and is 
unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; 
and  
(iv) he is not excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection.  
Serious harm consists of: 
(i) the death penalty or execution;  
(ii) unlawful killing;  
(iii) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of a person in the country of 
return; or  
(iv) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate 
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.  
 
Exclusion from humanitarian protection 
339D. A person is excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C (iv) 




(i) there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a crime against 
peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, or any other serious crime or instigated or 
otherwise participated in such crimes;  
(ii) there are serious reasons for considering that he is guilty of acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations or has committed, prepared or instigated 
such acts or encouraged or induced others to commit, prepare or instigate instigated 
such acts;  
(iii) there are serious reasons for considering that he constitutes a danger to the 
community or to the security of the United Kingdom; or  
(iv) prior to his admission to the United Kingdom the person committed a crime outside 
the scope of (i) and (ii) that would be punishable by imprisonment were it committed in 
the United Kingdom and the person left his country of origin solely in order to avoid 
sanctions resulting from the crime.  
339E. If the Secretary of State decides to grant humanitarian protection and the person has not 
yet been given leave to enter, the Secretary of State or an Immigration Officer will grant limited 
leave to enter. If the Secretary of State decides to grant humanitarian protection to a person 
who has been given limited leave to enter (whether or not that leave has expired) or a person 
who has entered without leave, the Secretary of State will vary the existing leave or grant limited 
leave to remain. 
 
Refusal of humanitarian protection 
 
339F. Where the criteria set out in paragraph 339C is not met humanitarian protection will be 
refused. 
 
Revocation of humanitarian protection 
 
339G. A person's humanitarian protection granted under paragraph 339C will be revoked or not 
renewed if the Secretary of State is satisfied that at least one of the following applies: 
(i) the circumstances which led to the grant of humanitarian protection have ceased to 
exist or have changed to such a degree that such protection is no longer required;  
(ii) the person granted humanitarian protection should have been or is excluded from 
humanitarian protection because there are serious reasons for considering that he has 
committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, or any other 
serious crime or instigated or otherwise participated in such crimes;  
(iii) the person granted humanitarian protection should have been or is excluded from 




guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations or has 
committed, prepared or instigated such acts or encouraged or induced others to commit, 
prepare or instigate such acts;  
(iv) the person granted humanitarian protection should have been or is excluded from 
humanitarian protection because there are serious reasons for considering that he 
constitutes a danger to the community or to the security of the United Kingdom;  
(v) the person granted humanitarian protection misrepresented or omitted facts, including 
the use of false documents, which were decisive to the grant of humanitarian protection; 
or  
(vi) the person granted humanitarian protection should have been or is excluded from 
humanitarian protection because prior to his admission to the United Kingdom the person 
committed a crime outside the scope of (ii) and (iii) that would be punishable by 
imprisonment had it been committed in the United Kingdom and the person left his 
country of origin solely in order to avoid sanctions resulting from the crime.  
In applying (i) the Secretary of State shall have regard to whether the change of circumstances 
is of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the person no longer faces a real risk of 
serious harm; 
339H. When a person's humanitarian protection is revoked or not renewed any limited leave 
which they have may be curtailed. 
 
Consideration of applications 
 
339HA. The Secretary of State shall ensure that the personnel examining applications for 
asylum and taking decisions on his behalf have the knowledge with respect to relevant 
standards applicable in the field of asylum and refugee law. 
339I. When the Secretary of State considers a person's asylum claim, eligibility for a grant of 
humanitarian protection or human rights claim it is the duty of the person to submit to the 
Secretary of State as soon as possible all material factors needed to substantiate the asylum 
claim or establish that he is a person eligible for humanitarian protection or substantiate the 
human rights claim, which the Secretary of State shall assess in cooperation with the person. 
The material factors include: 
(i) the person's statement on the reasons for making an asylum claim or on eligibility for a 
grant of humanitarian protection or for making a human rights claim;  
(ii) all documentation at the person's disposal regarding the person's age, background 
(including background details of relevant relatives), identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) 
and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes; and  




339IA. For the purposes of examining individual applications for asylum 
(i) information provided in support of an application and the fact that an application has 
been made shall not be disclosed to the alleged actor(s) of persecution of the applicant, 
and  
(ii) information shall not be obtained from the alleged actor(s) of persecution that would 
result in their being directly informed that an application for asylum has been made by 
the applicant in question and would jeopardise the physical integrity of the applicant and 
his dependants, or the liberty and security of his family members still living in the country 
of origin.  
This paragraph shall also apply where the Secretary of State is considering revoking a person's 
refugee status in accordance with these Rules. 
339J. The assessment by the Secretary of State of an asylum claim, eligibility for a grant of 
humanitarian protection or a human rights claim will be carried out on an individual, objective 
and impartial basis. This will include taking into account in particular: 
(i) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin or country of return at the time 
of taking a decision on the grant; including laws and regulations of the country of origin or 
country of return and the manner in which they are applied;  
(ii) relevant statements and documentation presented by the person including information 
on whether the person has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm;  
(iii) the individual position and personal circumstances of the person, including factors 
such as background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the 
person's personal circumstances, the acts to which the person has been or could be 
exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm;  
(iv) whether the person's activities since leaving the country of origin or country of return 
were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for 
making an asylum claim or establishing that he is a person eligible for humanitarian 
protection or a human rights claim, so as to assess whether these activities will expose 
the person to persecution or serious harm if he returned to that country; and  
(v) whether the person could reasonably be expected to avail himself of the protection of 
another country where he could assert citizenship.  
339JA. Reliable and up-to-date information shall be obtained from various sources as to the 
general situation prevailing in the countries of origin of applicants for asylum and, where 
necessary, in countries through which they have transited. Such information shall be made 
available to the personnel responsible for examining applications and taking decisions and may 
be provided to them in the form of a consolidated country information report. 
This paragraph shall also apply where the Secretary of State is considering revoking a person's 




339K. The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to 
direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the 
person's well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are 
good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. 
339L. It is the duty of the person to substantiate the asylum claim or establish that he is a 
person eligible humanitarian protection or substantiate his human rights claim. Where aspects 
of the person's statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects 
will not need confirmation when all of the following conditions are met: 
(i) the person has made a genuine effort to substantiate his asylum claim or establish 
that he is a person eligible humanitarian protection or substantiate his human rights 
claim;  
(ii) all material factors at the person's disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory 
explanation regarding any lack of other relevant material has been given;  
(iii) the person's statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run 
counter to available specific and general information relevant to the person's case;  
(iv) the person has made an asylum claim or sought to establish that he is a person 
eligible for humanitarian protection or made a human rights claim at the earliest possible 
time, unless the person can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and  
(v) the general credibility of the person has been established.  
339M. The Secretary of State may consider that a person has not substantiated his asylum 
claim or established that he is a person eligible for humanitarian protection or substantiated his 
human rights claim, and thereby reject his application for asylum, determine that he is not 
eligible for humanitarian protection or reject his human rights claim, if he fails, without 
reasonable explanation, to make a prompt and full disclosure of material facts, either orally or in 
writing, or otherwise to assist the Secretary of State in establishing the facts of the case; this 
includes, for example, failure to report to a designated place to be fingerprinted, failure to 
complete an asylum questionnaire or failure to comply with a requirement to report to an 
immigration officer for examination. 
339MA. Applications for asylum shall be neither rejected nor excluded from examination on the 
sole ground that they have not been made as soon as possible. 
339N. In determining whether the general credibility of the person has been established the 
Secretary of State will apply the provisions in s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 






339NA. Before a decision is taken on the application for asylum, the applicant shall be given the 
opportunity of a personal interview on his application for asylum with a representative of the 
Secretary of State who is legally competent to conduct such an interview. 
The personal interview may be omitted where: 
(i) the Secretary of State is able to take a positive decision on the basis of evidence 
available;  
(ii) the Secretary of State has already had a meeting with the applicant for the purpose of 
assisting him with completing his application and submitting the essential information 
regarding the application;  
(iii) the applicant, in submitting his application and presenting the facts, has only raised 
issues that are not relevant or of minimal relevance to the examination of whether he is a 
refugee, as defined in regulation 2 of the Refugee or Person in Need of International 
Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006;  
(iv) the applicant has made inconsistent, contradictory, improbable or insufficient 
representations which make his claim clearly unconvincing in relation to his having been 
the object of persecution;  
(v) the applicant has submitted a subsequent application which does not raise any 
relevant new elements with respect to his particular circumstances or to the situation in 
his country of origin;  
(vi) the applicant is making an application merely in order to delay or frustrate the 
enforcement of an earlier or imminent decision which would result in his removal; and  
(vii) it is not reasonably practicable, in particular where the Secretary of State is of the 
opinion that the applicant is unfit or unable to be interviewed owing to enduring 
circumstances beyond his control.  
The omission of a personal interview shall not prevent the Secretary of State from taking a 
decision on the application. 
Where the personal interview is omitted, the applicant and dependants shall be given a 
reasonable opportunity to submit further information. 
339NB. (i) The personal interview mentioned in paragraph 339NA above shall normally take 
place without the presence of the applicant's family members unless the Secretary of State 
considers it necessary for an appropriate examination to have other family members present. 
(ii) The personal interview shall take place under conditions which ensure appropriate 
confidentiality. 
339NC (i) A written report shall be made of every personal interview containing at least the 
essential information regarding the asylum application as presented by the applicant in 




(ii) The Secretary of State shall ensure that the applicant has timely access to the report of the 
personal interview and that access is possible as soon as necessary for allowing an appeal to 
be prepared and lodged in due time. 
339ND The Secretary of State shall provide at public expense an interpreter for the purpose of 
allowing the applicant to submit his case, wherever necessary. The Secretary of State shall 
select an interpreter who can ensure appropriate communication between the applicant and the 




339O (i) The Secretary of State will not make: 
(a) a grant of asylum if in part of the country of origin a person would not have a 
well founded fear of being persecuted, and the person can reasonably be 
expected to stay in that part of the country; 
or  
(b) a grant of humanitarian protection if in part of the country of return a person 
would not face a real risk of suffering serious harm, and the person can 
reasonably be expected to stay in that part of the country.  
(ii) In examining whether a part of the country of origin or country of return meets the 
requirements in (i) the Secretary of State, when making his decision on whether to grant 
asylum or humanitarian protection, will have regard to the general circumstances 
prevailing in that part of the country and to the personal circumstances of the person. 
(iii) (i) applies notwithstanding technical obstacles to return to the country of origin or 
country of return 
 
Sur place claims 
 
339P. A person may have a well-founded fear of being persecuted or a real risk of suffering 
serious harm based on events which have taken place since the person left the country of origin 
or country of return and/or activates which have been engaged in by a person since he left he 
country of origin or country of return, in particular where it is established that the activities relied 
upon constitute the expression and continuation of convictions or orientations held in the 




339Q(i) The Secretary of State will issue to a person granted asylum in the United Kingdom a 




UKRP may be valid for five years and renewable, unless compelling reasons of national security 
or public order otherwise require or where there are reasonable grounds for considering that the 
applicant is a danger to the security of the UK or having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, the applicant constitutes a danger to the community of the UK or the 
person’s character, conduct or associations otherwise require. 
(ii) The Secretary of State will issue to a person granted humanitarian protection in the United 
Kingdom a UKRP as soon as possible after the grant of humanitarian protection. The UKRP 
may be valid for five years and renewable, unless compelling reasons of national security or 
public order otherwise require or where there are reasonable grounds for considering that the 
person granted humanitarian protection is a danger to the security of the UK or having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a serious crime, this person constitutes a danger to the 
community of the UK or the person’s character, conduct or associations otherwise require. 
(iii) The Secretary of State will issue a UKRP to a family member of a person granted asylum or 
humanitarian protection where the family member does not qualify for such status. A UKRP may 
be granted for a period of five years. The UKRP is renewable on the terms set out in (i) and (ii) 
respectively. "Family member" for the purposes of this sub-paragraph refers only to those who 
are treated as dependants for the purposes of paragraph 349. 
(iv) The Secretary of State may revoke or refuse to renew a person's UKRP where their grant of 
asylum or humanitarian protection is revoked under the provisions in the immigration rules. 
 
Requirements for indefinite leave to remain for persons granted asylum 
or humanitarian protection 
 
339R. The requirements for indefinite leave to remain for a person granted asylum or 
humanitarian protection, or their dependants granted asylum or humanitarian protection in line 
with the main applicant or any dependant granted in accordance with the requirements of 
paragraphs 352A to 352FJ of these Rules (Family Reunion), are that: 
(i) the applicant has held a UK Residence Permit (UKRP) issued under paragraph 339Q 
for a continuous period of five years in the UK; and  
(ii) the applicant's UKRP has not been revoked or not renewed under paragraphs 339A 
or 339G of the immigration rules; and  
(iii) the applicant has not:  
a. been convicted of an offence for which they have been sentenced to 
imprisonment for at least 4 years; or  
b. been convicted of an offence for which they have been sentenced to 
imprisonment for at least 12 months but less than 4 years, unless a period of 15 




c. been convicted of an offence for which they have been sentenced to 
imprisonment for less than 12 months, unless a period of 7 years has passed 
since the end of the sentence; or  
d. within the 24 months prior to the date on which the application has been 
decided, been convicted of or admitted an offence for which they have received a 
non-custodial sentence or other out of court disposal that is recorded on their 
criminal record; or  
e. in the view of the Secretary of State caused serious harm by their offending or 
persistently offended and shown a particular disregard for the law; or 
f. in the view of the Secretary of State, at the date on which the application has 
been decided, demonstrated the undesirability of granting settlement in the United 
Kingdom in light of his or her conduct (including convictions which do not fall 
within paragraphs 339R(iii)(a-e)), character or associations or the fact that he or 




Indefinite leave to remain for a person granted asylum or humanitarian 
protection 
 
339S. Indefinite leave to remain for a person granted asylum or humanitarian protection will be 
granted where each of the requirements in paragraph 339R is met. 
 
Refusal of indefinite leave to remain for a person granted asylum or 
humanitarian protection 
 
339T. (i) Indefinite leave to remain for a person granted asylum or humanitarian protection is to 
be refused if any of the requirements of paragraph 339R is not met. 
(ii) An applicant refused indefinite leave to remain under paragraph 339T(i) may apply to have 
their UK Residence Permit extended in accordance with paragraph 339Q. 
 




342. The actions of anyone acting as an agent of the asylum applicant or human rights claimant 









344A(i). After having received a complete application for a travel document, the Secretary of 
State will issue to a person granted asylum in the United Kingdom and their family members 
travel documents, in the form set out in the Schedule to the Geneva Convention, for the 
purpose of travel outside the United Kingdom, unless compelling reasons of national security or 
public order otherwise require. 
(ii) After having received a complete application for a travel document, the Secretary of State 
will issue travel documents to a person granted humanitarian protection in the United Kingdom 
where that person is unable to obtain a national passport or other identity documents which 
enable him to travel, unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise 
require. 
(iii) Where the person referred to in (ii) can obtain a national passport or identity documents but 
has not done so, the Secretary of State will issue that person with a travel document where he 
can show that he has made reasonable attempts to obtain a national passport or identity 
document and there are serious humanitarian reasons for travel. 
 
Access to Employment 
 
344B. The Secretary of State will not impose conditions restricting the employment or 




344C. A person who is granted asylum or humanitarian protection will be provided with access 
to information in a language that they may reasonably be supposed to understand which sets 
out the rights and obligations relating to that status. The Secretary of State will provide the 
information as soon as possible after the grant of asylum or humanitarian protection. 
 
Third country cases 
 
345. (1) In a case where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the conditions set out in 
Paragraphs 4 and 5(1), 9 and 10(1), 14 and 15(1) or 17 of Schedule 3 to the Asylum and 




examine the asylum application substantively and issue a certificate under Part 2, 3, 4 or 5 of 
Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 as 
appropriate. 
(2) The Secretary of State shall not issue a certificate under Part 2, 3, 4 or 5 of Schedule 3 to 
the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 unless: 
(i) the asylum applicant has not arrived in the United Kingdom directly from the country in 
which he claims to fear persecution and has had an opportunity at the border or within 
the third country or territory to make contact with the authorities of that third country or 
territory in order to seek their protection; or  
(ii) there is other clear evidence of his admissibility to a third country or territory.  
Provided that he is satisfied that a case meets these criteria, the Secretary of State is under no 
obligation to consult the authorities of the third country or territory before the removal of an 
asylum applicant to that country or territory. 
345(2A) Where a certificate is issued under Part 2, 3, 4 or 5 of Schedule 3 to the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 the asylum applicant shall: 
(i) be informed in a language that he may reasonably be expected to understand 
regarding his removal to a safe third country;  
(ii) be provided with a document informing the authorities of the safe third country, in the 
language of that country, that the asylum application has not been examined in 
substance by the authorities in the United Kingdom;  
(iii) sub-paragraph 345(2A)(ii) shall not apply if removal takes place with reference to the 
arrangements set out in Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 (the Dublin Regulation) or 
Regulation (EC) No. 604/2013; and  
iv) if an asylum applicant removed under this paragraph is not admitted to the safe third 
country (not being a country to which the Dublin Regulation applies as specified in 
paragraph 345(2A)(iii)), subject to determining and resolving the reasons for his 
nonadmission, the asylum applicant shall be admitted to the asylum procedure in the 
United Kingdom.  
(3) Where a certificate is issued under Part 2, 3, 4 or 5 of Schedule 3 to the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 in relation to the asylum claim and the 
person is seeking leave to enter the Immigration Officer will consider whether or not he is in a 
position to decide to give or refuse leave to enter without interviewing the person further. If the 
Immigration Officer decides that a further interview is not required he may serve the notice 
giving or refusing leave to enter by post. If the Immigration Officer decides that a further 
interview is required, he will then resume his examination to determine whether or not to grant 
the person leave to enter under any other provision of these Rules. If the person fails at any 
time to comply with a requirement to report to an Immigration Officer for examination, the 




that time. The Immigration Officer will then consider any outstanding applications for entry on 
the basis of any evidence before him. 
(4) Where a certificate is issued under Part 2, 3, 4 or 5 of Schedule 3 to the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 the person may, if liable to removal as an 
illegal entrant, or removal under section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 or to 
deportation, at the same time be notified of removal directions, served with a notice of intention 
to make a deportation order, or served with a deportation order, as appropriate. 
 











349. A spouse, civil partner, unmarried or same-sex partner, or minor child accompanying a 
principal applicant may be included in his application for asylum as his dependant, provided, in 
the case of an adult dependant with legal capacity, the dependant consents to being treated as 
such at the time the application is lodged. A spouse, civil partner, unmarried or same-sex 
partner or minor child may also claim asylum in his own right. If the principal applicant is granted 
asylum or humanitarian protection and leave to enter or remain any spouse, civil partner, 
unmarried or same-sex partner or minor child will be granted leave to enter or remain for the 
same duration. The case of any dependant who claims asylum in his own right will be also 
considered individually in accordance with paragraph 334 above. An applicant under this 
paragraph, including an accompanied child, may be interviewed where he makes a claim as a 
dependant or in his own right. 
If the spouse, civil partner, unmarried or same-sex partner, or minor child in question has a 
claim in his own right, that claim should be made at the earliest opportunity. Any failure to do so 
will be taken into account and may damage credibility if no reasonable explanation for it is 
given. Where an asylum or humanitarian protection application is unsuccessful, at the same 
time that asylum or humanitarian protection is refused the applicant may be notified of removal 
directions or served with a notice of the Secretary of State's intention to deport him, as 
appropriate. In this paragraph and paragraphs 350-352 a child means a person who is under 18 




under that age. An unmarried or same sex partner for the purposes of this paragraph, is a 
person who has been living together with the principal applicant in a subsisting relationship akin 




350. Unaccompanied children may also apply for asylum and, in view of their potential 
vulnerability, particular priority and care is to be given to the handling of their cases. 
351. A person of any age may qualify for refugee status under the Convention and the criteria in 
paragraph 334 apply to all cases. However, account should be taken of the applicant's maturity 
and in assessing the claim of a child more weight should be given to objective indications of risk 
than to the child's state of mind and understanding of his situation. An asylum application made 
on behalf of a child should not be refused solely because the child is too young to understand 
his situation or to have formed a well founded fear of persecution. Close attention should be 
given to the welfare of the child at all times. 
352. Any child over the age of 12 who has claimed asylum in his own right shall be interviewed 
about the substance of his claim unless the child is unfit or unable to be interviewed. When an 
interview takes place it shall be conducted in the presence of a parent, guardian, representative 
or another adult independent of the Secretary of State who has responsibility for the child. The 
interviewer shall have specialist training in the interviewing of children and have particular 
regard to the possibility that a child will feel inhibited or alarmed. The child shall be allowed to 
express himself in his own way and at his own speed. If he appears tired or distressed, the 
interview will be suspended. The interviewer should then consider whether it would be 
appropriate for the interview to be resumed the same day or on another day. 
352ZA. The Secretary of State shall as soon as possible after an unaccompanied child makes 
an application for asylum take measures to ensure that a representative represents and/or 
assists the unaccompanied child with respect to the examination of the application and ensure 
that the representative is given the opportunity to inform the unaccompanied child about the 
meaning and possible consequences of the interview and, where appropriate, how to prepare 
himself for the interview. The representative shall have the right to be present at the interview 
and ask questions and make comments in the interview, within the framework set by the 
interviewer. 
352ZB. The decision on the application for asylum shall be taken by a person who is trained to 
deal with asylum claims from children. 
 






352ZC The requirements to be met in order for a grant of limited leave to remain to be made in 
relation to an unaccompanied asylum seeking child under paragraph 352ZE are: 
a) the applicant is an unaccompanied asylum seeking child under the age of 17 ½ years 
throughout the duration of leave to be granted in this capacity;  
b) the applicant must have applied for asylum and been refused Refugee Leave and 
Humanitarian Protection;  
c) there are no adequate reception arrangements in the country to which they would be 
returned if leave to remain was not granted;  
d) the applicant must not be excluded from a grant of asylum under Regulation 7 of the 
Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 or 
excluded from a grant of Humanitarian Protection under paragraph 339D or both;  
e) there are no reasonable grounds for regarding the applicant as a danger to the 
security of the United Kingdom;  
f) the applicant has not been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
and the applicant does not constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom; 
and  
g) the applicant is not, at the date of their application, the subject of a deportation order 
or a decision to make a deportation order.  
352ZD An unaccompanied asylum seeking child is a person who: 
a) is under 18 years of age when the asylum application is submitted.  
b) is applying for asylum in their own right; and  
c) is separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law 
or by custom has responsibility to do so.  
352ZE. Limited leave to remain should be granted for a period of 30 months or until the child is 
17 ½ years of age whichever is shorter, provided that the Secretary of State is satisfied that the 
requirements in paragraph 352ZC are met. 
352ZF. Limited leave granted under this provision will cease if 
a) any one or more of the requirements listed in paragraph 352ZC cease to be met, or  
b) a misrepresentation or omission of facts, including the use of false documents, were 
decisive for the grant of leave under 352ZE. 
352A. The requirements to be met by a person seeking leave to enter or remain in the United 
Kingdom as the spouse civil partner of a refugee are that: 
(i) the applicant is married to or the civil partner of a person who is currently a refugee 




(ii) the marriage or civil partnership did not take place after the person granted asylum 
left the country of his former habitual residence in order to seek asylum; an  
(iii) the applicant would not be excluded from protection by virtue of article 1F of the 
United Nations Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees if he were to 
seek asylum in his own right; and  
(iv) each of the parties intends to live permanently with the other as his or her spouse 
civil partner and the marriage is subsisting; and  
(v) if seeking leave to enter, the applicant holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance 
for entry in this capacity.  
352AA. The requirements to be met by a person seeking leave to enter or remain in the United 
Kingdom as the unmarried or the same-sex partner of a refugee are that: 
(i) the applicant is the unmarried or same-sex partner of a person who is currently a 
refugee granted status as such under the immigration rules in the United Kingdom and 
was granted that status in the UK on or after 9th October 2006; and  
(ii) the parties have been living together in a relationship akin to either a marriage or a 
civil partnership which has subsisted for two years or more; and  
(iii) the relationship existed before the person granted asylum left the country of his 
former habitual residence in order to seek asylum; and  
(iv) the applicant would not be excluded from protection by virtue of paragraph 334(iii) or  
(v) of these Rules or article 1F of the Geneva Convention if he were to seek asylum in his 
own right; and  
(vi) each of the parties intends to live permanently with the other as his or her unmarried 
or same-sex partner and the relationship is subsisting; and  
(vii) if seeking leave to enter, the applicant holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance 
for entry in this capacity.  
(viii) the parties are not involved in a consanguineous relationship with one another; and  
352B. Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the spouse civil partner of a refugee may 
be granted provided a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity is 
produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom as 
the spouse of a refugee may be granted provided the Secretary of State is satisfied that each of 
the requirements of paragraph 352A (i) - (v) are met. 
352BA Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the unmarried or same-sex partner of a 
refugee may be granted provided a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this 
capacity is produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited leave to remain in the United 




Secretary of State is satisfied that each of the requirements of paragraph 352AA (i) - (vii) are 
met. 
352C. Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the spouse civil partner of a refugee is to 
be refused if a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity is not produced to 
the Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited leave to remain as the spouse civil partner of a 
refugee is to be refused if the Secretary of State is not satisfied that each of the requirements of 
paragraph 352A (i) - (v) are met. 
352CA Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the unmarried or same-sex partner of a 
refugee is to be refused if a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity is not 
produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited leave to remain as the unmarried or 
same sex partner of a refugee is to be refused if the Secretary of State is not satisfied that each 
of the requirements of paragraph 352AA (i) - (vi) are met. 
352D. The requirements to be met by a person seeking leave to enter or remain in the United 
Kingdom in order to join or remain with the parent who is currently a refugee granted status as 
such under the immigration rules in the United Kingdom are that the applicant: 
(i) is the child of a parent who is currently a refugee granted status as such under the 
immigration rules in the United Kingdom; and  
(ii) is under the age of 18, and  
(iii) is not leading an independent life, is unmarried and is not a civil partner, and has not 
formed an independent family unit; and  
(iv) was part of the family unit of the person granted asylum at the time that the person 
granted asylum left the country of his habitual residence in order to seek asylum; and  
(v) would not be excluded from protection by virtue of article 1F of the United Nations 
Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees if he were to seek asylum in 
his own right; and  
(vi) if seeking leave to enter, holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in 
this capacity.  
352E. Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the child of a refugee may be granted 
provided a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity is produced to the 
Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom as the child of a 
refugee may be granted provided the Secretary of State is satisfied that each of the 
requirements of paragraph 352D (i) - (v) are met. 
352F. Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the child of a refugee is to be refused if a 
valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity is not produced to the 
Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited leave to remain as the child of a refugee is to be refused 





352FA. The requirements to be met by a person seeking leave to enter or remain in the United 
Kingdom as the spouse or civil partner of a person who is currently a beneficiary of 
humanitarian protection granted under the immigration rules in the United Kingdom and was 
granted that status on or after 30 August 2005 are that: 
(i) the applicant is married to or the civil partner of a person who is currently a beneficiary 
of humanitarian protection granted under the immigration rules and was granted that 
status on or after 30 August 2005; and  
(ii) the marriage or civil partnership did not take place after the person granted 
humanitarian protection left the country of his former habitual residence in order to seek 
asylum in the UK; and  
(iii) the applicant would not be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection for any of 
the reasons in paragraph 339D; and  
(iv) each of the parties intend to live permanently with the other as his or her spouse or 
civil partner and the marriage or civil partnership is subsisting; and  
(v) if seeking leave to enter, the applicant holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance 
for entry in this capacity.  
352FB. Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the spouse or civil partner of a person 
granted humanitarian protection may be granted provided a valid United Kingdom entry 
clearance for entry in this capacity is produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited 
leave to remain in the United Kingdom as the spouse or civil partner of a person granted 
humanitarian protection may be granted provided the Secretary of State is satisfied that each of 
the requirements in sub paragraphs 352FA(i) - (iv) are met. 
352FC. Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the spouse or civil partner of a person 
granted humanitarian protection is to be refused if a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for 
entry in this capacity is not produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited leave to 
remain as the spouse or civil partner of a person granted humanitarian protection is to be 
refused if the Secretary of State is not satisfied that each of the requirements in sub paragraphs 
352FA (i) - (iv) are met. 
352FD. The requirements to be met by a person seeking leave to enter or remain in the United 
Kingdom as the unmarried or same-sex partner of a person who is currently a beneficiary of 
humanitarian protection granted under the immigration rules in the United Kingdom are that: 
(i) the applicant is the unmarried or same-sex partner of a person who is currently a 
beneficiary of humanitarian protection granted under the immigration rules and was 
granted that status on or after 9th October 2006; and  
(ii) the parties have been living together in a relationship akin to either a marriage or a 




(iii) the relationship existed before the person granted humanitarian protection left the 
country of his former habitual residence in order to seek asylum; and  
(iv) the applicant would not be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection for any 
of the reasons in paragraph 339D; and  
(v) each of the parties intends to live permanently with the other as his or her unmarried 
or same-sex partner and the relationship is subsisting; and  
(vi) the parties are not involved in a consanguineous relationship with one another; and  
(vii) if seeking leave to enter, the applicant holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance 
for entry in this capacity.  
352FE. Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the unmarried or same-sex partner of a 
person granted humanitarian protection may be granted provided a valid United Kingdom entry 
clearance for entry in this capacity is produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited 
leave to remain in the United Kingdom as the unmarried or same sex partner of a person 
granted humanitarian protection may be granted provided the Secretary of State is satisfied that 
each of the requirements in subparagraphs 352FD (i) - (vi) are met. 
352FF. Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the unmarried or same-sex partner of a 
person granted humanitarian protection is to be refused if a valid United Kingdom entry 
clearance for entry in this capacity is not produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited 
leave to remain as the unmarried or same sex partner of a person granted humanitarian 
protection is to be refused if the Secretary of State is not satisfied that each of the requirements 
in sub paragraphs 352FD(i) - (vi) are met. 
352FG. The requirements to be met by a person seeking leave to enter or remain in the United 
Kingdom in order to join or remain with their parent who is currently a beneficiary of 
humanitarian protection granted under the immigration rules in the United Kingdom and was 
granted that status on or after 30 August 2005 are that the applicant: 
(i) is the child of a parent who is currently a beneficiary of humanitarian protection 
granted under the immigration rules in the United Kingdom and was granted that status 
on or after 30 August 2005; and  
(ii) is under the age of 18, and  
(iii) is not leading an independent life, is unmarried or is not in a civil partnership, and has 
not formed an independent family unit; and  
(iv) was part of the family unit of the person granted humanitarian protection at the time 
that the person granted humanitarian protection left the country of his habitual residence 
in order to seek asylum in the UK; and  
(v) would not be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection for any of the reasons 




(vi) if seeking leave to enter, holds a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in 
this capacity.  
352FH. Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the child of a person granted 
humanitarian protection may be granted provided a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for 
entry in this capacity is produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited leave to remain in 
the United Kingdom as the child of a person granted humanitarian protection may be granted 
provided the Secretary of State is satisfied that each of the requirements in sub paragraphs 
352FG (i) -(v) are met. 
352FI. Limited leave to enter the United Kingdom as the child of a person granted humanitarian 
protection is to be refused if a valid United Kingdom entry clearance for entry in this capacity is 
not produced to the Immigration Officer on arrival. Limited leave to remain as the child of a 
person granted humanitarian protection is to be refused if the Secretary of State is not satisfied 
that each of the requirements in sub paragraphs 352FG (i) -(v) are met. 
352FJ. Nothing in paragraphs 352A-352FI shall allow a person to be granted leave to enter or 
remain in the United Kingdom as the spouse or civil partner, unmarried or same sex partner or 
child of a refugee, or of a person granted humanitarian protection under the immigration rules in 
the United Kingdom on or after 30 August 2005, if the refugee or, as the case may be, person 




352G. For the purposes of this Part: 
(a) "Geneva Convention" means the United Nations Convention and Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees; 
(b) "Country of return" means a country or territory listed in paragraph 8(c) of Schedule 2 of the 
Immigration Act 1971; 
(c) "Country of origin" means the country or countries of nationality or, for a stateless person, or 
former habitual residence. 
 
Restriction on study 
 
352H. Where a person is granted leave in accordance with the provisions set out in Part 11 of 
the Immigration Rules that leave will, in addition to any other conditions which may apply, be 
granted subject to the condition in Part 15 of these Rules. 
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(1) The Secretary of State may designate a person who satisfies Condition 1 or 2 (subject to 
subsections (4) and (5)). 
(2) Condition 1 is that the person— 
(a) is a foreign criminal within the meaning of section 131, and 
(b )is liable to deportation, but cannot be removed from the United Kingdom because of 
section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (public authority not to act contrary to 
Convention). 
(3) Condition 2 is that the person is a member of the family of a person who satisfies 
Condition 1. 
(4) A person who has the right of abode in the United Kingdom may not be designated. 
(5 The Secretary of State may not designate a person if the Secretary of State thinks that an 
effect of designation would breach— 
(a) the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention, or 
(b) the person's rights under the Community treaties. 
 
131 “Foreign criminal” 
(1) For the purposes of section 130 “foreign criminal” means a person who— 
(a) is not a British citizen, and 
(b) satisfies any of the following Conditions. 
(2) Condition 1 is that section 72(2)(a) and (b) or (3)(a) to (c) of the Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act 2002 (c. 41) applies to the person (Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention: 
imprisonment for at least two years). 
(3) Condition 2 is that— 
(a) section 72(4)(a) or (b) of that Act applies to the person (person convicted of specified 
offence), and 
(b) the person has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment. 
(4) Condition 3 is that Article 1F of the Refugee Convention applies to the person (exclusions 
for criminals etc.). 
(5) Section 72(6) of that Act (rebuttal of presumption under section 72(2) to (4)) has no effect 
in relation to Condition 1 or 2. 
(6) Section 72(7) of that Act (non-application pending appeal) has no effect in relation to 




132 Effect of designation 
(1) A designated person does not have leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. 
(2) For the purposes of a provision of the Immigration Acts and any other enactment which 
concerns or refers to immigration or nationality (including any provision which applies or 
refers to a provision of the Immigration Acts or any other enactment about immigration or 
nationality) a designated person— 
(a) is a person subject to immigration control, 
(b) is not to be treated as an asylum-seeker or a former asylum-seeker, and 
(c) is not in the United Kingdom in breach of the immigration laws. 
(3) Despite subsection (2)(c), time spent in the United Kingdom as a designated person may 
not be relied on by a person for the purpose of an enactment about nationality. 
(4) A designated person— 
(a) shall not be deemed to have been given leave in accordance with paragraph 6 of 
Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (notice of leave or refusal), and 
(b) may not be granted temporary admission to the United Kingdom under paragraph 21 of 
that Schedule. 




(1) The Secretary of State or an immigration officer may by notice in writing impose a 
condition on a designated person. 
(2) A condition may relate to— 
(a) residence, 
(b) employment or occupation, or 
(c) reporting to the police, the Secretary of State or an immigration officer. 
(3) Section 36 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (c. 19) 
(electronic monitoring) shall apply in relation to conditions imposed under this section as it 
applies to restrictions imposed under paragraph 21 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 
1971 (with a reference to the Immigration Acts being treated as including a reference to this 
section). 
(4) Section 69 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (c. 41) (reporting 
restrictions: travel expenses) shall apply in relation to conditions imposed under subsection 
(2)(c) above as it applies to restrictions imposed under paragraph 21 of Schedule 2 to the 
Immigration Act 1971. 
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(5) A person who without reasonable excuse fails to comply with a condition imposed under 
this section commits an offence. 
(6) A person who is guilty of an offence under subsection (5) shall be liable on summary 
conviction to— 
(a) a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, 
(b) imprisonment for a period not exceeding 51 weeks, or 
(c) both. 
(7) A provision of the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) which applies in relation to an offence 
under any provision of section 24(1) of that Act (illegal entry etc.) shall also apply in relation 
to the offence under subsection (5) above. 
(8) In the application of this section to Scotland or Northern Ireland the reference in 
subsection (6)(b) to 51 weeks shall be treated as a reference to six months. 
 
134 Support 
(1) Part VI of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33) (support for asylum-seekers) shall 
apply in relation to designated persons and their dependants as it applies in relation to 
asylum-seekers and their dependants. 
(2) But the following provisions of that Part shall not apply— 
(a) section 96 (kinds of support), 
(b) section 97(1)(b) (desirability of providing accommodation in well-supplied area), 
(c) section 100 (duty to co-operate in providing accommodation), 
(d) section 101 (reception zones), 
(e) section 108 (failure of sponsor to maintain), 
(f) section 111 (grants to voluntary organisations), and 
(g) section 113 (recovery of expenditure from sponsor). 
(3) Support may be provided under section 95 of the 1999 Act as applied by this section— 
(a) by providing accommodation appearing to the Secretary of State to be adequate for a 
person's needs; 
(b) by providing what appear to the Secretary of State to be essential living needs; 
(c) in other ways which the Secretary of State thinks necessary to reflect exceptional 
circumstances of a particular case. 
(4) Support by virtue of subsection (3) may not be provided wholly or mainly by way of cash 
unless the Secretary of State thinks it appropriate because of exceptional circumstances. 
(5) Section 4 of the 1999 Act (accommodation) shall not apply in relation to designated 
persons. 
(6) A designated person shall not be treated— 
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(a) as a person subject to immigration control, for the purposes of section 119(1)(b) of the 
1999 Act (homelessness: Scotland and Northern Ireland), or 
(b) as a person from abroad who is not eligible for housing assistance, for the purposes of 
section 185(4) of the Housing Act 1996 (c. 52) (housing assistance). 
 
135 Support: supplemental 
(1) A reference in an enactment to Part VI of the 1999 Act or to a provision of that Part 
includes a reference to that Part or provision as applied by section 134 above; and for that 
purpose— 
(a) a reference to section 96 shall be treated as including a reference to section 134(3) 
above, 
(b) a reference to a provision of section 96 shall be treated as including a reference to the 
corresponding provision of section 134(3), and 
(c) a reference to asylum-seekers shall be treated as including a reference to designated 
persons. 
(2) A provision of Part VI of the 1999 Act which requires or permits the Secretary of State to 
have regard to the temporary nature of support shall be treated, in the application of Part VI 
by virtue of section 134 above, as requiring the Secretary of State to have regard to the 
nature and circumstances of support by virtue of that section. 
(3) Rules under section 104 of the 1999 Act (appeals) shall have effect for the purposes of 
Part VI of that Act as it applies by virtue of section 134 above. 
(4) Any other instrument under Part VI of the 1999 Act— 
(a) may make provision in respect of that Part as it applies by virtue of section 134 above, as 
it applies otherwise than by virtue of that section, or both, and 
(b) may make different provision for that Part as it applies by virtue of section 134 above and 
as it applies otherwise than by virtue of that section. 
(5) In the application of paragraph 9 of Schedule 8 to the 1999 Act (regulations: notice to quit 
accommodation) the reference in paragraph (2)(b) to the determination of a claim for asylum 
shall be treated as a reference to ceasing to be a designated person. 
(6) The Secretary of State may by order repeal, modify or disapply (to any extent) section 
134(4). 
(7) An order under section 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42) (power to remedy 
incompatibility) which amends a provision mentioned in subsection (6) of section 134 above 
may amend or repeal that subsection. 
 
136 End of designation 
(1) Designation lapses if the designated person— 
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(a) is granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, 
(b) is notified by the Secretary of State or an immigration officer of a right of residence in the 
United Kingdom by virtue of the Community treaties, 
(c) leaves the United Kingdom, or 
(d) is made the subject of a deportation order under section 5 of the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 
77). 
(2) After designation lapses support may not be provided by virtue of section 134, subject to 
the following exceptions. 
(3) Exception 1 is that, if designation lapses under subsection (1)(a) or (b), support may be 
provided in respect of a period which— 
(a) begins when the designation lapses, and 
(b) ends on a date determined in accordance with an order of the Secretary of State. 
(4) Exception 2 is that, if designation lapses under subsection (1)(d), support may be 
provided in respect of— 
(a) any period during which an appeal against the deportation order may be brought (ignoring 
any possibility of an appeal out of time with permission), 
(b) any period during which an appeal against the deportation order is pending, and 
(c) after an appeal ceases to be pending, such period as the Secretary of State may specify 
by order. 
 
137 Interpretation: general 
(1) This section applies to sections 130 to 136. 
(2) A reference to a designated person is a reference to a person designated under section 
130. 
(3) “Family” shall be construed in accordance with section 5(4) of the Immigration Act 1971 
(c. 77) (deportation: definition of “family”). 
(4) “Right of abode in the United Kingdom” has the meaning given by section 2 of that Act. 
(5) “The Refugee Convention” means the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done 
at Geneva on 28th July 1951 and its Protocol. 
(6) “Period of imprisonment” shall be construed in accordance with section 72(11)(b)(i) and 
(ii) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (c. 41). 
(7) A voucher is not cash. 
(8) A reference to a pending appeal has the meaning given by section 104(1) of that Act. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
1.1  Purpose of instruction 
 
1.1.1 This guidance explains the circumstances in which the Home Office will consider 
granting restricted leave to individuals who cannot be removed because this would 
breach their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and: 
 
► are excluded from the Refugee Convention for Article 1F reasons, or who would be 
excluded were a Convention reason to apply (i.e. those excluded from a grant of 
Humanitarian Protection), or 
► have been refused asylum under Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention  
 
1.1.2 The instruction provides specific guidance on: 
 
► the categories of persons who may be granted restricted leave under this policy; 
► the duration of leave and conditions that may be attached to any grant of restricted 
leave; 
► conducting an active review in cases granted restricted leave. 
 
1.1.3 This instruction must be read in conjunction with the asylum policy instructions, 
Exclusion under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, Cancellation, Cessation and 
Revocation of Refugee Status and Considering the protection (asylum) claim and 
assessing credibility. 
 
1.1.4 This updates and replaces the interim casework instruction on restricted leave issued 
on 28 May 2012. 
 
1.2  Background 
 
1.2.1 There may be circumstances in which asylum seekers have committed war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes outside the country of refuge or 
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, or who are a danger 
to national security or are otherwise non-conducive to the public good. This includes 
those who espouse extremist views. For more information, see Exclusion under Article 
1F of the Refugee Convention. Exclusion may either be agreed by Special Cases Unit 
(SCU, in OSCT) or may be imposed following an allowed appeal. 
 
1.2.2 Our policy is to remove such individuals wherever possible because they are not 
welcome in the UK. However, in cases where removal cannot currently be enforced for 
ECHR reasons we will deny the benefits of refugee status and Humanitarian Protection 
and instead grant a short period of restricted leave to which tight restrictive conditions 
may be attached according to the particular circumstances of each case. 
 
1.2.3 This policy applies to anyone where there is an ECHR barrier to removal, including 
country situations which meet the Article 15(c) threshold or where the person would 
ordinarily qualify for discretionary leave because they are in the terminal stages of 
illness and removal meets the very high Article 3 threshold established by case law. 
Such individuals must not be granted Humanitarian Protection or discretionary leave but 






Asylum Policy Instruction: Restricted Leave 
V1.0 (xx October 2014)      Page 4 of 18 
Note: This Document Becomes an Uncontrolled & Unsupported Version if Printed  
 
1.2.4 As those who fall within the scope of this policy have committed serious international 
crimes and/or represent a danger to the security of the UK, only Article 3 considerations 
will normally outweigh the public interest in removing them because it is an absolute 
right and the extent of the public interest cannot be taken into account. Where qualified 
rights are engaged, such as Article 8 ECHR, only in the most compelling 
compassionate circumstances could their family or private life, or medical 
considerations, outweigh the public interest in removal in these cases. It is expected 
there will be very few such cases, but where there are such cases this policy applies. 
 
1.2.5 Such cases will be reviewed regularly with a view to removal as soon as possible and 
only in exceptional circumstances will individuals on restricted leave ever become 
eligible for settlement or citizenship. Such exceptional circumstances are likely to be 
very rare. 
 
1.3  Policy intention behind Restricted Leave 
 
1.3.1 The policy objectives in excluding individuals from the Refugee Convention and/or 
refusing asylum or Humanitarian Protection and instead granting shorter periods of 
restricted leave with specific conditions is for: 
 
► Public interest. The public interest in maintaining the integrity of immigration 
control justifies frequent review of these cases with the intention of removing at the 
earliest opportunity. Therefore we want to ensure close contact and give a clear 
signal that the person should not become established in the UK. 
► Public protection. It is legitimate to impose conditions designed to ensure that the 
Home Office is able to monitor where an individual lives and works and/or prevent 
access to positions of influence or trust. 
► Upholding the rule of law internationally. The policy supports the principle that 
those excluded from refugee status, including war criminals, cannot establish a new 
life in the UK and supports our broader international obligations. It reinforces the 
message that our intention is to remove the individual from the UK as soon as is 
possible. 
 
Back to Contents 
 
1.4  Application in respect of children 
 
1.4.1 Some individuals who fall within this policy will have dependent children. In applying the 
policy the decision-maker must have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the 
welfare of children in the UK, as provided by section 55 of the Borders Citizenship and 
Immigration Act 2009. This means the decision-maker must have regard to the likely 
impact the imposition of any conditions may have on dependent children and consider 
what is appropriate in that particular case. The published guidance on the section 55 
duty can be found here: Section 55 Children's Duty Guidance. 
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Section 2: Legal Framework 
 
2.1  Refugee Convention 
 
2.1.1 Article 1F of the Refugee Convention excludes certain individuals from the protection of 
the Convention where there are serious reasons for considering that: 
 
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, 
as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of 
such crimes; 
 
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to 
his admission to that country as a refugee; 
 
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. 
 
2.1.2 Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention provides for the refusal of asylum where there 
are reasonable grounds for regarding someone as a danger to the security of the host 
state or where someone has been convicted of a particular serious crime and 
constitutes a danger to the community. 
 
2.2  Immigration Act 1971 
 
2.2.1 The power to attach conditions to leave is provided by section 3(1)(c) of the Immigration 
Act 1971. A person who knowingly fails to observe a condition of their leave commits an 
offence by virtue of section 24(1)(b)(ii) of the 1971 Act. Where appropriate, this policy 
will be enforced by the prosecution of individuals who do not comply with the conditions 
of their leave. 
 
2.3  Immigration Rules 
 
2.3.1 Paragraph 334 (iii) and (iv) of the Immigration Rules provide for the refusal of asylum 
where there are reasonable grounds to consider that an individual is a danger to the 
security of the UK or an individual is a danger to the community having been convicted 
of a particularly serious crime. This transposes Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention 
into the Immigration Rules. 
 
2.3.2 Paragraph 339A provides for the cancellation, cessation or revocation of refugee leave 
if such evidence comes to light after asylum has been granted.  These provisions are 
replicated in Paragraph 339G for those granted Humanitarian Protection 
 
2.3.3 Paragraph 322(1C) of the Immigration Rules sets out when an application for indefinite 
leave to remain must be refused when the applicant has criminal convictions. 
 
2.3.4 Paragraph 322(5) sets out that an application for a variation of leave to enter or remain 
(including a variation from limited to indefinite leave) should normally be refused if it is 
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of his conduct (including convictions which do not fall within paragraph 322(1C), 
character or associations or the fact that he represents a threat to national security. 
 
2.3.5 Paragraph 322(5A) sets out that an application for a variation of leave to enter or 
remain (including a variation from limited to indefinite leave) should normally be refused 
if it is undesirable to permit the person concerned to enter or remain in the United 
Kingdom because, in the view of the Secretary of State: 
 
(a) their offending has caused serious harm; or 
(b) they are a persistent offender who shows a particular disregard for the law. 
 
2.3.6 For further guidance on the general grounds for refusal in Part 9 of the Immigration 
Rules, please see General grounds for refusal. Officials should ensure they are familiar 
with the rest of the general grounds as there may be other grounds which will apply in 
an individual case. 
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Section 3: Categories Granted Restricted 
Leave 
 
Restricted leave can be imposed in the following categories of case: 
 
3.1  Those excluded under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention 
 
3.1.1 The purpose of Article 1F is to deny the benefits of refugee status to those who do not 
deserve international protection because there are serious reasons for considering that 
they committed war crimes, crimes against peace or humanity, serious non-political 
crimes or acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It is also 
designed to ensure that individuals cannot avoid being returned to their country of origin 
to be held to account for their actions.  Article 1F is intended to protect the integrity of 
the asylum process. See Exclusion under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention for 
detailed guidance on applying exclusion clauses in asylum decision-making. 
 
3.1.2 Those who are refused asylum because Article 1F applies must be prioritised for 
enforcement action and removal. Where they cannot be removed because this would 
be contrary to the UK’s obligations under the ECHR they should be granted restricted 
leave under this policy until we are legally able to enforce removal. 
 
3.2  Those excluded from Humanitarian Protection 
 
3.2.1 Paragraph 339D of the Immigration Rules sets out when an individual will be excluded 
from Humanitarian Protection. The reasons mirror those provided in Article 1F of the 
Refugee Convention and the guidance above in section 3.1 also applies to those 
excluded from Humanitarian Protection. 
 
3.3  Those refused under Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention 
 
3.3.1 Article 33(2) provides for the refusal of asylum to individuals who would otherwise be 
refugees where there are reasonable grounds for regarding them as a danger to the 
security of the UK. This includes those convicted of particularly serious crimes or those 
who espouse extremist views and behaviours. 
 
3.3.2 Those who are refused under this provision but cannot be removed to their country of 
origin because this would be contrary to the UK’s obligations under the ECHR should 
be granted restricted leave under this policy until we are legally able to enforce removal. 
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Section 4: Administration of the Policy 
 
4.1  Casework 
 
4.1.1 All exclusion and restricted leave cases must be considered within Special Cases Unit 
(SCU). 
 
4.2  Duration of leave 
 
4.2.1 Restricted leave should in most instances be limited to a maximum of six months at a 
time to emphasise its short-term nature and because it would be at odds with the aim of 
this policy to permit such a person to re-enter the UK. If someone with leave for six 
months or less travels outside the UK, their leave will lapse. A grant of leave for longer 
than six months permits a person to leave the UK and to be readmitted during the 
validity of their grant of leave (by virtue of section 13(2)(b) of the Immigration (Leave to 
Enter and Remain) Order 2000). 
 
4.2.2 All cases must be assessed individually. A shorter period than six months should be 
granted where removal appears to be reasonably likely within six months or where, in 
exceptional cases, the risk posed by the individual warrants the case being kept under 
review more frequently. 
 
4.3 Recourse to public funds 
 
4.3.1 Individuals placed on restricted leave will not have recourse to public funds unless they 
are destitute. For guidance on assessing destitution, and the evidence the individual 
must provide to make out a claim of destitution, see assessing destitution. The burden 
of proof is on the individual to show that they are destitute and in need of public funds. 
 
4.4 Employment restriction (including referral to the Disclosure and 
Barring Service) 
 
4.4.1 The presumption is that permission to work will normally be restricted rather than 
denied outright where any condition is imposed. Any employment restriction also 
applies to voluntary work, self-employment or engagement in any kind of business, paid 
or unpaid. The type of restriction imposed must be in proportion to the public protection 
risk posed by the individual. The options for restricting employment are: 
 
(i)   Imposing a requirement to notify the Secretary of State of all employment and 
volunteering roles 
This should be used for lower-risk cases so that the Home Office can notify other 
agencies, where appropriate, about the person’s employment. Individuals should 
normally be required to notify the Home Office within 14 days of a change in their 
employment circumstances (for example taking a new role or leaving a position). 
  
(ii)  Applying restrictions on working, including in certain occupations/professions 
Generally, this will be expressed as a condition not to take any employment or engage 
in any business unless the Secretary of State has given prior consent in writing. When 






Asylum Policy Instruction: Restricted Leave 
V1.0 (xx October 2014)      Page 9 of 18 
Note: This Document Becomes an Uncontrolled & Unsupported Version if Printed  
depend entirely on the risk factors posed in individual cases. The condition should 
generally be used to prevent the person from working in roles with unsupervised contact 
with vulnerable people, or in roles which could be inappropriate according to the alleged 
crimes or acts for which the individual is being excluded, e.g. working with migrant 
communities from the country of origin where war crimes were allegedly committed. If 
an individual is already in employment then details of that employment must be 
obtained and an assessment undertaken as to its continuing suitability prior to a grant of 
restricted leave. 
  
(iii)  A total ban on employment in any capacity, whether paid or as a volunteer  
This should be used exceptionally in cases posing a particularly high public protection 
risk. Such cases must also be referred to the local police force for handling under the 
Potentially Dangerous Person (PDP) regime. 
 
Operation of the employment restriction 
 
4.4.2 At the initial grant of leave, and at subsequent renewals, the Immigration Status 
Document / Biometric Residence Permit (BRP) will in most instances be completed with 
a remark indicating that employment is permitted only with the consent of the Secretary 
of State. This must be accompanied by a letter explaining that consent will normally 
only be given in relation to a specific job or business activity. Where the individual seeks 
to change their employment, or to take up an additional role, they must apply for fresh 
consent. 
 
4.4.3 An individual may apply for consent either in writing to the designated decision-maker or 
at a reporting event (where under a condition to report to the Secretary of State). In 
either case the individual must provide the following details to enable a decision to be 
made: 
 
► Name, address, contact details of employer; 
► Job title / position and job advertisement (if applicable); 
► Person specification for the role (if applicable); 
► Details of role and responsibilities. 
 
4.4.4 All requests for permission to work should be dealt with as soon as possible (usually 
with 14 days) after the request is made. The individual should be told that his request 
will be submitted to the decision-maker and the decision will be notified in writing to their 
home address, with a copy sent to their legal representatives (where applicable). It is 
important that the response is sent to the notified home address as this is a way of 
checking that the individual continues to live at the address given. The individual must 
also be notified of the requirement to update his BRP, because employers are not 
allowed to accept a Home Office letter as proof of permission to work.  
 
4.4.5 In considering whether to give consent to proposed employment, decision-makers must 
revisit the case background to make a judgement on whether previous behaviour 
suggests the person would be unsuitable for the proposed role in a UK context. The 
decision-maker must pay particular attention to unsuitable behaviour that occurred 
when the person previously held: 
 
► a position of authority over others (e.g. police, teacher, security guard, soldier); 
► a position of trust (e.g. doctor, nurse); 
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► a professional role that involved working unsupervised to a significant degree or 
instructing/supervising others. 
 
4.4.6 The presumption is that a person excluded from the Convention under Article 1F, 
excluded from Humanitarian Protection or refused under Article 33(2) should not be 
permitted to work or volunteer in any of the roles that require a standard or enhanced 
DBS check. These include (not an exhaustive list): 
 
► healthcare, e.g. doctors, nurses, chiropractors, opticians; 
► roles involving the humane killing of animals; 
► public sector roles e.g. police, court, prison and probation services; 
► roles requiring contact with children e.g. teaching and training roles or foster carers; 
► roles in the legal profession, including immigration advisers; and 
► other miscellaneous roles e.g. locksmiths, taxi drivers, security guards. 
 
4.4.7 Further information is available at: Disclosure and Barring Service: Services and 
guidance.  
 
Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) Referral Process 
 
4.4.8 Regardless of the employment condition being imposed, all cases excluded from the 
Convention under Article 1F, excluded from Humanitarian Protection or refused under 
Article 33(2) must be referred to the DBS as soon as an individual is granted restricted 
leave with any employment condition. 
 
4.4.9 The referral to DBS must include information relevant to the case, including the serious 
reasons for considering the individual has committed crimes/offences that led to the 
exclusion under Article 1F or refusal under Article 33(2). This would normally be the 
asylum decision letter or the Tribunal appeal determination, together with details of the 
restrictions being applied. It should not be the interview transcript, except on request by 
the DBS.  
 
4.4.10 The DBS will consider whether it is appropriate to bar the person under their 
discretionary barring procedure. If the DBS is minded to bar the person, they will be 
invited by the DBS to make representations within eight weeks which will be considered 
before a final decision is taken on barring. The DBS may contact the Home Office about 
any representations received and will inform the Home Office of the decision, so that 
this may be taken into account if the individual seeks permission to take or engage in a 




4.4.11 Where the applicant seeks consent for employment in a role under the supervision of a 
professional body (other than the DBS), decision-makers must consider whether public 
protection is best served by disclosure of the details of the criminality or extremist 
behaviours to that professional body. This can be done even where the decision-maker 
is not proposing to refuse consent to employment in that role – informing a regulatory 
body can serve to ensure a person’s behaviour at work is kept under supervision. 
 
4.4.12 After making a referral, the decision-maker must request disclosure from the 
professional/regulatory body about the action taken in respect of the individual. 
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individual may help to inform the precise nature of conditions that should be imposed by 




4.4.13 Relevant information of alleged past criminality can be shared with the DBS or 
professional and statutory regulatory bodies, consistent with our obligations under the 
Data Protection Act 1998. Where in doubt about whether information can be disclosed 
decision-makers should seek advice from senior caseworkers or a chief caseworker in 
the first instance. 
 
4.5 Residence restrictions 
 
4.5.1 These cases remain a priority for removal so decision-makers must  maintain contact 
with individuals to ensure removal action is pursued as soon as possible. A requirement 
to notify officials of a change of address is essential to ensure that the individual can be 
located when removal is possible. Requiring the person to live in a specific area where 
the accommodation is publicly provided or funded may also be legitimate to reduce the 
cost of providing housing. 
 
4.5.2 One or both of the following residence conditions should usually be imposed: 
 
► to notify the Secretary of State of the home address and any change of address; 
and/or 
► to seek the prior consent of the Secretary of State to any change of address. 
 
4.5.3 The first option, to notify the Secretary of State of changes of address, should normally 
be imposed in all cases. In cases requiring the additional condition in the second option, 
the individual will be subject to a requirement to seek the consent of the Secretary of 
State before changing address. This condition will be on the face of the Immigration 
Status Document/Biometric Residence Permit and must be explained in an 
accompanying letter. It is important that requests for consent to change address are 
dealt with promptly as the person, including their family, may have to change address 
and should not be left homeless or in breach of conditions. 
 
4.5.4 In deciding whether to give consent, decision-makers must have regard to known risk 
factors and seek advice from partners (e.g. police, local authorities) where appropriate. 
If specific risk factors are known, it may be appropriate to advise the individual that he 
will not be given permission to live within a certain area. 
 
4.5.5 In this section, ‘residence’ should be given the meaning of habitual residence. A person 
subject to a residence condition may also be subject to conditions such as: 
 
► not spending more than three consecutive nights away from the address without the 
prior written consent of the Secretary of State; and 
► not spending more than 10 nights away from that address in any rolling six month 
period. 
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4.5.6 Each case must be considered on the individual facts and risks. Particular risks may 
arise where: 
 
► the individual concerned may pose particular risks to individuals in the community 
on the basis of past behaviour – for example, the Home Office may want to prohibit 
residence close to a school or other facility; 
► there is a significant community from the applicant’s country of origin in that locality. 
The risk may be to the individual (e.g. from members of the community seeking 
retribution), or there may be a general public order risk if it becomes known that the 
person is living in the community. It also may be suspected that an excluded 
individual will seek to use his influence within the community to intimidate others or 
to exert undue influence. Where that is a real concern, the individual should be 
informed that permission will not be granted to live at an address within a specified 
area. 
 
4.5.7 A residence restriction may also be imposed where it would facilitate the progression of 
the individual to removal. 
 
4.5.8 In cases that pose a particularly high risk of public order or crime, the local police 
should be informed as part of the Potentially Dangerous Person (PDP) regime. 
 
4.5.9 A residence condition may have an adverse impact on child dependants. Where a child 
lives within the household of the excluded person, care should be taken to consider the 
impact on the child’s welfare in accordance with the Home Office’s s.55 duty. An 
example of this might be where a residence condition disrupts a child’s education at a 
crucial stage, or where it takes the child away from an extended family. Removing a 
child from the influence of a wider community may not be in the best interests of the 
child. A view may be sought from the Office of the Children’s Champion (OCC) about 




4.5.10 Any letter or notice setting out the basis of the leave given should make clear the 
consequences of non-compliance. Decision-makers must keep compliance with 
conditions under close review. They must liaise with reporting centres to use the 
reporting event as a means of monitoring compliance with any residence and 
employment conditions. 
 
4.5.11 Decision-makers must maintain contact with reporting centre staff and request that they 
are vigilant to signs that a person is no longer complying with conditions. An example of 
this might be if they consistently arrive late for reporting events and their explanation 
does not stand up to scrutiny, for example, if their travel tickets consistently show they 
have travelled to the reporting event from a location other than their notified address. 
 
4.5.12 Decision-makers should ask reporting centres to request evidence of recent utility bills 
or other evidence that corroborates the stated address. Reporting centre staff can also 
ask to see return bus or train tickets where the individual does not live within walking 
distance of the reporting centre or has not driven there. 
 
4.5.13 Where there are doubts about a person’s compliance with conditions, the decision-
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to commission an investigation, which may include a home visit. In some cases it may 
be appropriate to make a referral to an intelligence team to establish if there is evidence 
of a person living elsewhere, in breach of the residence condition. In the case of high 
harm individuals decision-makers may need to make other arrangements on a case-by-
case basis. 
 
4.5.14 Decision-makers should also consider the use of random home visits even where there 
is no obvious evidence of a breach of this condition. This can be justified, given the high 
priority of these cases for removal, in order for the Home Office to have confidence that 
it is maintaining contact. 
 
4.6 Reporting restrictions 
 
4.6.1 The presumption is that all cases subject to this policy will be made subject to a 
condition to report regularly to the Secretary of State. This condition is designed to 
maintain contact with the individual and monitor compliance with other conditions. 
Contact management is a priority because these cases must remain under review for 
removal at the earliest possible stage. The precise frequency and location of the 
reporting event will depend upon the following factors: 
 
► the imminence of removal; 
► the perceived risk of absconding; 
► the need to maintain contact with the individual to monitor compliance with 
conditions; 
► the impact of the reporting requirement on the individual taking into account: 
► the location of the reporting centre; 
► health and mobility; 
► domestic responsibilities; 
► employment. 
 
4.6.2 The frequency with which an individual will be required to report will depend on the 
individual circumstances of the case. As a guide, monthly reporting should be 
considered the normal standard for restricted leave cases, but the appropriate period 
should be determined  depending on the circumstances of each case. This frequency 
can also be modified up or down in the light of changing circumstances, taking into 
account the factors specified above.  Where, in exceptional circumstances, it would be 
unreasonable to expect the individual to report each time in person, other options 
should be considered, such as home visits. 
 
4.6.3 Before setting up the reporting regime, decision-makers must liaise with the relevant 
reporting centre manager to ensure they are aware of the facts relating to the individual, 
and in particular any risks they may pose when reporting. The reporting centre manager 
may wish to suggest an alternative reporting venue or specify a time when known 
victims or people at risk will not also be reporting. 
 
4.6.4 An individual may apply for the condition to be varied, to take account of domestic or 
other commitments. Such requests should be considered in line with the overall aims of 
the policy and this guidance and, if appropriate, the condition should be amended in 
writing. 
 
4.6.5 Decision-makers should be aware that asylum seekers supported under section 95 will 
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reporting condition should be set for the current address and then amended when the 
individual finds an alternative address. During this period it is important to maintain 
contact with the individual so that proposed addresses can be considered before the 




4.6.6 Through liaison with the reporting centre, and monitoring of the case on Home Office 
records, the case owner should ensure compliance with the reporting condition. Where 
an individual breaches the reporting condition without explanation, the case owner 
should liaise with Immigration Enforcement to arrange an enforcement visit to establish 
the reason for the breach and to take appropriate action, which may, for example, 
include consideration of tightening conditions of the Restricted Leave or prosecution 
under the Immigration Act 1971 for failure to comply with conditions of leave. 
 
4.6.7 In imposing the reporting condition, the individual should be told in writing of how to 
notify the reporting centre in the event that he is unable to attend a scheduled reporting 
event. 
 
4.6.8 These cases are amongst the highest priority cases for compliance action. Any more 
than one notified failure to report must be followed up by the case owner. Missed 
reporting events without satisfactory explanation should be referred to the local 
prosecution team for consideration. 
 
4.7 Restrictions on studies 
 
4.7.1 Grants of restricted leave should generally be subject to a condition which prevents 
them from undertaking a course of study, whether by attending in person or remote 
learning. 
 
4.7.2 These individuals are in the UK on a temporary form of leave, pending their removal 
from the UK when circumstances permit. The rationale for restricting study is that it 
underlines the temporary nature of the leave. It also reduces pressure on public 
finances and, for privately funded courses, ensures that the person does not occupy 
course spaces that would otherwise be taken up by British Citizens or lawful migrants. It 
is also in the wider public interest to ensure that migrants who are welcome in the UK 
are afforded the opportunities that come from education, ahead of those on restricted 
leave. 
  
4.8 Authority levels/oversight 
 
4.8.1 All proposed initial grants of restricted leave, and ‘conversions’ from Discretionary 
Leave to restricted leave following an active review (see section 4.9 below) must be 
approved by the Head of SCU. 
 
4.8.2 There is a need to ensure that conditions of leave are being imposed in a consistent 
and proportionate manner, and are properly addressing the aims of the policy. This 
approval mechanism is intended to establish an appropriate overview of the types of 
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4.9 The grant of Restricted Leave with conditions 
 
4.9.1 The reasons for and nature of the conditions being imposed must be clearly explained 
in the letter and notices accompanying the grant of leave to remain. This letter must 
include the precise meaning of the conditions, how to apply to vary the conditions and a 
statement that a failure to comply with conditions may result in prosecution. 
 
4.9.2 Where dependants have not made a protection claim in their own right, but were 
included as dependants of the main applicant before a decision was made, they should 
be granted leave in line with the main applicant. It is generally not appropriate to impose 
similar restrictions as apply to the main applicant. The restrictions applied should be at 
the minimum level necessary to maintain contact with the individual. 
 
4.10 Active reviews 
 
4.10.1 Grants of restricted leave will normally fall for renewal every six months. It remains the 
responsibility of the individual to apply for further leave to remain, but decision-makers 
must proactively review the case in good time before the expiry of the leave to re-
assess any protection needs and the prospects of removal. In many cases, the country 
situation will not have changed sufficiently to make removal possible within the next 
review period, but this must always be checked against the most recent country 
information, such as Country of Origin Information Service (COIS) reports. In this 
scenario, decision-makers should seek information either in writing or via a reporting 
event about the person’s work and future intentions and, on application consider a 
further grant of restricted leave in line with this policy. At the active review stage 
decision-maker should also review whether the conditions attached to the leave remain 
appropriate. 
 
4.10.2 Where the circumstances have changed to the extent that the individual’s removal 
would not be in breach of our ECHR obligations, the individual should be refused further 
leave and appeal rights notified in the usual way and, subject to those appeal rights, 
progressed to removal. 
 
4.10.3 Cases which were granted Discretionary Leave before 2 September 2011 should 
remain on their existing leave until it falls for renewal. When the renewal application is 
received, the case should be transferred to the Special Cases Unit to be considered in 
line with this policy and, if removal is not an option, be granted restricted leave with 
appropriate conditions unless exceptional circumstances justify departure from the 
published policy. This may mean that conditions are placed on who have not been 
subject to conditions before, for example they may have not had any restrictions on 
their employment. Reasons for imposing new conditions must be explained in the 
decision letter and the proportionality of them should be considered in the light of the 
risk the person presents and their compliance with Home Office requirements during 
previous periods of limited leave. 
 
4.10.4 All initial grants of restricted leave following a previous grant of Discretionary Leave 
should be approved by the Head of SCU. Subsequent renewals require approval for the 
grant of further restricted leave at an appropriately senior level but do not need Head of 
SCU approval unless the case is high profile or a significant change to the conditions or 
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4.10.5 Decision-makers should refer to section 83 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act 2002 when granting any form of limited leave to remain to failed asylum seekers. 
Grants of limited leave to remain (including restricted leave) which post-date the refusal 
of asylum may trigger a right of appeal under this provision, if leave to enter or remain 
exceeding one year has been granted (whether in one block, or in aggregate), unless 
they have already had a right of appeal against the refusal of asylum. Decision-makers 
must ensure that the correct paperwork is served in these cases. 
 
4.11 Appeal rights exhausted failed asylum seekers 
 
4.11.1 The instructions above relate to the handling of Article 1F and Article 33(2) cases who 
cannot be removed for legal reasons. Those who are refused asylum because Article 
1F applies and there are no ECHR or other legal barriers to their removal must be 
prioritised for enforcement action. 
 
4.11.2 Pending removal, these individuals should be on bail/temporary admission/temporary 
release as appropriate. It is essential that the bail conditions imposed in these cases 
effectively replicate the conditions that would be attached were a person to fall within 
this policy. Decision-makers should impose the same restrictions that they would 
impose with a grant of leave to remain. The only differences are that employment is 
prohibited and reporting would ordinarily be more frequent than monthly. 
 
4.12 Applications for indefinite leave to remain 
 
4.12.1 Those excluded from the Refugee Convention and/or Humanitarian Protection may 
make applications for indefinite leave to remain on the basis of long residence, for 
example because they have lived in the UK lawfully for 10 years or more. The 
requirements are at paragraph 276B of the Immigration Rules. Consideration must be 
given to all the factors listed in paragraph 276B(ii) and in particular consideration must 
be given to the person’s conduct which led to them being excluded from the Refugee 
Convention and/or Humanitarian Protection when looking at character, conduct and 
associations under paragraph 276B(ii)(c). Usually, given our international obligations to 
prevent the UK from becoming a safe haven for those who have committed very serious 
crimes, the conduct will mean that the application should be refused, but decisions must 
be taken on a case-by-case basis. 
 
4.12.2 Consideration must be given to each of the general grounds for refusal under paragraph 
276B(iii). Paragraph 322(1C) sets out the grounds for refusing indefinite leave to remain 
where a person has a criminal conviction. For the purposes of this rule, the conviction 
does not have to be a UK conviction, but any overseas conviction must be for an 
offence which has an equivalent in the UK. For example, overseas convictions for 
homosexuality or proselytising would be disregarded. Consideration must also be given 
to the rest of the general grounds for refusal at paragraph 322. 
 
4.12.3 Excluded individuals may seek to rely on N, R (on the application of) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2009] EWHC 1581 in which it was held at paragraphs 
21 and 22: 
 
 “This policy relating to those who are not within the protection of the Refugee 
Convention because of Article 1F(b) seems to me to be entirely reasonable. The 
rationale behind it I have not had spelled out before me, but it seems obvious that what 
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and relatively short intervals whether return can be effected because, as a general 
approach, those who would not qualify because of the commission of a serious offence 
should not generally be considered to be able to remain within this country. One can 
understand why that policy has been adopted. 
 
Accordingly, in principle, to award only six months is not in the least unreasonable. But 
the policy has, as it were, a cap. It is recognised that there will come a time when - 
provided the individual has behaved himself in this country - it would be proper to 
regard him as having put behind him, as it were, the original offending. Thus if someone 
has been here for ten years and subjected to a series of discretionary leaves for that 
period he will normally be able to remain here indefinitely. He will, after all, be expected 
by then to have made his life in this country, to have settled here, perhaps to have 
established family life here. The view is, again as it seems to me, entirely reasonably 
taken that generally speaking – and of course each case has to be considered on its 
own merits – such an individual will have leave to remain indefinitely and thus will be 
entitled to settle here.” 
 
4.12.4 Decision-makers must carefully consider the facts of an individual case against the 
specific facts in the case of R on the application of N to determine whether they are 
analogous and whether the principles set out in that case are applicable to the case 
under consideration. 
 
4.12.5 Where a person does not qualify for indefinite leave to remain, consideration must be 
given to whether there continues to be an ECHR barrier to removal. If there is not, then 
the case must be prioritised for removal. If there is, then the person must be granted 
restricted leave within the terms of this policy. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Purpose of instruction 
This guidance explains the limited circumstances in which it may be appropriate to grant 
Discretionary Leave (DL) and applies in both asylum and non-asylum cases applying from 
within the UK. DL cannot be applied for from abroad. It is intended to cover exceptional and 
compassionate circumstances and, as such, should be used sparingly. 
 
DL is granted outside the Immigration Rules in accordance with Home Office policy set out in 
this instruction. It must not be granted where a person qualifies for asylum or humanitarian 
protection (HP) or for family or private life reasons.  
 
Asylum caseworkers must read this guidance in conjunction with other key guidance products, 
in particular Assessing credibility and refugee status, Gender issues in the asylum claim, 
Humanitarian Protection, Further Submissions,  Exclusion, Restricted Leave, Appeals 
Guidance, and the Immigration Directorate Instructions in Chapter 8: Appendix FM: 1.0b 
Family and private life – 10 year route. 
 
1.2 Background 
The Immigration Rules are designed to cover the vast majority of circumstances in which 
migrants will be granted leave because they are entitled to remain in the UK. However, there 
are a small number of Home Office policies that recognise there may be individuals who do not 
meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, but there are nonetheless exceptional and/or 
compassionate reasons for allowing them to remain here. There is a separate policy (not 
covered in this DL guidance) on when to grant leave to remain outside the rules for Article 8 
reasons based on exceptional circumstances for those who fail to meet the family and private 
life Immigration Rules.  
 
Although several concessions outside the rules have been closed and others have been 
brought inside the rules, most notably as part of the Points Based System, a small number of 
concessions continue to exist. The circumstances in which someone may be granted leave for 
exceptional (non-family or private life) reasons are covered either by the policy on Leave 
outside the Rules (LOTR) for non-Article 8 reasons or this DL instruction. 
 
DL was introduced alongside HP in April 2003 to replace exceptional leave to remain (ELR) 
and was initially used to grant leave for Article 8 reasons where removal would breach our 
obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, 
following the implementation of the family and private life rules on 9 July 2012, DL should no 
longer be granted where the requirements of those rules in Appendix FM or paragraphs 
276ADE(1) to 276CE are met or where LOTR should be granted for Article 8 reasons. 
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From 6 April 2013, the policy of granting DL to unaccompanied asylum seeking children 
ended. Leave for this group must now be considered in accordance with paragraphs 352ZC to 
352ZF of the Immigration Rules and not under the DL policy. 
 
1.3 Policy intention 
The policy objective is to maintain a firm, but fair and efficient immigration system that 
generally requires those who do not meet the rules to leave the UK, but carefully considers 
exceptional and compassionate individual circumstances that may justify leave on a 
discretionary basis by: 
 providing a mechanism to cover those few cases where it would, at the time leave is 
granted, be unjustifiably harsh to expect someone to leave or enforce their removal - it 
is intended to be used sparingly  
 carefully considering evidence relating to exceptional compassionate circumstances 
raised as part of a protection claim to assess whether a grant of DL is appropriate 
 granting limited leave appropriate to the individual circumstances but not more than 30 
months unless there is compelling evidence to justify a longer period and ensuring that 
those granted DL generally do not benefit from a faster route to settlement than those 
who meet the Immigration Rules 
 requiring all migrants granted leave to pay the appropriate fee or meet the appropriate 
fees exemption to extend that leave if they show that they continue to meet the relevant 
criteria, including failed asylum seekers (FAS) 
 being clear that settlement is a privilege, not an automatic right, and that it is generally 
entirely appropriate for migrants wishing to stay in the UK permanently to complete a 
minimum period of continuous limited leave before being eligible to apply for settlement 
 
1.4 Application in respect of children and those with children 
The application of this guidance must take into account the circumstances of each case and 
the impact on children, or on those with children, in the UK. Section 55 of the Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 places an obligation on the Secretary of State to take 
account of the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the UK when carrying 
out immigration, asylum and nationality functions. 
 
In practice, this requires a consideration to be made of the best interests of the child in 
decisions that have an impact on that child. This is particularly important where the decision 
may result in the child having to leave the UK, where there are obvious factors that adversely 
affect the child, or where a parent caring for the child asks us to take particular circumstances 
into account.  All decisions must demonstrate that the child’s best interests have been 
considered as a primary, but not necessarily the only, consideration. Caseworkers must be 
vigilant that a child may be at risk of harm and be prepared to refer cases immediately to a 
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This applies whether the child is claiming in their own right or is dependent on a parent or 
guardian. The Home Office guidance on ‘Processing asylum applications from children’ and 
‘Every Child Matters – Change for Children’ sets out the key principles to take into account in 
all cases involving a child in the UK.  
 
In cases where it is considered appropriate to grant DL, caseworkers must also consider 
whether to exercise discretion in relation to the length of leave to be granted. This is because a 
decision about duration of leave granted outside the rules is an immigration function to which 
section 55 applies. The length of leave must be decided on the individual facts of the case.  
While a grant of 30 months’ leave will generally be appropriate, leave may be granted for 
shorter or longer periods, including, in particularly compelling circumstances, indefinite leave to 
remain. Caseworkers must demonstrate they have had regard to the child’s best interests 
when considering the type and length of leave granted following a decision to grant leave 
under the DL policy. See section 4 below for further guidance.  
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Section 2: Relevant Legislation 
 
2.1 Immigration Act 1971 
The Secretary of State has the power to grant leave on a discretionary basis outside the Rules 
from her residual discretion under the Immigration Act 1971. Discretionary Leave (DL) is a 
form of leave to remain that is granted outside the Immigration Rules in accordance with this 
policy. Applications for DL cannot be made from outside the UK. 
 
2.2 Immigration Rules 
Part 8 of the Immigration Rules and Appendix FM cover applications relating to family 
members and Part 7 of the Immigration Rules covers private life considerations for those not 
liable to deportation.  From 9 July 2012, DL is no longer granted for family or private life 
reasons though caseworkers must be aware that there will be cases where people were 
granted an initial period of DL on the basis of their Article 8 rights before 9 July 2012 and must 
refer to section 10: Transitional arrangements. 
 
Part 9 of the Immigration Rules covers the General Grounds for Refusal (GGfR) and must be 
consulted and applied before DL is granted. 
 
Part 11 of the Immigration Rules cover applications for asylum and humanitarian protection.  
When considering such claims caseworkers must also consider any evidence provided about 
exceptional circumstances under this DL policy if the individual is refused protection. 
 
Part 12 of the Immigration Rules contains provisions under paragraph 353B which are relevant 
to the application of the DL policy. 
 
Part 13 of the Immigration Rules covers deportation orders and procedure and Article 8 
(ECHR) in relation to deportation cases. 
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Section 3: Reasons for granting DL 
 
3.1 Key principles 
Discretionary Leave (DL) must not be granted where an individual qualifies for leave under the 
Immigration Rules or for Leave outside the Rules (LOTR) for Article 8 reasons. It only applies 
to those who provide evidence of exceptional compassionate circumstances or there are other 
compelling reasons to grant leave on a discretionary basis. 
 
DL should not be granted where another EU Member State (or Iceland, Norway, Switzerland 
or Liechtenstein) has accepted responsibility for an asylum claim under the Dublin 
arrangements or where an individual is otherwise removable on third country grounds. DL 
should not normally be granted to EEA nationals (or their family members) where they have 
free movement rights under EU law. See EEA and EU asylum claims.  
 
It is not possible to cover all the circumstances in which DL may be appropriate because this 
depends on the totality of evidence available in individual cases but the following broad 
categories may apply: 
 
3.2 Medical cases  
This category applies to both asylum and non-asylum cases. Non-asylum medical cases must 
apply on the FLR (O) application form, available on Gov.UK. Where there is an ongoing 
asylum claim, caseworkers must consider any relevant medical issues in conjunction with that 
claim or as part of any further submissions raised. 
 
An applicant seeking leave to remain on the basis of a serious medical condition may seek to 
rely on ECHR Article 3 and/or Article 8. In most circumstances, a person cannot rely on Article 
3 to avoid return on the basis that they require medical assistance in the UK. The improvement 
or stabilisation in a person’s medical condition resulting from treatment in the UK and the 
prospect of serious or fatal relapse on expulsion (ie deportation or removal from, or a 
requirement to leave, the UK) will not in themselves render expulsion inhuman treatment 
contrary to Article 3.   
 
The threshold set by Article 3 is very high. To meet the threshold, a person will need to show 
that there are exceptional circumstances in their case which militate against return. 
Taken together, the relevant case law of D v United Kingdom [1997] 25 EHRR 423 and N v 
SSHD [2005] UKHL31 suggests that exceptional circumstances will arise when a person is in 
the final stages of a terminal illness, without the prospect of medical care or the support of 
family or friends or palliative care (ie relief of the pain, symptoms and stress caused by a 
serious illness and the approach of death) on return. The House of Lords’ decision in N was 
upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in N v UK (2008) 47 EHRR 39, and recently 
affirmed by the Court of Appeal in GS (India) & Ors v The Secretary of State for the Home 
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threshold, stating that the case-law suggested that the ‘exceptional’ class of case is ‘confined 
to deathbed cases’ (paragraph 66). 
 
The test established by N and D requires that caseworkers must make an assessment of 
whether the person’s illness has reached such a critical stage (ie is a terminal illness and the 
person is close to death) that it would amount to inhuman treatment to deprive them of the 
care which they are currently receiving and send them home unless there is care available 
there to enable them to live their final days with dignity. Of particular relevance to this 
assessment will be whether: 
 
 the person is critically ill at the point of decision 
 there is any treatment available in the country of return (including palliative care) 
 the person will be able to access such treatment as is available (although the fact that 
they are unlikely to be able to do so is not determinative) 
 the person will have the support of family or friends on return 
 
Exceptional circumstances might in principle arise in other contexts, but the Courts have made 
clear that the threshold is very high. If the person’s condition or situation does not meet the 
Article 3 threshold, removal will not breach Article 3.  
 
ECHR Article 8 may also be raised where a person is suffering from a medical condition.  
Article 8 deals with respect for private life, which includes a person’s moral and physical 
integrity. The consequences to a person’s physical or mental health of removing them from the 
UK can, in principle, engage Article 8.  
 
However, in most cases concerning adults, the individual will not be able to rely on Article 8 to 
remain in the UK on the basis of their medical needs, unless there are other factors which 
engage Article 8 (for example, long residence or family ties in the UK).  However, the medical 
condition and any treatment being received are relevant to a holistic Article 8 assessment 
where other family or private life matters are raised (e.g. private life, long residence, family ties 
in the UK). This does not mean that leave should be granted in these circumstances, simply 
that the condition and treatment must form part of the Article 8 proportionality assessment.  
The relevant case-law is MM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 279 and GS (India) & Ors 
v the SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 40). 
 
In addition, if the person is a ‘health tourist’ (someone whose medical condition existed before 
they came to the UK and who came here with the deliberate intention of seeking treatment for 
it) is likely to be relevant to the Article 8 assessment. In these circumstances, removal is likely 
to be proportionate.  For further guidance refer to the instruction Human Rights on medical 
grounds.  
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3.3 Other cases where return would breach the ECHR 
This applies to asylum and non-asylum cases. Non-asylum cases making a standalone human 
rights claim must do so using the FLR (FP) or FLR (O) application form. Where there is an 
ongoing asylum claim, caseworkers must consider any other ECHR claims in conjunction with 
the asylum claim or as part of the further submissions. DL may be appropriate where the 
ECHR breach associated with return would not warrant a grant of humanitarian protection but 
where return would result in a flagrant denial of the right in question in the person’s country of 
origin.  For guidance on the consideration of other ECHR claims, see the Asylum Instruction 
on Considering Human Rights. It will be rare for return to breach another article of the ECHR in 
this way without also breaching Article 3.  
 
3.4 Exceptional circumstances  
This applies to asylum and non-asylum cases.  A grant of DL may be appropriate following 
consideration under paragraph 353B of the Immigration Rules. This applies in cases where 
there are outstanding further submissions to be considered, but also where there are no 
outstanding further submissions, appeal rights are exhausted and the case is subject to a 
review at the removals stage. This may include those who have spent a significant period of 
time in the UK for reasons beyond their control after having claimed asylum, though such 
individuals are expected to provide evidence as to why they cannot leave voluntarily.  
Caseworkers must carefully consider whether a grant of leave is appropriate under paragraph 
353B with reference to the Further Submissions guidance and Enforcement and Instructions 
Guidance (EIG) Chapter 53. 
 
3.5 Modern Slavery cases (including trafficking) 
Victims of slavery, servitude and forced and compulsory labour who are conclusively 
recognised as such by the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) may be eligible for DL based 
on the same criteria of personal circumstances, helping police with enquires and pursuing 
compensation as victims of human trafficking, and this provision applies across the UK.  
 
A person will not normally qualify for DL solely because they have been identified as a victim 
of modern slavery or trafficking – there must be compelling reasons based on their individual 
circumstances to justify a grant of DL where they do not qualify for other leave such as asylum 
or humanitarian protection. 
 
As part of the positive reasonable grounds decision letter issued by the Competent Authority of 
the NRM the potential victim of human trafficking in the UK, and modern slavery in England 
and Wales, will be asked if they would like to be considered for DL in the event of a positive 
conclusive grounds decision from the NRM. Where they indicate they would like to be 
considered for DL this will be considered under the criteria relating to personal circumstances, 
helping police with enquires and pursuing compensation detailed in the Competent Authority 
guidance once a positive conclusive grounds decision is issued. The person will not need to fill 
in an application form or pay a fee for an initial consideration of DL on this basis. A person who 
has claimed asylum will receive automatic consideration for DL on this basis if they are not 






Asylum Policy Instruction: Discretionary Leave 
v 7.0 August 2015      Page 11 of 26 
Note: This Document Becomes an Uncontrolled & Unsupported Version if Printed  
 
For further guidance on considering DL in modern slavery cases and for cases of modern 
slavery and human trafficking in Scotland and Northern Ireland see the Competent Authority 
guidance.  
Back to Contents 
 
3.6 Exclusion and criminality 
In all asylum and non-asylum cases caseworkers must consider the impact of an individual’s 
criminal history before granting any leave. 
 
Where there are reasonable grounds for considering that the applicant should be excluded 
from asylum or humanitarian protection, caseworkers must refer to the guidance on Exclusion. 
From 2 September 2011, the Restricted Leave policy replaced grants of DL for those excluded 
from protection under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention. The restricted leave policy was 
updated in January 2015 to cover those refused under Article 33(2) of the Convention.   
Restricted leave may be granted in these circumstances where removal would breach our 
obligations under the ECHR. Article 1F cases granted DL before 2 September 2011 should 
remain on their existing leave until it falls for renewal. If a renewal application is received, it 
must be considered in line with the restricted leave policy instruction. Restricted leave can only 
be granted by the Special Cases Unit (SCU) or Criminal Casework. All cases involving 
exclusion or extremism must be referred to SCU and cases involving criminality where there is 
no SCU interest must be referred to Criminal Casework. 
 
Where cancellation, cessation or revocation of refugee status or humanitarian protection is 
considered appropriate and the individual does not fall within the restricted leave policy it may 
be appropriate to grant DL. Caseworkers must refer to the guidance on Cancellation, 
Cessation and Revocation before considering a grant of leave on this basis. 
 
Where an individual does not fall within the restricted leave policy (for example, where they are 
not excluded under Article 1F or the criminal sentence was less than 2 years’ imprisonment), 
caseworkers must consider the impact of any criminal history before granting DL, having 
regard as appropriate to Part 9 (General Grounds for Refusal) and, where an individual is not 
liable to deportation, paragraph 353B(i) of the Immigration Rules. Criminals or extremists 
should not normally benefit from leave on a discretionary basis under this policy because it is a 
Home Office priority to remove them from the UK. 
 
In cases where there are exceptional reasons for granting DL to someone with a criminal 
history who does not fall within the restricted leave policy, the duration of leave to be granted, 
up to 30 months, will depend on the individual circumstances of the case. Caseworkers must 
consider whether removal appears to be reasonably likely and the extent of any risk posed by 
the individual, which may justify keeping the case under more regular review, eg by granting 6 
months’ DL. Where DL is granted for 6 months or less, if the individual travels outside the UK 
their limited leave will lapse whereas leave granted for a longer period allows a person to leave 
the UK and be readmitted during the validity of their leave, by virtue of article 13(2)(b) of the 
Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000. 
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3.7 Other cases 
This applies to asylum cases only.  Caseworkers must refer to the Home Office policy on 
Leave outside the Immigration Rules for guidance on granting leave outside the Immigration 
Rules in non-asylum cases in scenarios not covered in the sections above.  
 
The categories under which it would normally be appropriate to grant DL are set out above. 
There are likely to be very few other cases in which it would be appropriate to grant DL to a 
failed asylum seeker. However, it is not possible to anticipate every eventuality that may arise, 
so there remains scope to grant DL where individual circumstances, although not falling within 
the broad categories listed above, are so compelling that it is considered appropriate to grant 
leave.  
 
However, the fact that an application fails to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules 
for a grant of leave by a small margin (often called a near miss) or fails to meet only one of the 
requirements, is not in itself a reason to grant DL for compassionate reasons. Expressing a 
preference not to leave the UK is not a compassionate factor. The Immigration Rules made by 
the government and approved by Parliament regulate who may enter or stay in the UK as a 
matter of general policy. The fact that a person does not qualify in a particular category will 
generally by a deliberate consequence of that policy and caseworkers must not, when 
considering whether to grant DL for compassionate reasons, undermine those policy 
objectives. 
 
Where a decision is made to grant DL for reasons not covered by the broad categories listed 
above, the caseworker must discuss the case with a senior caseworker. Detailed file minutes 
will be required to keep accurate records of what has been decided and why. 
  
Back to Contents 
 
3.8 Unaccompanied asylum seeking children 
Where an unaccompanied child applies for asylum, decision makers must first consider 
whether they qualify for asylum, HP, or leave to remain on the basis of family or private life 
under Appendix FM or paragraph 276ADE(1) of the Immigration Rules (or LOTR for Article 8 
reasons) and then DL on any other basis.  
 
Where an unaccompanied child does not qualify for protection, it will normally be appropriate 
for the child to reunite with their family in their country of origin, provided that safe and 
adequate reception arrangements are in place and subject to an assessment of their best 
interests. Caseworkers must take into account the best interests of children as a primary 
consideration (although not necessarily the only consideration) when considering whether to 
grant leave. The starting point is that a child’s best interests are likely to be best served by 
reuniting them with their family, unless there are protection needs or safeguarding concerns.  
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Where an unaccompanied child qualifies for leave on more than one ground, they should 
normally be granted the leave that provides the longest period of stay. However, all grounds 
which informed the decision must be recorded in the file minute.  
 
From 6 April 2013, the policy on granting limited leave to unaccompanied children refused 
asylum and humanitarian protection and where there are no adequate reception arrangements 
in the country to which they would be returned, was incorporated into paragraphs 352ZC to 
352ZF of the Immigration Rules. Unaccompanied children who meet the requirements of these 
Rules are granted limited leave, normally for 30 months or until the applicant is 17.5 years of 
age, whichever was the shorter period.  
 
Unaccompanied children who, prior to 6 April 2013, were granted DL due to the absence of 
adequate reception arrangements and who apply for further leave on this basis after the new 
rules came into force, must be considered under paragraphs 352ZC to 352ZF of the 
Immigration Rules. However, when considering an application for further leave under 
paragraphs 352ZC to 352ZF for those previously granted DL due to the absence of adequate 
reception arrangements, or for those who were previously granted leave under paragraphs 
352ZC to 352ZF, caseworkers should also consider whether there are particularly compelling 
reasons in individual cases to grant a longer period of leave having regard to the best interests 
of the child. See section 5.3 below for further guidance. 
 






Asylum Policy Instruction: Discretionary Leave 
v 7.0 August 2015      Page 14 of 26 
Note: This Document Becomes an Uncontrolled & Unsupported Version if Printed  
Section 4: Granting or refusing leave  
 
4.1 Granting DL  
Asylum claimants refused protection but granted DL must be issued with a ‘Reasons for 
Refusal Letter (RFRL)’ explaining why the asylum and HP claim has been refused and why 
they have not been granted leave on the basis of family or private life. The primary reasons for 
granting DL should also be set out briefly. These reasons do not need to be detailed, but it 
must be clear why DL has been granted. The letter to the claimant should briefly refer to the 
basis on which leave was granted.  
 
If a person qualifies for DL under more than one heading listed in Section 3, they should 
benefit from the one that provides the longer period of leave so as not to disadvantage them.  
The letter does not need to refer to all the reasons for which they qualify for DL, but the 
consideration minute on file must show that each reason was considered. 
 
4.2 Refusing DL 
Asylum claimants who do not fall to be granted any leave must be refused, and reasons for the 
refusal should be clearly provided in the RFRL. For full details of how to refuse an asylum 
claim or further submissions, see Asylum Instructions on Assessing credibility and Refugee 
status and Further Submissions. 
 
4.3 Recourse to public funds, work and study 
Those granted DL have recourse to public funds and no prohibition on work. They are also 
able to enter higher education. However, those on limited leave are not eligible for higher 
education student finance under existing Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 
regulations. In addition, a study condition applies to all adult temporary migrants granted DL 
which prohibits studies in particular subjects without first obtaining an Academic Technology 
Approval Scheme (ATAS) clearance certificate from the Counter-Proliferation Department of 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Those granted DL who are aged 18 or will turn 
18 before their limited leave expires will, in addition to any other conditions which may apply, 
be granted leave subject to the requirements set out Part 15 in the Immigration Rules. 
  
4.4 UK born children of parents granted DL 
Children born in the UK to parents who both have DL and are not British Citizens should 
normally be granted limited leave in line with their parents. If only one parent has DL, the leave 
to be granted will depend on the status of the other parent. See Dependants and Former 
Dependents Instruction. 
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Section 5: Duration of Discretionary Leave  
 
Where DL is granted, the duration of leave must be determined by considering the individual 
facts of the case but leave should not normally be granted for more than 30 months (2 and a 
half years) at a time. 
 
When a person is granted an initial period of DL, this does not necessarily mean they will be 
entitled to further leave or to settlement. Subsequent periods of leave may be granted 
providing the applicant continues to meet the relevant criteria set out in the published policy on 
DL applicable at the time of the decision. 
 
From 9 July 2012, those granted DL must normally have completed a continuous period of at 
least 120 months’ limited leave (i.e. a total of 10 years, normally consisting of 4 separate 2 and 
a half year periods of leave) before being eligible to apply for settlement. Separate 
arrangements exist for those granted an initial period of 3 years’ DL prior to 9 July 2012. See 
section10 - Transitional Arrangements.  
 
5.1 Exceptional circumstances 
Where removal is no longer considered appropriate following consideration of the exceptional 
factors set out in paragraph 353B of the Immigration Rules and the guidance in Chapter 53 of 
the Enforcement Immigration Guidance (EIG), 30 months’ DL should be granted, unless one of 
the following situations applies:  
 
 where the UK Border Agency (as it was) made a written commitment that a case would 
be considered either before 20 July 2011 or before 9 July 2012, but failed to do so, and 
it is later decided that a grant is appropriate 
 where the UK Border Agency (as it was) made a decision either before 20 July 2011 or 
before 9 July 2012 that a grant of leave on the grounds then listed in Chapter 53 was not 
appropriate, but after that date reconsidered that decision and – on the basis of the same 
evidence (ie the evidence available to the original caseworker) – it is decided that the 
earlier decision was wrong and leave should have been granted 
 
Where the above applies and the relevant date was before 20 July 2011, Indefinite Leave to 
Remain (ILR) outside the rules should be granted. This is because before 20 July 2011 ILR 
was normally granted in cases which met the exceptional circumstances criteria in Chapter 53. 
Where the above applies and the relevant date was before 9 July 2012, three years’ DL should 
be granted, with the person normally becoming eligible to apply for settlement after 2 periods 
of 3 years’ DL (6 years’ continuous leave). This is because from 20 July 2011 to 8 July 2012 
the UK Border Agency (as it was) granted 3 years’ DL in cases that met the exceptional 
circumstances criteria in Chapter 53. 
 
If the caseworker considers that there are other exceptional, compelling reasons to depart 
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for further consideration.  In all other cases 30 months’ (2.5 years’) DL is normally the 
appropriate period of leave to grant.  
 
5.2 Non-standard grant periods: shorter periods of stay or deferral of 
decision or removal 
There may be some cases where it is clear from the individual circumstances of the case that 
the factors leading to DL being granted will be short lived. In such cases it may be appropriate 
to grant a shorter period of leave. Non-standard grants of less than 30 months should be used 
only where the information relating to the specific case clearly points to a shorter period being 
applicable. Reasons for granting a shorter period must be included in the letter to the 
applicant.  
 
There will also be some cases where the factors meriting a grant of DL are expected to be 
sufficiently short lived that the question arises whether to grant a short period of leave or to 
refuse the claim outright whilst giving an undertaking not to remove the individual or expect 
them to leave the UK voluntarily until the circumstances preventing their return have changed. 
Such cases could arise at the decision-making stage or following an appeal. Where it is 
considered that return will be possible within 6 months of the date of decision, it will normally 
be appropriate to refuse the claim outright, not grant a period of DL and defer removal until 
such time as it is possible. If the caseworker considers that there are reasons to depart from 
the policy of granting 30 months’ DL, the case must be referred to a senior caseworker for 
further consideration.   
 
5.3 Non-standard grant periods: longer periods of stay 
There may be cases where a longer period of leave is considered appropriate, either because 
it is in the best interests of a child (and any countervailing considerations do not outweigh 
those best interests), or because there are other particularly exceptional compelling or 
compassionate reasons to grant leave for a longer period (or ILR). In cases not involving 
children (as the main applicant or as dependants), there must be sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the individual circumstances of the case are not just unusual but can be 
distinguished to a high degree from other cases to the extent that it is necessary to deviate 
from a standard grant of DL under this policy. 
 
In cases involving children, caseworkers must regard the best interests of the child as a 
primary consideration (although not necessarily the only consideration) and one that can affect 
the duration of leave granted. This does not alter the expectation that in most cases a standard 
period of 30 months’ (2.5 years’) DL will be appropriate, but it does mean that there may be 
cases where compelling evidence is available that justifies a longer period of leave (or ILR) to 
reflect the best interests of the individual child. 
 
Factors such as the length of residence, whether the child was born in the UK and strong 
evidence to suggest that the child’s life would be adversely affected by a grant of limited leave 
rather than ILR need to be weighed against the wider requirements to ensure a fair, consistent 
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a qualifying period of limited leave before being eligible to apply for settlement. For example, 
there may be cases where a child has a serious and chronic medical condition which may not 
be able to be treated in the country of return and it is considered in their best interests to grant 
ILR to the child to provide a greater degree of certainty for the purposes of their continued 
treatment or mental wellbeing. 
 
An example of where it would not normally be appropriate to grant a child ILR may be because 
they would like to qualify for a student loan in order to go to university. This would not normally 
be a sufficiently exceptional or compelling reason without additional factors. Individuals in this 
position may be aged 18 or over and are not prevented from going to university by a grant of 
limited leave – rather they would not be eligible for a student loan. Some universities may have 
other funding which they could apply for, such as bursaries, scholarships or other types of 
support or fee waiver; likewise, some commercial companies and charities.  
 
Higher education institutions also have discretion to treat an ‘overseas’ student as a home 
student and charge the home student tuition fee, which is usually lower. A grant of limited 
leave provides permission to work and individuals could choose to seek employment before 
they attend university, study part time and work part time to fund their course, or wait until they 
qualify for ILR after completing an appropriate probationary period of limited leave and access 
a student loan at that point. 
 
Where a decision is taken to grant ILR to a child because it is considered to be in their best 
interests, this does not necessarily mean the parents should be granted ILR in line. It will 
normally be appropriate to grant them a standard period of leave and require them to complete 
the usual probationary period before being eligible to apply for settlement themselves, unless 
they can demonstrate exceptional compelling or compassionate factors in their own right that 
warrant departure from the standard grant of DL under this policy.  
 
In all cases the onus is on the applicant to provide evidence as to why it is in the best interests 
of the child to be granted a period of leave that is different from the standard period of 30 
months’ DL. Where a decision maker considers that it is in the best interests of the child or 
there are exceptional compelling or compassionate reasons to depart from the policy of 
granting 30 months’ DL, the case must be referred to a senior caseworker for consideration.  
 
5.4 Modern Slavery cases (including trafficking) 
Where a person qualifies for DL under the criteria relating to personal circumstances, helping 
police with enquires or pursuing compensation the period of leave to be granted will depend on 
the individual facts of the case and should normally be sufficient to cover the amount of time it 
is anticipated they will need to remain in the UK. However, leave should normally be granted 
for a minimum of 12 months, and normally not more than 30 months (2.5 years). A further 
period of leave may be granted if required and appropriate. For further details of the duration 
of leave in modern slavery cases see the Competent Authority guidance.                                                                                                 
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Section 6: Curtailing Discretionary Leave  
 
This section sets out the circumstances where consideration must be given to ending (or 
curtailing) DL.  
 
6.1 Voluntary actions leading to curtailment  
It will not usually be appropriate to curtail a person’s leave simply because they have returned 
to their own country or have travelled on their own national passport (those granted DL will 
normally be expected to keep their own national passport valid). This is because we will not 
have accepted that the person has a well-founded fear of return to their country and will have 
been granted DL for reasons other than protection. However, where it comes to light that a 
person has obtained a national passport following a grant of DL under paragraph 353B, the 
case must be reviewed. 
 
There may be other occasions where leave should be curtailed because the reasons which led 
to the grant of DL no longer persist: for example if their medical condition improves.  
 
6.2 Curtailment on grounds of character, conduct, or fraud  
DL should normally be curtailed if a person becomes subject to any of the grounds for 
exclusion in the ‘Exclusion under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention’ instruction, where 
there is criminality or where the individual is a danger to national security, eg through extremist 
behaviours. This will usually apply where a person’s actions after the grant of DL bring them 
within the scope of those grounds. There may also be situations where the Home Office 
becomes aware that a person is subject to one of the grounds of exclusion after a grant of DL. 
It will normally be appropriate to curtail leave in such cases and pursue removal or consider 
whether a grant of leave under the restricted leave policy is appropriate. 
 
DL should normally be curtailed if a person becomes liable to deportation and a deportation 
order is made, it will have the effect of invalidating any extant leave. Action to curtail or vary 
leave will only be necessary where a person is liable to deportation but it is not possible to 
make a deportation order (eg for ECHR Article 3 reasons).  
 
A person who fraudulently obtains leave to enter by deception is an illegal entrant. If it is 
decided to take illegal entry action against that person (under Schedule 2 to the Immigration 
Act 1971), any leave previously granted is no longer valid. Where a person has obtained leave 
to remain by deception under this policy, that person should have their leave curtailed 
following which they would liable to removal under section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999 as amended. See chapter 50 Liability to administrative removal under section 10 
(non EEA) Enforcement Instructions and Guidance (EIG). 
 
Separate action to vary DL will be required only where a decision to remove cannot be made 
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possible to remove a person but it is appropriate, given the circumstances of the case, to vary 
the amount of DL such that there is a shorter period of leave remaining. 
 
6.3 Other situations where the basis for the grant of leave has ceased 
There may be other occasions where due to a change in circumstances it would be 
appropriate to curtail DL. For example, it would normally be appropriate to curtail leave where 
a child who was granted leave under the UASC policy and who is still a child is subsequently 
contacted by an adult family member who can care for them in their own country.  It is normally 
considered to be in the best interests of a child to be reunited with family members in their 
country of origin.  
 
All such cases must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to ensure that this does not give 
rise to protection issues, for instance, where the family members are themselves the cause of 
the child’s need for protection. This may arise where domestic servitude, forced labour, 
trafficking or sexual exploitation are involved in the situation and there is insufficient of 
protection for the child. The views of children’s services and/or those currently caring for the 
child should be sought so that these can inform consideration of the child’s best interests. 
 
A senior caseworker must always be consulted before any action is taken to consider 
curtailment of leave under this category. Further guidance is given in the Asylum Instruction, 
‘Processing asylum applications from children’. 
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Section 7: Further leave applications 
 
This section applies to those granted an initial period of DL on or after 9 July 2012. See 
section 10 on Transitional Arrangements for cases where DL was granted before 9 July 2012.  
 
In most cases, a person will not become eligible to apply for settlement until they have 
completed a continuous period of 120 months’ (10 years’) limited leave. An individual should 
apply for further DL on the appropriate application form no more than 28 days before their 
existing leave expires if they wish to remain in the UK. If they apply after their limited leave has 
expired their application will be considered out of time. 
 
From 27 June 2015, all applications for further DL, including those from failed asylum seekers, 
must be made on a specified form and meet the requirements of a valid application under 
paragraph 34 of the Immigration Rules. They must also be accompanied by the correct fee in 
line with the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Fees Regulations, unless 
applying for a fee waiver under the Fee waiver guidance. See UK Visas and Immigration on 
gov.UK for the current forms and guidance.  
 
Where a further leave application amounts to a request for an upgrade from DL to refugee 
leave or HP, caseworkers must refer to the Further Submissions guidance. Protection claims 
or further submissions following the refusal of asylum must be made in person in Liverpool and 
cannot be lodged on a postal application form. Caseworkers are able to grant further DL in 
such cases where the individual qualifies for further leave under this policy but should not 
consider any protection based submissions. Where a request for an upgrade from limited 
leave to ILR is received, caseworkers must apply the guidance at section 5.3 above.  
 
A person granted DL before 2 September 2011 to whom the policy on restricted leave applies 
and who continues to be excluded from asylum and HP should be considered under the 
restricted leave policy and must not be granted further DL. From January 2015, this also 
includes those refused protection under Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention. 
 
7.1 Considering further DL applications  
All applications for further DL must be considered in line with this guidance, taking into account 
all information available at the date of decision, including the contents of the application form, 
country reports and any other relevant information, including that provided at the time of the 
original grant of DL. In most cases applications for further DL may be considered and decided 
without the need for interview, unless the caseworker is not satisfied they have all the 
necessary information or evidence in order to make an informed decision on the application. 
However, caseworkers should first write to applicants to request further information before 
considering whether an interview is necessary. 
 
Out of time applications must still be considered on the basis of all the evidence put forward 
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further leave where the individual otherwise qualifies under the policy. Those who apply out of 
time will be unable to accrue continuous leave towards settlement.  
 
7.2 Unaccompanied children who have turned 18 
Unaccompanied children granted DL in accordance with paragraphs 352ZC to 352ZF of the 
Immigration Rules who have turned 18 by the time they apply for further leave or whilst a 
pending application is being considered must be considered in the same way as an adult 
applying for further leave. They will no longer qualify for further leave as an unaccompanied 
child but caseworkers must consider whether they qualify under another category before 
refusing the further application. Those granted DL as an unaccompanied child may also apply 
on another route if they wish to extend their limited leave. 
 
7.3 Granting further DL 
Where an individual meets the requirements for a grant of further DL, they should normally be 
given leave in accordance with the duration of grants section above (see section 5), even if 
this means that they become eligible to apply for further leave or settlement before that period 
of leave expires. 
 
7.4 Refusing further DL  
Where an application for further DL is considered and it is decided that the individual no longer 
qualifies for DL, the application should be refused. There is no automatic right to further leave 
or settlement and those who apply for further leave must qualify under the policy in force at the 
time of the decision. 
                                                                                                                       






Asylum Policy Instruction: Discretionary Leave 
v 7.0 August 2015      Page 22 of 26 
Note: This Document Becomes an Uncontrolled & Unsupported Version if Printed  
Section 8: Settlement applications 
This section applies to those granted an initial period of limited leave under the DL policy on or 
after 9 July 2012 and who do not, at the date of decision, fall within the restricted leave policy. 
See section 10 - Transitional Arrangements for cases where an initial period of DL was 
granted before 9 July 2012.  
 
A person will normally become eligible to apply for settlement after completing a continuous 
period of 120 months’ (10 years’) limited leave. The application will be considered in light of 
the circumstances prevailing at that time. All settlement applications must be made on the 
appropriate form no more than 28 days before existing leave expires. Any time spent in prison 
in connection with a criminal conviction will not count towards the 10 years. However, leave 
can be aggregated either side of a period of imprisonment providing that the continuous 
residence requirement is met. 
 
Any leave accrued whilst waiting for a valid application for further leave to be considered, may 
count towards the required period of leave for settlement, providing the application was made 
in time and leave was automatically extended in accordance with section 3C(2) of the 
Immigration Act 1971. See Section 3C and 3D leave for further guidance. 
 
8.1 Considering settlement applications  
As with an application for further leave, the application should be considered in accordance 
with this policy to assess whether they still qualify for DL. Those who have accrued leave 
under the LOTR policy and later granted DL may be able to have all periods of leave taken into 
consideration in calculating the leave accrued towards the qualifying period when applying for 
settlement. This will depend on the individual circumstances, including the reasons for the 
grant of LOTR. 
 
8.2 Granting settlement  
Where a person has held DL for a continuous period of 10 years and continues to qualify for 
DL under the policy, they should be granted settlement unless there are any criminality or 
exclusion issues. See Criminality and Exclusion section.  
 
8.3 Further grants of Discretionary Leave  
There may be cases where it is clear that the basis for the (continuing) grant of DL is 
temporary. Settlement should not normally be granted if there is a clear basis for considering 
that within 12 months the factors giving rise to the grant of DL will cease to apply. A person 
may not be denied settlement under this section for more than 12 months beyond the normal 
qualifying period.  
 
8.4 Refusal of Settlement and Further Leave  
Where a person no longer qualifies for DL, the application for settlement should be refused 
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Section 9: Travel Documents  
 
A person granted DL will normally be expected to keep their own national passport valid or 
obtain a passport from their country of origin. This is because it has not been accepted that the 
person has a well-founded fear of return to their own country or of their own authorities and DL 
has been granted for other reasons.  
 
However, a person who has DL following an unsuccessful asylum claim may apply for a Home 
Office Certificate of Travel (COT) on the appropriate application form and payment of the 
correct fee. Applicants must normally provide evidence to show that they have been formally 
refused a national passport or evidence to demonstrate they have made efforts to obtain a 
passport which have proved unsuccessful in the absence of a formal refusal from the relevant 
Embassy. Where the applicant has ILR, the COT will usually be valid for 5 years. Otherwise it 
will usually expire when the holder’s current leave to enter or remain expires. 
 
It should be noted that even if all the criteria are met, an application for a COT can be refused 
for compelling reasons of national security and public order. Further information about applying 
for travel documents is available on Gov.UK.  
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Section 10: Transitional Arrangements 
 
All decisions made on Discretionary Leave on or after 9 July 2012 will be subject to the criteria 
set out in this guidance. Where a decision was taken before 9 July 2012 but an appeal is 
allowed on or after 9 July 2012 on Article 8 family life or private life grounds, staff must refer to 
IDI CH8 (Family Members transitional cases), except in deportation cases.  
 
Those granted DL before 9 July 2012 may apply to extend that leave when their period of DL 
expires. All such applications, including settlement applications under the transitional 
arrangements, must be made on the appropriate application form no more than 28 days before 
their existing leave expires. Caseworkers must apply the following guidance:  
 
10.1 Applicants granted DL before 9 July 2012  
Those granted leave under the DL policy in force before 9 July 2012 will normally continue to 
be dealt with under that policy through to settlement if they continue to qualify for further leave 
on the same basis as their original DL was granted (normally they will be eligible to apply for 
settlement after accruing 6 years’ continuous DL (or where appropriate a combination of DL 
and LOTR, see section 8 above)), unless at the date of decision they fall within the restricted 
leave policy.  
 
Caseworkers must consider whether the circumstances prevailing at the time of the original 
grant of leave continue at the date of the decision. If the circumstances remain the same, the 
individual does not fall within the restricted leave policy and the criminality thresholds do not 
apply, a further period of 3 years’ DL should normally be granted. Caseworkers must consider 
whether there are any circumstances that may warrant departure from the standard period of 
leave. See section 5.4.  
 
If there have been significant changes that mean the applicant no longer qualifies for leave 
under the DL policy or the applicant falls for refusal on the basis of criminality (see criminality 
and exclusion section above), the further leave application should be refused.  
 
Those granted DL for 6 months because of the refusal or withdrawal of asylum or humanitarian 
protection on grounds of criminality and who do not fall within the restricted leave policy, must 
normally wait 10 years before being eligible to apply for settlement. Where an individual has 
accrued 10 years’ lawful residence under the DL policy and applies for settlement, 
caseworkers must consider Part 9 of the Immigration Rules and, in particular, paragraph 
322(1C). 
 
10.2 Validity of further applications  
Caseworkers may continue to see applications for further periods of leave made on the HP or 
DL Form. These should be accepted and considered providing the application was received 
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From 6 April 2015, all applications for further leave under the DL policy must be made on the 
FLR(DL) form and are chargeable unless the applicant falls within the scope of the fee waiver 
policy. For failed asylum seekers (and victims of modern slavery or trafficking) this applies only 
to further leave applications – the initial grant of leave following refusal of asylum is still 
processed free of charge. Those who are applying for further leave on the basis of family or 
private life should use the FLR(FP) form. All applications must meet the conditions in force at 
the time the application is made.  
 
Applications for further DL must be accompanied by the correct fee in line with the 
requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Fees Regulations and Fee waiver guidance 
for FLR(FP) and FLR(O). See Gov.UK for the current forms and guidance. 
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